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Dr. Salahu M.L.

Department of History and International Studies,
Faculty of Education and Arts,
Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University, Lapai, Niger State.
lahistjournals@gmail.com

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- All charts/diagrams which must not exceed 3.5 inches by 5.0 inches should be scanned and fixed into appropriate positions within the text.
- Authors should adopt the MLA referencing style and endnotes should be used instead of footnotes.
- Articles should be submitted in hard copy to:

**The Editor, Lapai Journal of Humanities,
Department of History and International Studies,
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INSURGENCY AND SOCIO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA (A CASE STUDY OF FULANI HERDSMEN)

Eze-Michael, Ezedikachi. N (PhD)

Abstract

This study examined insurgency and socio economic development of Nigeria. Fulani herdsmen insurgency in the North has posed multifaceted threats to Nigeria as a nation. The study adopted mixed method to source for data. Data were gathered through books, documentaries on insurgencies, journals, articles and the use of internet. Interview was conducted and that complemented the major sources of data. Findings revealed that, the Fulani herdsmen insurgency has affected the socio economic development in Nigeria. It led to the collapse of tourism industry, discouragement of home and foreign investors and closure of schools and institutions in the northern parts of the country. The study recommended that the government should address the Fulani herdsmen insurgency. The military should be equipped, and the police force reorganized. This will prevent the collapse of security in Nigeria.

Eze-Michael, Ezedikachi. N (PhD) Department of Political Science and Public Administration Babcock University Ogun State Nigeria

Keywords: Insurgency, Insecurity, Terrorism, Herders, Farmers, Violence, Sustainable Development

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria as a country is a broad-based and a multi-religious state having a population of over 160 million inhabitants that cut across the divides of ethnicity and religious beliefs. Nigeria consists of 36 states, a federal capital territory (FCT) and 774 local government councils, (Oyeniya, 2015). The complexity of Nigeria as a country is based on its political formation, economic, social and religious inclinations. Ever since Nigeria gained her independence, the country has experienced a lot of ethnic and religious crisis of diverse degrees and magnitude (Gilbert, 2016). Grappling with such political and economically motivated crises, successive regimes in Nigeria have been criticized by either the Muslim or Christian faithfuls when they are not favoured, (Eze, 2019). Akhain (2015) sees insurgency as a threat to the economic, political and social security of a nation and a major factor leading to underdevelopment, mainly because insurgency does not encourage investments both from the local and foreign investors. In addition, insurgency reduces the quality of life, destroys human and social capital, damages relationship between citizens and the states, undermining democracy, rule of law and the ability of the country to promote development, (Akhain, 2015). When the residents of a country do not feel secure, their enthusiasm to invest, buy or rent from the product of investment declines, and that is why all over the world today, any country that emits an environment of lack of security naturally discourages investment initiatives from investors, (Mamkaa, 2018). Globally, every country has its peculiar problems and challenges in which Nigeria is not an exception. Today, insecurity is one of the greatest problems bedeviling Nigeria as a country in diverse degrees, as it affects the policies of government and as well hinders development, (Ifijeh, 2016).

At the moment, Nigeria is experiencing persistent killings by Fulani herdsmen, bandits and Boko Haram and this has continued to raise the insecurity level of Nigeria high. Contemporary discussion in relations to Nigeria is almost inexorably replete with issues surrounding insecurity, militancy, insurgency, and terrorism, as a result of the linkages with economic, social, political and governance activities, with spiraling effects on the socio economic

development of Nigeria, (Adewumi, 2018). Ever since Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999, there has been an increase in the number of violent activities across the country with herdsmen-farmers insurgency, ethnic clashes, banditry and the rest. The herdsmen-farmers clash has turned out to be a great threat to internal security as their activities have now gone beyond the Northern part to the Southern parts of Nigeria, (Nwagboso, 2018). With the escalating and persistent violent attacks on security forces, civilians, churches and mosques, farms, schools, as well as communities, it has further compounded a number of challenges already faced in Nigeria especially in the Northern part, (Gadzama, 2018).

Sadly, the federal government of Nigeria has failed on her responsibilities to provide an enabling, secured and safe environment for lives, properties and the conduct of business and economic activities, (Ewetan, 2015). The increasing rate of insecurity in Nigeria has fuelled the rate of crime and terrorists attacks in different parts of the country, leaving unpleasant effects on the social, economic and policies development of the country (Ewetan, 2015). According to Mohammed (2019), Fulani herdsmen has destroyed the economic activities of places they have spread their tentacles to as well as led to movement of people from the affected place due to restlessness, which has created fear and sense of insecurity in the Nigerian communities. In particular, between May 2015 and January 2020 a lot of villages and communities were attacked by Fulani herdsmen and a lot of individuals as well as women and children were either killed or injured (Adesoji, 2017).

The ruthless activities of these herders have unsettled the country to the level that ample time and socio-economic cum political resources that are expected to be channeled to the development of the entire country is being wasted on various efforts geared towards checkmating and possibly, annihilating the insurgency in Nigeria (Amzat, Fagbemi, Lawal, Wantu, & Akingboye, 2016). It can be agreed that, the North-east is the epicenter of the insurgency but its effect reverberates through the entire country and has constituted a major source of underdevelopment to Nigeria. Security is a vital element in the development of states' affairs, (Marc, Mogaka, & Verjee, 2015), and on the local level, policymakers and relevant stakeholders are putting diverse mechanisms in place to address the issues of insurgency and insecurity in order to create an

enabling society for all, (Adegoroyo, Iorhemen, & Nyam, 2018). The insurgence of Fulani herdsmen attacks, have led to the death of thousands of innocent Nigerians, majority of who are farmers, (Ezea, 2019). Consequently, the dangerous trend that insecurity has assumed in the country with killing, slaughtering, maiming and kidnapping of people is frightening, (Oli, Ibekwe&Nwakwo, 2018), and this has escalated the call for splitting of the country.

Attacks by herdsmen have turned out to be the most potent threat to national security in the last couple of years. However, what makes the attacks by herdsmen so disturbing are the frequency, the level of destruction and sheer brutality, which is characterized by high casualty rate and massive displacement of communities, (Gadzama 2018). It is against this backdrop that this study examined the impact of insurgency on the socio-economic development of Nigeria, focusing on Fulani herdsmen insurgency.

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to examine insurgency and socio-economic development of Nigeria. However, the specific objectives are to;

- i. examine the socio-economic effects of Fulani herdsmen insurgency in Nigeria.
- ii. find out the causes of insurgency in Nigeria.
- iii. assess the social implications of Fulani herdsmen insurgency in Nigeria
- iv. investigate the measures put in place by the Federal Government to combat insurgency in Nigeria.

Research Questions

- I. What are the socio-economic effects of Fulani herdsmen insurgency in Nigeria?
- ii. What are the causes of insurgency in Nigeria?
- iii. Are there any social implications of Fulani herdsmen insurgency in Nigeria?

- iv. Are there any measures put in place by the Federal Government to combat insurgency in Nigeria?

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Insurgency

Various scholars and theorists have given diverse clarifications of what insurgency is. While a number of these clarifications are closely related, others are not so related but contain common elements and this however makes the subject technically difficult to define. Liolio (2013) posited that, insurgency is not terrorism or conventional war, though they share a number of similarities like the use of force and guerrilla tactics to accomplish an end which is mostly political. Fundamentally, the disparity between insurgency and terrorism lies in the scope and magnitude of violence. For instance, terrorism rarely brings about political change on its own, while insurgency attempts to bring about change through force of arms, (Liolio, 2013). By tradition, insurgency attempts to remove from power an extant order with one that is commensurate with their political, economic, ideological and religious goals, (Gompert & Gordon, 2016).

In addition, Kilcullen (2014) sees insurgency as the struggle to control a contested political space between a state (and a group of states or occupying powers) and one or more popularly based non-state challengers. Kilcullen (2014) went further to draw a line between classical and modern-day insurgencies thus: while the latter attempt to replace the extant order, the former attempt to strive for the expulsion of foreign invaders from their territory or seek to fill an extant power vacuum. In a nutshell, insurgency implies an internal revolution outside the confines of state's laws and it is often characterized by social-economic and political goals as well as military and guerrilla tactics. In another way, insurgency is a protracted struggle carefully and methodically conducted to accomplish specific goals with the ultimate aim of replacing the extant power structure, (Kilcullen, 2014).

Akhain (2015) sees insurgency as a threat to the economic, political and social security of a nation and a major factor leading to underdevelopment, mainly because insurgency does not encourage investments both from the local and foreign investors. In addition, insurgency reduces the quality of life, destroys

human and social capital, damages relationship between citizens and the states, undermining democracy, rule of law and the ability of the country to promote development, (Akhain, 2015). When the residents of a country do not feel secure, their zeal to invest, buy and rent from the product of investment declines, and that is why all over the world today, any country that emits an environment of lack of security naturally discourages investment initiatives from local and foreign investors, (Mamkaa, 2018). Globally, every country has its peculiar problems and challenges in which Nigeria is not an exception. Today, insecurity is one of the concerned problems bedeviling Nigeria as a country in diverse degrees, as this affects the policies of government and hinders development, (Ifijeh, 2016).

Fulani herdsmen insurgency

Herdsmen refer to a group of individuals involved in the rearing of cattle, goat and sheep. They are socio-economically pastoralist by behavior and occupation. In Nigeria and many parts of Western Africa, they are principally of Fulani ethnic group, hence, the emergence of the maxim “Fulani Herdsmen”, (Mamkaa, 2018). According to David and Taiwo (2015), one third of Fulani populations are pastoralist, thereby making Fulani the largest herding ethnic group in the world. Herding is a cultural and socio economic part of the Fulani group. They are projected to be between 10 and 15 million in Nigeria, Fula, Fulbe, or Hilani (as they are referred to), are culturally bonded by the Fulfulde language and religiously by Islam, (John, 2018). Fulani Herdsmen oral history opines that, they are a group of individuals from Egypt, the Middle and Far East, (Adeyemo, 2018).

In Nigeria, the group of individuals that are actively involved in herding activities are the Kanembu, Kiroya, Manga, Fulbe (Fulani) and Shuwa Arabs, (Bello, 2016). Amongst these mentioned groups, the Fulani is the largest livestock owner in Nigeria, accounting for about 90percent of the country's stock, (Abbas, 2018). This connotes that, Fulani dominates the herding activities in Nigeria, (Mamkaa, 2018). Hence, a lot of individuals refer to herdsmen with the ethnical phrase “Fulani herdsmen”. Just like in their 15th century, Fulani herding activities search for pasture is strategic. While a number of individuals have argued that, herdsmen pastoral activities are simply for the evasion of tax, prevention of harsh climatic conditions (Amzat,

Fagbemi, Lawal, Wantu, & Akingboye, 2016); dangerous cattle diseases and a form of cheap economic production (Gani, 2018), Others have argued it to be connected with their culture (Enor, Magor& Expo 2019). In present times, their socio-economic activities have increasingly ended in violent conflicts with the economic activities of quite a number of farming communities, and the increasing state of its trends has led to destruction and human fatality, which is now an issue of national security in modern Nigeria, (Dasam&lbe, 2018).

The activities of armed Fulani herdsmen who have been terrorizing most especially the farming communities in the Middle-Belt region of Nigeria (Plateau, Benue, Taraba, Adamawa, Nasarawa and Southern Kaduna States) have equally been a critical concern, (Mamkaa, 2018). Since 2013, they crossed over from the Middle-Belt area to the Eastern and Southern parts of Nigeria. A number of scholars refer to the menace as Farmers/Herders conflicts (Gani, 2018). Ever since their emergence, the armed Fulani herders have terrorized, kidnapped, maimed, slaughtered, killed, raped, burnt farming communities, property and possessed lands that belong to the farming communities for their grazing activities, (Oli, Ibekwe&Nwakwo, 2018). Their activities have led into loss of revenue by the states, threatened national unity, diversion of budgetary allocations for the maintenance of internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps, loss of human capital and damage to the country's international image (Enor, Magor& Expo 2019).

Below are some cases of armed Fulani herdsmen attack on Nigerian communities between 2013 and 2020

Cases of Fulani herdsmen attacks in Nigeria

S/N	Date	Location	Nature of Attack and Consequences
1	Feb 2013	Agatu LGA, Benue State	Communities attacked by armed -herdsmen in military uniform, killing about 500 individuals, many injured, houses and food items burnt down.
2	09/11/2013	Guma LGA, Benue State	Several communities in Guma local government were attacked by armed -herdsmen killing 22 persons and property worth millions of Naira were destroyed
3	20/02/2014	Gwer West LGA, Benue State	Attacks on farmers in 6 wards by armed-Fulani herdsmen killing 35 and displacing a lot of people.
4	23/03/2014	Gbajimba, Guma LGA, Benue State	Attack by armed -Fulani herdsmen, killing 25 persons and injuring 50.
5	March 2013 to Jan 2015	Communities in Wukari LGA, Taraba State	Attacks on farming communities by armed -Fulani herdsmen, killing more than 100 persons and over 5000 displaced. Homes and farms were destroyed.
6	24/05/2015	Ukura, Gafe, Per and Tse -Gusa in Logo LGA, Benue State	Attacks on these communities by armed -Fulani herdsmen, killing 100 persons and displacing a lot of people
7	10/04/2016	Dori&Mesuma Villages in Garbabi Ward Gashaka LGA, Taraba State	Attacks on the communities by armed -Fulani herdsmen, killing 40 persons, injuring many and burning of houses
8	25/04/2016	Nimbo, Enugu State	Attack on the community by armed -Fulani herdsmen, killing 40 persons, destruction of homes and farms.
9	04/12/2017	Numan and Demsa LGAs, Adamawa State	Attacks on farming communities in the two LGAs, killing over 80 persons, a lot injured, burning of houses and food items. Many individuals were displaced
10	31/12/2017 to 02/01/2018	Benue Communities, GaambeTiev, Ayilamo, and Turan in Logo LGA; Umenger, Tse-Akor&Tomatar in Guma LGA	Attacks on these communities by armed -Fulani herdsmen, killing over 50 persons, several others injured and displaced. Property (houses) and farm land destroyed.
11	06- 15/01/2018	7 Communities in Lau LGA, Taraba State	Attacks on farming communities in Lau LGA of Taraba State by armed -Fulani herdsmen, killing over 80 persons, destruction of homes and farms; displacement of high number of persons.
12	04/04/2018	Takum LGA, Taraba State	Attacks on Mbiya and Bassan communities in Takum LGA by armed-Fulani herdsmen, killing 5 persons, displacement of many and destruction of farms and properties
13	05/05/2018	Gwaska, Kaduna State	Attack on the community by armed -Fulani herdsmen, killing over 55 persons, destruction of houses and farms
14	23- 24/06/2018	Communities in BarkinLadi, Riyom, Bokkos, and Mangu LGAs, Plateau State	Multiple attacks on farming communities by armed Fulani herdsmen leading to 233 deaths, several injured and property destroyed. High number of IDPs
15	June and July 2018	Communities in Numan and Demsa LGAs, Adamawa State	Attacks on farming communities in the two LGAs by armed-Fulani herdsmen, killing over 100 persons, many injured, burning of houses and food items. Many displaced
16	10- 11/02/2019	Kajuru, Kaduna State	Attacks on farming communities by armed -Fulani herdsmen, over 151 killed, several persons injured, property & farms destroyed and many displaced

15	June and July 2018	Communities in Numan and Demsa LGAs, Adamawa State	Attacks on farming communities in the two LGAs by armed-Fulani herdsmen, killing over 100 persons, many injured, burning of houses and food items. Many displaced
16	10- 11/02/2019	Kajuru, Kaduna State	Attacks on farming communities by armed -Fulani herdsmen, over 151 killed, several persons injured, property & farms destroyed and many displaced
17	05- 07/05/2019	Kona Communities in Ardo-Kola LGA, Taraba State	Attacks on Jukun -Kona communities by armed -Fulani herdsmen, killing of 20 persons, burning down of houses & farm produce; displacement of persons
18	09/01/2020	Kulben Village, Kombun District of Mangu LGA of Plateau State	Attack on the community by armed -Fulani herdsmen, killing more than 12 persons
19	26/01/2020	Kwatas, Bokokos LGA	Attacks by armed -Fulani herdsmen, over 26 persons killed and a lot of persons were displaced
20	13/02/2020	Avwon, Agadama, Ohoror, and other communities in Ughelli LGA, Delta State	Attacks by armed -Fulani herdsmen, killing 10 persons; property and farms destroyed
21	12/05/2020	Gom in Numan LGA	Attack on the community by armed -Fulani herdsmen at 2am, killing more than 10 persons and burning of houses

Source: Electronic, Print Media & Published Materials

The effect of insurgency on economic development in Nigeria

Nigeria is a country that is blessed with abundant natural and material resources, all competing favorably with one another in securing a big chunk of foreign exchange earnings for the country in the early 60s, though, the discovery of oil and the unprecedented wealth accrued from it in the 70s later emerged as a major foreign exchange earner for Nigeria, (Akhain, 2015). Despite the natural and mineral resources with which the country is endowed coupled with a lot of governmental policies and programs to promote peaceful co-existence among the various multi ethno-religious entities which make up Nigeria, the country has practically turned out to be a battle field where persistent ethno-religious and political crises are staged, (Afolabi, 2018). The implication of the crisis on economic development is that, the instrument which ought to be used for the sustainable development of the country is conversely being used for destruction and vandalization purposes, (Mohammed, 2012). In essence, it has gulped the federal government of Nigeria millions of naira to put in place several amenities which were destroyed during crises, (Akhain, 2015). Resources which could have been used to enhance and improve these amenities and embark on other developmental project would have to be used on

restructuring and replacing what had been damaged during the crisis.

In some situations, the government had to compensate the victims of these crises and this has gulped millions of naira which could have been used to develop the economy. Again, virile men of the nation are seriously affected in the crises which consequently led to their death, (Johnson, 2011). The country's source of revenue is equally affected by crises. For instance, the Niger Delta had shaken the country's economy to her root. Since no economic development could happen in an atmosphere of fear, anarchy and insecurity. It therefore implies that, Fulani herdsmen, bandits and Boko Haram activities are bane to economic development, (Imam, 2014). Aside the fact that the image and reputation of Nigeria has been dented across the world as a country which breeds social miscreant and criminals, these crises have as well made investors to flee the nation's troubled spots particularly, the Northern parts of Nigeria, (Shehu, 2014).

According to Obinna (2016), the grave effect of all these is the amount of funds that are diverted to security issues and other related matters. The primary objective of this is to enable the country meet the challenges of the existing threat in the country. Though, these funds could have been used in providing basic infrastructures and amenities in the country, such as good roads, electricity and other vital amenities. The irony is that while the country is pushing towards capacity building, the menace of insurgency is crumbling its effort, (Leadership Newspaper, 2019).

The effect of insurgency on social development in Nigeria

In the time of the colonial era, Nigerians lived in peace with one and another; this is because the colonial masters merged under the hegemonies suzerainty of colonial masters. The social background of Nigerians then can be surely said to be peaceful until the exit of the colonial masters when things started falling apart. The people of Nigeria faced one another with serious enormity, hatred and they did not want to see one another again, (Aborisade, 2015). The social background of Nigeria shifted from peaceful to chaos which eventually gave

birth to a cankerworm that has eaten deep into the very fabric of Nigeria social system. The implication here is that, to achieve social development in Nigeria became impossible because the people living in the northern parts are no longer in unity.

Imam (2014) revealed that, education is vital in attaining social development. Nigeria has been doing everything possible to put in place amenities for the purpose of elevating the education standard of the country. This, however, is affected by constant closure of schools and institutions in the northern parts of the country. Schools had been burnt down while many were forced to shut down for months (Imam, 2014). The education of youths was equally disrupted under tumultuous situation created by the various groups such as Boko Haram sect, bandits, and Fulani herdsmen as individuals were forced to emigrate from the crisis areas, (Akhain, 2015). From past incidences, it is no longer a surprise to witness an on-going activity been disrupted because of security reasons. In the last campaign towards the last general election, there were several scares of bomb threat across various part of the country, though, this are not directly traced to Fulani herdsmen, but people may pretend under the guise of the herders to carry out evil in the country. The fear of Fulani herdsmen attacks has turned out to be the beginning of safety. The ensuing factor is that insurgency has directly and indirectly contributed towards the disruption of social activities in the country.

The effect of insurgency on Nigeria's security

Herdsmen attacks have led into massive loss of lives, displacement of individuals and the disruption of the occupational pursuit of a lot of persons (Obi, Uzochukwu, & Chukwuemeka, 2018), all of which have impoverished victims of their attack, aggravate the living conditions of individuals (Akpor-Robaro, & Laure-Babalola, 2018), affected environs and importantly, led in a drastic drop in agricultural (crop and livestock) produce, (Dasam&lbe, 2018). In the past three years, over 6,000 individuals have died due to the Fulani herdsmen attacks; this makes up a huge loss in human capital, and when corroborated with reports of about 175,000 displaced persons in Benue state

alone, the economic security of the country is further threatened (Agbakwuru, 2018). There are about 20 government funded internally displaced persons camps in Nassarawa State, 8 in Benue state among several others established in various states across the country, (Ukumba, 2018.) In April 2018, there were about 10,000 earlier reintegrated persons who returned to various camps across Nassarawa State, (Abogonye, 2018), the implication was invariably a decline in food production and rising cost of goods influenced by their displacement and loss of occupational and economic productivity (Duru, Yusuf, Nanlong, & Odama, 2018). These adverse effects of Fulani herdsmen attacks, if not curtailed now could eventually degenerate into harsh socio-economic crises.

Presently, retaliation attacks are now being adopted by a small number of farming communities seeking justice they perceive cannot be given by the country's security apparatus, (Ebegbulem, 2018). Recently, anti-Fulani sentiments have spread across the country that herdsmen are mainly Fulani. The Bachama retaliation attack on a Hausa community believed to be Fulani has the potential to spiral ethno-religious crises within the country if a counter attack became an option of the affected community, (Obi, et al., 2018). On 6th May 2018, in Cross River State, two trucks transporting Fulani nomad were caught and returned by communities after an alarm was raised by the "Hausa Settlers" in Ogoja. According to them, the new Fulanis will make life very difficult and intimidating for them to continue living in Ogoja peacefully; mainly because it is likely they were driven away from wherever they came from because they were associated with killer herdsmen, (Ajilore&Olomojobi, 2017). These returnees were mainly women, children and the elderly. They could themselves be fleeing from the reprisal of herdsmen attacks. Insecurity is tantamount with fear and due to Fulani herdsmen attacks; there is the fear of any individual who controls a herds of cattle can be dangerous, (Ajilore&Olomojobi, 2017). Most dangerous of it all is the proliferation of small and light weapons which are mostly used for these attacks and concomitant reprisals. The fact as well remains that, the Boko Haram factions could camouflage as herders and cause major havocs on farming communities is another source of worry, (Odunsi, 2018). Obviously, the country might not

withstand, for long, the disturbances from herders, Boko Haram, militants and secessionist movements all at once. It is apparent that, the state security is overstretched; hence, there is the need for the Nigerian state to make genuine peace with itself through justice, fairness and equity in its treatment of its citizens across the diverse ethnic groups.

Frustration aggression theory

The frustration-aggression theory is a theoretical framework developed by John Dollard with his associates in 1939 but was later expanded, improved and modified by Yate 1962 and Berkowitz (1963), designed mainly from the psychological basis of motivation and behavior. The theory provides explanation for violent behavioral disposition which was caused by the inability of persons to fulfill their human desire. It is on the basis of the general premise that all individuals have basic needs which they seek to accomplish and any distraction that can prevent them from getting these basic needs will likely create violence, (Berkowitz, 1963). The theory stresses the differences between what individuals feel they want and the difference between what is sought and what they get, (Berkowitz, 1963). As a result, the theory seeks to explain that violent response by individuals resulted from the prevention from achieving his basic needs. The theory stressed that, in the face of frustrated expectations, a person is normally embarking upon violent destructive behavior or be a ready army to be used to cause crisis once their basic needs are not fulfilled, (Joda&Abdulrasheed, 2015).

This study, therefore, is underpinned by the frustration aggression theory in the case of Fulani herdsmen insurgency. This is because, the study examined the state of insurgency in the Northern Nigeria caused by the Fulani herdsmen killings which turned out to be a major issue. Insurgency has led to the collapse of education, economic and farming activities, as well as norms and values of the people especially in the Northern Nigeria. The possession of arms, ammunition and small light weapons by the herders has led to the destruction of lives and properties and a lot of people displaced. Fulani herdsmen attack which is now a major problem in Nigeria has created critical consequences that

have destroyed the education and farming system in the North. However, the relevance of frustration aggression theory has been justified in the study on the emergence of non-state armed groups such as the possession of arms and ammunition by the Fulani herdsmen insurgent group.

METHODOLOGY

The mixed method will be used as it aligned with the research questions, purpose and the nature of the study. The study explores, identify, examine, and understand the effects of insurgency on the socio-economic development of Nigeria. The population for this study is the entire victims who have experienced or been exposed to Fulani Herdsmen insurgency in Nigeria. Selected sample participants had the experience, emotions, and mental capacity to provide credible information relating to their personal experience, perspective and opinion on Fulani herdsmen insurgency. The informed consent protocol will be utilized to establish mutual respect and transparency with the participants in the study. The selected participants were those who had experienced and suffered grievously from exposures to Fulani herdsmen vicious terror attacks. This sample group will be made up of individuals between the ages of 15 and 30 years old. The sample size collection will be made up of 10 purposefully selected participants with divergence of experience and knowledge of the activities of the terror group and the consequences from the place.

Interview will be conducted to elicit data from participants. The interview question patterns to be used in this study will be a combination of different types that are vital to the study. To avoid any ambiguity, the study will use singular, clear and open-ended questions, and a concerted effort will be made in the choice of words used in structuring the questions to avoid any leading questions that will prompt a preconceived response. Therefore, this study relied on interview to complement major sources of data. Data generated will be analyzed using content analysis I method for an in-depth analysis of the study.

ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW RESULTS / DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This section discusses the findings from the interview on insurgency and social economic development of Nigeria. At this point, the researcher started the interview by greeting the respondents and then introduced himself to the respondents while the respondents as well introduced themselves. On the other hand, before the interview with the victims of Fulani herdsmen insurgency, it was agreed upon that the names of the victims (interviewee) would be anonymous. Thereafter, the researcher went straight into the interview proper based on each objective of the study.

4.1. Result Analysis of Respondents

Respondents	age	status	gender	IDP Camp
Respondent 1	28	victim	male	ibeju-lekki
Respondent 2	25	victim	male	Ibeju-lekki
Respondent 3	26	victim	male	Ibeju-lekki
Respondent 4	22	victim	male	Ibeju-lekki
Respondent 5	30	victim	male	Ibeju-lekki
Respondent 6	35	facilitator	female	Ibeju-lekki
Respondent 7	20	victim	female	Ibeju-lekki
Respondent 8	19	victim	female	Ibeju-lekki
Respondent 9	30	victim	female	Ibeju-lekki
Respondent 10	25	victim	female	Ibeju-lekki

Discussion of findings

4.2. Research Question one: What are the Socio-economic effects of Fulani herdsmen insurgency in Nigeria?

It was observed that the security challenge posed by Fulani herdsmen recently

has reached a point where indigenes and non-indigenes are leaving the northern region to avert their being killed by the insurgents and business owners closed down their shops. In addition, the economic activities of states such as Borno, Yobe and other northern states where Fulani herdsmen spread their tentacles have been crippled economically.

It was further claimed by another respondent that, the Fulani herdsmen has led to the discouragement of home and foreign investment. The brutal ambush on individuals and institutions provides a highly unfavorable business environment for home and foreign investors. Again, foreign investors play a role in contributing to an increase in the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In addition, they create livelihood opportunities through the creation of job opportunities and the provision of large scale products and services in the host communities. The unfavorable business environment created by the violent activities of Fulani herdsmen no longer avail Nigeria this opportunity.

The Fulani herdsmen attacks have led to the collapse of tourism industry which is a viable sector with abundant economic and socio-cultural benefits. For a nation to enjoy these benefits, it must be free from security threats, because security constitutes a sensitive aspect of tourism. As a result, these benefits are lost as a consequence of security challenges posed by the sporadic killing and ambush of innocent Nigerians who ply major routes in Nigeria from one destination to another. This has restricted the activities of the tourism business further.

Another respondent claimed that, Fulani herdsmen activities have led to the reduction of government derivation from the affected northern states as a result of restiveness in those areas as well as reducing investment and growth of business. The insecurity challenge continues to make it impossible for the government to execute vital projects for the people. In addition, the issue of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has turned out to be a social problem and dangerous to economic development of the country. The population of IDPs in the north is alarming. In addition, it was found that, the effect of insurgency has affected education negatively in north eastern Nigeria; school children

witnessed some of the attacks and such horrors experienced may have discouraged them from going back to school. The Fulani herdsmen attacks have created critical consequences that have destroyed the education in the Northern parts of Nigeria.

4.2. Research Question two: What are the causes of insurgency in Nigeria?

It was observed from one of the respondents that, some of the major causes of insurgency in Nigeria are poverty, corruption, problem of ethnicity, unemployment, lack of proper education, religious extremist, inequality in the distribution system, and illiteracy. Emphasizing the above points, one of the respondents claimed, poverty has been the major cause of insurgency because individuals who are deprived economically and socially are more likely to buy violence as a way to express their grievances. This is in agreement with the assertion of Zulum (2020), who stated that youths who are faced with extreme poverty turn out aggravated and disgusted by the level of corruption that persists at all facets in the country. Thus, in their fury and disillusionment, they resorted to violence as a way of showing their grievances and are readily recruited and manipulated.

Another respondent claimed that, the issue of religious extremist is another cause because from all indications the Fulani herdsmen are believed to have targeted mostly the communities that Christians and farmers reside. And this has led to the Christians to cry out that there is conspiracy against them. This is in agreement with the findings of Gilbert (2018) who affirmed that, more than 6,000 Christians were killed and maimed by Islamist terrorists Fulani herdsmen whose anti-Christian brutality goes largely unanswered by Nigerian government. And this situation has threatened the unity and integration of Nigeria as a whole.

Another respondent claimed that, unemployment of the youth is a very big problem to the development of a country. Unemployed youths are perceived vulnerable to recruiters of the herders, because they can easily be engaged and recruited to carry out their barbaric acts. This is in agreement with the findings

of Adelaja, Labo and Penar (2018) who asserted that, the vicious cycle of unemployment makes it very easy for unemployed individuals to turn out to be victims for Fulani herdsmen recruitment.

On the part of education, it was observed that, individuals who lack access to proper education might not understand the negative effects and dangers of engaging in violent acts. As such, it is important that, youths are given adequate and proper education in order to enlighten them on the dangers of the barbaric acts of the herders and to know what is best to do to prevent them if they are caught in a tight corner. Education is the bedrock for the success of a country and therefore it is important that education is made free so that the less privilege can have free access to education and get themselves equipped with the adequate knowledge needed for the future.

Weak Security System is another major contributory factor to the level of insurgency in Nigeria, and this can be attributed to a number of factors that include lack of funding of the police and other security agencies, lack of contemporary equipment in weaponry and training, inadequate welfare of security personnel, and lack of personnel. According to Olonisakin (2008) the police-population ratio in Nigeria is 1:450 which falls below the standard set by the United Nations. The implication of this is that Nigeria is grossly under policed and this partly explains the inability of the Nigerian Police Force to effectively combat crimes and criminality in the country.

4.3. Research Question three: What is the Social implications of Fulani herdsmen insurgency in Nigeria?

It was observed from the interview that, from the period Nigeria got her independence, the Nigerians have faced one another with serious enormity and sometimes hatred. The social background of Nigeria turned from peaceful to chaos which finally gave birth to a cankerworm that ate deep into the very fabric of Nigerians social system. The implication is that, attaining social development in Nigeria has become so hard as there is no longer trust among the various parts of the country, and this has undermined national unity within

the country.

One of the respondents claimed that, the incessant attack of Fulani herdsmen has led to the closure of schools and institutions in the northern parts of the country. A lot of schools were burnt down while many were forced to close down for months which in effect made the interaction of innocent citizens impossible and created a very bad opportunity for parents of different ethnic groups to withdraw their children from school. It was further observed that, the education of innocent citizens and Nigerian youths were equally disrupted under tumultuous situation created by the Fulani herdsmen, as many were forced to emigrate from the crisis areas.

Another respondent claimed that, every social gathering that attracts people most particularly, the elite in the society is prone to several attacks. Another respondent stated that, from past occurrences, it is no longer a new thing to witness an on-going event been disrupted due to security reasons. In addition, it was found that, the effect of insurgency has affected the education negatively in northern part of Nigeria as students no longer feel the necessity to go back to school after they have severally witnessed some of these attacks and destructions in their schools. The Fulani herdsmen attack is now a major issue in Nigeria and has created critical consequences that have destroyed the education in the North. This may eventually spread as a contagious disease to other parts of the country, if no conscious efforts are made to properly address this problem.

4.4. Research Question four: What are the measures that have been put in place by the Federal Government to combat insurgency in Nigeria?

It was observed that the federal government of Nigeria established the Joint Task Force (JTF) and deployed 8000 soldiers to the region, which was the largest military deployment since the Nigerian civil war. The troops have succeeded in reclaiming most of the areas under terrorists' control. In addition, this was supported by the Nigerian Air Force and the army who have on different occasions launched several attacks against the insurgents, rescuing

captives, arresting insurgents and destroying their weapons. Despite the government efforts, little achievement can be pointed to on the effectiveness of the JTF in combating insurgency in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

Fulani herdsmen insurgency has heightened fears among Nigerians, especially those living in the northern part of the country. The activities of the group have led to the death of some Nigerian citizens and properties worth millions of naira destroyed. Business ventures, shops and schools have been affected due to Fulani herdsmen attacks. All of these have had a negative effect on the socio-economic development of Nigeria. In light of the findings and conclusion, the following recommendations are considered:

1. Victims of insurgency should be given adequate medical facilities and counseling towards recovering from the menace of insurgency
2. Government should match words with action in dealing with the security challenges in Nigeria. This should include equipping the military, re-organizing the police force, settlement of political, economic and religious disputes without favoritism.
3. The Nigerian government should partner with the international community in addressing the Fulani herdsmen insurgency and other criminal activities in the country.
4. There should be adoption of an effective measure to ensure motherland security. This arrangement must evolve from the grass root believing that if every village and town is secured, the nation will in turn be secure
5. Non-government organizations should collaborate with the government to provide the apparatuses, treatment, care, research, training, and capacity building for camp officials and care givers in order to aid effective delivery of quality mental health services to those who need it most, especially children who are exposed to the horrors of

terrorism and insurgency.

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS IN NIGERIA.

Timothy Sunday Joshua

Abstract

Since the colonial era, whenever internal crises occurred in Nigeria, which threatened peace and security, successive national governments have habitually deployed the army and more recently, the Joint Task Force, comprising the Nigerian Military, Navy, Police Force, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps and the Department of State Services to restore order to the troubled zone. However, in recent times, the involvement of the armed forces in internal security operations, especially their relationship with the civilian population has come under intense scrutiny, even before the release of the 2015 Amnesty International Report on the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Nigerian military. This work attempted a study of civil-military relations in Nigeria's insurgency-infested regions of South-south and North-east, in order to understand what impact this has had on counterinsurgency campaigns, especially the intelligence gathering component. Data were gathered from secondary sources and analysed qualitatively. The study found that civil-military relations in these regions have not been commendable and has had negative effects on the quality of intelligence gathering and counterinsurgency campaigns. It recommended that improvement of civil-military relations would positively impact counterinsurgency operations.

Timothy Sunday Joshua Department of Political Science, Wesley University
Ondo

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations-CMR, Insurgency, National Security, Counter-insurgency-COIN, Intelligence Gathering

STUDY BACKGROUND

The reality of the contemporary national and international politics is such that in most nation-states, whether democracy or autocracy, the usefulness of the armed forces in maintaining peace and security within or across national borders cannot be overemphasised (Maikomo,2018). This is true, because conflict situations do arise that threaten internal and or interstate peace and security and, which require armed presence to forestall or manage them, in order to have an orderly society. This has brought the civilians in close contact with men of the armed forces as armed presence is felt in conflict zones, and this goes a long way in defining their interrelationships. Civil-military relations describe the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organisation(s) established to protect it (Feaver,1999). It incorporates a diverse, often normative field, which moves within and across management, social and policy scales (Shields,2015).

National security is the requirement to maintain the survival of the state through the use of economic power, diplomacy, power projection and political power (Harold, 1983). It is the security and defence of a nation state, including its citizens, economy and institutions, which is regarded as duty of government. It is the policy enacted by a national government to ensure the survival and safety of the nation-state, including, but not limited to the exercise of diplomatic, economic and military power in both peace and war (Donald,1976). Earlier conceived as protection against armed attacks, it is now understood to include also non-military dimensions, including the security from terrorism, minimization of crimes, economic security, energy security, cyber-security, food security etc. Governments often rely on a range of measures, which includes political, economic and military power to safeguard the security of a nation-state (Paleri,2008).

One of the most dangerous issue posing threats to peace and security in international political system is the proliferation of insurgency and insurgents (Amalu,2015). It has increased rapidly in the post-cold war era and its effects have been felt more in the developing countries. Insurgency is seen as a rebellion against authority (for example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents (lawful combatants) (Robert and Timothy,2009). Insurgents often

have one or more socio-politico-economic grievances against the government, and must have brought these to the knowledge of the political administration, which would have (equally) been ignored or badly managed by the latter, prompting a reaction and counter-reactions from both sides, and which, if not properly addressed, would degenerate into violent conflict between them (Douma,2003). Insurgents employ terror tactics to create fear in the civilians and bring government to concede to their demands and, because they are no match for national armed forces, they direct their attacks (often surprise) against the civilians (Hughes,2011).

Faced with the reality of firm entrenchment of insurgency, governments often have peculiar ways of reacting to insurgents' activities, and this is known as counter-insurgency measures, which involves political bargaining, occupation of conflict zones by the military, negotiation and mediation (Metanock,2015). The clandestine nature of the group makes engagement with them a very complicated and daunting task, in that their exact locations are not known, because they often reside among the civilians (Dwight,2013). Moreso, where their base is known, their existence among the civilians makes it more difficult for government forces to fight them conventionally. In this case, intelligence gathering about them appears the most useful tactics to stem insurgency tide. By this strategy, useful information geared towards revealing the true identity of the insurgents, their hideouts, logistics, operation bases, planned attacks and leadership can be obtained (Bachrach,2017). This helps government forces to be more proactive in foiling surprise attacks and thwarting insurgents' efforts. Surprise attacks are averted before they are carried out and cell leaders are arrested in time, using properly coordinated intelligence gathering network.

In order for intelligence gathering to be successful, civil-military relations (hereinafter referred to as CMR) is key; in that members of the armed forces deployed in conflict area to fight insurgents are expected to make frantic efforts in ensuring that considerably friendly relations is maintained and sustained with the local communities, by refraining from such callous acts that may irk the civilians they are meant to protect (Wilkerson,2018). This is required, because it is by it that the local population will be willing and ready to share intelligence information about the insurgents with government forces. Even when CMR deteriorates, the people will still share information, but the quality of whatever they are willing to share may be adversely affected by the reason of such collapse in relations, and consequently impact counterinsurgency operations negatively (William,2010).

Generally, the paper study civil-military relations, national security, insurgency, counterinsurgency models, intelligence gathering and the role of Civilian Joint Task Force. The specific objective of this paper is to study the impact of civil-military relations in insurgency-infested regions (South-South and North-East) of Nigeria, on counterinsurgency campaigns. It adopt and attempt the application of McCormick's counter insurgency model to the Nigerian situation, with special reference to the role of civil-military relations and its impact on intelligence gathering component of counterinsurgency operations.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Civil Military Relations-CMR

Civil Military Relations details the relationship that exists between civilians and the military and between the Military and the government of the day. It has been described as a game of strategic interaction in which each side attempts to achieve outcomes that maximally promote that side's interests (Baker 2007: 123). Civil-military relations encompass the broad range of relationships and experiences involving various state security actors and non-state actors within a society. It has been described by the National Defence Policy-NDP (2006) as the hierarchy of authority between the Executive, National Assembly and the Armed Forces as well as the principle of civil supremacy over the armed forces. Civil military relations, according to NDP is premised on the principle of civilian control of the military in a democracy (2006:56). However, the challenge in this definition is the narrow conceptualization of CMR, limiting it only to higher realms of engagement with leaders of the people yet recognising the dominance of civil control over the military.

This view which partly aligns with Huntington's (1957) civil military theory and concept of 'Objective Civilian Control' is problematic in that modern-day civil military relations discourse and engagement transcends military's relations with top echelon of society, but must actively include the average citizen on the street, who comes in close contact with the soldier. This concept of CMR actively recognise sex changes between civilian leaders with top military brass (who possess a lot of finesse), but also the ordinary citizens. A healthy CMR is essential to the stability of democratic regimes and a toxic relationship between civilians and the soldiers will effectively produce either a weak military or one that becomes a threat to the public they are supposed to

protect (Tapia,2016:2). Civil-military relations describe the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organisation(s) established to protect it. It combines a diverse, often normative field, which moves within and across management, social and policy scales.

The Concordance theory by Rebecca Schiff offers a clue to the operational definition of CMR herein considered, in that it does not require such a state of separation between the civilian and the military worlds as argued by Huntington (Ibid), but argued that three societal institutions- the military, political elites and the citizenry must aim for cooperative arrangement. She stressed a proper factoring of the civilian population into the civil-military relations concept as it is only then that an orderly society short of unfriendly CMR can be maintained. She stressed a proper factoring of the civilian population into the civil-military relations concept as it is only then that an orderly society short of unfriendly CMR can be maintained. This work conceptualizes CMR as the relationship that exists between the civilians, who are under attack from insurgents and the military (members of the armed forces), who have been drafted to restore order, peace and security, especially in an insurgency-infested area, and whose activities cut across civil-military enclaves. It is the way the military conducts its activities geared towards restoring decent peace and the way the civilian population react to them.

Civil-Military Relations in Pre-colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial Periods

In pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods, CMR was never cordial, because, in most cases, the military was viewed by the people as the king's dogs or colonial weapon, who were bent, only on protecting the royal family and enormously deployed by the colonial master to suppress the colonial peoples respectively. The relationship was that of suspicion, mistrust and fear, in that the military was often viewed as no-nonsense group of people, which the military compounded by being inaccessible and cruel in their implementation of royal or colonial orders and laws, as demonstrated in the 1929 Aba Women Riots, where the members of the armed forces deployed to maintain peace in the area were very brutal in their response to and suppression of women peaceful protest.

The role perception of the Nigerian security agents is inevitably shaped by its historical evolution as a colonial bequest. As a colonial force, the role of the security forces was largely to suppress, aggress, repress and oppress those

opposed to the imposed authority of the colonialists. Consequently, it is widely accepted that even after over seven decades of independence, the Nigerian security personnel still operates like an occupational force. This has culminated in a state of permanent hostility between the security agents and the citizens. Correspondingly, the Nigerian state is used by the dominant ruling class to suppress the agitation, grievances and revolt from below-the lower classes. Although the official attempt to enforce the law necessarily carries with it certain coercive and punitive procedures which are, in the main, at variance with the guarantees stipulated in favour of the citizens by the constitution, the armed forces' penchant for brute and unbridled force is quite alarming.

The establishment and deployment of the Force with the mandate of restoring law and order in the North-Eastern parts of Nigeria has heightened the incidents of rights violation in the region. The counter-insurgency operations of the JTF in the Boko Haram hotbed has not only intensified the militant activities of the sect, but also alarmingly affects civil-military relations. Although this ignoble disposition of members of the force is rather ironical and contradictory to the internationally recognised and time-honoured responsibility of the security agencies in the protection and preservation of the rights of the citizenry, the practice corresponds with the overall nature and character of the Nigerian state. The prevailing warped understanding of national security in the country which is usually elevated above the security of the nationals has become the greatest threat to the fundamental rights of the citizenry. It is therefore, within the context of the specific character and nature of the post-colonial state of Nigeria that one can best understand and analyze the ugly incidents of human rights abuses by members of the armed forces in insurgency-infested regions of country.

National Security

National security or national defense is the security and defense of a nation-state, including its citizens, economy and institutions, which is regarded as a duty of government. Originally conceived as protection against military attack, national security is now widely understood to include also non-military dimensions, such as the security from terrorism, minimization of crimes, economic security, , environmental security, food security, cyber-security etc. Similarly, national security risks include, in addition to the actions of other nation-states, action by violent non-state actors such as insurgents, militants,

by narcotic cartels, and by multinational corporations, coupled with the effects of natural disasters.

Governments rely on a range of measures, including political, , and military power, as well as diplomacy, to safeguard the security of a nation-state. They may also act to build the conditions of security regionally and internationally by reducing transnational causes of insecurity, such as climate change, economic inequality, political exclusion, and nuclear proliferation.

The concept of national security remains ambiguous, having evolved from simpler definitions which emphasised freedom from military threat and from political coercion. Among the many definitions proposed to date are the following, which show how the concept has evolved to encompass non-military concerns:

- A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war. (Walter Lippmann, 1943).
- It distinctively means freedom from foreign dictation. (Harold Lasswell, 1950)
- It objectively means the absence of threats to acquired values and subjectively, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. (Arnold Wolfers, 1960)
- It, then is the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders. (Harold Brown, U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1977-1981)
- It is best described as a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and wellbeing. (Charles Maier, 1990).
- National security is an appropriate and aggressive blend of political resilience and maturity, human resources, economic structure and capacity, technological competence, industrial base and availability of natural resources and finally the military might.

- It is the measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multi-dimensional threats to the apparent well-being of its people and its survival as a nation-state at any given time, by balancing all instruments of state policy through governance and is extendable to global security by variables external to it. (Prabhakaran Paleri, 2008)
- National and international security may be understood as a shared freedom from fear and want, and the freedom to live in dignity. It implies social and ecological health rather than the absence of risk and is a common right. (Ammerdown Group, 2016)

Dimensions of National Security

Potential causes of national insecurity include actions by other states (e.g. military or cyber attack), violent non-state actors (e.g. Insurgent attack), organised criminal groups such as narcotic cartels, and also the effects of natural disasters (e.g. flooding, earthquakes). Systemic drivers of insecurity, which may be transnational, includes climate change, economic inequality and marginalisation, political exclusion, and militarisation. In view of the wide range of risks, the security of a nation state has several dimensions, including economic security, energy security, physical security, environmental security, food security, border security, and cyber security. These dimensions correlate closely with elements of national power.

Although states differ in their approach, with some beginning to prioritise non-military action to tackle systemic drivers of insecurity, various forms of coercive power predominate, particularly military capabilities. The scope of these capabilities has developed. Traditionally, military capabilities were mainly land or sea-based, and in smaller countries they still are. Elsewhere, the domains of potential warfare now include the airspace, cyberspace, and psychological operations. Military capabilities designed for these domains may be used for national security, or equally for offensive purposes, for example to conquer and annex territory and resources.

Nigeria's National Security Policy and Strategy

- Ø The Grand Strategy: This is the major security policy document developed in 2000 by President Obasanjo. It defines National Security as “the aggregation of the security interest of all individuals, communities, ethnic groups, political entities and institutions in the territory of Nigeria”. These components are aggregated into elements

of state power, including economic and social development, defense, foreign policy, law and order and information management. Developed and published by the Office of the National Security Adviser in 2014, the Nigeria National Security Strategy guides the formulation of policies and conduct of operations. Nigeria's over-arching strategic vision is to create a peaceful, self-reliant, prosperous, strong nation". The underlying objective is to "apply all elements of national power to ensure physical security, build individual and collective prosperity, cause national development and promote Nigeria's influence in regional, continental and global affairs". The National Security Strategy 2014 addresses two critical threat areas:

a. National Security Interests: The core national interests as defined in Nigeria's National Security Strategy are the security and welfare of its people; sovereignty and defense of its territorial integrity; peace; democracy; economic growth; and social justice. Sub-regional security and economic cooperation are classified as strategic interests. Promotion of peace, security, development, democracy and international cooperation in Africa and the world are peripheral to Nigeria's national interests.

b. Threats to National Security: The most potent threats to Nigerian national security include global challenges; terrorism; transnational organized crimes; crude oil theft or illegal bunkering; Nigeria's borders; climate change; communal and ethno-religious conflicts; pastoralists and farmers conflicts; politics and federalism in Nigeria; governance; poverty; kidnaping, proliferations of small arms and light weapons; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; illegal migration; economic challenges; financial crimes; information technology and cyber security; natural, man-made and medical related threats; environmental security. The threats enumerated above are by no means the only threats to Nigeria national security. They are nevertheless the most potent and are adjudged potential sources of disaffection, discontent and instability that could adversely affect the country's quest for national stability, unity and development.

Ø Sectorial Strategies: Nigeria's National Strategy relies on sectorial strategies. Sectorial documents are derived from the Grand Strategy and the National Security Strategy. They are developed as responses to the identified threats to Nigeria's national interests. Some of these strategies are fully realized, including the National Defense Policy, the National Counter Terrorism Strategy, and the National Policy on Public Safety and Security.

a. National Defense Policy: The National Defense Policy of Nigeria emanates from the National Security Strategy, which focuses on the preservation of the safety of Nigerian at home and abroad and the protection of the sovereignty of the country and the integrity of the assets. A constitutional provision is made for the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to defend the country from external aggression, to maintain the territorial integrity and secure the borders from violation on land, sea and air as well as to suppress insurrection and act in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president.

b. The National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST): The current strategy is a review of the initial 2013 document, which seeks to confront terrorism and counter violent extremism in Nigeria. The overall objective of the strategy is to ensure public safety revolving around five main work streams: Forestall, Secure, Identify, Prepare and Implement (FSIPI). Roles and responsibilities of ministries, departments, and agencies are clearly defined in the document.

c. National Policy on Public Safety and Security: The National Policy on Public Safety and Security is an inter-ministerial and inter-disciplinary initiative under the leadership of the Federal Ministry of Interior. The principal goal is reduction and eventual elimination of threats to safety and security. It also addresses the socio-economic and mental well-being of Nigerian citizens, including property rights and environmental issues.

d. National Cyber Security Strategy. In its entirety, cyber security policy and strategies provide a framework of guiding principles and action plans aimed at addressing cyber security and its related incidents. The strategy is totackle cybercrimes, cyber terrorism, cyber espionage, and online child abuse and exploitation.

INSURGENCY

Insurgency is a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency. It falls into the category of "irregular warfare", sinceit normally lacks the coordination of a revolution, despite having the same objective. While revolutions often begin (as a mutiny) within a country's armed forces, insurgencies do arise in remote areas, where insurgents gain strength slowly by winning the confidence of rural populations. An insurgency may be based on ethnic or religious identity, or its roots may be basically political or economic. Since insurgencies are rarely

strong enough to face a national army head-on, they tend to use such tactics as surprise attacks, bombing, kidnapping, hostage taking, assassinations and hijacking of planes.

Ikelegbe and Okumu (2010), defines insurgency as an organised, armed and violent revolt, uprising or insurrection against a government or state. An insurgent group is an armed opposition that resists challenges or subverts the authority of the state. The defining distinctions are:

- i. Socio-political objectives and motivation: Insurgent groups often project, protect or respond to identity-based concerns and challenges such as regional autonomy and resource distribution.
- ii. Dominantly internal or within a state's jurisdiction, though activities, support and presence could spread across state boundaries.
- iii. Accepts the nation-state project, but seeks political change of existing government or structural redesign of governance systems.
- iv. Conducted by irregular, illegal, private and clandestine armed groups and often deploys irregular operational strategies.
- v. Resistance or armed challenge to the status quo in social, economic, political, religious or related terms.
- vi. Often possesses a defining ideological, cultural/religious, organisational principles and linked to some historical experiences and fetish empowerment. (Ikelegbe and Okumu, 2010)

A close look into the formation, activities, operational and organisational evolution of both Boko Haram insurgency and the Niger-Delta militancy in Nigeria would reveal the salient facts that these groups fit perfectly into the categorisations above. Despite their many-sided transformations, one thing is key to their existence; that is, they are armed, illegal, subversive, violent and agitated groups, who have challenged the existing order as to its suitability to remain unchanged. The Boko Haram group which began as a religious faction of the Islamic faith and was preaching about the faith, selling its ideologies in the process, did not just take up arms, until some violent altercation with members of the Nigerian security forces. Its supreme leader was gruesomely and extra-judicially murdered (as usual) and some of the adherents got arrested indiscriminately by the security forces, which orchestrated the unprecedented cycle of violent attacks, both on the civilians and government forces. Their

attacks were reactionary at the onset, but became proactive later on, after the group had been linked to a more powerful insurgents abroad.

Similarly, the Niger-Delta militants also began as a group of disgruntled youths in the oil-rich region of Nigeria, demanding a socio-economic development for the impoverished people of the area. This was necessitated by the fact that both the Nigerian government and the foreign multinational oil corporations exploiting crude oil in the region had left the area largely underdeveloped with little or no signs of amelioration of the people's suffering from both sides. These pleas were ignored until the youths took up arms challenging the federal government, which became so coordinated that the government had to call for negotiation with the group later on. The Niger-delta militants employed usual, but more coordinated guerrilla warfare, targeting multinational corporations, especially its properties and top officials, as well as some government establishments in the area.

Unlike the Boko Haram sects which had occasionally conflicting grievances, the Niger-delta militants fought for justifiable rights that had long been denied them in the region. Decades of economic destruction and occupational rights denial caused by gas flare, both on agrarian lands and water ways, which ultimately left the region alarmingly poor, without means of livelihood and any hope of a better tomorrow. The government is chief in this allegation as proceeds realised from the sale of crude oil were never used to develop the host communities; instead, politicians often pocketed earmarked resources and deployed the armed forces to silence the people. Several calls from different quarters, both locally and internationally were ignored or haphazardly considered until the dissatisfied youths in the area took up arms against the almighty government forces.

The most intriguing part of these issues is that government and its forces are pitched against an unknown belligerent, who engage in surprise attacks, clandestine operations and massively terrorise the armless civilians, with the sole purpose of bringing the government to its knees and conceding to their demands. According to Ikelegbe (*ibid*), insurgency is of three major groupings: rebel insurgency, militia insurgency and Islamic insurgency, each of them being established for varied reasons. What they all have in common is their clandestine nature and surprise attacks or guerrilla warfare. Some of them get to be known later, but they largely operate underworld, appearing only to attack, after which they simply disappear into distance. Globalisation has made it

possible for them to communicate their intentions as well as their impending attacks to government. Insurgents are a closed group, who are faceless, but possessing enormous resources, which they use to purchase firearms, recruit personnel and regroup after an attack. They often have people planted in government who help them to monitor their opponent and provide intelligence reports on same.

Insurgents use different tactics, but the most common is their guerilla warfare tendencies, due to the fact that they are not trained soldiers, they do not possess sophisticated weapons and are few in number, compared to conventional government forces, as a result of which they cannot face trained armed men in conventional battles. The government and its security agencies possess enormous resources to fight and win a conventional war, which is why insurgents have often resorted to surprise attacks, targeting civilian gatherings. To them, creating maximum effect is a strategic advantage, because the more the casualties, the more bargaining advantage they have; hence their proclivity towards attacking large gathering of civilians such as in a restaurant, supermarkets, as is the case with Boko Haram; churches, mosques, cinemas, recreation centres, airports or on planes, festivals etc.

MODELS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Model

According to McCormick's (1987), Counter-insurgency is defined as all-embracing efforts—both civilian and military, taken to concurrently overpower and contain insurgency and tackle its core causes. A well-coordinated counter-insurgency incorporates and coordinates political, security, economic, and acquainting components that strengthen governmental acceptability and efficacy, while also decreasing the influence wielded by the insurgents over the population. Its strategies are often devised to concurrently protect the residents from insurgent violence, coupled with reinforcing government's legitimacy and institutional competence to manage responsibly and, by so doing, freeze out the insurgents politically, socially, and economically.


Features of Counter-insurgency: This is a multifarious determination and attempts that incorporate the full range of civilian and military agencies. It is often more centred around the population as it concentrates on obtaining and governing the residents or population in a conflict zone, than adversary-

centered, which aims at defeating the insurgents. This does not presuppose that counterinsurgency does involve little or no violence in relation to other types of conflict, but that, as is the case with other conflict variants, lives can be lost in the process. This is an exceedingly challenging enterprise; it is often vastly contentious politically, it encompasses a succession of vague proceedings that are very cumbersome to construe and, which often involves massively more resources and spend than originally projected. Most especially, governments that engage in counterinsurgency campaigns often brutally misjudge the necessity for a very protracted conflict or long-duration, moderately humongous cost commitment. For instance, several resources will be committed to the task, such as government high finances, political capital, military resources as well as unimaginable loss of human lives.

Counterinsurgency campaign is so demanding that it, sometimes, requires the capabilities needed for assisting in developmental projects, peacekeeping and peace-building operations and humanitarian assistance campaigns. Conversely, the objective of any counterinsurgency campaign is to sway and maintain widespread backing for the government in an insurgency-dominated area, and, at the same time, reduce or completely alienate whatever influence wielded by the insurgents on the local population; hence, it is basically a militarised political struggle between the government and the insurgents. Consequent upon this, the ultimate goal of counterinsurgency is to seize power and gain control over the troubled zone, its population, the flow of events and security of lives and property, including the disbandment of the insurgents, and this differentiates it from humanitarian or peacekeeping campaigns. The peculiar nature of counterinsurgency is understood through the sophisticated interconnectivity of some important factors such as the feature of the environment in which it occurs, be it economic, human, physical or political; the character of the insurgency clique as well as the character and structure of the government's counterinsurgency.

McCormick's (1987:297) model was fashioned to serve as an instrument for counter-insurgency, even though it created a stable assessment of the needed measures for both the insurgents and government or counterinsurgency forces to achieve their objectives. By this, model can reveal what may lead to the success or failure of either group. The tactics and principles of the model are applicable to both forces—the insurgents and the government forces respectively, such that, the level to which each side can go in adapting the

principles and strategies of the model will have a direct relationship with the failure or success achievable by each side.



McCormick Insurgency Model (McCormick: 1987:297)

There are four key elements or players, depicted by the model, which form the basis for counterinsurgency and they are as follow:

1. The local population in the red zone,
2. The Insurgents,
3. Government's counterinsurgency force and
4. The External community or international environment.

All these key elements interact to a large extent, with each player acting, reacting and evaluating its alternative among a list of competing options, such as:

- ✓ Winning the cooperation of the local population,
- ✓ Unsettle and upset opponent's grip on the local population,
- ✓ Direct confrontation with the enemy,
- ✓ Cut or severe the enemy's relations with the global community and, in its stead,

- ✓ Create and sustain favourable rapport with the global community.

Looking at all the interacting elements in McCormick model, Gaining Population Support is key to achieving any meaningful successes in a COIN campaign. In this case, government and its forces must strive to establish a peaceful and cordial relationship with the local population in the area, because it signals a sense of friendliness and of belonging in the minds of the people. It is not that they do not understand that government forces have been deployed for their sake, but that they intend to see a more friendly and accommodating presence of government forces. When youths are indiscriminately arrested and, sometimes, killed extra-judicially by government forces, it points only to one direction; which is, that there is no significant difference between the insurgents and government forces in the long run.

Both Berman and Matanock (2015), in their analysis, argued for an information-centric structure to define unbalanced conflicts on a local level. According to them, there are three players involved in the frame, which are the insurgents, the local civilians and the government forces. Both the insurgents and government forces are eternally pitched against each other in an environment occupied by the local civilians and have the highest likelihood of being wounded in the fracas. The civilians, in this context, possess enormous potentials capable of tilting the balance of victory in either side; first, by anonymously divulging secret about the insurgents to the government, thereby helping the latter to use its uneven gain to attack the insurgents or by informing the insurgents about government forces' moves, thereby helping them to escape arrest. Having understood the essential role of the local population, each side will earmark considerable resources for the provision of needed services to the civilians in order to influence them into sharing vital intelligence reports about the enemy, and this goes a long way in determining the type and level of success or failure achievable by either side.

Assumptions of this Model:

This model and its framework is predicated on some assumptions that inherently influence its submissions and they are as outlined, that:

- the substantial usefulness of the local population is sharing of vital

information,

- Civilians are assumed to react positively to incentives,
- The civilians will necessarily share intelligence reports namelessly with given incentives and without putting the suppliers of information under attack,
- That none of the players (government forces or insurgent groups) will want to risk its relationship with the civilians by coercing them to give vital information.

Implications of this framework for counterinsurgency strategies are that:

1. Both sides are motivated to altruistically provide needed services to the local population, which will consequentially upgrade the level and value of information they are ready to share with either side.
 - When government provides social and economic services to the population, this may subside or reduce the violence from the insurgents. For instance, if the government execute projects which tackle the immediate needs of the local people subject to the information they supply, it may reduce the shelter they offer to the rebels and subsequently reduce insurgents' violence in the area. In practical terms, short-reaching projects capable of swaying the previously held negative impression and opinion about government may be executed, and be made subject to revocation, if necessary information is not given.
 - Government should come with it, innovations that skyrocket the worth of blueprintsto local population, like including development specialists in project plan and executionthat willheighten the effect of violence-reducing.
2. Government should provide services hand-in-hand with security of lives and properties of the local population, in such a way that civilians can depend on them for the provision of a safe haven.

3. The civilians are most likely going to reduce support for either side which causes civilian casualties in the area.
4. When government forces make the supply of nameless technical information about the rebels easier for the residents, insurgent violence will be greatly reduced.

Galula (1964:19), proposed four principles of counterinsurgency as follows:

1. Population is paramount: nothing guarantees immediate and sustainable success as enlisting the unflinching support of the local population. In this case, the fundamental aim of any counterinsurgency programme is to obtain and maintain positive relations with them, without which it is almost practically impossible to succeed in the cause and end the flow of insurgency personnel.
2. Government forces can easily gain such support by penetrating active minority, who are ready to support the cause. Through this group, government forces can also pierce the veil of insurgency's popular support by also gaining the assistance of few neutrals among them. By doing so, the insurgency stronghold will be neutralised.
3. Sustaining the gained support: government forces must refrain from doing whatever will jeopardise the civilian support for them, knowing full well that the support is not absolute, but conditional as it can be lost any time the recipient of the support acts against its earlier promise or understanding with the population.
4. Efforts should be intensified and means should be vast: since fighting insurgency requires holistic concentration of resources and personnel, efforts should be spread across affected areas, especially the vital zones and resources moved massively to support the efforts. For instance, as the intelligence gathering efforts are being made, the service provision and military personnel and weapons should follow simultaneously, and having the background knowledge that it's a protracted battle that government is fighting, the level of preparedness and timeliness of support is very germane.

Intelligence Gathering Component of Counter-Insurgency

Intelligence refers to the product resulting from the collecting, collating, evaluating, analysing, integrating and interpreting collected information. This is an expert information product that provides the state with intelligence reports needed to pursue and achieve its interest on the global stage. One of the vital reasons it is needed is its ability to reduce the imprecision that is intrinsic or inherent in observing and predicting events on the international scene. It may be deployed by an enemy state to secretly study the security details, capabilities and moves of another state.

So also, in an insurgency-infested zone, government forces may use it to obtain vital information relating to the location, planned attacks, weapon supply and international connection of an insurgency group, especially before an attack. The information hunted for could tilt the favourable balance to the side of the insurgents and this could help them to outshine government forces through a well-coordinated strategy capable of achieving their goals. In developing intelligence report, vital information about the insurgents is obtained from different sources and circulated almost immediately after collection to the other units of counterinsurgency, depending on the quality and the timeliness of its usefulness, especially its operational needs.

There are basically two categories of intelligence report, which are operational or strategic. A strategic report often provides government institutions with required data to make policies or decisions which have far-reaching effects. Operational intelligence reports refer to the integration of information relating to the military, economies, society or social interactions as well as technological advancement, the evolution of which is long, thereby requiring allocation of resources for its study. It involves collecting information capable of informing the decision of government or an armed group, such that the level of expertise demonstrated by each group will largely determine the success and or failure of the group.

In counterinsurgency, information management (being case-knowledgeable and influential) is the fundamental component for all adjoining activities as it provides interconnectivity of strategies that permit isolated information

(acquiring knowledge and exerting influence) and is the base component for all other activities, providing the linkages that allow discrete functional elements to cooperate as an integrated whole. Information is the foundation for all other activities, and provides the linkages that allow isolated purposeful elements to conjoin as an incorporated whole. The way information is collected, formulated, stored and distributed is very germane in an effort to shape the way all players view the impasse.

In counterinsurgency campaign, the way intelligence circulate can be understood in two ways; that is, the report which players intend to understand that will later inform their actions and strategies, and the report that is intended to be circulated among the local residents that is capable of exerting considerable influence on their conducts afterwards. Equally, interest is placed on disrupting the flow of information between different groups or cells, so that the insurgents are deprived the opportunity to collect vital information and their capacity to influence the local residents will consequently be reduced. Below are the requirements for a well-coordinated intelligence management:

- **Understanding conflict environment:** Decision-making at various levels of counterinsurgency requires adequate knowledge about the process and flow of events, because by so doing, players are better informed about the way the insurgents carry out their attacks as well as how they will react to government forces' moves. This type of information goes beyond that which is needed for military engagement alone as it includes in depth analysis about the local population themselves to be able to know their grievances, basis for support for the insurgents, immediate and long-term needs, etc. Fighting a conventional war will only require intelligence reports on the enemy, but as unconventional as insurgency warfare is, it demands that government forces have a detailed background and operational knowledge about the population and the insurgents.

At the tactical stage, knowledge about the rationale behind the population's motivation for offering their support for the insurgency is required, most especially how this has unfolded and sustained, the key players, their grievances and demands, what can be done to salvage the situation, the willingness and capacity of government to address this problems, and the

influence this might have on foreign intervention in the imbroglio. At the level of operation however, there is need for greater knowledge about the strong points as well as the susceptibilities of the insurgent stratagem, the potencies and limitations of government and its forces, and what is required of the local population. Continuous feedback on the degree of success of ongoing COIN efforts is also critical.

At the strategic stage, COIN forces must identify the active insurgents' identity, their operational nexus, strategies, arsenals, strength and objectives. Why do the civilians sympathise with, provide cover for and team up with the insurgents? How can the civilians be influenced in such a way as to gain their support, get maximum information about the insurgents from them and consequently insulate the insurgents? These questions must be asked and the responses factored into the adopted strategy. Frankly, all types of intelligence gathering have different roles in counterinsurgent, albeit, history is replete in the veracity of human sources (civilians, agents and arrested and or repentant insurgents) of intelligence, which is said to have had and made the greatest contribution to the success of COIN. The most important, yet not fully utilised aspect of COIN is the mismanagement and refusal to share information by different agencies of government involved in COIN, because a common base or central coordination of information is paramount to defeating the enemy.

- **Opinion Shaping:** To effectively counter the insurgents, government must be able to shape popular opinion among the civilians by manipulating filterable information and guiding its actions in such a way as to demonstrate the opposite of whatever impression the insurgents had earlier created about it. One of the basic roles of COIN is rebuilding the almost lost confidence in government, and in the process, reduce the influence and believability built by the insurgents among the local population. Whatever actions and conducts of government forces must be seen to be in tandem with this fundamental objective.
- **Intelligence and influence:** information flow is most useful to insurgents in the same way it is useful to counterinsurgency team. Hence, to guarantee success, government forces must strive to cut or reduce the flow of information between different cells of the insurgents, and this can be done

using counterintelligence, propaganda and obvious isolation of the insurgents from the local population. To achieve this, countering and pre-empting the insurgents' messages through driving out the insurgents from among the populace is key. To control actions and messages, COIN forces must be both proactive and reactionary; that is, they should be the first to report an event in order to shape people's impression about it, since first impression lasts longer and can be very difficult to change. Thus, before the occurrence of an attack, COIN forces should be equally prepared on what and how to report whatever the consequence is to the people. The insurgents often edge out COIN forces in this regard as they are the first to report bad events among the population, in order to discredit government's effort, but this must not be the case. But, where it is the case, COIN forces should be quick to counter the information before it spread and where it has spread, efforts should be geared towards discrediting it with superior and more appealing information. The information management must support whatever action they take and their superiority in this art determines their level of influence in the process.

Just like the economic entrepreneurs, COIN requires proactive approach in managing and filtering of information. To counter insurgent's messages, speed is of the utmost essence, because the longer it takes before a refutation or counter message to fly around, the ineffective and irrelevant it will become eventually. Collectively, whoever (among the players) is most proactive in the formulation, processing and deployment of messages will have an edge over the other player in influencing the population. Some of the counterinsurgents' pause in reaction may be resulting from the need to scrutinise happenings and ascertain facts (a restraint from which rebels are normally excused), nonetheless a holding response is largely superior to uncommunicativeness. Less reasonable is the deferral inbuilt in prolonged authorization methods.

Taking a cue from the British government, local population have been the target by counterterrorism unit's posters since 2004. Posters, Radio and Television programmes and campaigns bearing captions like, 'If you suspect it, report it!', and 'Handyman? Pest Controller? Bomb Maker?', have all been deployed to sensitise the civilians and alert them to the fact that, supplying vital intelligence information to the government is in their best interest, because government is

only trying to protect them from the nefarious activities of terrorists, in which case they need to be actively involved in the struggle. It became obvious that similar strategy widely adopted by the Metropolitan Police in the United Kingdom has also been in operation in cities across the USA, Australia, Canada and France respectively. Even though government propaganda to promote and sustain civilian involvement in assisting the government to fight insurrections or threat to peace is never a new development, there has been prevalent growth recently, especially in the amount and intensification of civilian surveillance in the west since the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

Surveillance activities are vindicated, grounded or based on the logics of threat and prevention, in which it functions as precautionary measures or early warning bleeps that permit recognition of intending rebels, and subsequently disorganise them and prevent future planned attacks or it may enable government to carry out some developmental projects and services, on which potential insurgents' case would be built around. This is true, because the identification of the societal problem that could constitute a ground for violent protest puts government at a vantage position to address it before it goes out of hand. Conversely, individuals are often critical about the unspoken implications which their active involvement and giving out of vital information might have on their human freedoms, peace and security. This is true, because if security were to be equated with liberation, civilian-surveillance operations have severe repercussions for the safety of individuals, as a result of the danger of racial, ethnic or tribal sketching or profiling, coupled with the uncertainty of mistrustful conduct that these operations depend on.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS IN NIGERIA

Table II: Incidences of JTF human rights abuses causing strained civil –military relations

S/N	Date	Place/Event	Victim(s)
1	1990	Umuechem Community	The Umuechem community was visited by contingents of Nigerian police. Eighty community members were murdered in the unprovoked attack, coupled with burnt houses and looted properties.
2	10 November, 1995	Ogoni Land	the Nigerian military regime of General Sani Abacha murdered Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders of the Ogoni people of the Niger Delta
3	28 & 29 October, 1999	Rivers State: Choba town	Several youths were feared dead and over 60 women were raped by the Police after being deployed to disperse demonstrators.
4	November 20, 1999	Bayelsa State: Odi town	Nearly 2500 civilians were killed in Odi town by the JTF under the pretext of ambush by the Odi youths.
5	19 February, 2005	Odioma community: Bayelsa State	About 50 members of Odioma community in Bayelsa State of Nigeria were reported massacred on Saturday, February 19, 2005 during a military raid by a Joint Task Force of the Nigerian Army and Navy
6	August, 2007	Port Harcourt	Human Rights Abuses Committed by JTF Forces in Port Harcourt
7	August, 2008	Agge, Bayelsa State	the invasion and incineration of Agge in retaliation for the militants' attack on the JTF in Bomadi on 26 July, 2008.
8	June 11, 2009	Boko Haram funeral procession in Maiduguri	Shooting of 17 suspected members of Boko Haram over their refusal to use motorcycle crash helmet
9	May 13, 2009	Gbaramatu Kingdom, including Okerenkoko & Oporoza	Tens of Thousands Caught in Crossfire in Niger Delta Fighting. It was the mother of all attacks on the kingdom in terms of the military size, spate and speed of attacks and the casualties.
10	Between July 28 and August 1, 2009	Borno, Bauchi, Kano and Yobe States	Extra judicial execution of the sect's leader, Mohammed Yusuf and 24 other suspected members of the sect
12	July 31, 2009	His farm settlement outside Maiduguri	Execution of Buji Foi, a former commissioner in Borno State over alleged sponsorship of the sect
13	July 31, 2009	The Borno State Police Command	Execution of Baba Fugu Mohammed, the 72 -year old father-in- law of Mohammed Yusuf
14	August, 2009	Niger Delta	The period since the restoration of democracy in 1999 has been characterized by unusually high levels of political violence centered on the Niger Delta, the heart of Nigeria's oil industry. UNIFP
15	December 1, 2010	Ayakoromor Community: Delta State	The raid on Ayakoromor Community on December 1, 2010 in search of recidivist militant, John Togo, of the Niger Delta Liberation Force, NDLF
16	January 26, 2012	Raiding of the Gidan -Yashi neighbourhood of Maiduguri	Execution of 3 brothers — Dala, Mallam Tijani and Mallam Mohammed Mustapher
17	March 9, 2012	Kano	Soldiers gunned down Ali Sadiq, a graduate of Bayero University who got married 5 days before the incident
18	May 1, 2012	Maiduguri: Kawar Maila	JTF men burnt down approximately 33 houses and forcefully evicted, maimed and killed the occupants.
19	May 13, 2012	Pre-dawn raid of Dorayi neighbourhood in Kano	Soldiers went from house to house, broke down doors, ransacked homes, and in some cases, stole money
20	March 28, 2012	Disobedience to court Order	Mallam Aliyu Tashoku, a suspected Boko Haram member who was granted bail by the court but the police defied the order
21	July, 2012	Niger Delta, Porthacourt	Approximately 20,000 people were forcibly evicted from their homes in Abonnema Wharf in Port Harcourt
22			

23	April 16, 2013	The Baga Massacre	There are conflicting reports from Sen. Maina, Human Rights Watch, National Human Rights Commission, NASRDA, and NEMA. But generally over 200 people died, 642 persons were internally displaced, while 2,000 houses, 62 motor vehicles and 486 motorcycles were destroyed
24	April 25, 2013	The Bama Massacre	17 persons killed, over 200 houses and shopping malls burnt
25	29 September, 2016	Nigeria	The volunteers who helped beat back Boko Haram are becoming a problem
26	February 28, 2017	Maiduguri	They Told Us They Were Here to Help Us.' Then Came Slaughter
27	March 15, 2017	Maiduguri	Nigerian Army Abuse of Civilians (New York Times)
28	31 May, 2018	Maiduguri	Nigerian Military Accused Rape
29	14 February, 2020	Nigeria	Nigeria: Military razes villages as Boko Haram attacks escalate

Source: Authors' Fieldwork

Implementing a civil-military relations project in Nigeria is no mean feat given the mutual distrust that exists between civilians and the military. Perceptions of military's high-handedness, uncontrolled use of force, stern-looking soldiers, memories from military's rulership in Nigeria (including wounds that are yet to heal) and the tensions arising from modern-day military-civilian contact; all form a strong basis for civilians to avoid the military at all cost. However, emerging security challenges across the land and the recurrent deployment of the military into civilian spaces underpins the need for both parties to come to the dialogue table towards understanding their role in securing the country and on protecting democracy itself. The CMR project that commenced implementation in 2015 aims to achieve the objective to ensure continuous and improved dialoguing between civilians and the military towards better security outcomes and the respect for the fundamental human rights for the country. The lessons gathered should form the basis for further intervention and recommendations to all stakeholders towards fostering better CMR in Nigeria.

Again, within the insurgency that has spanned over nine years in the North-east of Nigeria, the military, especially the army has become a permanent feature in the lives of the locals in a bid to curtail the crisis. However, as the crisis continues, so are issues of alleged human rights violations between civilians and security actors escalating. The Crisis Group (2016) states that these abuses of the civilian community in various internal operations (past and present) and within the framework of countering violent extremism continues to alienate citizens from the military, whose cooperation are crucial for the success of internal security operations. One of the lessons in implementing this project is that civil military relations is a tool for countering insurgency. Parties impacted by a security challenge must be willing to come to the dialogue table and discuss

positive ways towards ending the crisis. The CMR forumshosted in the North East continues to bring stories of the tensed relationship between the military and the locals where Borno residents have lamented severally the lack of trust by the military to the locals, owing to the army personnel considering everyone as a potential Boko haram suspector relative to one.

The civilians are needed in counter-insurgency exercise so much, that their exclusion will negatively affect the outcome of the exercise. Government forces alone cannot obtain needed information about the opponents, in which case civilian cooperation is crucial, because government forces are not permanent residents in the conflict zone, coupled with the fact that they know little or nothing about the people, among whom perpetrators of political tension reside, but they will do well, if they try (as much) not to irk the local people. What has been observed over time in Nigeria, is that, government forces often get entangled in the imbroglio, and because they are trained combatants, caution is not exercised in their dealings with the local people, thereby pushing an already dangerous situation further to the brink of collapse. One wonders why this has often been the case, especially with the greater advantage obtainable through cooperating with the locals. This is partly responsible for conflict escalation in tensed regions of the country, where men of the security forces drafted to maintain law and order in a conflict area, often ended up deteriorating whatever peaceful relations that were left with the people instead.

The local population have often been systematically ignored, to the peril of government forces, and this is responsible for the spate of attacks and killings of government forces in the North-east of Nigeria lately, with the insurgents being reported in the news to be gaining some unprecedented victories against the Joint Task Force, hereinafter referred to as JTF. The Army has been more hit by this trend and the media is full of reports hinging on the number of soldiers killed in the conflict zone between September and December, 2018 coupled with those humongous list in 2019. The alienation of these people when the problem began was (partly) the genesis of the protractedness of the impasse; in that, at inception in 2009, when the boko haram group first attacked government forces, CNN reporters alleged that the army often raided these communities, arresting many young men in the process, the latter who were killed, some in the presence of their family members, while some family members often go to police stations or army barracks a day after an arrest was made, only to pick up their relatives' dead bodies.

This singular act, coupled with the fact that the JTF completely made themselves impenetrable and unaccommodating, so much that the local people began to see them as not too different from the insurgents they were meant to fight, all combined to considerably alienate them from the communities. It was gathered that at a point, some community members served as surveillance to and for the insurgents against government forces, offering them useful information as to the exact locations of the JTF, and this led to serious setbacks for the forces. Crossing to the other side of the country, in the South-South, one would see the same mistakes being made by government forces in conflict areas, even though this preceded the Boko haram insurgency. In the popular Niger-Delta militancy conflict, the JTF, commissioned by the federal government of Nigeria, to restore orderliness to the oil-rich area, went from maintaining peace, to actually escalating the conflict, by their uncivilised and inhuman treatment of the local people in the area. First, the people alleged that the army were maltreating them, by arresting the youths, imprisoning them and killing some of them. This act irked the local people to the point that they became the eyes and ears of the militants against government forces.

As noted in the profiling table, several inhuman treatments were meted out to the local people by JTF members, and these range from indiscriminate arrest, extra-judicial killings, lack of regard for human lives, refusal to exercise restraints in the use of firearm in densely populated areas, rape accusations, callously deliberate destruction of properties such as razing down of several villages and communities without lawful justification, treating all community members as insurgents or insurgents' sympathisers, forcefully acquiring information from the people, rounding up several armless youths and killing them in cold blood. All these combined to almost completely alienate the local people from the JTF. As a way of escaping from the claws of the JTF inhuman treatment, some youths decided to partner with government forces in fighting insurgency, which is in tandem with the saying that, 'if you can't beat them, join them', and this was responsible, in no small measures, for why the northern youths troop out enmass to join the Civilian Joint Task Force when the opportunity presented itself in the North-eastern region, even though this was not thought about during the Niger-delta imbroglio.

The emergence and involvement of the local defence forces, known as Civilian-Joint Task Force (Civilian-JTF), in the combat operations threw up a new dimension to the counterterrorism campaign in Nigeria. For instance, in Iraqi and Afghan militia groups involvement in counterterrorism were

effective at reducing violence, and their intervention was referred to as a "watershed" moment (Bush 2012, p. 14). In Nigeria, the Civilian-JTF have been described as "national heroes" for their gallantry and bravery in confronting Boko Haram. On the other hand, Amnesty International and other human rights organizations have heavily criticized the rules of engagement of the local defence forces, as well as Benraad (2011) who notes that empowered militias under the control of tribal actors pose a danger to the central government that may outweigh its benefits, while other scholars express genuine fears of divergent objectives of the militias in the campaign (Madden et al. 2016). Truly, the CJTF did help in the reduction of insurgent attacks, but they were untrained and or badly trained combatants, who soon abused their access to weaponry, as they were also accused of unleashing terror on their own enemies, not necessarily the insurgents, whom they gave to the JTF as insurgents and got involved in rape allegations.

The colonial nature of government responses to insurgency or any form of civil unrest has not helped matters, and successive governments do not seem to have learnt any lessons from the setbacks recorded in adopting 'fire for fire' tactics, which is not different from a declaration of war on conflict zones. It is bizarre to constantly see the government (through its forces) unleash terror on the people in these areas, despite that these communities only serve as hideouts for insurgents, and not that they are insurgents themselves, or that they support the insurgents. The youths are often the victims here, and government forces indiscriminately arrest, torture and, sometimes, kill them without recourse to judicial processes. These forces are not trained in the art of modern counter-insurgency, but are trained to fight conventional wars. In this case, civilians in insurgency-infested areas are treated as enemies, rather than as partners, useful for furthering the cause.

In the COIN model, McCormick, Berman and Matanock espouse the strategic position occupied by the civilian population in COIN; the success lurked in building and sustaining their support and the degree of failure inherent in losing it. Both Berman and Matanock (2015), for instance, argue that a system centred around information gathering and dissemination may be used to explain unbalanced conflict locally and that the local population could namelessly share information with COIN forces, that will consequently tilt the balance of success to the side of the latter and motivate it to use its lopsided advantage to effectively attack the insurgents. Bassey (2004) and Okeke (2004) have posited that, 'while internal security management could be preventive, proactive and

strategic, which tends to be less costly and more sustainable, the reactive, responsive and operational strategy has been dominant in Nigeria. This presupposes that building the support of the locals will help immensely in gathering intelligence information from them, which will, in turn, aid government forces in proactive responses to potential insurgent attacks, thereby reducing their casualty targets, but that the government is more tuned to react after the deed has been done or attack has been carried out, due (partly) to their loss of civilian support.

A significant number of studies have shown that counterinsurgency "cannot be addressed through military force alone" (Hughes 2011). Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, emphasis has been placed on three key issue areas: intelligence gathering, the participation of indigenous people, and finding a political resolution to terrorism (Nolan 2013). These are critical social dynamics of the terrorist environment of which the military, in the nature of their training, has limited knowledge of, and therefore, cannot effectively operate without the inclusion of the civilian population. By social dynamic, we refer to the knowledge-base of the local people in "defining the enemy, determining and targeting their (insurgent) critical vulnerabilities" (Builta and Heller 2011, p. 1). Peresin (2013, p. 8) points out that the armed forces do not have the capacity to meaningfully address these key aspects of 'social dynamics' of security environment. However, counterterrorism approaches across the world, continue to ignore this critical segment, believing that combatting violent extremism is the sole responsibility of the State security apparatus.

There is no single all-encompassing method to counterinsurgency in the literature. Terror groups and their activities are too multifaceted to be solved by a single solution. Also, no one nation has the answer to counterterrorism because no one nation has been able to "defeat" terrorism (Guiora 2011, p. 3). Furthermore, counterterrorism is viewed through different lenses-law, policy operation and intelligence. A successful counterterrorism approach incorporates all the four pillars. Even when military operational approach is adopted, reliable strategic and operational intelligence is required to guarantee success. The UN provides us with almost comprehensive framework for counterterrorism. The 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) focuses on four core pillars:

- (1) addressing "the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism" because terrorists exploit grievances for their own goals;

- (2) "preventing and combating terrorism" by denying terrorist actors the means to carry out attacks;
- (3) "building states' capacity" and strengthening the role of the UN to prevent and respond to terrorism; and
- (4) "ensuring Human Rights and Rule of Law" while countering terrorism (UN2006; Amin 2014, pp. 15–16).

The African Union (AU), too, has adopted a series of frameworks in relation to counter terrorism, namely, the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism, a Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism in 2002 and an African Model Law on Counter terrorism in 2011 (AU2015). These frameworks all allude to the need for a human rights-based approach to countering terrorism, the need for inclusion of civil society and the coordination of activities by the various structures.

Moreso, both Niger-delta militancy and Boko haram imbroglio would have been managed or even resolved by a well-meaning government, without such level of loss of life, and useful information would have been garnered from the civilians to arrest the situation, before it degenerated into a long-drawn-out conflict. But the JTF went scapegoating and killing innocent youths in the area, thereby destroying whatever foreseeable peaceful relations between the residents and government. And, at a time in the course of the conflict, the people often oscillated between pitching their tent with the insurgents and the government forces, and this led to the protractedness of the conflict, such that by the time government realised this, the conflict had been firmly entrenched. Even when the JTF began to enlist the civilians in their COIN strategies, it was not wholly to its advantage, because some of these civilians only joined the JTF in order to have access to information to pass to the insurgents and save themselves and family from attacks from both sides.

This points to how worse it can get, if the unflinching support of the civilians is not enlisted by government forces in COIN campaign. For three months now, the Boko haram insurgents have been regrouping and unleashing terror, both on the residents and the JTF, in particular. The JTF and government have recorded an unprecedented setbacks recently, in their COIN exercise and this can be traced back to their strained relationship with the civilian population, who were earlier poised to help the JTF, but were not welcome then. For over ten years (since 2009) in which the JTF has been fighting the insurgents in the Northeast,

it has not been able to arrest the rebel leaders, let alone kill them. Also, were it not for the timely and sensible manner in which the Umaru Musa Y'aradua handled the Niger-deltan militant imbroglio, the relative peace being enjoyed in the oil-rich region would have been possible only in our imagination. The local people are so crucial to counter-insurgency, that losing their support does considerably tilt the balance of success in either side, especially the side with more friendly relations or the most threatening side.

CONCLUSION

The concept of civil-military relations transcends only relations between the political leadership and the military institution, to include relations between the civil society and the military, because the reality of the contemporary socio-politico-economic relations in most developing nations-states is such that issues of economic injustice, uneven development, ethnic domineering, resource control, religious disorientation and dogmatism, to name but a few, persist, which is not commendably managed or resolved, and most of the disgruntled elements in these states often tend to resort to arms carrying and terror unleashing to express their grievances, especially where all peaceful entreaties have failed to yield needed results. National security is one of the cardinal functions of the state and the armed forces are charged with this responsibility, both within and across national borders, to protect against internal violence and external aggression, but the protection of lives and properties of the civilian population is cardinal in the grand national security design. Ever since the return to civil rule in 1999, insurgency has gradually grown in Nigeria, especially in the oil-rich South-south and later in the North-east regions respectively, which has threatened national security and necessitated the deployment of the armed forces to restore order in the area, but their relationship with the civilian population often deteriorated, especially after an attack against the military, which create cycle of reprisal and counter-reprisal attacks, thereby pushing an already dangerous situation to the brink of utter collapse. It is herein argued that, in both Niger-delta militia and North-east Boko haram insurgencies, the JTF deployed to these zones often maintained a discordant relationship with the host communities and this negatively impacted the counterinsurgency operations, especially the intelligence gathering efforts, and since the military are pitched against faceless enemies, the failure to obtain quality intelligence from the locals about the insurgents only served to protract the imbroglio.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Government and its forces should strive to enlist the trust and support of the residents in an insurgency-infested area or conflict zone. Military operations should be carried out in such a way as to retain the support of the civilian population.
- Government should carry out laudable projects capable of addressing the socio-economic causes of the problem.
- Government should attempt to resolve or better-manage the impasse, before it escalates and, when it does, all the local population should not be treated as common criminals or insurgents, but as necessary partners in the cause.

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LANGUAGE POLICY AND FRENCH STUDIES: THE ANGLO-FRANCOPHONE INTERFACE

Tanitolorun, Ezekiel Oladele

Introduction

Language is one of the essentials of any nation's socio-politic and economic growth. Obviously, communication is as paramount as a lack of communication; without proper communication, there will not be any meaningful development. Nigeria as a heterogeneous society is known for its problem of language policy, classification, and the improper placement of French as one of the leading languages of the world. French today in Nigeria is still not properly identified as a language Nigerians need in their socio-political, cultural, and economic advancement.

According to Ajiboye (2005:6), the Abacha government declaration of 1996 established that the French Language be seen as the second official language of Nigeria. According to him, despite of the Nigerian Policy of Education published in 1998, which supports the idea of French becoming a core subject in the secondary school curriculum, there has been an uneven positive surge in favor of French. Also, the Federal Ministry of Education (2001) states in its recent policy of education the following in favor of French Language studies:

This new policy is informed by the need for Nigerians to acquire competence in a language that is a major international language of science, commerce, industry, diplomacy, and technology. Furthermore, the study of French will certainly be of great use for Nigerian secondary school pupils... Nigerians need to take their rightful places in international organizations (e.g. ECOWAS, INTERPOL, UN, African Union...) and diplomacy where French is a prerequisite for employment. It is therefore important that French be given a new impetus in both content and delivery method (11).

This assertion of 2001 renewed government interest in French studies, but a cursory study of the situation of French studies in our schools (secondary and tertiary) revealed that the reality is contrary to the assertion above. A majority of Nigerians do not experience French education in the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of their learning process. In Benin Republic, a francophone country where the English Language is studied, the teaching and learning of the English Language is more pronounced than the presence of French in Nigeria, an anglophone country. What could be responsible for this? Could it be due to language policy or other factors? This article is aimed at satisfying answers to this question by discussing language policy and French studies; the Anglo-Francophone interface.

Tanitolorun, Ezekiel Oladele Department Of French Tai Solarin University of Education Ijebu Ode Ogun State Nigeria

LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION POLICY IN NIGERIA

Nigeria is a country that is without doubt multilingual in nature. According to Adebite (2004:23), the numerous languages of the nation can be classified into two lines based on the societal rather than individual or personal roles they perform. He added that all the endogenous languages which are societal (communal) are referred to as 'mother tongues', while endogenous as well as exogenous languages that serve societal (national and international) uses are referred to as 'second languages'. These are the languages that are most crucial for national development. All other languages which serve personal rather than societal uses are regarded as 'special languages'. Adebite suggests the following classification:

Mother tongue: All indigenous languages; e.g. Fulfude, Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, Edo, Efik, Kanuri, Tiv, etc.

Second Language: English

Special Language (1): Indigenous languages other than the speaker's mother tongue; e.g. Hausa to a Yoruba person.

Special Language (2): French, Arabic, etc.

In Nigeria, there is no clear-cut comprehensive language policy document anywhere particularly in favor of the French Language. What can be regarded as the language policy are scanty and sporadic language provisions contained in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the National Policy on Education (NPE, 1981, 1984). Such provisions relevant to our discussion in this paper are presented below:

...in addition to the appreciation of the importance of language in the educational process, and as a means of preserving the people's culture, the government considers it to be in the interest of national unity that each child should be encouraged to learn one of the three major languages other than his own mother tongue. In this connection, the government considers the three major languages in Nigeria to be Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba (NPE, Paragraph 8).

...Government will ensure that the medium of instruction will be principally the mother tongue or the language of

the immediate community (NPE, Paragraph 11(3): Pre-primary Education).

...Government will see to it that the medium of instruction in the primary school is initially the mother tongue or the language of the immediate community and at a later stage English (NPE, paragraph 15(4): Primary Education).

The language policies mentioned above have no impact on the teaching and learning of French in Nigeria. According to Ajiboye (2005:41), the necessity of foreign language studies is no longer an issue for debate to many developed countries and a few developing countries in Africa and Asia. It has been discovered that foreign language education is crucial to the overall national development and outlook. Furthermore, it has become evident that it enhances professional and technical competence. Doctors, nurses, engineers, career diplomats, journalists, scientific researchers at all levels have come to realize that with minimum competence in a key foreign international language (French for the Nigerian context), the window to further and faster advancements in their respective fields would be flung open. Adeboye added that it is easy to see from the foregoing the wisdom behind the Helsinki Agreement signed by the U.S. and 34 other nations, which stipulates the encouragement of the study of foreign languages and cultures to serve “as a means to expanding communication among people”. Nigeria needs to learn a great deal about this, as has been expressed above, our language policy is practically derogatory to the purpose for which the French Language should be studied.

The Curriculum

A Curriculum has been put in place in order to ensure the stability of the education system. The word curriculum is Latin; “*curus*” meaning to run a race, “*courir*” in French. Generally, one starts to run a race when one begins to learn. The curriculum of any school brings together experiences that the school consists of, in all the situations the school may select and consistently organize, for the purpose of bringing about changes in the behaviors of learners and as a means of developing the personality of the individuals. It is the total experience involving the school in the process of educating young people. Curriculum can be taken to mean the instrument through which schools seek to translate the hopes of society.

The School Curriculum and French Language

Language is said to be one of the distinguishing attributes of human beings. Most philosophies from Greek to African regard language as the source of human life and power. In some African traditions, a newborn child is regarded as a “thing”, “kintu”, and not yet a “mantu”, a “person”. It is when that child is capable of learning a language that the child is regarded as a human being. The French Language, like other languages, is expected to play a vital role in the Nigerian school curriculum, as is one of the leading languages of the world. It owes its origin to France, which formally adopted it as the official language.

English is Nigeria's official language, inherited from the colonial masters. Thus, it is used for administration and official communication. However, the need for the French Language cannot be underestimated because Nigeria is an Anglophone country engulfed by French-speaking nations on all sides except the south, where the Atlantic Ocean is; Cameroon is in the east, Chad in the north-east, Niger in the north and the Republic of Benin in the west. For Nigeria as a heterogeneous country to communicate effectively with her neighboring countries, French has been included in the school curriculum since the inception of the education system till today, and the current administration still maintains the inclusion of this language in the curriculum, but with what effect?

French in the Primary School Education

Primary school education is a six-year program, enjoyed by children between the ages of 6 and 12. The system is in place to accomplish certain objectives. These include inculcating permanent literacy and numeracy, and the child's ability to express himself very well. The French Language is one of the subjects offered at this level. The NPE (2004:6) prescribed French for the Universal Basic Education covering primary school and junior secondary school, stating that:

“Government appreciates the importance of language as a means of promoting social interaction and national cohesion and preserving cultures...Accordingly, French shall be the second official language in Nigeria (p. 10). This is the reason why French Language is taken at the common entrance examination.

The Junior Secondary Education

Junior secondary education is what comes immediately after the completion of primary school. Admission into this level is through a smooth transition based on a prescribed benchmark. The curriculum at this level comprises the following courses: English studies, social studies, mathematics, basic science and technology, and general knowledge. Pupils are not tested in the French Language before admission is offered. This means that the recommendation above is not implemented.

Senior Secondary Education

Senior secondary is a post-basic education with a duration of three-years. It is a level with four fields of study. These are commercial studies, humanities, science, mathematics, and technology. The French Language, which falls under humanities, is one of the requirements for gaining admission into a university. At least, a credit/pass in this subject is essential for someone who wants to study it at the university level.

Tertiary Education

This is the third echelon of the nation's education system. It is the next level after secondary school. This level of education makes relevant training available for the training of high-level manpower who in turn will make contributions to national development and the provision of affordable quality learning opportunities to the citizenry.

Colleges of education, universities, polytechnics, etc. are all tertiary institutions. The French Language is also taught at this level. In order to enhance and facilitate the learning of this language, most especially for students of higher institutions, language resource centers have been established. We have, for example, the Nigeria French Language Village, an inter-university center dedicated to the teaching and learning of French for students of colleges of education, universities, and other individuals who need a working knowledge of the French Language.

THE WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATION COUNCIL (WAEC) AND NATIONAL EXAMINATION COMMISSION (NECO) CURRICULA

Based on courses of interest according to WAEC and NECO, the higher secondary school subjects can be grouped as follows:

Key WAEC/NECO Subjects

1. English (compulsory)
2. Mathematics (compulsory)
3. Yoruba/Hausa/Igbo
4. Biology
5. Economics

Compulsory WAEC/NECO Subjects for Arts Students

1. Literature-in-English
2. CRK/IRK
3. History
4. Government
5. Music

Compulsory for Sciences

1. Physics
2. Chemistry
3. Geography
4. Agricscience
5. Further mathematics
6. Technical drawing
7. Food and Nutrition

Compulsory for Commercial

1. Accounts
2. Commerce
3. Government
4. Further Mathematics

Students are allowed to add other subjects as electives among which we have the French Language. It is obvious from the list of subjects above that WAEC and NECO do not attach any importance to French Language teaching at the secondary school level. French is, however, considered an elective subject that the student may decide to study or not. This is grossly a disservice to the quest of French to become the second official language in Nigeria.

OUR PREOCCUPATIONS AS REGARDS TO THE TEACHING OF FRENCH IN NIGERIA

It is obvious that the Federal Government enacts policies that support the teaching and learning of the French Language for the primary school to the tertiary level. Perhaps the Nigerian government wants its citizenry to learn French by establishing the French Language Village, Badagry to serve this purpose.

To our dismay, a number of factors are inhibiting the further spread and development of French studies in Nigeria. Such factors include the following:

Myopic view of French Studies as a Course

We observe that most of our youths and even their parents do not believe in the positive future of a child that chooses French as a career. The general syndrome of studying medicine, law, pharmacy, accountancy, and the likes of them, even when the labor market has been flooded by such professions and studies, has a terrible effect on the teaching and learning of the French Language. Students that participate in and lead French classes in our secondary schools are often from the science group. Such students without a doubt will drop French later in their further academic pursuits.

Insincerity on the part of Government

Our government across multiple levels is fond of making policies that favor French studies in our schools. Such robust policies are most of the time blueprints denied implementation. Such is not the case in many Francophone countries, where the English Language is taught as their second official or target language.

Paucity of Qualified Personnel to Handle the Teaching of the Subject

The Nigerian education system today suffers from a lack of qualified and dedicated teachers to handle the teaching of the French Language. This is because the majority of the teachers do not undergo pedagogical training that can enable them the language effectively, In some schools where you find teachers that underwent the pedagogical training, their dedication to teaching is not so noticeable and therefore they perform poorly. This is characterized by the lack of interest demonstrated by the government and school authorities.

Non-Provision of language Laboratories and Audio-Visual Materials

In most of our schools where the French Language is taught, there are no language laboratories, let alone audio-visual materials. It is so worrisome to mention that priorities are given to other courses like the sciences when it comes to the issue of allocation or provision of materials.

French Option to Candidates whose Performance do not Merit their Chosen Course of Study

Psychologically, applicants that are dragged to the French department to study French may not do well in the language. This is noticeable in our colleges of education and universities nowadays. Most of such students may end up performing poorly in their French studies.

LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION POLICIES IN BENIN REPUBLIC


The Republic of Benin is also a plurilingual country; a total of 55 languages are spoken. French is the official language inherited from the colonial masters, and all the indigenous languages are considered as national languages.

The English Language is studied as a foreign language at the primary (private), secondary, and tertiary levels. There is consequently a high demand for English teachers in Benin.

The Republic of Benin operates on a 6-7-6 system of education:

- Primary school – 6 years
- Junior High School – 4 years
- Senior High School – 3 years
- Bachelor Degree – 3–6 years

We have the following education system according to Mbuko (2007:67)



Since the advent of democracy in the Republic of Benin in 1960, the country embraced English as the language that could connect them to the rest of the world, while French is used administratively.

The government of the country and the education policymakers recognized this fact and made English a core subject in their secondary school curriculum. It is also worthy to note that Béninois businessmen and women, government workers in all its categories, young scholars, parents, religious leaders, etc. are all delighted to be identified with the use of the English Language.

Background Policy

The Béninois government gives children aged between six and seven the compulsory right to elementary education. The child completes this cycle with a Primary School Leaving Certificate in their seventh year of education.

Overall, it requires seven years to complete both junior and senior high school. At the end of the first four years of junior high school, the students have to take the O-Level examinations (Brevet d'Etudes du Premier Cycle: BEPC); then after two years, the students have to take the A-Level exam (Baccalauréat: BAC) which is the equivalent of the US high school degree. At this level, the candidate must pass the English Language requirement in order to proceed on.

Senior High School Education

Senior high school in Benin is multi-disciplinary, just like what we have in the Anglophone system. In the final class, the students have to take the Baccalauréat (BAC) which gives them access to tertiary education. English Language requirements must be passed before a student could claim to have passed the BAC.

Grading Passed Mark

The grading system is from zero to twenty, with twenty being the highest mark:

- Passed grade: 10
- Fairly good grade: 12
- Good grade: 14 – 15
- Very good grade: 16 – 17
- Excellent: 18 – 20

Highest Institutions

The leading institutions today in Benin Republic are as follows:

- The University of Abomey-Calari
- The University of Parakou
- The University of Porto-Novo
- The Polytechnic of Abomey-Calari
- The College of Education of Porto-Novo, among others including private institutions.

School Curriculum in Benin Republic

It is worthy to note that all Francophone countries in Africa give priority to the study of the English Language, most especially at the secondary school and

university levels. This could be as a result of the dominance of America or perhaps, according to Kwofie (2015:94), the need for a differential treatment or as a means to access the world at large.

English in the Primary School

English is not officially taught in the Francophone primary schools. Today, in terms of preference, some private primary schools teach it from primary three to six in order to boost the image of their school and attract more patronage.

The Secondary School

The secondary school curriculum is loaded with several subjects, among which is the French Language, mathematics, civics, bookkeeping, and English among others. Some subjects enjoy more status than the others; the English Language is one such subject that is highly rated in the curriculum of the secondary school. No student would proceed to the next class having failed English.

The University

As was earlier mentioned, students enter universities in Francophone countries having passed the Baccalauréat. The subjects involved are numerous, and grouped into series. What is fundamental here is that every student must pass the English Language at the BAC level, hence failure in the one subject is counted as a failure in all. It is observed that at the secondary school level, students make an effort to learn the French and English Language simultaneously. That is why most of the primary and secondary school teachers, lecturers in the high institutions, and even an individual that passed through secondary school are always capable to display at least a working knowledge of the English Language.

The curriculum is grouped into series A, B, C, D.

The subjects grouped under series A and B are as follows:

Mathematics	}	Core Subjects
French		
English		
Biology		
Philosophy		

History/Geography }
 Spanish } Electives
 German }

It is noted that the English Language is one of the core subjects, while other subjects like biology, Spanish and German are optional.

Subjects under series C & D:

General mathematics }
 French }
 Physics } Core Subjects
 Chemistry }
 Biology }
 English }
 Philosophy } Electives
 History/Geography }

Also under series C and D, the English Language is highly relevant. It is also pertinent to note that oral examinations in English are conducted for all categories of students at the Baccalauréat level.

Use of French in Nigeria and English in Benin Republic: Our Experience

It is obvious to express that Nigerian society is not friendly to the use of the French Language. Most of our highly-placed people that learned it during their secondary school forgot almost everything upon their exit of the school when they finally graduated. The situation is so bad that ordinary greetings in French, some could not even say. Everybody is linguistically satisfied with the use of their mother tongue and the English Language. In Francophone countries, we have a different scenario. An Anglophone visiting a market to buy some items (markets like Dantokpa, Ouando, etc.) in Benin Republic will be able to communicate freely in English with real Beninois sellers. The situation is not the same in Anglophone countries like Nigeria, where our level of French is nothing to write home about.

What we need to do

Nigeria needs to trace back her language policy as it affects the curricula used in our schools. When policies are made to favor French Language studies, such policies must be openly implemented. The second foreign language that readily comes to mind after English is French. The support enjoyed by the teaching and learning of English should be shifted to French until the society and every home completely embrace it. Our school curriculum should be fashioned in a way that nobody will gain admission into university without a credit pass in French, like the experience of students in Francophone countries studying English. The Federal Government should revisit the year abroad program in France for French teachers, as was practiced in the early 1980s. Every individual should be self-determined, particularly our teeming youths, because knowledge of only the English Language is inadequate to fit into the world of today. It is also noticeable that no language is sufficient as languages loan words to one another. A large number of English words used today are from French and vice versa. It is therefore expedient to change our minds and values and join other nations of the world in the quest to make our nation internationally bilingual.

Conclusion

This chapter examines the position and reflection of the teaching and learning of French in Nigeria (an Anglophone country), and English in Benin Republic (a Francophone country). We make an effort to briefly analyze the language policies of the two countries involved in this study in terms of the curriculum operated in the primary, secondary and tertiary education, specifically as it affects the teaching and learning of French in Nigeria and English in Benin Republic. It is therefore our view that this discussion will reposition the teaching and learning of French in Nigeria in the same manner as English is effectively taught in Benin Republic.

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VULNERABILITY OF STREET CHILDREN TO SUBSTANCE ABUSE IN KEFFI

Sarkin Noma Yahaya Sabo

Abstract

Despite not attaining adulthood, a street child carries the obligation of taking charge of his/herself; lives on the street, and hustles for money and other things to make life better. While on the street, such a child becomes acquainted with unscrupulous behaviours as a result of frequent interaction with people of different views and backgrounds. By this exposure, street children are socialized into subcultures that glorify substance abuse which negates the dominant societal culture. It is in this light that this work has set out to understand the patterns and consequences of substance use as well as the coping strategies employed by street children in navigating substance usage. This study essentially established on a qualitative research design and extensive content analysis to analyze both in-depth interviews and key informant interviews, the study found that substance usage is social and mostly peer influenced. Also, it was found that the use of the substances by street children is done in groups rather than alone, while cannabis is the most abused substance which smoking is the most preferred method of cannabis abuse. Furthermore, the result revealed that substance use by children was accompanied by both positive and negative costs. However, street children's attempts to disengage from substance usage have often been a futile effort as many have given up trying to stop it. Therefore, the study concludes that neighborhood structure, peer influence, access to the substance, family disintegration, and subculture socialization are all major pull factors for street children to engage in substance abuse.

Sarkin Noma Yahaya Sabo Department of Sociology Nasarawa State University, Keffi

Keywords: Substance Abuse, Street Children, Vulnerability**Introduction**

Globally, millions of children face the reality of living their everyday lives on the streets. The quality of life of these children is very poor as their vulnerability to violence, deprived living conditions, and a lack of access to necessities; healthcare and education become even more. According to UNICEF (2015), a street child includes any boy or girl who has not attained adulthood, for whom the street has become his or her habitual abode and sources of livelihood, one who is inadequately protected, supervised, or directed by a significant other or responsible adult. Also, street children from the Nigerian constitutional stand, are children less than 18 who maintain minimal or no interaction with their families, and by extension, lacks adequate protection, supervision, and guidance which exposes them to many health and psychosocial problems. Street children spend most or all of their time on the street and such a child shoulders full responsibilities of his/her life. Street children are further seen as either a child 'on the street' or 'of the street', that 'of the street' lives and sleeps on the streets as their homes. Children 'on the street' have their homes and only come to the streets to hustle for money during the day and return home in the evening. Substance use is part of risky behaviours in which street children are known to engage in. They may be curious about how substances will affect their behaviour or thinking. Alcohol and drugs can induce a very wide range of feelings. For example, they can induce a sense of calmness, increase energy, enhance confidence or alter how sensations are experienced. Some street children may turn to drugs or alcohol as a coping mechanism from poor life chances. They may choose alcohol or drug intoxication as a method 'to switch off' or 'to make problems go away' (Ongwae, 2016).

Excess consumption of destructive substances such as alcohol, cannabis, tobacco, marijuana, stimulants, pharmaceutical drugs, inhalants, and solvents have increased at an alarming rate over the years (Heatly, 2016). The World Health Organization (2017) considers substance abuse as a "maladaptive pattern of use indicated by continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent social, occupational, psychological or physical problem that is caused or exacerbated by the use (or by) recurrent use in a situation in which it is physically hazardous." Substance abuse is a universal phenomenon that cuts across people of different cultural, religious, ethnic, and

socioeconomic backgrounds. Despite the efforts of the various tiers of government to stem its tide in Nigeria, there has been a consistent rapid rise in the number of cases especially among children, adolescents, and youths in the streets who are 10-24 years of age. This has resulted in an increase in morbidity, cases of cultism, violent disorders, mental disorders, and high mortality among Nigerian youths (Tarfa, 2021; Oche, 2021). According to a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in 2017, an estimated 14.8 percent representing 14.3 million Nigerians between 15 and 64 years of age had used drugs (UNODC, 2018). This estimate is even under-reported since drug users below 15 years are not accounted for, as such, if they are included, the estimates are likely to go beyond the figures reported. This is because there is a sharp increase in the proportion of street children in Nigeria who are using different types of drugs and substances. Some of these children sometimes engage in vulnerable activities such as intake of alcohol, cigarette, cannabis, wheelbarrow pushing, and carrying heavy loads (Ogunkan&Adeboyejo, 2014). Most of these street children hardly return home as the streets automatically have become their abode (Malindi&Cekiso, 2014).

A study by Qadri, Kumar, and Rasool (2013) showed that there is a high prevalence rate of substance use among children in urban centres than those children in the rural areas and of course substance use is more prevalent among male street children than their female counterpart. This is true as most drugs are sourced within the urban areas. In a related study by Onzabergu (2018) on the causes and effects of substance abuse in communities, an overwhelming majority of the respondents indicated that Cannabis, popularly known as “Indian hemp” or “weed” was the commonly abused drug in the community. also, a significant number of the respondents revealed that narcotics and alcohol were also among the drugs commonly abused by the youth. This is similar to the findings of the UNODC (2018) survey in Nigeria where cannabis was reported to be the most commonly used drug with an estimated 10.8 percent (10.6 million) users. In addition, the World Health Organization (2014) highlighted the prevalent substance abused by street children to include but not be limited to alcohol, nicotine, opioids, hallucinogens, cannabis, Hypnosdatives, stimulants, and inhalants. Similarly, Santa-Maria, Narendorf, and Cross (2018) reported that substance abuse is significantly higher among children living on and off the street than those children who have a family and a shelter to return to. This sentiment was also noted in a study by Singh, Thapar, Kaur, Kumar, and Saini (2017) where they found a 91.7% prevalence of

substance abuse among homeless children.

There are several triggers to substance abuse by street children. Studies have shown that different triggers such as poverty, family disorganization, peer influence, stress, media, illiteracy, exploitation of the child as a wage earner, and neighborhood structure among others are all factors that influence street children to retreat to substance abuse (Fiasorgbor & Fiasorgbor, 2015; Hossain & Alam, 2016; Bah, 2018; Ikoh, Smah, Okwanya, Clement & Aposhi, 2019). Gaidhane *et al.*, Zahiruddin, Waghmare, Shanbhag, Zodpey, and Joharapurkar (2010) found in a study that the most common reasons for substance abuse by street children were peer pressure (62.1%), experimentation (36.3%) or to boost self-confidence (28.7%). Alawa (2021) states that children abuse substances due to curiosity, a form of recreation to cope with stress which further leads to a complex set of social, medical, and economic problems (UNODC, 2018; Tarfa, 2021). Regarding risk factors, substance abuse was significantly associated with domestic violence, maltreatment of the child, nuclear families, runaway status, and the working process. The influence of peers also plays a role in the pattern of street children's vulnerability to substance abuse. To buttress this, Ayub, Kumar, and Rasool (2017) observed that 4 out of 5 street children are out of school. Hence, some of them go out on the street to beg, where they also meet various categories of other street children who introduce them to substance use. In the course of their interactions, they get socialized into the methods of taking these substances. While some smoke the substances, other methods include; sniffing, oral administration, and injection among others.

Aside from the foregoing, there is perhaps another factor that is highly found in the literature; the neighborhood structure of the street children can be described as largely disorganized, which makes the substance abuse subculture thrive even more easily. Most of the street children stay in low-income areas which lack basic infrastructures like housing and other amenities, hence, the majority of them live on the street (Hossain & Alam, 2016) to carry out their survival activities. Street children abuse drugs and other substances because, either a particular substance adds something to their lives or it temporarily solves a problem. There is a connection between the problems of life on the street and the effects that substances sometimes produce; for example; lessens hunger pains, boredom, fear, feelings of shame, depression, and hopelessness. It also helps to solve the difficulty in falling asleep that arises because of noise, overcrowding, room temperature, and mosquito bites (Bah 2018). According to

the Global Burden of Disease Study (2013), the use of substances among adolescents and young people in the street has become a subject of public health concern worldwide partly because of its potential to contribute to unintentional and intentional problems. Moreover, previous studies showed that children living in the street are exposed to delinquent behaviours such as stealing, alcohol abuse, cigarette, drugs, and other hard substances, which often affect their physical and psychological development (Meltzer, Ford, Bebbington & Vostanis, 2012; Ballet *et al.*, 2013).

Despite the increasing knowledge and awareness of the serious social and health consequences associated with drug and substance abuse, many street children use them. Also, despite the variations in the leading causes to the emergence and development of the problem of street children at the global level, street children in Keffi show many similarities to street children worldwide. Based on this fact, the **major** aim of this research is to examine the vulnerability of street children to substance abuse in Keffi. Specific issues to be examined include the patterns, consequences of substance among street children, and the coping strategies of street children to drug abuse.

Theoretical Framework

The social disorganization theory according to Shaw and Mckay believes that deviant behaviours are developed as a result of the breakdown in the social control and organization of the society. The theory as advanced by Shaw and Mckay (1942) focuses on the relationship that exists between neighborhood structure, social control, and crime (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). It is believed that the structure of a neighborhood plays a role in determining whether it will be favourable or unfavourable for deviant behaviours. Different elements such as urbanization, family disorganization, poverty, and neighborhood structure among others have been identified as factors contributing to the development of street children in society. As a result of the breakdown of norms and order in the society, which could be a function of the above-listed factors, the society becomes disorganized with little or no control over behaviours. Many street children in the course of navigating society for survival meet and interact with different kinds of people. Due to the loss of social control in society, different deviant subcultures are developed on the street, which is largely unorganized. Therefore, as street children spend the most time on the street, they become vulnerable to the prevailing antisocial behaviours and habits in the neighborhood. The social disorganization theory can explain the link between

conditions of the society or neighborhood and the development of street children, however, it does not account for the socialization processes which enable the street children to get socialized into the subculture of the neighborhood. This justifies the adoption of the Differential Association Theory.

Edwin Sutherland's Differential Association Theory postulates that individuals learn deviant behaviour through frequent interactions and association with other individuals where such behaviour is reinforced (Zembroski, 2011). Many street children in the course of their activities on the street engage with themselves. This could be ascribed to the similar goal of survival which they all have. As a result, these street children begin to see themselves as belonging to the same group within the society and this makes them associate with themselves. This exposes them to the behaviours in the group, as such, their learning is influenced by the frequency and duration of interaction with the group. Many of the street children get exposed to different substances as they move and interact with the group as part of their surviving habits. Hence, this makes them adopt the substance abuse subculture of the group since they consider such group as their reference group. Therefore, they become vulnerable to substance abuse in the process of their interaction and association with other street children. What follows is the conceptual framework.




Figure 1.0

Methods

The study was conducted in Keffi Local Government Area. Keffi is located in Nasarawa-west senatorial district, Nasarawa State, Nigeria. It has an area of 138 km² and a population of about 92,664 at the 2006 census and is 50 kilometers from Abuja, the Federal Capital. The study research adopted a qualitative approach where the in-depth interview (IDI) and Key informant Interview (KII) were the principal instruments employed to elicit relevant information from street children between 10 and 17 years. This approach was necessitated due to the need to understand personal experiences of substance abuse, coping strategies, and consequences they experienced. Also, the use of the qualitative research method provides the opportunity to capture emotions and raw feelings that are integral parts of the data presentation and analysis. Thus, in total, 45 In-Depth Interviews (IDIs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted among street children. A multi-stage sampling technique was adopted to select participants and this was done in two stages.

In stage one, a purposive sampling technique was employed to select Keffi Local government area. This was a more efficient technique as it provided access to a self-selected population for the research. Also, because of the number of economic activities going on in Keffi coupled with its proximity to Abuja, street children likely to be found there. In stage two, a snowball sampling technique was adopted to identify key persons who first referred and introduced the researchers to some street children in Keffi. This technique was required because of the difficulty in assessing street children's experiences. The data collected were analyzed using content analysis. The procedure began with verbatim translation and transcription of tape recordings of interviews. Afterward, common themes were generated from the responses and categorized thematically accordingly in line with the objectives. The results were presented according to the majority and important minor responses. Verbatim quotes were then used to demonstrate important responses and to support relevant explanations.

In addition, ethical considerations were observed throughout the fieldwork. IDIs and KIIs were conducted with participants following prior permission from parents/guardians and verbal consent from the participants. More so, the researchers briefed the subject on the general purpose of the study as well as information regarding anonymity and confidentiality.

Results and Discussions

This part is dedicated to the analysis, presentation, and interpretation of data gotten from the field conducted on the vulnerability of street children to substance abuse in Keffi. The data obtained from the IDI and KII conducted for respondents within the ages of 6 to 17 is presented below.

Patterns of vulnerability of street children to substance abuse in Keffi

Respondents were asked about the type of substance they took, the age they started using or taking this substance, who introduced them to the use of these substances, the method adopted in using the substances, and the location where they usually took them. Most of the respondents gave responses bothering around the use of weed as the most abused substance. They also elicited the internal social control mechanism used to ensure that everyone in the group continues to smoke weed. Therefore, one of the participants' views was captured as:

I started smoking weed at the age of 14. I often went with my friends to a place that is far. There we would take different positions some people would sit while others stood. We often talked about what happened during the day then one of us that sells would enter with a bag that often contained weed. He would sell to us many of us that wanted to smoke if you didn't have money to buy you could share. Anyone that didn't buy or smoke was often laughed at and booed. Sometimes they are often warned not to return to the place. (IDI/Male/16years/Keffi/2021)

A key informant stated that not all street children make use of the substance, because some of them do not value them. His thought was captured as:

I know one of them that works around my shop, he does not engage in substance intake. Even though they see him as an outcast, he still does not smoke any of those things (KII/Male/40yrs/Trader/Keffi/2021).

Another key informant also expressed that;

Majority of them are doing it because they see their friends smoking marijuana or cigarette, sniffing tobacco and drinking alcohol. Some of them picked interest in drinking dry gin after they have been sent on several occasion to buy it (KII/Male/35yrs/Street Trader/Keffi/2021).

Another interviewee also said:

I was introduced into smoking by my big friend who I worked with in the garage when I was 10years old. We always carry load on wheelbarrow together. I noticed that he was always with a white stick in his mouth and I often wondered what it was. One day I asked him to give me to put in my mouth but he refused. One day I found one of the white sticks on the ground and put it in my mouth. I started coughing seriously but then I tried it another time and I did not cough again(IDI/Male/14years/Keffi/2021).

Similarly, a key informant revealed that introduction to the use of the substance was self-motivated. His opinion was captured thus:

Some of these children are not taught on how to use those substances such as cigarette they can just pick a cigarette leftover and smoke it and they become addicts(KII/Female/45years/street trader/Keffi/2021).

Based on the result gotten from the content analysis of the interviews conducted, vulnerable street children were already familiar with substance use, they all admitted to using different types of substance within the last three years. Our findings show that a significant number of the participants abuse marijuana, others admitted to taking only cigarettes, and few of them seldom take Rohypnol. This is similar to the result of a study conducted by Onzabergu (2018) on the causes and effects of substance abuse in communities, which revealed an overwhelming majority of the respondents indicated that cannabis, popularly known as “Indian hemp” or “weed” was the commonly abused drug in the community.

Having established marijuana as the main substance abuse among vulnerable street children, the common pattern of substance use among those interviewed was smoking. Other patterns of substance use among vulnerable street children, include; cooking it with meals, chewing, and drinking. The participants also supplied the fact that these substances were often taken in hideouts and enjoyed better when taken in a group.

The result shows that a significant number of street children were introduced to substance abuse at the age of 14. Others claimed they were introduced to substance abuse at the young age of 10 and 12 years respectively. This finding aligns with Qadri *et al*(2013) postulation that the common age of onset of

substance abuse was between the ages of 13 – 16 years.

Many of the interviewees also affirmed that they were influenced to using substances as a result of peer influence as often they would gather together in hideouts to take these substances and anyone who did not partake was seen as an outcast. This shows a form of subculture and can be related to Edwin Sutherland's differential association theory. Although the dominant response about how these children were influenced into using substances was peer influence, others were introduced to using these substances as a result of curiosity, there were very few of them who said they were influenced by their family members.

Consequences of substance abuse on street children

Participants were asked if they ever felt any adverse effect as a result of using any substance and which peculiar effects have they experienced, they were also asked the social, physical, and legal consequences of substance abuse among vulnerable street children. The responses gathered from these questions were analyzed and one of the interviewees said;

The side effect I experienced the first time I was introduced to marijuana and cigarette smoking was severe abdominal pain and I coughed for days. There was also the general feeling of tiredness that I felt when I began taking the substance (IDI/Male/14years/Keffi/2021).

Another participant added that;

When I began to take these things, I could not sleep for several weeks. When I told my street boss that I could not sleep, I was advised to consume more of the substance I take or combine it with another substance in order to overcome the sleeplessness. (IDI/Male/14years/Keffi/2021).

(IDI/Male/15years/Keffi)

Similarly, a key informant opined that;

Most of them experience one adverse effect or the other, while some complain of constant migraine, stomach ache, cough, others complain of dizziness and general weakness of the body. There was a day I overheard one of them telling his friend that he has started to feel

numb to pain, that no matter how hard you hit or flog him once he has taken his wraps, he rarely feels the pain (KII /Male /35years /Keffi /2021).

Another key informant said that;

..... There is this particular one among them that always spoke to himself whenever he is high. And at other times he begins to address people he knows as if they are strangers and sometimes share experiences of places, he had been recently even though we all know he has not traveled out of Keffi in almost 10 years(KII/Male/60years/Keffi/2021).

Another interviewee explained that;

I had a friend then who takes this substance and when he does, he will start vomiting the little food he had taken since morning, he would complain weakness of the body and lost a lot weight within a short period of time(IDI/Male/16years/Keffi/2021).

The result of the content analysis revealed that a significant number of the participants admitted to having experienced some adverse of drugs and substances. The key informants and interviewees mentioned sleeplessness, hallucination, coughing, vomiting, and dizziness as peculiar adverse effects experienced by substance users. These results were similar to an extent with Bah's (2018) findings which states that coughing, weight loss, and dizziness are some of the effects of drug use. However, some of the parallel effects mentioned by the key informants and participants were sleeplessness vomiting and hallucination. Results also revealed that all the adverse effects mentioned by the participants and informants were largely based on what they observed with themselves or others, none of them spoke on the clinically proven adverse effects of drug use among the study population.

Based on the social, physical, psychological and legal consequences of substance abuse among vulnerable street children, the result gathered shows that societal or parental rejection are the social consequences of substance use, permanent marks or disability are the physical consequences, mental instability are the psychological consequences, while arrest and prosecution are the legal consequences of substance use. The interviewees and informants attested to these consequences are as follows;

My family told me they never want to see me or have anything to do with me again unless I stop using this substance, I remember my father saying he curse anyone who ever associates with me again. Though, I have never been arrested by the police before neither have I been prosecuted, however, I have been involved in a few fights one of which resulted in this scar on myhead(IDI/Male/13years/Keffi/2021).

Another said;

My family has not rejected me even though they are aware that I take dry gin, my mother does advise me to desist from taking it and I promised I was going to change. I don't fight with people when I drink my dry gin and no law enforcement officer has ever arrested me before(IDI/Male/14years/Keffi/2021).

A key informant revealed that;

A good number of them that you see here have been rejected by some or all of their family members. That one that greeted me before we started this interview, his father was here some months ago to tell him that he has disowned him and can only return when leaves the street and stops using the substance. I have not heard or seen any of them being mentally unstable. These children avoid been arrested or prosecuted because they avoid public places when taking whatever substance, they use(KII/Male/39years/Keffi/2021).

A participant's view was captured as:

We are a street family, there is no way we can reject ourselves. Fighting that leads to maiming and other physical damages are not common among us. We don't snitch on anybody taking our substance that is none of us have been arrested by police or NDLEA.

(IDI/Male/17years/Keffi/2021).

Another interview said;

I have three friends and all of us have been rejected by our parent for participating in substance use. We sometimes wrestle among ourselves when there is dispute over marijuana but it does not lead to injuries or death. We have a secret place where we stash our marijuana in order for us not to get caught with them in public or being arrested

for possession(IDI/Male/15years/Keffi/2021).

Our findings revealed that a significant number of the align with Sahu and Sahu (2012) that the abuse of alcohol and other drugs by youth may result in family crises and jeopardize many aspects of family life, sometimes resulting in family dysfunction. Both siblings and parents are profoundly affected by alcohol- and drug-involved youth. Sahu and Sahu (2012) did not consider some other aspects of our findings that some of them have adopted elderly figures on the street as family members and the few of them that were not rejected still get counseled by their parents.

Contrary to Sahu and Sahu (2012) claims that physical and psychological instability are consequences of substance abuse, this study findings however showed that substance use among vulnerable street children has little or no physical or psychological consequences. Also, because the use of substances among vulnerable street children is clandestinely carried, the findings show that a significant number of them evade arrest and prosecution. This finding also proves contrary to Sahu & Sahu's (2012) claims that arrest, adjudication, and intervention by the juvenile justice system are eventual consequences for many youths engaged in alcohol and other drug use.

Coping Strategies of Street Children of Substance Abuse

Participants were asked how often they used the substances, what they did when they could not have access to the substance. They were also asked if they felt remorseful about taking the substance and they have ever considered quitting.

Based on the results obtained from the content analysis, it was noted that most of these street children use these substances on a regular and daily basis. They admitted that they were used to taking this substance and could not function well without taking them. It was also reported that when they were unable to get access to the substance, they either borrowed money from their friends to buy or steal from people in their environs.

However, some of them looked for an alternative substance to take apart from the regular one they do take such as dry gin, cigarettes (for those that take only cannabis). Some participants pointed out the fact that they could not do without this substance because not taking it in a day would result in physical stress and less productivity which could anger their "oga". Some revealed that when they are sad about life or are emotionally stressed, they took these substances and

whenever they did, they felt a whole lot better.

When asked if they wanted to quit, the majority of the children were indifferent as few of them outrightly said they were not going to quit while a very few of them said they wanted to quit. One of the responses given by participants was:

I smoke everyday especially in the morning. I smoke in the morning to give me energy to push wheelbarrow with big load very well and I don't feel too much pain when doing so. If I take it at night, I will be restless and won't be able to sleep well. If I don't smoke, I can't push the wheelbarrow well I will be feeling tired and I will be slow and my oga in the garage will be very angry with me and sometimes the customer I am helping to carry load will be shouting at me that I am too slow and they won't pay me well. If I don't get weed to buy, I often borrow money from my friends which I always pay back. I am not sure if I want to quit smoking because if I do it will affect my work (IDI/Male/15years/Street Child/Keffi/2021).

In an in-depth interview, a participant expressed that when he cannot access the substance, he engages in stealing and use the money to buy the substance for consumption. He expressed that;

I usually go out to steal anything I can sell to get money and use to buy the substance if I do not have (IDI/Male/14yrs/street child/Keffi/2021).

From the analysis, narratives, and interpretations above, the following findings are the outcomes of the study in relation to the objectives of the study.

Cannabis, alcohol, and cigarette have been identified as the common substances used by street children. This can be said to be due to the fact that these street children stay in proximity to parks where they interact with touts who are likely to also be frequent substance users. Cannabis has however been indicated to be the most used substance. This is similar to the findings of Onzabergu (2018) who reported that cannabis is most prevalent among street children. The influence of peers has been identified as a major driver of substance abuse among street children. This is because many of them claim to have been introduced to a substance by their friends and people they interact with on the street. Various studies have also shown that different indices such as poverty, family disorganization, peer influence, stress, media, illiteracy, and neighborhood structure among others are all factors that could make street children liable to substance abuse (Fiasorgbor&Fiasorgbor, 2015; Hossain

&Alam, 2016; Bah, 2018).

Also, from this study, it can be deduced that despite that the activities of street children are not strictly regulated, many of them still do not openly abuse these substances due to their deviant status in society. Hence, the majority of them abuse these substances in hideouts such as uncompleted buildings and other enclosed areas which also serves as a dwelling place for some of them, according to Salaam (2011) and Bah (2018). Findings also revealed that many of the street children abuse these substances in a group. This can as well be linked to the fact that many of them were introduced to substance usage through friends and interactions they make on the street. Therefore, they engage in the abuse of substances as part of the ways of getting socialized into the substance culture on the street.

Furthermore, it was found that many of the street children predicated their abuse of different substances on their perceived usefulness to them. This is because many of them in the study believe that the abuse of these substances makes them more energetic to work more on the street and as well gives them boldness among their peers to prevent intimidation. However, many of them still suffer from various adverse effects of substances. Some of these as revealed in the study include hunger, dizziness, intoxication otherwise referred to as “highness” and headache among others. These findings are also in consonance with Bah (2018) who reported that the common consequences of substance abuse are largely aggressiveness, stomach upset, intoxication, and drunkenness to mention a few. Nevertheless, despite the adverse effect of the substances on the children, many of them still take the substances because they have become addicted to them. Hence, without abusing these substances, they may not be able to function well on the street.

In conclusion, further findings in the study showed that many of the street children rely on substances to overcome the challenges they face on the street. This is reflected in the frequency of their usage, with many indicating that they use the substances regularly. Some of these street children are also addicted to these substances, therefore they always ensure that they find the means to get the substances. While some keep money aside for buying the substances, some get it from their friends. Bearing in mind that some of the smoke in a group, it becomes easier for them to cope by sharing the substances with their friends. Nonetheless, some of the street children still consider quitting the abuse of substances owing to the consequences and negative perception that substance

abuse has in society. This is in tandem with the finding of Gaidhane *et al.* (2010) who found in a study that almost three-quarters (70.0%) of all substance users want to quit and about 40% had tried to quit but cannot, due to the associated dangers of substance abuse. Quitting is however difficult for most of them as long as they remain on the street. Therefore, this makes them adopt different coping mechanisms to the abuse of substances.

Based on the above, the study recommends that:

- i. Street children should be able to have access to governmental vocational training, without the pre-requisites of legal credentials. Such a project can be strongly supported by all NGOs working with street children that believe in the efficacy of the vocational training programs provided at the governmental level, which street children should benefit from.
- ii. Street education should play a central role in reaching out to a far greater number of street children who cannot be reached through the center-based approach. Training of ex-street children on methods of peer-to-peer counseling can be very effective. However, selection and training of ex-street children should be made through the NGOs involved.

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WOMEN, INFORMAL CROSS-BORDER TRADE, AND SECURITY IN SOUTH-WESTERN NIGERIA

Funmilayo I. Agbaje, Ph.D

Abstract

The importance of border security for the peace and prosperity of the entire West African region cannot be overemphasised. Informal Cross-border Trade among Nigerian women has been recognised as a dynamic that happens on a large scale in all cross-border areas of West Africa. Despite the fact that there are security concerns related to the largely unregulated nature of informal cross-border trade, it also carries a potential that can be harnessed for ensuring security and improving the livelihood of the people because it serves as a source of income to about 41 percent of the people's population. The focus of this paper, therefore, is on the correlation between informal cross border trade by women in the south-western part of Nigeria and the security of the states. This is achieved through a review of the existing scholarly works and examination of the general characteristics of informal cross-border trading as well as the security issues surrounding the practice.

Funmilayo I. Agbaje, Ph.D Department of Peace, Security and Humanitarian Studies Faculty of Multidisciplinary Studies University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

Keywords: *Cross-border; trade, women, security, Nigeria*

Introduction

A key factor in the important issue of security for the peace and prosperity of the entire West African region (as indeed in much of Africa) is the dynamic and large-scale informal cross-border (ICBT) trade mainly engaged in by women, including women in south-western Nigeria who constitute the case that is reported in this paper. Elements in the literature do define informal cross-border trade as a trade that is generally legal but largely unregulated, mostly undocumented, unregistered, and unaccounted for in countries' official state statistics and national accounts (Simavi, et. al., 2010: 1). Others (for instance, Ogalo 2010) distinguish between the activities of the sector as either legitimate or illegitimate, depending on the income opportunities created by such activities. Thus, legitimate income opportunities may include cross-border trading opportunities around such small-scale activities such as farming, cloth-selling and tailoring, hairdressing/barbing, commercial transport operations, and petty trading, while illegitimate ones may include smuggling, human trafficking and prostitution, among others (Gössling and Schumacher, 2012).

Nigeria is located to the eastern side of the West African coast and shares borders with Cameroon further to its east, Chad to the northeast, Niger to the north, Benin to the west and the Gulf of Guinea along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean to the south. Cross-border trade with these neighbours, among such other countries as Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire who do not share physical boundaries with it, have been very active, while landlocked neighbouring countries of Niger and Chad rely, to some extent, on Nigeria for imports and exports.

Two elements need to be noted at this stage. First, surveys suggest that informal cross-border trade represents a significant proportion of regional cross-border trade in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in Nigeria, a recent estimate by the Central Bank showed that the informal exports flowing to neighbouring countries account for US\$ 6,912.96 million, corresponding to around 39.9 percent of Nigeria's official export flows to these countries (CBN, 2016). A substantial proportion of informal cross-border trade in Nigeria concerns staple

food commodities such as rice, maize, beans and cattle and low quality consumer goods such as shoes, clothes and electronic appliances. It is mainly engaged in by individual traders and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises often trading in relatively small consignments (Lesser and Moise-Leeman, 2009: 41). Second, women play a key role in this informal trade. For example, it is estimated that 70 percent of informal cross-border trade in southern Africa is by women (UNIFEM, 2009: 4). In West Africa, the contribution of women informal cross-border traders to national GDPs has been estimated at 64 percent of value-added trade in Benin, 46 percent in Mali and 41 percent in Chad (Charmes, 2000 in UNIFEM, 2010).

Against this background, this paper examines its subject, using Seme and Aseri-Owode border communities in the southwest of Nigeria as a case. In an attempt to illustrate the porosity of the border and the likelihood of criminals taking advantage of the situation as well as the circumstances of women traders, the paper highlights the ease with which transnational crime and insecurity could thrive in such border communities in the absence of efficient and effective border security measures. It underscores the extent to which atrocities can be committed under the guise of informal cross-border trading in which women feature prominently. While the danger has not been shown to be alarmingly high, the likelihood that the loose security of borders of focus and the largely informal nature of women engagement in cross border trade may enhance the possibility of criminals exploiting this platform to commit crimes such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, smuggling and moving terrorists and contraband goods should also not be overlooked, unless mechanisms are put in place to curtail such illegal activities. West Africa has become notorious for instability and armed conflict and is increasingly known for transnational criminal networks. Unregulated movement across borders, therefore, creates security threats in the sub-region.

Statement of the Problem

Studies have focused on the impact of cross border trade on food security and on women participation in such trade in relation to its nature and role in income and consumption levels (Malecki 1993, Awang et al. 2013, Ndlela 2006, Olutayo 2005, Little, 2010). However, there is an urgent need to add to

scholarly attention (cf. Alusala, 2010) that has been paid to the nexus of cross-border trade and state security beyond those parts of Africa that have been so studied.

Noteworthy is the fact that while the marginality of cross border trade has been a subject of debate (Peberdy 2000), limited research has been conducted on the link between women traders and vulnerability issues relating to such traders and the people at large in terms of threats to livelihood and security. Peberdy (2002:36-37) argues that “the characterization of informal cross border trade as 'informal' has negative impacts on it”, making it to be viewed often as an illegal activity. The consequence is that the government, as well as policy makers, tend to ignore the sector. Meanwhile, ignoring it hampers the attention required for security in that sector by government and private interests alike within the local sphere and in the country in general.

Moreover, collecting reliable data on ICBT is a difficult exercise. The image and reality of illegality in the trade prevents women traders from securing full recognition from formal structures of government and organised business as important traders, which leaves their contributions in such areas as trade expansion and economic growth largely unrecorded and therefore hardly documented in terms of volumes of trade and the conditions these traders experience (Brenton et al, 2011).

This means that the evident contribution of informal cross-border traders to trade expansion, social well-being and economic growth is largely unrecorded and largely 'invisible' to officials and decision makers. The implication of ignoring this segment of the trading population is significant: it means that policy decisions are being made in response to incomplete data and information, and that informal business may be missed in policy decisions and not offered the support it needs to expand and perform system-wide roles creditably.

Literature Review

As indicated earlier, informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is usually carried out by small businesses and unrecorded in official statistics; it often involves trade in legitimately produced goods and services, and others not so legitimately

produced or procured, that escape the regulatory framework of government, and as such are often able to avoid certain tax and regulatory burdens (Njiwa, 2013; Afrika and Ajumbo, 2012). It is necessity driven, in certain cases (for trade in consumer items, for instance) involving low capital as well as skills (Berner, et. al., 2012), and plays a vital role in poverty reduction, employment, and income opportunities (Kabira, 2006) (Cagatay and Ozler, 1995). Alusala (2010) and Njikam and Teshouassi (2011) add that it often involves bypassing border posts, concealment of goods, under-reporting, false classification, under-invoicing and other similar tricks.

Despite the fact that it is difficult to get an accurate overview of the extent of informal cross-border trade in Nigeria and, more specifically, in the south-western region of the country, surveys suggest that it still represents a significant proportion of regional cross-border trade. According to Lesser and Moisé-Leeman (2009), the informal sector still constitutes an important part of developing country economies. In Africa, it is estimated to represent 43 percent of official gross domestic product (GDP), thus being almost equivalent to the formal sector. It provides short-term solutions to poor households, but in the longer term, it could pose a serious challenge to economic development if not properly handled.

UNIFEM (2008) reports that women constitute between 70 percent to 80 percent of people engaged in cross-border trade activities such as moving goods through border crossing points as trade is one activity that women can take up with little or no resources. Moreover, Charmes (2000: page?) posits that women in cross-border trade “employ 1.2 people in their home businesses; support on average 3.2 children as well as 3.1 dependents who are not children or spouses”. In the words of Morris and Saul (2000, page?), ‘women cross-border traders (WCBTs) are now more diverse and engage in higher value and volume of goods than the traditional sale of a few items every market day’. Similarly, Desai (2009) maintains that cross-border trade has enabled many women to become financially independent.

In recent times, scholars have paid attention to challenges and constraints encountered by women who engage in informal cross-border trading. The most common constraints mentioned include inadequate public and private

transportation; multiple control posts; multiple and arbitrary taxations of goods; insecurity and harassment; limited market information; communication costs; language barriers; and the problem of exchange (Dejene 2001; Mzizi 2010; Njikam and Tchouassi 2010), among several others. On the other hand are several benefits that accrue to women in cross border trading. For instance, cross border trade enables many women to become financially independent (Desai, 2001). Many female household heads have broken out of poverty through cross border trading (Muzvidziwa, 1998), and often opt for cross border trade as a strategy to ease competition and cope with poverty (Shamu, 2005) while others (such as Dejene, 2001) link these women's activities to national and regional economic development. In general, informal cross-border trade is an important coping mechanism for women especially at the grassroots level to reduce poverty and promote economic income for their families; hence they make up the majority of the traders and rely on it as their primary means of subsistence.

As indicated earlier, however, one gap that this paper addresses relates to the interfaces of women, CBT and security in those communities that have hardly been considered by extant literature in this regard. The case focused upon in this instance is that of cross-border traders in south-western Nigeria, and it is done against the backdrop of persistent and increasing trans-border crimes in Nigeria, especially from the 1980s and 1990s (Bayard, et al, 1999; Williams, 1998).

Methodology

This is a qualitative study. Data collected from both primary and secondary sources were utilised in this study. This study was carried out in Seme and Aseri Owode border areas of Lagos state. The selected border communities between Benin republic and Nigeria are prominent in cross border trade in the southwest Nigeria. Women commercial activities are mostly observed in the two selected border communities. The primary sources of data were key informant and in-depth interviews with women involved in informal cross-border trading in the two selected border areas. Other primary data sources included non-participant observation. Sixteen women informal cross-border traders were interviewed in-depth while two cross-border bus drivers and two customs officials provided

key information, which were categorised and discussed along emerging themes. The secondary sources comprised documents on border issues, publications by the government and international bodies. The data collected was content analysed.

Analysis and Discussion

As indicated earlier, informal cross-border trade is trade between neighbouring countries often engaged in by vulnerable, small, unregistered traders. The informality refers to the status of the traders which are largely unregistered by/with government and its agencies. Cross-border trade by Nigerian women has been in existence since the colonial era. West African women have been involved in trade, both within their country and across borders, particularly in the distribution of food and small consumer items and in the trade in services (Jawando, Adeyemi, and Oguntola-Laguda, 2012). This notion was buttressed by some of the elderly participants of this study who stressed that cross-border trade by women has been practiced before, during and after the arrival of the colonialist especially in the southwest Nigeria (In-depth interview, 2018). According to Morris and Saul (2000), informal cross-border trade in West Africa has increased since the 1990s in the wake of economic liberalisation policies, population growth, and urbanization. Informal cross-border trade has gender dimensions. In major cross-border posts within south-western Nigeria, women account for a high percentage of informal traders (Njiwa et al., 2010). This female-intensive sector has broad poverty and development ramifications. It constitutes a vital source of employment and livelihood for the poor, in particular for low-income and low-skilled women, in border districts as well as in the municipals. A study participant mentioned:

This trade is our means of survival...we feed ourselves and pay our children's school fee from this trade... (In-depth Interview, 2018).

Another interviewee said:

A lot of us are widows while some are single mothers. We engage in cross-border trade, not for crimes but to take care of our family (Indepth-Interview, 2018).

Noteworthy is the fact that many of the traders that are involved in ICBT are self-employed women. They are not able to enter the formal sector due to various reasons, including difficulties in getting access to traveling documents or trading licenses, overcharging by customs officials, and lack of knowledge of official procedures. Moreover, due to the nature of this trade and the lack of an adequate legal framework, the informal women traders are often faced with corruption with officials soliciting for bribes in order to facilitate smuggling, sexual abuse and confiscation of goods. The complexities include the fact that while these women can serve as vehicles of insecurities, they can also, through proper regulations, be a potent vehicle for enhancing security (Key-Informant Interview, 2018). Unleashing the complexities of gender dimension to informal cross-border trading and the security of the state, therefore, is germane at this time when there is a rise in security-related matters in Nigeria. The opportunities offered through ICBT relate to regional integration, income and employment opportunities, and the changing role within the household in terms of women involvement in the decision-making process. (Elson, 1995).

Cross-border trading has resulted in new trans-national networks supported by common languages, culture and kinship. Tsikata (2009) explains that residential regulations during the colonial period restricted women's access to urban areas and confined them to rural areas under the jurisdiction of chiefs. These circumstances resulted in the gender segmentation of the labour force, which forced women to restrict themselves to the margins of the colonial order, delivering much-needed services to male migrants and establishing themselves in the informal distribution of goods and services. The geographical dimensions of this segmentation is not as pronounced after decolonisation as it was before then, but gender role segmentation, including those in the economic sphere, formal and informal, often persists.

In the south-western region of Nigeria, women cross-border traders have for long been involved in selling unprocessed and processed food. Traditionally, the women limited their trade to foodstuff and allied consumables and use

shop-assistants at the borders (In-depth Interview, 2018). At present, they are involved in cross-border trading of a wide range of goods and services. The profit made is mostly spent on households to cover basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter.

Security Issues in Informal Cross Border Trading by Women

Informal cross-border trade in Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by a large share of female traders (around 70 percent), for who profits from informal trade often constitutes the major source of earnings and economic empowerment. Women informal cross-border traders sustain their family livelihoods and contribute to their country's economy (UN Women, 2011). Moreover, according to the World Bank report (2015), 85 percent of cross-border traders are young women in the Great Lakes region. Studies suggest (Brenton and Soprano, 2018) that trade provides women with 60 percent of non-agricultural self-employment in sub-Saharan Africa, and they play a key role in addressing vital livelihood issues such as food and income security. Evidently, women informal cross-border traders sustain their family livelihoods and contribute to the country's economy hence promoting human security in the process.

Findings reveal that there are several insecurities that arise from informalization of women cross-border trading. These insecurities are associated in part with activities of law-enforcement agents and touts coupled with the facts that women traders are generally not knowledgeable about the formal procedures that guide international trade (Yusuf, 2014). Due to the low level of literacy among women traders in south-western part of Nigeria, they are usually faced with challenges in reading customs forms and understanding the procedures, even where there are systems and structures in place that support their small scale transactions. Due to their ignorance, some of the women traders usually pay a high number of undue "informal" taxes (Key-informant Interview, 2018). These findings are consistent with studies previously carried out (Alusala, 2010; Mijere 2009) which have associated informal traders with low levels of education.

Women informal traders are incentivized to escape trade-related regulations and duties when important price disparities arise between formally and

informally traded goods in the importing country due to high levels of import and export duties on selected commodities. It was revealed that women in cross border trading are perceived as smugglers (*Fayawo*). Smuggling of banned goods into the country is seen as detrimental to national productivity and economic growth. It is posited therefore in relevant official discourses among state agents that women in informal cross border trading are enemies of national progress (Yusuf, 2014; Brenton, Bucekuderhwa, Hossein, Nagaki and Ntagoma, 2011). This perception brings constant acrimony between uniformed personnel and women in informal cross-border trading.

In addition, it was discovered that whenever these women are prevented by immigration officers from entering the border, they find their ways through unmarked bush paths and unmanned gateways across borders. Consequently, in their vulnerabilities, elements among these women could be used in importing dangerous and harmful substances into the country, including armed weapons as well as contraband and substantial goods that can adversely impair well-being and security, into the country. It is common practice that criminals who pose as customs officials do take advantage of the women's ignorance and exploit them in various ways during travels and at the borders. In addition, the security of the women traders are at stake as many women report cases of sexual harassment and violence such as rape, robbery and kidnap among others (In-depth Interview, 2018).

The study discovered that many of the women traders involved in cross-border business activities are not aware of the importance of immunization against diseases such as yellow fever, meningitis and other viral communicable diseases that they are susceptible to in their cross-border activities. Also, the researcher observed that provision of infrastructure to support women in border areas is generally inadequate or gender-insensitive. The consequence to the health security of the people in the region under study could be fatal as these women traders can serve as carriers of diseases into the country even as they also bear the risk of turning into victims of the situation (Non-participant observation, 2018).

Further observation in the border areas confirms that the environment is porous. People from within and outside the country engage in one business or

the other and there are no sufficient law enforcement officials on patrol to check their activities. A lot of hooliganism and touts' activities go on there. Despite the substantive economic contribution by women in ICBT in the south-western region in Nigeria, their “invisibility” and lack of effective recognition in official statistics, policies, and institutional frameworks, among others, if not properly revisited, could pose great security threat to the nation. Government policy aimed at improving informal traders' activities, therefore, should include a formalization component that takes into account the scale of their activities, security issues and the standard of living of women traders. This formalization would facilitate increased social and economic security.

Notwithstanding the negative dimensions of informal cross border trade, the women who engage in it possess the capacity to enhance the security of the nation. One of the good sides of informal cross border trade discovered during this research is that it provides jobs for a significantly number of people, particularly women (Eselebor, 2021). Women's informal cross border trading activities have cushioned the effects of financial, employment and food crises on African countries and on Nigeria in particular, and has enabled the women to make an important contribution to economic growth (Key-informant Interview, 2018).

In addition, it was discovered that many of these women are multi-lingual such that they have mastered languages being spoken in and across the border regions due to the nature of their work. They often have first-hand information about security issues not only in terms of verbal utterances but also in terms of the routes that could pose as security threats to the country. They tend to notice events and issues that occur around their bases of operation and could serve as excellent chroniclers of such matters in manners that minimize losses in translation and transmission, thereby enhancing collective memories of security and related matters. If properly handled, these women could be a viable source of reliable information that can strengthen the security of the nation. They can be useful in building deep and meaningful relationships with neighbouring countries (Key-informant Interview, 2018).

This is in accordance with Rubio-Fernández and Glucksberg's (2012) submission that adults in general, suffer interference from their own

perspective when reasoning about other people's beliefs. However, bilinguals and multi-linguals are relatively less susceptible to such bias than monolinguals and therefore better able to understand the perspectives of others. Thus, in today's global society, the ability to speak more than one language is a valuable asset. It can enhance economic competitiveness abroad, improve global communication, help to maintaining political and security interests, and promote tolerance and intercultural awareness (Pratt, 2002; Sollors, 2002).

However, despite the significant advantages, potential and actual, that informal cross border trading offers the women that engage in it and their various countries, much still requires to be done in terms of spreading awareness to the women, government and non-governmental organizations on the inherent challenges arising from the widespread informalization of ICBT activities, as well as the opportunities that such work offer for enhanced national security. This is an area that requires further and persistent attention from scholars, activists, the business and security communities, and policy makers alike.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Informal cross-border trade by women contributes significantly to the stabilization of political, economic and social activities in Nigeria and especially in the country's south-western region as highlighted by this paper. Nonetheless, it has also been shown that the informal nature of women traders' transnational activities is one major challenge in this area that can cause insecurity. Evidently, despite the fact that there are security concerns related to the largely unregulated nature of informal cross-border trade, it also carries a potential that can be harnessed for ensuring security and improving the livelihood of the people, since it currently serves as a source of income to about 41 percent of the people's population (World Bank, 2015).

This paper thus recommends the following: First, there is a pressing need to address the issue of informality of women's cross border trade in mainstream trade policy making and to strengthen the notion that women informal traders are also an important contributor to the economic strength of the nation. The

vicious cycle of invisibility, informality and violation of rules and regulations will only be interrupted when more data become available and when governments, the organised private sector, and relevant border, security and other paramilitary organizations involved in the nexus between national and international trade more fully recognize that women cross border traders create wealth, contribute to poverty reduction, employment creation and regional integration in a considerable way. Facilities for accommodation, ease of transportation and for doing business, as well as for hygiene, among others, would give women traders much more safety in their work. Addressing all this would require a significant level of sensitivity to ensure that as the challenges facing the women in the ICBT are addressed, their sphere of activities is not transformed into yet another sphere of formality that stifles vitality and creativity and promotes the needs of structures above those of the human beings that man, benefit from and generate value to the wider society through ICBT.

Informal women trader associations require support and encouragement to organize and register and thus have legal status to enhance their access to and voice in the decision making processes of governmental and business life, as well as have access to information and training opportunities on their work, well-being and how these interface with security matters. In this regard, for instance, existing regulations and protocols on export, important national security requirements and procedures need to be translated into local languages for easy understanding by the women. Finally, there is a need to carry out more research on the experiences of women in informal cross-border trade in various Nigerian communities.

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MASS MEDIA AND WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS IN NIGER STATE

Abdullahi Muhammad Hassan

Abstract

Active participation of women in politics is one of the conditions for progress in the society. Thus, the place of women in the political life of a given society cannot be over-laboured. This work focused on the public perception of the influence of the mass media in promoting women participation in politics in Niger state. The study was guided by the social responsibility theory and the agenda setting theory. The survey method of research was used in the study. Questionnaire was used to collect data from 385 respondents in Niger state. It was found that the public perceive the political participation of women in Niger state as good, the influence of the media in promoting women political participation in Niger state is effective while radio is the most used medium in promoting the political participation of women in the state. The recommendations were given: The media should endeavour to cover women in a light that does not only portray them as people who are meant to give birth and take care of their children and husbands, the media should hammer on the political rights and privileges of women as this will help ginger them to come out in full political force. Political parties should strive to carry women in their party along in all their political activities and equally give them the privilege of occupying some positions and getting political appointments. This will serve as a motivation for women to bring in other women in the political circles. Women should come together to fight against those barriers that limit their participation in politics.

Abdullahi Muhammad Hassan Doctoral Students; School of Postgraduate Studies, Department of Mass Communication, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

Key words: Media, Influence, women, politics, perception, participation

Introduction

The participation of women in Nigerian politics has been a recurring nagging issue for decades now. *Mohammed and Zaid (2014)*, in this light hinted that “women political participation in Nigeria is an issue of concern to many because of the continuing record of women's under-representation in both elective and appointive positions” (p. 65).

Agunyai, Odeyemi and Olawoyin (2014), stated that “most research works on gender inequity in politics have largely been focused on gross under-representation and sometimes lack of representation of women in Nigerian politics” (p. 55).

Women constitute almost half of the world population, but their participation in decision making and general political processes is relatively low when compared to their male counterpart. *Mohammed and Zaid (2014)*, observed that low levels of women's representation in elected public offices and gender inequality are a pervasive global phenomenon in politics. Women were under-represented and discriminated in the global politics. Udodinma (2013) in *Mohammed and Zaid (2014)*, opined that men occupies a large number of political positions while women are constantly left behind despite their significant contribution in the electoral process.

However, Agbalajobi (2010) as cited by *Mohammed and Zaid (2014)*, observed that over the years, there has been a series of debates over the participation or desire for women to participate in Nigerian politics. He further argued that, some cultures and norms perceive women as weak in terms of social struggle which necessitates them to assume a subordinate position to men in politics and in other areas of life.

In Nigeria, low level of women's participation in the country's politics is disturbing and at an alarming rate. This phenomenon affects the politics greatly from attaining a high level of recognition at international level and makes the government to face a lot of critics from its citizens. The preoccupation that women play the number two role at homes is playing itself out in their political life. In the words of Oby Nwankwo: “Women were discouraged from seeking political offices by discriminatory attitudes and practices, family and child care responsibilities, and the high cost of seeking and holding public office, socialization and negative stereo tying of through the media, reinforcing the

tendency for political decision making to remain the domain of men” (Nwankwo, 2009, p. 60 in Eme and Onuigbo, 2015, p. 18).

Agbalajobi (2010), stated that “the 1979 Nigerian constitution guaranteed the rights of women to participate in active politics; however, the last decade has witnessed a relative increase in women's participation. This is only when we measure increase in participation with certain standards like the number of women who vote in elections; the number of public offices held by women; number of women related policies implemented by government etc” (p. 77).

In Niger state, just like in some other states in northern Nigeria, the participation of women in politics is still on the awakening stage. There has been calls from different quarters for women to be active in politics and thus contribute their quota to the development of their state.

This work, however, is positioned to examine public perception of the influence of the media in promoting women political participation in Niger state.

Statement of the Problem

Agbalajobi (2010), opined that over the years, there has been raging and concerned debates over the participation of women in Nigerian politics. Some argue that: Women perceived as weaker sexes, are social constructs owing to social value, norms and beliefs, which have neglected their meaningful contributions and have placed them in a subordinate position to men in the nation's political system.

The trend of the afore-stated has continued to lower the participation of women in politics. Some still have the orientation that women are only supposed to take care of their households and sit back and watch as things unfold in sensitive areas especially the political circles.

This situation is not lacking in Niger state. Most women in the state are confined to the houses of their husbands who believe that the ultimate function of the women folk is to give birth to children and take care of them and their husbands.

It is quite disappointing that in Niger state, the only well-known outstanding female politician is Hajiya Zainab Abdulkadir Kure, the former first lady of the state and senator representing Niger South constituency. Though there are still women who have been appointed into different political positions in the state

but the percentage of the women in active is alarming.

The media as the fourth estate of the realm can play a great role in awakening women political participation state. Wogu (2008) stated that much of the issues considered important in the society and discussed are parts of items earlier projected by the media.

This paper is therefore out to actually ascertain the perception of the public regarding the influence of the media in promoting the political participation of women in Niger state.

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study includes;

- a. To determine public perception of women participation in politics in Niger state.
- b. To determine the extent to which media influence women political participation in Niger state.
- c. To determine the medium for the promotion of women participation in politics in Niger state.

Research Questions

The following make up the research questions.

- a. What is the public perception of women participation in politics in Niger state?
- b. What is the extent to which media influence women political participation in Niger State?
- c. What is the medium for promotion of women participation in politics in Niger State?

Definition of Terms

a. Perception

Perception is defined as the act or faculty of perceiving by means of the senses or the mind. It could also be seen as the conscious understanding of something or a phenomenon. It is that which is detected by consciousness as a thought or intuition.

b. Media

This is defined as the channels of communication used in promoting women political participation in Niger state. They include Television, Newspaper, Radio, Magazine and Internet.

c. Women

Women in this work include all the adult females who are married or single in Niger state.

d. Politics

Politics includes all activities related to running government.

e. Participation

This means to take active part in an activity.

Literature Review

Important literatures will be reviewed in order to engender a better understanding of the study.

Women and Political Participation in Nigeria

Political participation as one of the key elements of democracy provides the justification for inclusion of marginalised groups such as women and youth in electoral competition. Participation of women in politics will be meaningful only if the process is just, fair, permissive and level playing ground is guaranteed for possible ascension of women politically. Politics has strategic importance for women because the ultimate success of women's movement will rest heavily on effective use of the political process (Lynn, 1978 in Quadri 2015).

Women's ability to effectively use the political process to get to political positions may increase their representation in elective positions and effect public policies. However, it is very clear from Nigeria's experience that the political process is male dominated and men influence the process more than women.

Momodu (2003, p. 48) cited in Quadri (2015) submits that “the issues of women's political participation and representation in politics and governance should be seen from four perspectives. Access, Participation, Representation

and Transformation” (p. 4). Access to political institutions, participation (which includes control of power within such institutions), quantitative and qualitative representation and the end result will be social and political transformation in the polity. Women's political empowerment can be enhanced when these four conditions are fulfilled.

The view that women in politics matter is sustained by three reasons: First, politics is an important arena for decision making. Individuals who hold official positions in government get to decide how to allocate scarce resources, such as tax revenues. Politicians make political decisions that may help some people at the expense of others. Decisions by politicians often affect people's individual choices by encouraging some behaviours and outlawing others. Second, political power is a valuable good. Politicians hold power over other social institutions, such as the family...., third, holding a political position is to hold a position of authority (Paxton, 2007 in Quadri 2015). Women in positions of authority and power can influence decisions on issues that bother on women and impact positively on the lives of female gender.

It is possible to argue that men cannot adequately represent women's interests, needs and concerns in the legislature. There are substantive women's issues such as reproductive health, HIV/AIDS, women trafficking amongst others that require women's perspectives and orientation towards addressing them. Integrating women in the political process provides women with the opportunity to discuss women issues facing challenges. Empowerment relates to the degree of representation in deliberative bodies and is often measured by the percentage of women in the Legislature (Beer, 2009 in Quadri, 2015). The number of women in the legislative house can determine the extent to which women's issues will attract the attention of policy-makers.

The Media

Oyinade, Daramola and Lamidi (2013, pp. 29-30) submit that Nigeria mainstream media have been dominated by men since its inception and even today the apparatus of bias and gender inequality is written all over the establishment. Anyanwu, (2001) **in Oyinade, Daramola and Lamidi (2013)** expressed the view that very little attention is given to real life issues that shape the quality of living, things that dominate the minds and hearts of the populace. Women issues belong to a genre of information considered light weight she concluded. This is an indictment of the Nigerian media.

Thus, publications that feature women in large numbers are easily branded women's publication. The media continues to be selective in the nature of news carried and covered relegating and obscuring women issues. The visibility of women in elected offices observed Anyanwu, (2001) in **Oyinade, Daramola and Lamidi (2013)**, is relatively low in spite of the number of women in prominent capacities. The media is eager to put women's picture on the cover page of the newspaper for her beauty and elegance to sell newspapers but always short of substance where the women voices are to be heard.

Anyanwu (2001) **Oyinade, Daramola and Lamidi (2013)** lamented that the silence of women on national issues gives an impression that women do not care about things happening around them. She went on to say that some females' assembly members have complained the press has always short changed them even when they grant interviews. The end result is that, these prominent women are either grossly misquoted or they are not reported. This one sided view of media seriously undermines and cast doubts on whether Nigerian media practitioners take into considerations, the functions of the media within the structure of society.

It must be noted that the media serve as a watchdog and serve as the eyes and ears of those that are not where news event occur. The media in Nigeria failed to call a spade a spade and thus failed woefully in the marginalization of women issues in the press. By all account the media must be fair, accurate, balanced and objective. Women should not have to go out of their way to engage with the news media for adequate coverage. It is the duty and obligation of the media to cover all issues without reservation. If the media continues to engage in this selective coverage and reporting, then the trust placed in the media could very well go into oblivion.

Media coverage of women issues in Nigeria has been unimpressive. The growing criticism of the media is borne out of the need to improve on news coverage and reporting hence to be fair and accurate. The question of whether Nigerian media practitioners are fulfilling their roles as the mouth piece of the people dedicated to looking at all issues without predetermined notion of relegating one gender in preference to the other is questionable. Thus, it will be wrong to say that the work of a journalist is unimportant in a democratic society. The fact remains, that the Nigerian media practitioners are not living up to par and will seriously be ineffective if a segment of the Nigerian society is unheard.

Obstacles to Women Political Participation

Mohammed and Zaid (2014) stated that researches and analysis of political participation around the world discovered that the level of participation of the individual is influenced by some factors such as:

i. Socio-economic Factor

Socio-economic status is a determinant of individual political participation. Individuals with high levels of socio-economic status such as education and income are more likely to adopt psychological orientations that motivate their participation in politics. Feminists and scholars have observed that the status of women is high in countries with higher GDP and per capita income. They argue that as the country's GDP and per capita income rises, the socio-economic and political situation of women improves as a result of better educational attainment, economic contribution and representation.

ii. Ecological Factor

Ecological factor has contributed immensely to the low level of women's participation in Niger state and Nigeria as a whole. The Nigerian political scene is not female friendly and above all not very favorable to women.

The political arena is often perceived as a dirty vocation for crude and uncouth people who bend rules and subvert due process. The media are full of stories of unsavory and manipulative actions of members of the political class who are in essence corrupt. The political process is time consuming with caucus meetings, campaigns, fundraising, primers etc. Nocturnal meetings are a norm rather than an exception.

iii. Cultural Practice

Culture is another factor militating against the participation of women in Niger state politics. Women in Niger state have all along been minors legally and economically, they have been word of men and it is clear they had no political roles. They have no independent thinking powers. A number of cultural practices persist which prevent women from political participation.

An institution like child-marriage and purdah are barriers to adult females exercising their basic constitutional rights.

iv. Political Violence

Political violence is among the reasons that contributed immensely to the low level of women's participation in Niger state politics. Political violence has become the feature of democratization in Nigeria. Many political activities are soaked by violence and killings. Political violence seems to be institutionalized in Nigerian political process which make the politics look dirty in the eyes of many Nigerians, and this often discourages people more especially women from participation.

v. Illiteracy or Low Level of Education

Illiteracy or low level of education are one of the major obstacles to women's political participation in Niger state. UNICEF survey 2004 revealed that, in Nigeria, only 60% of women aged 30-45 years manage to complete their elementary education and only 26% proceeded to the secondary level. Similarly, a survey by the National Planning Commission indicates that 50% of women had no formal education.

Theoretical Framework

This paper is anchored on two theories: Social Responsibility theory and Agenda Setting theory.

Social Responsibility Theory

The social responsibility theory is an offshoot of libertarian theory. This theory took its origin from the Hutchin Commission of 1947, but was later expanded by Peterson, Siebert and Schramm in 1956 (Asemah et al. 2017). This theory posits that freedom carries with it a concomitant obligations and the press which enjoys a privileged position under a government is obliged to be responsible to society for carrying out certain essential tasks of mass communication in contemporary society.

To this end, the mass media as the fourth estate of the realm owe it as a duty to maintain their good image in the society and should consider the coverage of rural areas as part of the responsibilities. It is on this basis that this theory is considered apt for this scholarly piece of work taking into cognizance the role the mass media place towards women mobilization in a democratic society.

Agenda Setting Theory

Ndolo (2005, p. 32) stated that the agenda setting theory explains the effects of mass communication on culture and society. It describes a very powerful influence of the media; the ability to tell us what issues are important.

McCombs (2014, p. 1) asserted that the power of the media to set a nation's agenda, to focus public attention on a few key public issues, is an immense and well documented influence. Not only do people acquire factual information about public affairs from the media, readers and viewers also learn how much importance to attach to a topic on the basis of the emphasis placed on it in the news.

According to Cohen (1963, p. 13) in Wogu (2008, p. 140), “the press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”

The essence of this theory to this study is that based on the premise that the media help to cover and raise issues that are important to the society, they through this way, enlighten the women in Niger state of the need to be active in politics.

Research Methodology

Research Design

The research design adopted in this study is survey method of research. This is because the study involves the opinions and views of the people of Niger state on the influence of the media in promoting women political participation in the state.

Population of the Study

Peil (1982) in Ohaja, (2003, p. 75) stated that the population refers to all persons or things that fall under the umbrella of the topic or that can be examined to address the research or meet the research objectives. Therefore, the population of the study comprises of all the people in Niger state.

However, according to the Niger State Bureau of Statistics – Socio-economic Survey, 2014, the projected population of Niger state is 5,168,063. Therefore, this number formed the population of this study.

Sample Size

The sample size of this study is 385. This was gotten by using the National Statistical Service and Sample Size Calculator. The result displayed is as follows:

Confidence Level: 95%

Population Size: 5,168,063

Confidence Interval: 0.04998

Upper: 0.54998

Lower: 0.45002

Standard Error: 0.02550

Relative Standard Error: 5.10

Sample Size: 385

Sampling Technique

From the three senatorial districts in Niger state: Niger South, Niger North and Niger East, simple random sampling technique was used to select three local government areas to be studied in the state. Thus, Katcha LGA (Niger South), Kontagora LGA (Niger North) and Bosso LGA (Niger East). This is to ensure that each senatorial district is duly represented.

Purposive sampling was used as the technique to select the respondents in the LGAs. The researcher decided to make use of this sampling method so as to ensure the copies of questionnaire that will be distributed will get to the right persons knowledgeable enough to give the desired information for this research.

Instrument of Data Analysis

The instrument used in gathering information for this study is the questionnaire. The instrument comprises two sections: section A which is for demographic data and section B for the psychographic data. The questionnaire contains a total of 12 open and close-ended questions arranged in such a way as to answer the research questions in the numerical order.

Data Presentation and Analysis

The analysis of the study was made using frequency tables and simple

percentages. A total of 385 copies of questionnaire were distributed but only 358 copies or 93% were completed and returned. 22 copies were not returned while 5 copies were not properly filled. The analysis was therefore done with 358 copies as duly completed questionnaire.

Section A: Demographic Data

Table 1: Respondents Demographic Data

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Sex:		
Male	213	59.50
Female	145	40.50
Age:		
18-28 years	129	36
29-39 years	111	31
40-50 years	93	26
51 and above	25	7
Marital Status:		
Single	207	57.82
Married	151	42.18
Divorced/Separated	-	
Religion		
Christian	105	29.33
Islam	240	67.04
African Traditional Religion	13	3.63
Total	358	100

Data displayed on table 1 above indicates that 59.50% of the respondents were male, while 40.50% were female; 36% were in the age bracket of 18-28, 11% are in the age bracket of 29-39 years, 93% in the age bracket of 40-50 years while 7% are within the age bracket of 51 and above. 57.82% are single while 42.18% are married. However, 29.33% are Christians, 67.04% are Muslims while 13 are traditionalists.

Psychographic Section of Data Analysis

This section will help answer the research questions from the data analysed therein.

Research question 1: How does the public perceive the political participation of women in Niger state?

Question 5: Do you know about issues concerning women political participation?

Table 2: Respondents' response on whether they know about issues concerning women political participation

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	358	100
No	0	0
Total	358	100

Table 2 shows that all the respondents know about issues concerning women political participation in Niger state.

Question 6: How do you perceive the political participation of women in Niger state?

Table 3: Responses of respondents on how they perceive the political participation of women in Niger state

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Excellent	45	12.57
Very good	72	20.11
Good	126	35.2
Fair	88	24.58
Undecided	27	7.54
Total	358	100

The table above reveals how the public perceive the political participation of women in Niger state. Thus, 45 (12.57%) respondents opined that it is excellent, 72 (20.11%) respondents said it is very good, 126 (35.2%) respondents were of the view that it is good while 88 (24.58%) said it is fair and 27 (7.54%) were undecided.

Research Question 2: Does the public perceive the influence of the media in promoting women political participation in Niger state effective?

Question 7: Do you think the media influence of women political participation in Niger state is effective?

Table 4: Responses of respondents whether the media influence of women political participation in Niger state is effective

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	358	100
No	0	0
Total	358	100

All the respondents affirmed that the media influence of women political participation in Niger state is effective.

Question 8: If yes, how effective is the media influence of women political participation in Niger state?

Table 5: Responses of respondents on how effective the media influence of women political participation is in Niger state

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Very effective	72	20.11
Effective	183	51.11
Less effective	103	28.77
Total	358	100

The table above shows that 72 (20.11%) respondents said that the media influence of women political participation is *very effective*, 183 (51.11%) respondents said is *effective* while 103 (28.77%) said is *less effective*.

Research Question 3: What medium of communication is mostly used in the promotion of political participation of women in Niger state?

Question 9: Which of the medium of communication is mostly used in the promotion of political participation of women in Niger state?

Table 6: Responses of respondents on the most used medium in the promotion of women political participation in Niger state

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Newspaper	40	11.17
Radio	119	33.24
Internet	87	24.30
Magazine	51	14.25
Television	61	17.04
Total	358	100

The table above reveals that 40 (11.17%) respondents were of the view that *newspaper* is the most used medium in the promotion of women political participation in Niger state. 119 (33.24%) said is the *radio*, 87 (24.30%) is the *Internet*, 51 (14.25%) respondents said is *magazine* while 61 (17.04%) respondents said is *television*.

Discussion of Findings

In order to engender a proper understanding of the research paper, it is pertinent to discuss the findings in line with the research questions. The demographic details will be given attention first.

It was found that majority of the respondents were males (59.50%) while the females were just (40.50%). In the age distribution of the respondents, it was found that most of the respondents were within the age range of 18-28 (36%) while 51 years and above (7%) were the least in number. This shows that most of the respondents were young people. In the marital status of the respondents, it was found that most of the respondents were single (57.82%) while 42.18% of them were married and none of them indicated that they were divorced/separated. However, it was not surprising to know that most of the respondents were Muslims (67.04%). This must be because Niger state is in the northern part of Nigeria where Muslims are preponderant.

Research question: How does the public perceive the political participation of women in Niger state?

Questions 5 and 6 as contained in the questionnaire were used to answer this research question.

It was found that all the respondents indicated that they know about issues concerning political participation of women in Niger state. More so, majority of the respondents indicated that they perceive their political participation to be good (35.2%). This points to the fact that the public see the political participation of women in Niger state as good. It is pertinent to note that during the 2015 presidential and gubernatorial election in the state, women trooped out en masse to participate in different political activities in the state.

Research question 2: Does the public perceive the influence of the media in promoting women political participation in Niger state to be effective?

Questions 7 and 8 as contained in the questionnaire were used to answer this research question.

It was found that all the respondents affirmed that media influence on political participation of women in Niger state is effective. Moreover, it was found that 72 (20.11%) respondents indicated that it is very effective, 183 (51.11%) respondents indicated it is effective while 103 (28.77%) respondents indicated that it is less effective.

Based on the finding, it pertinent to note that majority said that it is effective. This must stem from the fact that women in the state are beginning to gain political consciousness and thus seen the need to take the bull by the horn politically. However, Oyinade, Daramola and Lamidi (2013) is in complete variance with the media been effective in the act of actually promoting the political participation of women when they stated that “women issues belong to a genre of information considered light weight...this is an indictment of the Nigerian media” (p. 29).

Research Question 3: What medium of communication is mostly used in the promotion of political participation of women in Niger state?

It was found that radio is the most used medium in the promotion of political participation of women in Niger state. Thus, 119 (33.24%) respondents indicated radio, 87 (24.30%) respondents said is the Internet, 61 (17.04%) respondents said is the television, 51 (14.25%) respondents said is the magazine while 40 (11.17%) respondents said is the newspaper.

Based on the findings, it could be said that it is not surprising that radio is the most used medium considering the fact that radio is affordable and highly portable coupled with the fact that an average northerner is always glued to his/her radio set. More so, Onabajo (2006, p. 7) posits that “within limits, radio can persuade and effectively influence large audience, thereby contributing substantially to the building of a national consensus” (p. 7).

Conclusion

This work has examined the public perception of the influence of the media in the business of promoting the political participation of women in Niger state. It is instructive to note that women in the Niger state, despite the fact that they are beginning to get politically conscious still need to work harder towards take a giant step towards coming out fully in the political circles.

This can only be possible with a great sensitization and enlightenment that will be championed by the media especially radio stations. This will facilitates the breaking down of all the barriers that have clamped the women in the state from giving their 100% in the politics of the state. Communication has the strength to break all barriers.

Recommendations

Based on the findings the following recommendations will be needful. Thus;

- a. The media should endeavour to cover women in a light that does not only portray them as people who are meant to give birth and take care of their children and husbands.
- b. The media should hammer on the political rights and privileges of women as this will help ginger them to come out in full political force.
- c. Political parties should strive to carry women in their party along in all their political activities and equally give them the privilege of occupying some positions and getting political appointments as this will serve as a motivation for women to bring in other women in the political circles.
- d. Women should come together and fight against those barriers that limit their participation in politics.

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DECENTRALIZED LOCAL GOVERNANCE AS A FULCRUM FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

**Kayode Wakili OLAWOYIN (Ph.D.),
Akinwande Olumuyiwa OPAYINKA**

Abstract

The study examines the inability of local government to achieve the goal of ensuring popular participation in grassroots democracy, underscored by the constitutional provision of decentralized local governance in Nigeria's fourth republic. The objective of study is to examine the challenges of decentralized local governance affecting community development in Nigeria grassroots democracy. Methodologically, the study adopts both qualitative and quantitative technique of data gathering. Subsequently, content analysis was employed in the interpretation of qualitative responses, reports and publications obtained from the Community Based Organization (CBO), and Community Development Associations (CDAs) while quantitative responses were analysed descriptively. The findings reveal that the introduction of decentralized local governance in many developed countries has done little in transforming rural community to a development state due to undue interference in the activities of grassroots democracy by the government. However, significant progress has been made in the areas of encouraging popular participation (Citizens participation) in grassroots democracy and encouragement of decentralizing responsibilities and function at all levels of government in Nigeria. The study therefore recommends that there is need for a paradigm shift from the practice of local government to local governance in Nigeria in order to ensure popular participation in grassroots democracy and be self-sustaining, as a substitute of depending solely on statutory allocation from the higher levels of government.

**Kayode Wakili Olawoyin (Ph.D.) Department of Political Science
Osun State University Osogbo Nigeria, Akinwande Olumuyiwa
Opayinka Department of Local Government and Development
Studies, Obafemi Awolowo University Ile-Ife Osun State Nigeria**

Keywords: Local government, Local governance, Decentralized governance, Community Development, and Democracy

Introduction

Decentralized local governance has been the centerpiece of sustainable development since the dawn of 21st century. It currently drives global community development toward the sustainable human development paradigm and grassroots democracy (UNDP, 2000). The effectiveness of decentralized local governance to change rural communities into vibrant modern communities has often been highlighted.

Decentralized local governance has been a central focus and one of the positive legacies sustaining the development of most of the developing countries and it is noteworthy to state here that the process started here in Nigeria during the fourth republic. Now, many African countries have been replicating the system with firm believe that it will kickstart the accelerated development of the grassroots in the various countries, if it is faithfully implement coupled with good vision and taking into cognizance the peculiarities of each communities, (Osmani, 2000).

Further-more, decentralized local governance played is sine-qua-non to the reduction of poverty, it also encourages and gives sense of belonging to the people at the grassroot. It gives them (people at the local level) a channel to contribute to how they are being governed coupled with the fact that they have avenue to make their wants and needs know to the government, (World Bank 1995).

In addition to the above, community development fundamentally involves a series of actions and decisions that improve the process of decentralized local governance in order to achieve a structural revolution which not only help store vamp structures and institutions, but also to reorganize grassroots democracy and to realign them with demands for greater effectiveness, responsiveness and common decision making, (UNDP, 2007).

These views support that rural development initiative with the sole purpose of carry people at the grassroots along in the process of development and harnessing local intelligent to bring about community development program such as technical assistance, skill acquisition, sustainable food production among others is the only way to make the country a truly independent one with booming economic viability, (Harry, 2000).

Paradoxically, even though Nigeria's decentralization process is greatly acclaimed the success, but the ability to deal with community developmental needs becoming slouch in a balance owing to great apathy, dearth of local governance system support, weak institutional capacity, lack of ownership and commitment and hence limited popular participation, and inter-agency conflict among others (Gboyega, 2003). Therefore, since over two decades of the democratic governance in Nigeria, the challenges to rural community development and poverty reduction are still famous and the reasons for decentralized governance was jeopardized. Currently, the aims and objectives of decentralized government has not been achieved because poverty, inequalities in the distribution of social amenities and benefits is still glaringly obvious in almost all our communities at grassroot in Nigeria during the fourth republic, (Crawford, 2008).

Specifically, this paper attempts to examine the salient factors affecting the community development in grassroots democracy in Nigeria's fourth republic. The site purpose being to find lasting solutions to the challenges of decentralized local governance affecting community development in grassroots democracy of Nigeria.

2. Conceptual Discourse

The main concepts discussed in this paper relate to Local government, Local governance, Decentralized governance, Community development and Democracy. Detailed explanation of the above concepts based on the opinion of scholars is provided below:

2.1 Local Government

It is appropriate to state that Local government, as conceptualized by different scholars, particularly from the functional viewpoints, is rather narrow and incomplete. The United Nations explicates that Local Government is a political sub-division of a nation or federal state/system, which is constituted by the law and also has substantial control of local affairs including the power to impose taxes or to exert labor forces for prescribed purposes. The governing body of such an entity is elected or otherwise locally selected. While the United Nations definition of Local Government seems Local Government as the third tier of government in the world today. Therefore, according to Olowu (2002) asserts that local government is the product of devolution as a dimension of decentralization. Aransi (2000) opined that "local government is

a governmental administrative unit closest to the people, or in general parlance, the grassroots". According to him Local government system served as a veritable agent of local service delivery, mobilize of community-based human and material resources, and organizers of local initiatives in responding to a wide variety of local needs and aspirations, it provides the basic structures and conditions for grassroots participation in democratic process.

Hence the Guidelines for Local Government in Nigeria postulated local government as:

"Government at the local level exercise through representative council established by law to exercise specific powers within defined area. These powers should give the council substantial control over local affairs as well as the staff and institutional and financial powers to initiate and direct the provision of services and determine activities of state and federal government in their areas, and to ensure, through devolution of functions to these councils and through the active participation of the people and their traditional institutions, that local initiative and response to local needs and conditions are maximized", (FGN, 1976).

Adeyeye, (2000) emphasized that "local government as the management of services and regulation of functions by a locally elected council which is officially responsible to them, under statutory and inspectorial supervision of central legislature and executive, but with enough financial and other independence to admit of a fair degree of local initiative and policymaking". From the various views we can say that the characteristic of local government area are as follow: given a distinct demarcation and population, strong institution that has three tiers of government, self-autonomy with an independent legal identity, that functions as a government on behalf of her people without outside influence or manipulation.

2.2 Local Governance

According to United Nations Development Programs, (2005) asserts that local

governance referred to the mechanism, processes, and institutions through which citizen or a group of peoples articulate their public interest, needs, legal right and political obligation within their local level. Therefore, local governance can served as are placement mechanism of local government; with its attendant structures and procedures by a plethora if not a plurality of providers. According to Caroline, (2008) asserts that local governance is a broad concept, which in swift means the formulation and execution of collective decision or action at the local level. It's extensiveness to includedirect and indirect responsibilities of formal institutions of local government and government hierarchies, as well as the function of informal norms, network, community organizations, and neighborhoods associations in pursuing collective decisions. Local governance expounds the scaffold for citizen-citizen and citizen-state interactions, collective decision making, and delivery of local public services.

2.3 Decentralized Governance

The World Bank reports (2000) postulated that decentralized governance are restructuring and re-organizing in public authority, so that there will be a system of political co-responsibilities among the institution of governance within the state.

2.4 Community Development

According to United Nation Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (2006) describes community development is the process by which the efforts of the people themselves are united withthose of governmental authorities to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of communities in the life of the nation and enable them contribute fully to national progress.

2.5 Democracy

The term democracy is capable of diverse interpretations. In defining this concept, Lipset (2004) describes it as an ideology of majoritarian with common decision taking within the society. He stressed further that it's governance that achieved the mechanism, processes and institutions through which citizens articulate their public interests, needs and their fundamental human right in a state.

3. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework engaged for this study is Decentralized Theory (1965).

This theory emphasizes on sharing the political power, authority and responsibility among the tiers or levels of government within the state, which is also postulated by Charles Tarleton. Decentralized theory describes the participatory nature of grassroots democracy and community development that is central to the local governance in any system of government.

The relevance of this theory emphasizes the importance of decentralized governance as a fulcrum of grassroots democracy in which the citizens of any locality act directly in their decision-making process of both local government and their community development.

The strength of this theory is to create opportunity for the majority citizens at the grassroots level to take part in collective decision making and also gain access to political authority in their locality. Promote community development with the involvement of the people as a special preoccupation to improve the living conditions of the citizens (people) in the society.

Moreover, the theory presumed that the challenges of any grassroots institutions (civil democratic governance), is all about fiscal independence, which is the root cause of all their problems, this is because they could not come out may project independently without fiscal autonomy.

4. Methodology

The study adopted a mixed method research design, through uses of both primary and secondary sources of gathering relevant information and materials. Subsequently, content analysis was employed to analyse the salient factors affecting the community development in grassroots democracy in Nigeria's fourth republic.

Participants' Responses on Salient Factors Affecting the Community Development in Grassroots

Democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

Salient Factors (Variables)	Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Undecided		Agree		Strongly Agree		Total	Total
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	%	%
	Income Inequality Issues											
Reduced Life Expectancy	19	6.3	79	26.3	9	3	102	34	91	30.4	300	100
Increases Corruption	15	5	39	13	45	15	118	39.3	83	27.7	300	100
Unemployment Issues												
Increases Poverty	19	6.3	76	25.3	10	3.3	127	42.3	68	22.8	300	100
Increases Malnutrition	7	2.3	56	18.7	13	4.3	104	34.7	120	40	300	100
Lower Productivity	29	9.7	51	17	-	-	112	37.3	108	36	300	100
Increases Crime-Rate in Society	35	11.7	87	29	10	3.3	83	27.7	85	28.3	300	100
Rural and Urban Migration Issues												
Decreases Agricultural Output	32	10.7	56	18.7	4	1.3	106	35.3	102	34	300	100
Reduces Professional Labour	40	13.3	50	16.7	5	1.7	64	21.3	141	47	300	100
Refugee Returnees	24	8	54	18	8	2.7	72	24	142	47.3	300	100
Literacy Level Issues												
Community Empowerment	25	8.3	30	10	23	7.7	128	42.7	94	31.3	300	100
Increases the Productivity	35	11.7	19	6.3	14	4.7	120	40	112	37.3	300	100
Determinant of Family Size	20	6.7	24	8	4	1.3	122	40.7	130	43.3	300	100
Popular Participation Issues												
Lack of Community Empowerment	64	21.3	60	20	57	19	88	29.3	31	10.4	300	100
Lack of Institutional Capacity	82	27.3	104	34.7	58	19.3	36	12	20	6.7	300	100
Lack of Genuine Leadership	106	35.5	117	39	40	13.3	24	8	13	4.4	300	100

Source: Field Survey, 2020

Presentation of Result on Salient factors affecting the Community Development in Grassroots

Democracy in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

There are several salient factors that affects the decentralized local governance in community development that can be seen from the table above are followings; income – inequality, unemployment, poverty, Illiteracy, and dearth of popular participation among the members in the society are the basic salient factors affecting the community development at the grassroots democracy in Nigeria's fourth republic. The Nigerian local governments are grouped into communities. Local Government officers in charge of community development would have regular meetings with local communities or their leaders to familiarize themselves with the developmental plans and intentions as well as the problems confronting them on the one hand, and to teach (or suggest to) local communities the roles they could play in the development of their area and how this could be done, when etc. on the other.

Therefore, when a community feels the need of some social amenities, a list is compiled of things that are needed. Appeals are made to members of that community for their contribution towards the development projects. Appeals are also made to the people outside the community, e.g. Community Development Association (CDA), Grassroot Development Initiatives (GDI), etc. The project is carried out through communal efforts, communal interest, and communal points of view by the local people and advice of community development officers.

5. Impact of Decentralized Local Governance on Community Development in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

Decentralized local governance is a key role in poverty reduction, and promotes the growth of sustainable community development. Decentralized governance is a multifaceted system of interaction among structures, traditions, function (responsibilities) and processes (practices) characterized by three key values of accountability, transparency and participation(USAID,2002).

Decentralized governance can also be seen as an instrument of effective citizen participation in society's institutions. If the institution is granted a truly fiscal autonomy to development their localities at their own pace without undue interrelations from other arms of government(Hope, 2003).

Community development association is unique institutions that balance and negotiate relationships among their members, communities association, the state and community trader; make use of their social capital facilities to developed their locality, (Osmani, 2000). Therefore, community institutions serve as a cooperative devolve of decision-making process within the community spirit and pride in a contemporary world,

Furthermore, community development served as a centerpiece for sustainable development and local governance in the developing locality with a certain level of institutional capacity for them to satisfy their community shareholders. Decentralized governance principle like participation, accountability, responsiveness and transparency, are normally associated with grassroots democracy that are also applicable to the needs of the populace. Strengthening the significance of participation, feeling of belonging and property, responsiveness is crucial for local governance in the deliberation of community meeting looking for the application of the common principles like, participation, accountability, transparency and consensus orientation in the deliberation of their common interest,(Kaufunan, 2008). Moreover, it's concluded that decentralized governance would succeed in improving development performance at the local level through the integrity system and application of ethical consideration that prevails the laws and respecting the spirit behind the law in the various community.

Conclusion

Generally, the nature of decentralized localgovernanceprovidestheneeds forsustainablecommunity development strategy and the achievement of outcomes such as equality, participation, accountability and transparentasitaffects peoplesat the grassroots. Itisimportant to reiterate once again, that all tiers or levels of governmentsshould be directlyinvolved in

affairs of sustainable community development. Rather than two tiers of government should only allocate resource for the development of locality (community). The issue of inappropriate allocation of resources for community drives development should be abrogated. All the public control measures and institutional capacity mechanisms put in place by the levels of government that should be allow the local government authorities in Nigeria focus on concrete community development projects devoid of incessant interruption.

Recommendations

The following specific recommendations are therefore germane:

The challenges facing decentralized local governance for effective grassroot development are multi-faceted, and these have led to many paper work on how to find lasting solutions to the problems.

In an attempt to do this underlisted suggestions are raised, though it is not exhausted:

- Improvement of economic resources at the grassroot autonomy.
- Equitable distribution or re-distribution of common resources through the instrument of grassroots institutional capacity within the locality.
- Provision of adequate resources (funds) by the higher levels of governments to the community development at the various locality within the local government areas.
- Attitudinal change through the national value re-orientation of both the leaders and the followers, especially with regards to government effort, property and public life. The current perception of government effort and property is to provide a functional and effective social amenity as a part of community development for the people in their locality.
- Effective and efficient service delivery to the peoples, and

dissemination of information through the use of propaganda to sensitize and arouse the interest of the rural masses in community developments. Information is power and thus, vital in all human dealings. Without effective information and subsequent dissemination, the rurality's may not be aware of the benefits of community development. According to Olowu, (2002)emphasized that,

“There is no limit to the sacrifices that people are willing to make when they understand that they themselves would be the final beneficiaries. Hence community unions and cooperative associations have proved effective and successful again and again in raising the resources to finance important projects where many are centrally-dominated local governments have failed”.

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THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL RULERS ON NIGERIAN SECURITY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

Murtala Abubakar
Nura Ahmad

Abstract

Before the advent of colonialism, every African community was blessed with a well-enshrined political process anchored by Monarchs. Kings and Queens were the major traditional rulers that determined how communities were administered and how they related with one another. The Monarchs were referred to as Oba, Emir and Obi. Going by a Yoruba adage “Agba kiiwa loja ki ori omo tuntun wo”, meaning, “Elders in the community do not allow the young to go astray, Traditional rulers in any human society are the divine beings that uphold the above assertion. As a symbol and custodian of culture, Traditional rulers are the solid corner stone through which human societies are glue and become unified; they are the major block through which unity becomes reality among communities, cities, states, and empires. The recent security problems in Nigeria have seemed to further spur Nigerians into a greater appreciation of the role of traditional rulers. The emphasis on community policing, which seems to increase in tempo with every new Inspector General of Police, all point to a rising appreciation of the place of traditional institutions in the search for peace and order. This approach is aimed at soliciting the support of the Traditional Rulers and their subjects in the communities, in the fight against crime. Traditional rulers in the country used to have a robust constitutional role. Under the 1960 and 1963 Constitutions, the Council of Chiefs was established for them in the regions and some of the traditional rulers even rose to become regional governors. In the 1979 Constitution, traditional rulers were represented in the National Council of State. But the role of traditional rulers was virtually expunged in the 1999 Constitution, an indication of the declining status of the traditional institutions in the scheme of things. Using the state capture theory, the study argues that continued non-involvement and the loss of traditional rulers constitutional roles with the attendant upheaval in the Nigeria is fuelled by weak enforcement of legislations and laws by relevant government agencies. Data for the study were generated from documentary sources while analysis effected through content analysis. The study suggests a constitutional role and support from governments at all levels.

Murtala Abubakar Department of Social Development Waziri Umaru Federal Polytechnic Birnin Kebbi Nigeria, Nura Ahmad Department of Islamic Studies Shehu Shagari College of Education Sokoto State Nigeria

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INTRODUCTION

The vague natures of the relationship between traditional leaders and post-colonial states have been a recurring theme in sub-Saharan Africa politics since the achievement of independence (Mamdani 1996). This is due in part to colonial forms of indirect rule that used and incorporated them as an extension of colonial regimes, a means to extract human and natural resources and a strategy for curbing organized resistance against the colonial masters (Mbembe 2001). Although some chiefs had assisted liberation struggles across the continent, post-colonial governments saw them mainly as the collaborators of the colonial masters and as impediments to the modernization and nation-building projects of the 1960s and 1970s. Despite the attempts to ban or contain kinship-based institutions, as Sklar (1999) discuss, since independence most African countries have experienced a “mixed polity” or a *dualism* of structures of power.

Skalnik (2004), chieftaincies or kinship-based forms of governance have never ceased to be important, despite various attempts by states to do away with them. The current security challenges facing Nigeria has this brought to the fore. The spate of insecurity and threats to lives and properties in Nigeria has reached alarming proportions despite the increasing visibility of the Nigerian state security agencies and para-military agencies in the management of internal conflicts. For many Nigerian families, 2018 has become a nightmare on account of deaths resulting from auto accidents and violent crimes. Just about 10 weeks into the New Year, the country has lost 1,351 to violent deaths, according to Sunday Vanguard checks (Ndujihe, 2018). According to him, no fewer than 517 people died violently, across the country. In January, about 676 Nigerians were cut down through herdsmen and farmers clashes, sectarian crises, communal clashes, Boko Haram insurgency, cult clashes, kidnapping, and ritual killings, among others. The deaths are 176 more than the 500 recorded in January 2017. The 1,351 deaths recorded since the beginning of 2018 exclude those who died from illness, childbirth, Lassa fever, etc. The North-East remains the killing field with 591 deaths. It is followed by North-Central, 270; North-West, 193; South-West, 136; and South-South, 131. At the bottom of the list is South-East, 30. Borno State, the hotbed of the Book Haram insurgency, recorded the highest number of deaths with a figure of 361. Borno

is followed by Benue, 163; and Borno's north-eastern neighbours, Taraba (107) and Adamawa, which witnessed 103 violent deaths; Kaduna, 71; Rivers, 66; Plateau, 54; Zamfara, 45; Lagos, 45. States that also recorded huge deaths include Ondo, 39; Ogun, 35; Jigawa, 30; Kano, 27; Nasarawa, 22; Delta, 19; Anambra, 18; Kebbi, 18; Akwa Ibom, 16; Kogi, 14, and Cross River, 14. The rest are Oyo, 12; Bauchi, 11; Yobe, 9; Edo, 9; Bayelsa, 7; Kwara, 6; FCT Abuja, 6; Niger, 5; Enugu, 4; Imo, 4; Ebonyi, 3; Katsina, 2; Ekiti, 2; Abia, 1; and Osun, 1. There were no reported violent deaths in Gombe and Sokoto.

As community leaders, they had records of all the people that come into the community. Whenever new person comes into the town, information get to the palace, such person is put under surveillance immediately such information gets to the natural leaders. This approach will checkmate and reduce the rate of crime such as kidnappings and other vices in the community and in the country. Security is everybody's business, if community must be involved, the authority must involve traditional rulers that will inform the security agencies whenever they see strange persons.

CONCEPTUAL ELUCIDATION

Security as a basic human need is important to the individual community. According to ¹ security is a contested concept, it means different things to different people and it also a contested practice, security for a group may constitute insecurity for another group. Therefore, security raises ontological debates about its nature and scope. Is there such a thing as security? There are two perspectives on the ontology or reality of security. The first perspective argues that security depicts a reality, a feeling and a condition. The second perspective conceives security as a label attached to a condition that someone considers undeniable.

TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Traditional institutions refers to the indigenous political system or arrangements whereby leaders with proven track of records are nominated, appointed and installed in accordance with the provisions of their native laws and customs. The essence of the institutions is to preserve the customs, traditions and cultural heritage of the people and manage conflicts and violence arising among or between members of the community by the instrumentality of laws and customs of the people.

TRADITIONAL RULERS

In our day to day language we often hear the word traditional rulers in our society. The concept refers to the indigenous arrangements whereby leaders or persons by virtue of heredity or people with proven track records are nominated, appointed and installed in line with the provisions of their native laws and customs. The essence of the institution is to preserve the tradition, the customs, cultural heritage of the people and to manage, settle and resolve disputes/conflict arising within or between members of the community by the instrumentality of laws and customs of the people in that particular community or society. Generally, they are seen and referred to as the custodians of their people's norms, cultural values and practices.

Adding on conceptual elucidations has identified three categories of traditional title holders that derive their titles from and through the traditions of the people, although the traditions vary from time, place and depth of cultural roots. Firstly, those holding literally honorific titles, conferred on them by superior traditional rulers in recognition and appreciation of the service rendered to the society. This category has no schedules or specific functions seen as a good chain of information and agents of conscientizing or mobilizing people when the need arises. The second categories are holders of titles or positions due to recent recognition or creation of such titles. In contrast to the above, they may have executive functions but restricted by the same laws that created them or gave them recognition. The last category is full time executive traditional title holders who perform executive functions from traditions largely rooted, revered and recognized and exercise their executive functions.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS

This study has adopted the **hierarchy of needs theory** as theoretical framework of analysis. The security and defence outfit in Nigeria has been shaped and formed by the colonialists. Of-course, prior to their coming, both the state and the royal institutions had their Dogarai system and this later operated under the Native Authority (NA) in both the colonial and post-colonial eras. This affects the security-public relations. Security agencies are seen by the general public as politically siding with the government of the day as they always maintain the notion that, it is the order from the above, instead of them to serve as a referee between people, people and government instead of serving the interest of the people and the state by making the general public to conform and comply with the aspirations, expectations of the citizenry, they

rather protect the dominant ruling class in the society. These in all sense posed a serious challenge to the security administration in the 21st century.

Hierarchy of Needs Theory

Security is a basis (human needs), it is a basic truth for an individual group, society, organism, an organization to survive, certain conditions necessary. Need is therefore an absolute precondition, pre-requisite for survival and whose death, disintegration, demise, collapse etc. will follow. American psychologist, articulated the hierarchy of needs. To him the survival of the human being whether for the individual or humanity as a whole of the personal or group level is dependent on the fulfilment of certain needs or necessities, at least one of which is fundamental and physiological (biological) such as food, shelter and clothing. Other needs on which survival depends include security, sense or experience of love, care, affection and belonging, self-esteem, respect and self-actualization or the realization of one's potential(s). In order to meet the need for survival in the society, people look up to the traditional institutions to provide security for their lives and property. In Hausa land and most African societies, traditional head is the custodian of all spheres of life. There is well-organized chain of command and authority which ensure that chief or village head is aware of entry and exist of all his subjects even in peace time². The people submitted themselves and were absolutely submissive to the authority of the rulers who in turn were expected to rule for the general good and welfare of the community as a whole. They were seen as the symbols of the people's past, and present, and custodians of their history, and upholders of their children.

Theoretical Framework of Analysis

This study is anchored on historical orientation as its framework of analysis. Like the legal approach, the historical approach is essentially an orientation. It is the historian's orientation which relies heavily on understanding the present through a probing of what happened in the past. The emphasis is on the sequence of past events. In this approach, the present is regarded as one stage in a series that will continue into the future and the specific features as well as the complexity of developments are carefully described and analyzed. A concern with trends and patterns is sometimes as feature of this approach. At its best the historical approach helps to place a given administrative system in wider context.

Historical studies are essentially relevant because they give more local information. They constitute detailed studies of local communities in Nigeria. The author concentrates particularly on the traditional rulers in Nigeria. That is they concentrate particularly on the social, political, and administrative systems in the various communities before the advent and during the era of British colonial administration. Descriptive-historians have been able to challenge some myths and easy generalizations contained in the semi-official and official studies of the same historical period. The traditional states of northern Nigeria formed the backbone of the British system of Indirect Rule. From the early colonial period onwards these states and their peoples have been the subject of a number of studies, most of which have been descriptive and historical.

As articulated by Blech, *et. al* (2006) important early overviews include Burdon's *Northern Nigeria, Historical Notes on Certain Emirates and Tribes* (1909), Temple's *The Native Races and their Rulers* (1918) and *Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria* (1919), Meek's *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria* (1925) and *Tribal Studies in Northern Nigeria* (1931), and Hogben's *The Muhammadan Emirates of Nigeria* (1930), revised and updated by Hogben and Kirk-Greene in *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria* (1966). Basic anthropological information is collected in the volumes produced for the *Ethnographic Survey of Africa* (e.g. Forde 1950; Gunn 1953; 1956; Gunn & Conant 1960).

These various works draw upon local histories and chronicles and in turn have spawned more detailed histories of individual polities. The most widely known of these have been published by outside scholars that and include Last's *The Sokoto Caliphate* (1967) and M.G. Smith's trilogy *Government in Zazzau* (1950), *The Affairs of Daura* (1978), and *Government in Kano* (1997). But the most rapidly expanding and vibrant category of historical literature is that of locally published histories and iographies written by Nigerians themselves. Examples are recent works on the Berom chiefship (Nyam & Jacobs 2004; Dung 2005) and on past and present Emirs of Zazzau (Dalhatu & Hassan 2000; Dalhatu 2002). Many more examples are cited in their report Blech, *et.al* (2006). Studies such as these are important both as sources of information and as active contributions to the debate about the contemporary significance of traditional rulers and related institutions.

METHODOLOGY

This work uses qualitative research approach and applied chronological, thematic method of analysis of data. The work uses both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include royal document, Archival materials and intelligence report written on the institution. Secondary source materials include published and unpublished works such as textbooks, pamphlets and project works. Internet materials were also used. In addition, visits were made to both the Waziri Junaidu Library, Department of History Library, both in Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto. The technique of content analysis is used to analyze these sources.

NIGERIAN SECURITY CHALLENGES: *THE PLACE OF TRADITIONAL RULERS*

Security is a natural choice of subject for this conference, as the traditional leadership institutions evolved out of people's own attempts to ensure peace and security in their communities. These institutions have changed enormously in the past century in Nigeria, but equally the problems of security have also become more complex and more intractable. Presently the connections between chieftaincy and the various security organizations are mostly informal, but they are very regular and important nonetheless.

Nigerians and her leadership have advanced several reasons for this state of affairs ranging from high level unemployment to acute poverty in the land, ill equipped Police Force, the collapse of Libya's Gaddafi regime and ineffective Policing or what our revered traditional ruler the sultan of Sokoto referred to as the collapse of internal security architecture. Quite frankly the solution to all our several security challenges lies in our adoption of community policing as the methodology of Policing. As proposed, this policy is meant to identify, reinforce and accept community policing as an internal security model in the fight against crime and upkeep of law and order.

According to Aliyu (2007), our traditional rulers, nationwide, have been involved in the past and will continue to be involved in the future in the maintenance of our national security includes following among others: a. Trans-border Security b. Internal Security which he divided into Physical and Community, and Food Security. In the pre-colonial era, traditional rulers were generally assisted in their onerous task of securing their domains by subordinate chiefs appointed by them. They were divine kings and

personifications of the various communities under them. They were seen and observed as the pivots around which the administration and everything revolved, the supreme religious head as well as the civil authority in the land.

In his argument in support of the significant roles by traditional institutions in the maintenance of internal security, Professor Tekena Tamuno in his *Crime and Security in Pre-Colonial Nigeria* stated that: Then law and order were maintained through well structured though undemocratic methods. In examining the roles of traditional rulers in pre-colonial Nigeria vis-à-vis the internal security of their domains, one can say that they had ably performed security roles at the executive, legislative and judicial levels. They had unlimited powers to punish offenders in line with their own codes of conduct in the various communities. They also engaged in such duties as the general maintenance of law and order, acting as the chief custodians of communal laws and natural resources, reception and entertainment of distinguished visitors. Usman Dan Fodio set out the following functions for the Emirs he dispatched to various parts of Northern Nigeria:

1. Organisation of troops, posting them to different areas and fixing their grants;
2. Maintenance of justice and appointment of judges and other State officials;
3. Collection of Haraji and Sadaqat; and
4. Protection of the land, the defence of the State and protection of religion against change or innovations (Aliyu,2007).

The Emirate system was a federal type of government held together by two powerful Emirs. The central administration was divided into two major sections: the eastern zone and the western zone. The eastern zone included Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Zaria and Yola with its headquarters at Sokoto. The Emir (Sultan) of Sokoto presided over this zone. The western zone included Gwandu, Ilorin, Argungu, Kontgagora and Gwari, with its headquarters at Gwandu. The Emir of Gwandu controlled the administration of the western zone. Immediately after the Jihad Usman Dan Fodio assigned what responsibility of administering the emirate to his relatives. The eastern zone was administered by his son. Bello, and the western zone was administered by his brother Abdullahi.

Traditional rulers hold the key to the success or failure in security administration in Nigeria because they operate at the grassroots level and interact closely with people in their daily activities consequent upon which they are highly respected. Abdullahi (2008) noted; Community based approach as opinion leaders' traditional authority are first stakeholders if they do not back opinion and will face problem as they are closer and always in contact with people. Traditional rulers' specified roles in security maintenance include the following:

- (1) Membership of emirate, district, village and ward security; observation, surveillance and maintenance and the weekly meeting
- (2) Security of village, ward, district and emirate vigilante committees
- (3) Security surveillance reports pass to relevant authorities.
- (4) Head of urban and rural areas, security watchdogs and reporters to know about happenings every minutes, seconds, hours, time, days, weeks, months and years.
- (5) Security ICT Networking with CCTV Cameras and gadgets
- (6) Head of security, safety and protection enlightenment campaigns
- (7) Sensitizing/conscientizing individuals. What citizens need to know i.e. do and don'ts on security tips in form of vigilance, surveillance etc.
- (8) Meetings attendants
- (9) Policy decision making
- (10) Making security surveillance and intelligence reports.
- (11) Watchdogs in numbering all houses to know their occupants and their general conduct (Orji and Olali, 2010).

In order to administer the villages successfully each district head appointed village heads for all the villages. Each village head was responsible for the peace, order and good government of his village. He administered the village in the interests of the district head. The Hausa/Fulani political system was a hierarchical chain of authority flowing from the central authority, to the emirs, through the district level to the village level.

In order to please the members of different professional groups, the Emir assigned titles to those who demonstrated high ability in their professions. For example, the best fisherman in a fishing community was conferred with the title of Sarkin Ruwa, and the best butcher was assigned the title of Sarkin Pawa. Once assigned these titles, such people acted as leaders of their various professional groups.

Specifically, according to Aliyu(2007), the Emir and members of his council of advisers served as both the legislative and executive arms of government. They made the laws and supervised their enforcement. At the district and village/ward levels the district and ward heads with their assistants also combined executive and legislative functions. While the executive and legislative functions were fused, the judicial function was quite distinct.

In some parts of Nigeria, especially in the North, certain categories of Emirs were given powers as the sole Native Authorities to administer their Emirates almost to the exclusion of those officials, who before the advent of the British, had considerable input in the administration of their Emirates. The Native Authority system could be divided into two-Administration and Finance and Security. The Administration and Finance was composed of the following:

1. Family Head
2. Ward Head
3. Village Head
4. District Head

This structure had political, economic and security implications. It was at once a structure for tax collection as it is was security reporting system. The Family Head had as his responsibility to report to the Ward Head the arrival of a visitor to his home; the full bio-data of the visitor including parentage, town, occupation and reason for the journey undertaken. By this method, the entire administrative structure would be fully aware of movement of people within their domain. The security department was composed of the following units:

- a. Emirs personal Body Guards (Dogarai)
- b. Native Authority Police

c. Prisons

The Body Guards (Dogarai), Prisons Guards and the Police were a selected group of people loyal to the Emirate. The heads of these units were carefully selected in order to protect the person of the Emir and to ensure peace and security of the territory. To emphasize the importance of the police within the Native Authority structure, the leadership of the Police Force was often entrusted to a prince. Indeed it had become customary for any eligible Prince to control the Police Force-on his way to the throne.

**POST-COLONIAL BASIS OF THE TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY:
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS**

There is no community in the world that achieves development, order and stability without defined norms and values embedded in its institutions and exercised by its leaders. The Traditional Authority has managed to survive the onslaught of colonialism. Some reverend place in the new setting even though it seems that the contemporary politicians are only honoring them in the meantime, this is why the Traditional Authority found itself in the prestigious but wholly ceremonial house of chiefs. Some of them were given ministerial appointments without portfolios. Some were becoming influential even more than the politicians. However, the politicians still need the institution to get the co-operation and support to quell conflict and restore order and stability.

The Traditional Rulers survived not because they were constitutionally recognized but based on their utility to the new political setting. Likewise, since the parliamentary system had allowed opposition, they had to seek the support of the traditional rulers so as to reduce the weight of opposition, provision of surveillance of people coming into their communities. In addition, the state of local government reforms since independence undoubtedly in no small measure affected the roles of the traditional authority, not only in local government administration but of the whole societal officers. The coming of the military into Nigerian politics in 1966 ushered in a gradual reduction of the participatory role of traditional rulers in local government administration. Thus structural re-organizations were implemented in various parts of the country with a view to establish new set of objectives in local government structures actions and functions. The traditional rulers were used as tax collectors and seen as administrative links between the regime and the people. They were used for chancellorship positions of a few universities in Nigeria and very frequently used as informal arbitrators of national as well as regional conflicts.

As a matter of fact, the introduction of a Federal Constitution in 1954 which brought an end to indirect rule as it was replaced with new systems of local government supposed to be a turning point for the usurpation of traditional rulers' authority in Nigeria. In Northern Nigeria the position of the Traditional Rulers from 1967-1972 was greatly undermined in the context of power and authority. The instruments of coercion the police, courts, prisons, were removed from its control. This action undermined the Emir's legal power and authority which ultimately deprived them of the important outward manifestation of their authority.

Similarly, the 1976 local government reforms chaired by Dasuki among others, excluded the traditional rulers from participating actively in political/security affairs. That is to say they were virtually excluded from a decision-making process of duly established local government council and were made non-executive, ceremonial as well as non-participatory in local government administration.

The reform among other things only provided for the establishment of traditional council of chiefs at the state and local government levels to handle chieftaincy and religious matter, assist in the maintenance of law and order and such other matters as the government might refer to the council from time to time. Consequently, the creation of traditional council of chiefs and their detachment from local government council marked the end of formal role of traditional rulers in politics and administration of criminal justice system, security inclusive in Nigeria.

Paradoxically, government had found it imperative to consult traditional rulers in order to establish their accountability and legitimacy in public eyes. Furthermore, they perceive traditional rulers not only as viable but also as an effective link particularly in implementing many of their programmes and policies that have direct bearing on the people of the grassroots level such as health, education, rural development, security etc. It is because of these and other allowed roles played, the traditional rulers in recent times that successive governments considered them very vital to the efficient discharge of the former duty. Government all along regarded and accorded loyalty to them to the extent that they are at times consulted before making some key political appointments at both local, state and federal levels. This can be more visible when the former regime of Babangida called on a meeting with Traditional rulers in Abuja admonishing them to use their position as traditional leaders of their various

societies to solve the problem of insecurity in their areas. However, the specter of crisis in Nigeria did not frighten most members of the Assembly into conceding at least an important role for this institution in its public continuity in the country. Hence they were not favored as before and have no specific role to play in security administration in Nigeria other than advice which was subject to acceptance or rejection by the government. The traditional rulers have no specific roles to play today, tomorrow or in the future. This is what led the Shehu of Borno into conceding that the traditional rulers were used by government as fire brigade mechanism only useful when there is a crisis in the country.

Evaluating the Role of Traditional Rulers before, during and after Colonialism in Nigeria

There is no community in the world that achieves development, order and stability without defined norms and values embedded in its institutions and exercised by its leaders. According to the findings of this study, pre-colonial Nigeria had traditional rulers as its leaders who exercised governance, power and authority or influence over their respective communities. Exercising these power, authority and influence which had its root in tradition, in turn, helped them (traditional rulers) in the aspects of managing affairs, administering justice and most especially resolving conflict. Suffice to say, the pre-colonial Nigeria benefited immensely from these roles played by the traditional rulers, as a result, crisis based on tribal, ethnic and religious sentiments were very minimal. These roles of traditional rulers changed during the colonial era. As it is done everywhere Europeans form colony, they inculcate their religious ideas and values and other forms of ideology such as democracy into the system of governance of their subjects which in turn erode the domestic policy-making process of their subjects. The colonial Nigeria was not an exception of this. According to the findings of this study, the domestic policy making process embedded in various institutions of governance in the pre-defined Nigeria were altered radically by the British who imposed their hegemony by assigning roles to traditional rulers in the bid to penetrate their subjects. According to the findings of this study, these roles were different from their initial roles in the pre-colonial period as the traditional rulers ruled in accordance to the directives of the British. Afigbo (1972) asserts that the British instituted Native Courts and installed chiefs by warrant that controlled them. He also explained that, many warrant chiefs solely constituted colonially backed usurpers of power and had little legitimacy beyond the fact of being installed by colonial state.

The implication is that, the domineering roles played by traditional rulers in the pre colonial era became weakened as their(traditional rulers) authority was seriously undermined with lost of prestige from their subjects

These downward trends of reduction of powers of traditional rulers have remained from the colonial era to the post – colonial Nigeria state. As a matter of fact, the introduction of a federal constitution in 1954 which brought an end to indirect rule as it was replaced by the new system of local government supposed to be a turning point for the usurpation of traditional rulers authority in Nigeria. However, this may not be entirely true in Nigeria as the British intensified her hegemony by merely replacing her officials with privileged individuals trained in Britain in the 1940s and 1950s with quasi-socialist ideas to manage Nigeria along with traditional rulers. Although, these individuals acted under the auspices of fighting or negotiating for federalism and parliamentary but the fact remains that their assumption of power did not help the traditional rulers in gaining back their sovereign authority. Accordingly these individuals portrayed the traditional rulers as a relic of a former era as the British monarchy and thereby substituted their (traditional rulers) status from being responsible for local administration and governance in their respective domains during the colonial era to advisers of local government as stipulated in the 1976 Local Government laws. Subsequently, as Nigeria fell victims to a series of military coups and the rather haphazard authoritarianism, the situation is however different when the military dictators used them as tools to mobilize peoples support for their (military dictators) programmes. As they(traditional rulers) especially the non – elected ones during first constitution, worked for the military dictators, the traditional rulers derived a kind of prestige in exchange for the legitimacy giving to the dictators.

Consequently, after Nigeria returned to democratic dispensation, the focus of both citizens and elected leaders was on the activities of the few traditional rulers who collide with military dictators in looting public revenues for private gain and not on their relevance to the Nigerian society as they did during the pre-colonial era. The implication is that, their roles in most of the constitutions were on advisory ground and not as the royal fathers of their various domain. This has bred failure in governance of the new state. Therefore, the loss of direction in governance which leads to the prevailing state of poverty; the frequent electoral and post-electoral strife; and the persistence of widespread ethnic and civil conflicts in the new Nigerian state, is the manifestation of the failure of the new Nigerian state. According to the findings of this paper, the

new Nigerian State has neglected the cultural norms and values which were embedded in the pre-colonial institutions of traditional rulers. The pre-defined Nigeria had norms and values that existed within its various communities before the arrival of the British. The British replaced these values with theirs without any considerations of the ones they met. According to Dore (n.d.) when policy neglects history, culture, and social context, huge amounts of effort and resources can be wasted on poorly conceived initiatives. Therefore, in the bid to build and strengthen the new Nigerian state, there is the need to recognize traditional rulers and its institutions. This is principally borne out by a growing recognition that capable democratic States must be grounded on indigenous social values and contexts, while adapting to changing realities. This will require among other actions, aligning and harmonizing traditional governance institutions with the modern State especially in the aspect of conflict resolution upon which this paper is focused

The Relevance of Traditional Rulers in Security Management

For traditional rulers to participate meaningfully on matters of security in the country, there is the need for them to be re-positioned so as not to just serve as agents of conflict resolution but also as security managers which they were before. With the ever increasing security challenges facing the nation today, the integration of traditional rulers into a security network that will provide necessary stability is desirable. To effectively operate, the security agencies in Nigeria often have to relate with traditional rulers who play prominent roles at the grassroots. They are very well situated to assist security agents in neutralizing threats emanating from their domains or neighbouring communities.

Collaborating this view, a former Inspector General of Police, IGP, Solomon Arase and a champion of Community Policing, has said that since Nigeria got her independence, the country is yet to have a proper policy for national internal security in place. He said this policy is meant to identify, reinforce and accept community policing as an internal security model in the fight against crime and upkeep of law and order. Mr. Arase made this known at a conference on policing the Nigerian federation, organised by the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, NIPSS, tagged “towards integrating community policing in Nigeria’s security architecture: models, policy options and strategies.” According to the *Nation newspaper*, Mr. Arase argued that community policing is historically the rock upon which policing and internal

security management rests. The former IGP said such a community policing policy should have distinct principles of policing and pathways to strengthening public trust and partnership between the police and the citizens. He said that the inability of the force to introduce reforms needed for the reorientation of the police psyche inherited from the colonial masters is a major factor that causes lack of trust between the police and citizens (Aderibigbe,2017)

The Traditional Rulers played important roles in recent times that doused tension in crises situations which could have escalated into major crisis in many parts of the country. It can therefore be deduced that interventionist policies of some traditional rulers have attested to show important and helpful. They had been and will continue to be relevant on matters of security affecting any part of the nation. The above stand was further strengthened by the renowned historian Dr. Bala Usman when he said:

Traditional rulers have always been called upon and used to neutralize crises as and when they arose. Besides, successive governments realized that, the surest way to win the hearts and minds of the citizens on major issues of the day was through the traditional rulers(Aliyu, 2007,13).

The argument for a special role for traditional rulers in our constitution should not imply an abandonment of the democratic system of government. What it means is that traditional structures should be accommodated and made to operate within modern democracy in such a way that they reflect and mutually reinforce each other. It cannot be denied that we may not have survived as a people without the leavening effect of our traditional rulers. They have acted and continue to act as respected interlocutors on behalf of the people with their elected and appointed government officials.

Today's largely heterogeneous communities in Nigeria have made the concept of internal security difficult to realize. The traditional rulers should be encouraged to monitor activities in their immediate domains. In most communities, traditional rulers still have a lot to say in the security management of such areas. There is a need to revive the traditional security institutions which used to support governance in the past. However, these may have to be modified to suit the dictates of civility.

It is an irony of fate that traditional rulers who are recognized in all States of the Federation and graded by State Governments are not given official recognition and security roles by the 1999 Constitution. In spite of the above, they have been the pillars of national security from the grassroots to the centre in the country.

CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD

It is an indisputable fact that a drop of water is not too strong enough to wash anything away and a thin thread is very weak, even a child can break it but when a number of thread are woven into a thick rope, that an elephant can't break. Yes, this illustration portrays the power in peace/unity and that peace/unity is the only ingredient that promotes growth and development of any nation, particularly a country like Nigeria due to her multi-cultural and multilingual nature which in most cases threatens national cohesion.

Traditional ruler as an institution with honour and dignity and as a divine being whom people rely upon and trust require discharging true leadership role by sowing the seed of peace, unity and harmony in the Nigerian societies. They are to ensure harmony among themselves such that they will jointly promote absolute peace and unity. Identifying unity as a power, all hand should be on deck, and Nigerians should be aligned with the submission of the Osun State government Mr. Rauf Aregbesola who posit that, "all humans are basically the same, even if we have differences in culture, sociology, education and technological attainment, which are temporary, and that we must respect our differences, promote our similarities and areas of agreement and pursue relentlessly our common aspiration because unity is a gargantuan investment which we cannot afford to be jeopardise". We should therefore respect, allow and support our monarchs to promote peace and unity in Nigeria.

The way forward is to Return to Traditional Rulers authority in Nigeria pertaining security Administration in Nigeria, Partial return of instrument of coercion (the police, courts, prison) with minimal control to be overseen by traditional rulers, Inclusion of Traditional Rulers' participation in security affairs in their localities, Creation of Traditional Council of Chiefs and attachment to Local Government to participate in the administration of security matters in Nigeria and finally Consultation with Traditional Rulers to provide viable means of curtly insecurity in Nigeria.

Recommendations

1. Traditional rulers should see themselves as fathers to all and enemy to none while discharging their traditional role at the same time ensure they sow the seed of peace and unity in their communities. Also, for traditional ruler to function as agent of change, peace and unity, they should work in tandem with the various community developmental programmes in their areas by contributing their wealth of experience to government policies.
2. Traditional rulers should desist from partisan politics and sees themselves as father that accommodate all into their fold: This will enable them to easily promote unity both at the local level and at the federal levels. Government at all levels should also ensure uniform policy of improving the welfare of traditional rulers and at the same time desist from action that could create disparity among the royal fathers.
3. Traditional rulers should endeavour to amplify certain cultural heritage that assists in achieving the value of integrity, discipline, tolerance, cooperation and unity among not only the youth but including adults that are in various positions where issues concerning distribution of national resources are taking place. Government should provide special security agents and ensure a good welfare package for traditional rulers.
4. The meeting of the National Council of Traditional Rulers of Nigeria (NCOTRN) should be given much attention by the government and such meeting should be held across the country and not only in Abuja, this will further advance the course of unity among traditional rulers which will in turn enhance their efforts in promoting national unity in Nigeria.

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IMPACT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ON PERFORMANCE IN ARM PENSION MANAGERS LTD. ABUJA

**ChinwenduAnnastesia Obiagwu
Isyaka Mohd Sani PhD
Anthony Auya Ayasal
Moses Omuya Salawu**

Abstract

The study assessed the Impact of Information Technology on performance in ARM Pension Managers Abuja -FCT. The study investigated how Information Technology on performance in ARM Pension Managers Abuja (Business Growth, Business Size and Market Share) covering a period of 5 years from 2013-2017. The study adopted a survey research method where primary data was collected from the respondents with the use of copies of questionnaire. The population is made up of 264 employees and some customers of ARM Pension Managers Abuja -FCT who were adopted as the sample of the study due to the small size of the population. Out of the 264 copies of questionnaires that were distributed, 225 were retrieved and used for analysis. Ordinary Least Square was used to test the formulated hypotheses in line with the objectives of the study and the result revealed that there is positive relationship between Information Technology and performance in ARM Pensions Managers Abuja. The study concluded that Information Technology have positive impact on performance in ARM Pension Managers Abuja. It was recommended that ARM Pension Managers, Abuja should come up with policies and techniques that will improve Information Technology as affects objectives set by the organization. This can be achieved by engaging experts in IT to train staff involved in Information Technology management.

ChinwenduAnnastesia Obiagwu, Isyaka Mohd Sani PhD, Anthony Auya Ayasal, Moses Omuya Salawu Department of Business Administration Faculty of Management Science, University of Abuja, Nigeria

Keywords: Impact, Information Technology, Organization and Performance**1.1 Background to the Study**

Organizations these times are always involved in processes and procedures that tend to improve what is and could be in the present circumstances within the business world as the evolution that bring about transformation are constantly changing. Most organization in quest to meet up with these times keeps adjusting and improving on the production, services, staff and even the procedures to remain relevant these times.

Guest, Michie, Conway, and Sheenam (2003) pointed out that the major challenge for modern organizations is the urge for increasing productivity and achieving a competitive advantage. To achieve competitive advantage every organization re-strategized. Surprisingly, the rate at which the business world is revolving, most organizations have but to engage themselves immensely to rediscover and assess their capacity to actually deliver to their existing customers and also attract prospective ones. . Although the enlargement of markets with globalisation has provided new opportunities for organisations to increase their production and sales, increased competition resulting from ever increasing number of competitors in international markets is becoming a real threat for the firms (Kürsat, 2000). This actually boils down to organizations re-evaluating the business operations and activities, so as not to be left behind or become absolute and redundant.

It is in realization of this that organizations, have been devising several strategies and techniques to improve tremendously on the status quo in a bid to gain competitive advantage and remain relevant in the industry. Pension companies in Nigeria have been facing several problems, ranging from customers complains, late pay-out, bad reputation, low patronage, staffs non-commitment, low market share and low profit margin, low returns on investment, low returns on assets and aggressive competition from other pension fund administrators, ARM pension administrator particularly have these challenges and various strategies have been put in place towards reducing the impact of these challenges. In ARM pension managers Abuja, it is the Information Technology (IT) department that makes use of technical equipments and techniques available to the company in order to achieve organizational objectives. This explains the importance of IT and Operations in the organization, thus the management must take their function seriously as any

failure in this aspect leads to inability to perform by the organization. It is against this backdrop that the study was conducted to assess the impact of Information Technology on performance in ARM Pension Managers Ltd.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Business organization are set up with the aim of achieving various goal and in doing this, IT plays important roles. Any organization therefore that wants to perform must take the information technological aspect of the organization seriously. One of the most difficult areas of organizations Information Technology is the employment of suitable IT staffs which determine the quality of technological in-put, equipments/soft ware and IT strategies in the organization. The information technology includes the information security, data base and network management and computer technical support.

The management of ARM Pensions Managers, Abuja use various forms of information technology strategies in order to enhance their performance. These have not yielded the desired results as there are challenges of decrease in the communication and feedback among the staffs and customers, high cost of transactions and reduction in market share in ARM Pension Managers, Abuja. It is based on these that the study is carried out to assess the impact of information technology on performance in ARM Pensions Managers Abuja.

1.3 Research Questions

The study provided answers to the following research questions:

- i. To what extent does information technology influence the business growth in ARM Pensions Managers Ltd Abuja?
- ii. In which way does information technology affect the operating cost in ARM Pensions Managers Ltd Abuja?
- iii. How does information technology impact on the market share in ARM Pensions Managers Ltd Abuja?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of information technology on the Performance of ARM Pension Managers Ltd. Abuja, Nigeria. The specific objectives are:

- i. To evaluate the influence of Information Technology on

business growth in ARM Pensions Managers Ltd Abuja.

- ii. To determine the effect of Information Technology on operating cost in ARM Pensions Managers Ltd Abuja.
- iii. To ascertain the impact of Information Technology on the market share of ARM Pension Managers Ltd. Abuja.

1.5 *Statement of Hypotheses*

In the course of this study, the following hypotheses were formulated:

- Ho₁:** There is no significant relationship between Information technology and business growth of ARM Pension Managers Ltd Abuja.
- Ho₂:** There is no significant relationship between Information technology and the operating cost of ARM Pension Managers Ltd Abuja.
- Ho₃:** There is no significant relationship between Information technology and the market share of ARM Pension Managers Ltd. Abuja significantly.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The significance of the study will be to the following:

Government: the government can implement a policy that changes the trends and the applicability of information technology at ARM Pension Managers Ltd Abuja and the entire business environment. This study will enable policy makers understand IT practices to carry out and also enable them make business friendly policies/decisions that will promote business and attract foreign investors.

Student/Researchers: this study will serve as reference materials for students undergoing similar study. The data from the study may assist in theoretical discussions relating to information technology and performance of companies in Nigeria.

Shareholders: the shareholders of the organizations under this study shall benefit from the findings and suggestions the study will come up with in the area of adopting the use of information technology in every unit to enhance easy operations as regards to the performance indices.

Board of Directors: the Board of Directors shall also gain a lot of experience,

principles and practice of information technology adaptation that will stimulate and sustain the organization for future failure. Also, ethical views shall be part of the benefits derived as a result of the study.

Employees: The employees of the organization under study shall conduct their duties on the basis of transparency and accountability which will improve their income level.

Nigerian Youth: it is expected that most companies-will survive the troubling business environment and thereby increase production and demand more manpower for marketing, sales, production, finance and accounting. In summary, the study shall benefit the stakeholders and improve the nation's economy.

1.7 Scope of the study

The study examined Information Technology on Performance in ARM Pension Manager Ltd Abuja. The study adopted two (2) variables namely: dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable is performance which is proxied by business growth, operating cost and market share, while, the independent variable is information technology and was held constant. The population of the study is the entire staff of ARM Pension Fund Managers Ltd totalling 213 employees of different levels (Top, Middle and lower) with different experience and some of their customers (32) The study covered period of five (5) years, 2013 to 2017. The period was chosen because it witnessed stiff competition among Pension Fund Administrators and decline in the organizational performance in ARM Pension Managers.

2.0 Literature Review and theoretical framework

2.1 Conception Frame Work

According to Hansson, (2015) the word technology is of Greek origin, based on “techne” that means art or skill and “-logy” that means “knowledge of” or “discipline of”. The word Technology on it's own refers to the application of scientific know how for practical purposes.

Technology could be defined as the art of constructing and fabrication of better and easier ways of achieving a goal. This in other words is the procedure by which an objective can be actualized better than the already existing form, which implies that technology is a process and is also a medium of achieving goal.

Information technology a relatively new term, according to the *Online Etymology Dictionary*, the term 'information technology' [has been around since 1958](#). It first appeared in the *Harvard Business Review*. Etymology is the study of the origin of words and how their meanings have evolved.

In 1958, [Harold J. Leavitt and Thomas L. Whisler](#) wrote the following in a *Harvard Business Review* article: “The new technology does not yet have a single established name. We shall call it information technology. It is composed of several related parts. Information technology refers to anything related to computing technology, such as networking, hardware, software, the internet or the people that work with these technologies (Kumar, 2014)

According to Anyakoha, (1991) cited in Ogbomo and Ogbomo (2008) information technology is the use of man-made tools for the collection, generation, communication, recording, re-management and exploitation of information. It is technology involving the development, maintenance, and use of computers and software for the processing and distribution of information.

Merriam-Webster explains that IT or information technology refers to the development, maintenance, and use of computer software, systems, and networks. It includes their use for the processing and distribution of data. Data means information, facts, statistics, etc., gathered together for reference, storage, or analysis.

Stephen Bigelow and Margaret Rouse, (2019) said the term information technology was coined by the *Harvard Business Review*, in order to make a distinction between purpose-built machines designed to perform a limited scope of functions and general-purpose computing machines that could be programmed for various tasks. As the IT industry evolved from the mid-20th century, computing capability advanced while device cost and energy consumption fell lower, a cycle that continues today when new technologies emerge.

Anyakoha, (1991) cited in Ogbomo and Ogbomo (2008) information technology includes those applications and commodities, by which information is transferred, recorded, edited, stored, manipulated or disseminated.

Information technology (IT) is a term that encompasses all forms of voice conversations, still images, motion pictures, photos, multimedia presentations, and other forms, including those not yet conceived).

Frenzel, (1999) conceptualizes information technology as the term that describes an organizations computing and communications infrastructure, including computer systems, telecommunications, networks, and multimedia software and hardware. He goes on to assert that information technologies are computer based and operate on a convergence of the electronics and telecommunications devices.

Stephen Bigelow and Margaret Rouse, (2019) Information technology (IT) is the use of any computers, storage, networking and other physical devices, [infrastructure](#) and processes to create, process, store, secure and exchange all forms of [electronic data](#). Typically, IT is used in the context of enterprise operations as opposed to personal or entertainment technologies. The commercial use of IT encompasses both computer technology and telephony.

Information technology reflects the combination of three technologies, digital computing, data storage and ability to transmit digital signal through telecommunication network. Rapid change in semiconductors technology, information storage & networking, combined with advance in software, has enabled new application, cost reduction and widespread diffusion of IT. The expanding array application makes IT more useful & further fuels the expansion of IT.

2.2 Company's Performance

The concept of company performance is very common in the academic literature; its definition is difficult because of its many meanings. For this reason, there isn't a universally accepted definition of this concept. In the '50s company's performance was defined as the extent to which companies viewed as a social system fulfilled their objectives. Performance evaluation during this time was focused on work, people and company structure. Later in the 60s and 70s, companies have begun to explore new ways to evaluate their performance so performance was defined as a company's ability to exploit its environment for accessing and using the limited resources. A similar position was adopted by Lupton, Gribbin and Warmington, (1977) who defined good organizational performances to be those which were able to achieve high productivity and employee satisfaction with low turnover rates and costs.

Otley, (2002) view performance as the end result of activities, dealing with profitability, market share, sales growth, and cost reduction among others. Richard, (2009) opine that company performance encompasses three specific

areas of company outcomes: (a) financial performance (profits, return on assets, return on investment, etc.); (b) product market performance (sales, market share, etc.); and (c) shareholder return (total shareholder return, economic value added, etc.)

In a nut-shell, performance is the improvement of the organizations major factors in existence which comprises of the production level, goals achieved, customers satisfaction, financial status, employees satisfaction and cost reduction.

2.3. The Six Important Business Objectives of Information Technology

According to Chirantan Basu, (2019) Starting in the early 1980s with the first desktop computers, information technology has played an important part in the U.S. and global economies. Companies rely on IT for fast communications, data processing and market intelligence. IT plays an integral role in every industry, helping companies improve business processes, achieve cost efficiencies, drive revenue growth and maintain a competitive advantage in the marketplace.

Information Technology in Product Development

Information technology can speed up the time it takes new products to reach the market. Companies can write product requirement documents by gathering market intelligence from proprietary databases, customers and sales representatives. From innovations in microprocessors to efficient drug delivery systems, information technology helps businesses respond quickly to changing customer requirements.

Information Technology in Stakeholder Integration: Using global 24/7 interconnectivity, a customer service call originating in Des Moines, Iowa, ends up in a call centre in Manila, Philippines, where a service agent could look up the relevant information on servers based in corporate headquarters in Dallas, Texas, or in Frankfurt, Germany. Public companies use their investor relations websites to communicate with shareholders, research analysts and other market participants.

Information Technology in Process Improvement: Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems allow managers to review sales, costs and other operating metrics on one integrated software platform, usually in real time. An ERP system may replace dozens of legacy systems for finance, human

resources and other functional areas, thus making internal processes more efficient and cost-effective.

Information Technology and Cost Efficiencies: Although the initial IT implementation costs can be substantial, the resulting long-term cost savings are usually worth the investment. IT allows companies to reduce transaction and implementation costs. IT-based productivity solutions, from word processing to email, have allowed companies to save on the costs of duplication and postage, while maintaining and improving product quality and customer service.

Cost Savings and Competitive Advantage: Cost savings, rapid product development and process improvements help companies gain and maintain a competitive advantage in the marketplace. If a Smartphone competitor announces a new device with innovative touch-screen features, the competitors must quickly follow suit with similar products or risk losing market share. Companies can use rapid prototyping, software simulations and other IT-based systems to bring a product to market cost effectively and quickly.

Information Technology in Globalization: Companies that survive in a competitive environment usually have the operational and financial flexibility to grow locally and then internationally. IT is at the core of operating models essential for globalization, such as telecommuting and outsourcing. A company can outsource most of its noncore functions, such as human resources and finances, to offshore companies and use network technologies to stay in contact with its overseas employees, customers and suppliers.

2.4 Information Technology and Its Role in the Modern Organization

According to Chris Mackenchnie, (2019) Information technology (IT) has become a vital and integral part of every business plan. From multi-national corporations who maintain mainframe systems and databases to small businesses that own a single computer, IT plays a role. The reasons for the omnipresent use of computer technology in business can best be determined by looking at how it is being used across the business world.

Communication between Employees, Suppliers and Customers: For many companies, email is the principal means of communication between

employees, suppliers and customers. Email was one of the early drivers of the Internet, providing a simple and inexpensive means to communicate. Over the years, a number of other communications tools have also evolved, allowing staff to communicate using live chat systems, online meeting tools and video-conferencing systems. Voice over internet protocol (VOIP) telephones and smart-phones offer even more high-tech ways for employees to communicate.

Inventory Management Systems:When it comes to managing inventory, organizations need to maintain enough stock to meet demand without investing in more than they require. Inventory management systems track the quantity of each item a company maintains, triggering an order of additional stock when the quantities fall below a pre-determined amount. These systems are best used when the inventory management system is connected to the point-of-sale (POS) system. The POS system ensures that each time an item is sold, one of those items is removed from the inventory count, creating a closed information loop between all departments.

Data Management Systems:The days of large file rooms, rows of filing cabinets and the mailing of documents is fading fast. Today, most companies store digital versions of documents on servers and storage devices. These documents become instantly available to everyone in the company, regardless of their geographical location. Companies are able to store and maintain a tremendous amount of historical data economically, and employees benefit from immediate access to the documents they need.

Management Information Systems:Storing data is only a benefit if that data can be used effectively. Progressive companies use that data as part of their strategic planning process as well as the tactical execution of that strategy. Management Information Systems (MIS) enable companies to track sales data, expenses and productivity levels. The information can be used to track profitability over time, maximize return on investment and identify areas of improvement.

Managers can track sales on a daily basis, allowing them to immediately react to lower-than-expected numbers by boosting employee productivity or reducing the cost of an item.

Customer Relationship Management: Companies are using IT to improve the way they design and manage customer relationships. Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems capture every interaction a

company has with a customer, so that a more enriching experience is possible. If a customer calls a call centre with an issue, the customer support representative will be able to see what the customer has purchased, view shipping information, call up the training manual for that item and effectively respond to the issue.

The entire interaction is stored in the CRM system, ready to be recalled if the customer calls again. The customer has a better, more focused experience and the company benefits from improved productivity.

Establishment of objectives: Planning requires a systematic approach and starts with the setting of goals and objectives to be achieved. The objectives provide a rationale for undertaking various activities as well as indicate direction of efforts. Moreover, these objectives focus the attention of managers on the end results to be achieved. As a matter of fact, objectives provide nucleus to the planning process. Therefore, objectives should be stated in a clear, precise and unambiguous language. Otherwise the activities undertaken are bound to be ineffective. As far as possible, objectives should be stated in quantitative terms. For example, Number of working men, wages given, units produced, etc. But such an objective cannot be stated in quantitative terms like performance of quality control manager, effectiveness of personnel manager. Such goals should be specified in qualitative terms. Hence objectives should be practical, acceptable, workable and achievable.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

This study is guided by the following theories:

2.5.1 Technology Acceptance Model (TAM)

TAM adapted from the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) is an information system theory that models how users come to accept a technology and how they use that technology. Kondo, *et.al.*, (2013) argue that amidst the well-developed theories, TAM received extension empirical documentation on the validations, applications, and replication of its power to forecast the behaviour of usage. Perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use determine an individual's intension to use a system with the intension to use servicing as a mediator of actual system use according to the TAM, Surendran, (2012). It includes beliefs about usefulness and ease of use as the primary determinants of ICT adoption in farming.

2.5.2 Diffusion of Innovation Theory (DOI)

The Diffusion of Innovation Theory of Rogers, (1983) is one of the theories used in information system to study the use of ICT service by users. It is used as a technology acceptance model. Many studies like; Cater and Belanger, 2004; Atkinson, 2007; Li, 2010; Macvaugh and Schiavone, 2010; Woosley and Ashia, 2011, have emphasized that in the field of information systems, DOI is used as technology acceptance theory. Kapoor, *et.al.*, (2013) report that many researcher's argue that the classic diffusion of innovation based on Rogers, (1983) diffusion of innovation model may be used to assist our understanding of technology usage. The advantage of using the DOI is that it provides the contextual sets that drive the acceptance of the technological innovation such as the use of ICT on agricultural information (Ituma-aleke and Egwu, 2014).

2.5.3 Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT)

Venkatesh, *et al.*, (2003), examined eight technology acceptance theories. They formulated a model that integrates and unifies the characteristics and elements of other related theories. This is labelled UTAUT theory. The theories that were incorporated into the UTAUT are the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), combination of TPB and TAM, Motivational Model (MM), Personal Computer (PC) utilization, Diffusion of Innovation (DOI), and the Social Cognitive Theory (SCT). The UTAUT integrates the common elements of these theories. UTAUT suggests that three constructs are the main determinants of intention to use an information technology. The three constructs are performance expectancy, effort expectancy, and social influence (Li, 2010). Venkatshet, *et.al.*, (2003) define performance expectancy as the degree to which an individual believes that using the system will help one attain gains in job performance. They argue that effort expectancy is the level of ease associated with the utilization of the scheme. Social influence is defined as the extent to which and individual perceives that important others believe one should use the system. Finally, they argue that facilitating conditions are defined as the degree to which an individual believes that an organizational and technical infrastructure exist to support the use of the system.

2.5.4 Media richness theory (Daft and Lengel, 1986) shares some characteristics with social presence theory. It posits that the amount of information communicated differs with respect to a medium's *richness*. The theory assumes that resolving ambiguity and reducing uncertainty are the main

goals of communication. Because communication media differ in the rate of understanding they can achieve in a specific time (with "rich" media carrying more information), they are not all capable of resolving uncertainty and ambiguity well. The more restricted the medium's capacity, the less uncertainty and equivocality it is able to manage. It follows that the richness of the media should be matched to the task so as to prevent over simplification or complication.

2.5 .5 Theoretical Base of the Study

This theory reviewed some theories which include Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) Diffusion of Innovation Theory (DOI), Unified Theory of Acceptance and use of Technology (UTAUT), Media Richness Theory. The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) shall be adopted as the theoretical base of the study due to the fact that it focused on how users come to accept a technology and how to make use of the technology in this regards, Information Technology.

2.6 Empirical Studies

Adeyemi, Oyebisi, and Kajo, (2020) investigated, Evaluating the Effect of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) on Health Care Delivery in Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), FCT, Abuja is yet another gap that has existed in the health sector. Countries have adopted the use of ICT tools to improve health care delivery across the world. Nigeria is faced with corruption and infrastructural decay which has prevented the country from fully benefiting from the ICT gains. This however has prompted the researcher into evaluating the Effect of ICT on Health Care Delivery in Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), FCT, Abuja. In the sample, twenty-five (25) health professionals, patients and patients relatives were randomly selected from the 10 selected private and public hospitals amounting to two hundred (200) respondents which from the population of the study. Krejcie and Morgan (1960) formula was used to determine the sample size of the study, and 152 was gotten. Probability sampling technique is utilized in this study. The study adopted statistical tool of Ordinary Least Square method of Regression Analysis and Pearson multiple correlation using SPSS. The results were that, there is a significant relationship between the availability and use of ICT tools by health professionals and the promotion of Health Care Delivery, also, that, the use of ICT tools by health professional has no significant relationship with the efficiency and effectiveness of Health Care Delivery, Abuja.

2.7 Existing Study Gap

There are many studies and literatures written on the impact of information technology (IT) in Nigeria but for the purpose of this research, only studies of Mahmoud, et al, (2014), [Apulu](#), et al, (2013), and **Adeyemi, Oyebisi, and Kajo, (2020)**. All of these studies were conducted within Nigeria and both in FCT- Abuja using similar variables. However, the point of departure from the previous studies is that, both the dependent and Independent Variables were put it unwilling. The Independent Variable is Information Technology (IT) and was held constant in the study, while the Dependent Variable Organizational Performance is proxied by Business Growth, Operating Cost and Market Share respectively. This is quite different from the conventional approach in the similar studies empirically used in the study. Finally, the further uses survey research design. The study also employed random sampling method in the administration of the questionnaire, a statistical tool of simple linear method of regression and statistical software of e-view to analyzed data.

The Alpha values are reliable in this study because, the pilot study was tested and the values gotten were not significant but a pre-tested was conducted, it gave us alpha values that were above 0.7 from both the dependent and the independent variables.

3.1 Research Methodology

The procedures adopted for conducting this research covered area of the study, research design, population of the study, sampling technique, sample size determination, source of data, method of data collection and analysis, study variables.

3.1 Sampling Technique and Sample size

The population of the study being the entire members of staff of ARM Pension Managers, Abuja (213) and 32 customers of theirs was adopted as the sample size of the study. This was based on the fact that the population was not large and could be managed by the researcher.

3.2 Sources and Method of Data Collection

The study used primary data from the sample of the study being the entire members of staff of ARM Pension Managers, Abuja and some of their customers) and secondary data books and internet. The primary source of data was obtained through a well-structured questionnaire that was administered to

the entire members of staff and some customers of ARM Pension Managers, Abuja.

3.3 Method of Data Analysis

The method of data analysis adopted for this study was the use of frequency tables and the inferential statistics approach of Regression. The reason for using regression is that it is useful for the estimation of relationship between the independent variable (Information Technology) and dependent variable, ARM Pension Managers Ltd Abuja's performance.

3.4 Scope of the Study:

This study evaluates the effect of information technology on ARM Pension Managers Ltd. Abuja. The entire staffs of ARM Pension Managers Abuja and some customers was used as the study population. This includes 213 employees of various levels, (Top, Middle and Line Management) with different experiences and 23 customers of various levels.

3.5 Area of study

The study focused on ARM Pension Managers Ltd. Abuja, Nigeria. From the sampling frame, a sampling of Top managers, middle managers and line managers were adopted in the (Federal Capital Territory) Abuja.

3.6 Population of the Study

The population of the study includes the 213 Staff of the company who were of various experience and departments and some 32 picked customers. The primary data were sourced through questionnaires and interviews while the secondary data were obtained from Books, Journals and Internet. It covers formal Pension establishments, which are defined as those that are duly registered and have audited accounts.

3.7 Research Design

The data obtained were analyzed using Single Regression Technique, Descriptive Statistics and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Technique to test the formulated hypotheses in order to establish a significant relationship between the variables.

3.8 Validity and Reliability of the Instrument

The validity and reliability of the instrument for the questionnaire testing the variables in the study. Sekran, (2001) is 0.7 Alpha values for each instrument under study. The researcher tested the validity of these variables under study by conducting a pilot test at one of the insurance Companies in Abuja where, 30 copies of questionnaire were administered to staff using stratified method and the result showed that, the instruments used are valid. See table 3.8.1 below.

Table: 3.8.1 Cronbach's Alpha Computation table

Variables	Pre-test	Cronbach's Alpha
Information Technology	0.53	0.81
Business Growth	0.41	0.89
Operating Cost	0.40	0.82
Market Share	0.52	0.78

Source: Researcher's Computation (2021)

3.9 Model Specifications

The Information Technology is (Independent Variables) and Organizational Performance (OP) (Dependent Variables) are proxies by Business Growth (BG), Operating Cost (OC), and Market Share (MS). The multiple and simple model employed to estimate the impact of Information Technology on the Performance in ARM Pension is thus, expressed in this study as:

In order to evaluate the impact of IT on OP in ARM Pension Managers in FCT, Abuja, a simple linear model was built.

The model is given as follows:

The model is given as follows:

$$OP = f(IT) \dots\dots\dots 3.1$$

The explicit form of the model can be stated thus:

$$IT = a + b_1 BG + e \dots\dots\dots 3.2$$

$$IT = a + b_1 OC + e \dots\dots\dots 3.3$$

$$IT = a + b_1 MS + e \dots\dots\dots 3.4$$

Where:

BG = Business Growth,

OC = Operation Cost and

MS = Market share, which are the proxies of Dependent Variables

a = constant

IT= Information Technology, which is proxy of the Independent Variables.

4.0 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

The study presents and analyses the data collected from the respondents as follows:

4.1 Response Rate

Table 4.1: Response Rate

Company Staff	No of Questionnaires Distributed	No of Questionnaires Returned	No. of Questionnaires not Returned	Percentage of Questionnaires Returned
Top Management Staff	20	14	6	5.3
Middle Management Staff	75	68	7	25.76
Line Staff	118	99	19	37.2
Customers of more than 7years	23	19	4	7.2
Customers of less than 5 years	28	25	3	9.47
Total	264	225	39	85.23

Source: Field Survey, (2021)

Table 4.1 shows that out of the two hundred and sixty-four (264) copies of questionnaire that were administered, two hundred and twenty-five (225) constituting 85.23 percent response rate which was used for the analysis. Of this number, 14 of the Top Management Staff completed and returned the questionnaire representing 5.3 percent, 68 or 25.76 percent of Middle Management Staff completed and returned the questionnaires while 99 or 37.3 percent are Line Staff who completed and returned the questionnaires. 19 or 7.2 percent of the customers of more than 7years returned the questionnaires while 25 or 9.47 percent of questionnaires were returned. The implication of this finding to the study is that the quality of the expected responses is to a considerable extent dependable, since majority of the respondents are very familiar with the area of the study.

4.2 Test of Hypotheses

Hypothesis One

Ho, There is no significant relationship between Information Technology and Business Growth of ARM Pension Managers Ltd. Abuja.

Table 4.1: Ordinary Least Square Method of Regression.
E-view Statistical Software Package, 23.00 Editions.

Dependent Variable: BG

Method: Least Squares

Date: 12/03/21 Time: 11:50

Sample (adjusted): 376

Included observations: 50 after adjustments

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.652814	0.324171	5.240605	0.0001
IT	0.437605	0.043156	7.335319	0.0000
R-squared	0.653586	Mean dependent var		1.320000
Adjusted R-squared	0.630744	S.D. dependent var		0.471212
S.E. of regression	0.373792	Akaike info criterion		0.908944
Sum squared resid	6.706587	Schwarz criterion		0.985425
Log likelihood	-20.72361	Hannan-Quinn criter.		0.938069
F-statistic	31.45971	Durbin-Watson stat		0.252396
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000002			

Source: Computed by the Author Using E-view Statistical Software (Version 23)(2021)

1% level of significance, 5% level of significance and 10% level of significance

Table 4.1 shows the regression result for hypothesis one revealed that Information Technology in ARM Pension, Abuja in terms of Business Growth does not have any significance effect on 43% for every 1% increase in Business Growth. The coefficient (0.43) of Information Technology (IT) is positive and significant Business Growth in ARM Pension, Abuja. The p-value of 0.00 and standard error of 0.043 are less than the t-statistic value of 7.33 which indicates that there is no significant relationship between information Technology and Business Growth in ARM Pension. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that says 'there is significant relationship between Information Technology and Performance (Business Growth) in ARM Pension Managers ltd. Abuja.

Ho₂ Information Technology does not have significant effect on the Operation Cost of ARM Pension Managers Ltd Abuja.

Table 4.2: Ordinary Least Square Method of Regression.
E-view Statistical Software package, 23.00 Editions.

Dependent Variable: OP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/03/21 Time: 12.34
Sample (adjusted): 376
Included observations: 50 after adjustments

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	1.437293	0.256292	7.726203	0.0000
IT	0.621436	0.285223	8.641214	0.0000
R-squared	0.721175	Mean dependent var		3.120000
Adjusted R-squared	0.703700	S.D. dependent var		1.154229
S.E. of regression	0.698571	Akaike info criterion		2.159618
Sum squared resid	23.42407	Schwarz criterion		2.236099
Log likelihood	-51.99046	Hannan-Quinn criter.		2.188743
F-statistic	85.77008	Durbin-Watson stat		0.325073
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Source: Computed by the Author Using E-view Statistical Software (Version 23) (2021)

1% level of significance, 5% level of significance and 10% level of significance

Table 4.2 shows the regression result for hypothesis two revealed that the performance in ARM Pension, Abuja in terms of Business Size (OC) does not have significance effect on 62% for every 1% increase in Operation Cost. The coefficient (0.43) of Information Technology (IT) is positive and significant in achieving Operation Cost (OC) in ARM Pension, Abuja. The p-value of 0.00 and standard error of 0.028 are less than the t-statistic value of 8.6 which indicates that Information Technology does have significance effect on Operation Cost in ARM Pension, Abuja.

Hypothesis Three

Ho, Information Technology does not impact the Market Size of ARM Pension Managers Ltd. Abuja significantly.

Table 4.3: Ordinary Least Square Method of Regression.
E-view Statistical Software package, 23.00 Editions

Dependent Variable: MS
Method: Least Squares
Date:12/03/21 Time: 02:06
Sample: 376
Included observations: 160

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.027547	0.060494	0.455368	0.6495
IT	0.392121	0.052187	7.513771	0.0000
R-squared	0.955906	Mean dependent var		2.193750
Adjusted R-squared	0.955058	S.D. dependent var		1.451509
S.E. of regression	0.307714	Akaike info criterion		0.505393
Sum squared resid	14.77136	Schwarz criterion		0.582273
Log likelihood	-36.43146	Hannan-Quinn criter.		0.536611
F-statistic	1127.287	Durbin-Watson stat		0.515243
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Source: Computed by the Author Using E-view Statistical Software (Version 23) (2021)

1% level of significance, 5% level of significance and 10% level of significance

Table 4.3 shows the regression result for hypothesis three revealed that the performance in ARM Pension, Abuja in terms of Market Size (MS) does not impart 62% for every 1% increase in Information Technology (IT). The coefficient 0.39 of Information Technology (IT) is positive and significant in achieving Market Share (MS) in ARM Pension, Abuja. The p-value of 0.00 and standard error of 0.028 are less than the t-statistic value of 7.5 which indicates that information technology does not impact Market Share (MS) in ARM Pension, Abuja. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that says 'there is significant relationship between Information Technology and Performance (Market Share) in ARM Pension Managers ltd. Abuja.

4.4 Discussion of Major Findings

The results of the analysis indicate that Information Technology is statistically significant positively in achieving performance (Business Growth, Operation

Cost and Market Share) in ARM Pension Manager, Abuja. Among the variables of Information Technology premises has more impact on performance in ARM Pension Manager, Abuja.

The analysis in hypothesis 1: Shows the regression result for hypothesis one revealed that Information Technology in ARM Pension, Abuja in terms of Business Growth does not have any significance effect on 43% for every 1% increase in Business Growth. The coefficient 0.43 of Information Technology (IT) is positive and significant Business Growth in ARM Pension, Abuja. The p-value of 0.00 and standard error of 0.043 are less than the t-statistic value of 7.33 which indicates that there is no significant relationship between information Technology and Business Growth in ARM Pension. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that says 'there is significant relationship between Information Technology and Performance (Business Growth) in ARM Pension Managers ltd. Abuja. This study agrees with the study conducted by **Adeyemi, Oyebisi, and Kajo, (2020) investigated**, *Evaluating the Effect of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) on Health Care Delivery in Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), FCT, Abuja is yet another gap that has existed in the health sector. Countries have adopted the use of ICT tools to improve health care delivery across the world. Nigeria is faced with corruption and infrastructural decay which has prevented the country from fully benefiting from the ICT gains. This however has prompted the researcher into evaluating the Effect of ICT on Health Care Delivery in Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), FCT, Abuja.* This study is in line with that of Mahmoud, et al, (2014), investigated, ICT Infrastructure and Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) in Nigeria: An Impact Assessment of Microfinance Banks in Abuja.

The finding based on the analysis in hypothesis 2: shows the regression result for hypothesis two revealed that the performance in ARM Pension, Abuja in terms of Business Size (OC) does not have significance effect on 62% for every 1% increase in Operation Cost. The coefficient 0.43 of Information Technology (IT) is positive and significant in achieving Operation Cost (OC) in ARM Pension, Abuja. The p-value of 0.00 and standard error of 0.028 are less than the t-statistic value of 8.6 which indicates that Information

Technology does have significance effect on Operation Cost in ARM Pension, Abuja. This study agrees with the study conducted by Mahmoud, et al, (2014), investigated, ICT Infrastructure and Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) in Nigeria: An Impact Assessment of Microfinance Banks in Abuja. *The study examines the application of Information and Communications Technology (ICTs) Infrastructure in the Nigerian Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) with a view to assessing the Microfinance Banks in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. This study is in agreement with the studies conducted by Apulu, et al, (2013), studied, in today's global economy Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is often regarded as a strategic tool for achieving success and competitiveness in organisations. This study is in line with that of Mahmoud, et al, (2014), investigated, ICT Infrastructure and Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) in Nigeria: An Impact Assessment of Microfinance Banks in Abuja.*

The analysis in hypothesis 3: shows the regression result for hypothesis three revealed that the performance in ARM Pension, Abuja in terms of Market Size (MS) does not impart 62% for every 1% increase in Information Technology (IT). The coefficient 0.39 of Information Technology (IT) is positive and significant in achieving Market Share (MS) in ARM Pension, Abuja. The p-value of 0.00 and standard error of 0.028 are less than the t-statistic value of 7.5 which indicates that information technology does not impact Market Share (MS) in ARM Pension, Abuja. We therefore reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that says 'there is significant relationship between Information Technology and Performance (Market Share) in ARM Pension Managers Ltd. Abuja. This study is in line with that of **Adeyemi, Oyebisi, and Kajo, (2020) investigated, Evaluating the Effect of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) on Health Care Delivery in Abuja Municipal Area Council (AMAC), FCT, Abuja is yet another gap that has existed in the health sector.** This study agrees with the study conducted by, et al, (2013), studied, in today's global economy Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is often regarded as a strategic tool for achieving success and competitiveness in organisations.

5.1 Conclusion and Recommendations

5.2 Conclusion

We therefore made the conclusion that Information Technology impact positively on performance (Business Growth, Operation Cost and Market Share) in ARM Pension Managers Abuja. However, information Technology has most positive impact on the Operation Cost Performance in ARM Pension Managers, Abuja.

5.2 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusion of the study, the following recommendations were made:

1. The management of ARM Pension Managers Abuja should come up with policies that will improve the process and strategies in achieving main objectives set by the organization. This can be achieved by engaging experts in training staff who are involved in finance and transaction management to ensure Business Growth for the company.
2. The management of ARM Pension Managers Abuja should improve on the IT since it enhances Operation Cost performance in the organization. This can be done by assigning professionals in the business promotion and employ internet and other information techniques to create more awareness and keep customers & prospects involved to decrease the Operation Cost.
3. The management of ARM Pension Managers should come up with effective consultant marketing and sales Information Technology System Experts in this field and be engaged to develop and create techniques on services in establishing Market Share and train staff on processes involved in expanding the Market Share.

5.3 Contributions to Knowledge

The study fills existing gap in knowledge by examining the impact of Information Technology on performance with a particular reference to ARM Pension Managers, Abuja. This study will help scholars and academia as well as

students to develop their research skills and contributes to existing literature in the area. The study will also offer practitioners, experts in Information Technology a lot of information on the relationship between IT with particular focus on business growth, business size and market share and performance, thereby contributing to existing knowledge of IT and performance.

5.4 Suggestions for further studies

This study examined the impact of Information Technology on Performance in ARM Pension Managers, Abuja, other studies could be carried out, such as; The Impact of Human Resources Management on employee's performance in an organization, The effect of Information Technology functions on employee's performance and Impact of IT establishment in insurance sector.

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THE END SARS MOVEMENT AND THE NIGERIAN STATE

Felix Ikalewumi

Kolawole Ekoh

Abstract

The paper examines the #EndSARS Movement staged by the Nigerian youths against the aged long perceived brutality, corruption, recklessness and indiscipline that characterized the operation of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARs): a wing of the Nigerian Police constituted to nip in the bud advanced crimes in the society. Rather than pursuing the mandate professionally, the security outfit has come under a wide condemnation that its operations is more of an instrument of coercion, intimidation and abuse of the citizenry who needs its protection. Hence, the protest of the #EndSARS movement brought disbandment of the SARs and grounded the country to her knees in a manner unexpected. The aim of this paper therefore is to analyse the challenges posed by the Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) that necessitated the outbreak of the #Endsars Movement in Nigeria. The paper employs discourse analysis to analyse the crisis while the sources were mainly gathered through the secondary data. The findings revealed that the alleged corruption, indiscipline and malfeasances that characterized the activities of the SARs and the agitation of the Endsars movement is nothing more than graphic reflection of the conditions of the Nigerian State whose larger army of youths wallow in brutality, suffer unemployment, insecurity, despair and fear as a consequence of battered institutions, corruption, poor governance and minutest concerns for the welfares of the general citizenry amidst resource sabotage by the elites. Consequently, many young ones who could have been involved in the task of building the nation now engage in criminal activities like armed robbery, banditry, prostitution and fraud that endanger their future. The situation was heightened by the ravaging COVID-19 pandemic thus making agitations more inevitable. The unchecked activities of the SARs in human right abuses, illegal stop and search, illegal arrest and detention, extrajudicial killings, sexual harassment of women and brutalizing of many young Nigerians that resulted in #Endsars agitation was just the last straw that broke the camel's back. This paper calls for urgent reforms of aged long societal ills that have encapsulated the country for a long time as such depicts a dim and glimpse future if not addressed.

Felix Ikalewumi Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College
Kolawole Ekoh Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College

Keywords: Social movements, Endsars, threats, analysis, mobilize, Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

The global upsurge of streets activism and social movements had in the recent times taken a new dimension, wavering and unleashing palpable tension, fear, despair and cascading into an atmosphere of uncertainty with the rising demands for the emergence of a tsunami of unpredictable changes and political renewal by the citizenry against governments and its agencies across the contemporary world especially in most of the African countries where issues of poor governance, human abuses, corruption and maladministration are on the rise. Despite the autocratic tendencies to crack down such political agitations, it has continued to rise across the continent of Africa against overwhelming odds. Consequently, social movement in form of insurrections, protests, angers and pent up demonstrations has become a potent weapon of expressing frustrations by the citizenry against the government in the face of increasing poor policies, economic hardship, human rights abuses, social exclusion and corruption of the governments and its agencies. It has come to redefine citizenship model of political participation and engagements against the negligence, marginalization and macabre brutality of the government and its unsavory agencies in the contemporary times. Undoubtedly, such outrage has aided the overthrow of many dictatorial governments in many of the African countries and still counting.

Flowing from the above, the protests and agitations leading to the clamoring for the #ENDSARS, a Special Anti –Robbery Squad in Nigeria and other similar insurrections in African countries were perhaps inspired by what had happened in the United States and in England and around the World (Osi, 2020). In addition, the case of the Arab spring in Libya with its contagious effects may perhaps had concretized the foundation for other insurrections that happened in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya almost a decade ago where citizens overthrew their dictatorial governments with economic hardship, poverty, unemployment and other bottled neck grievances' being the driving force. For example in Egypt, more than 846 people were killed while in Tunisia, the revolution started unannounced, sparking the first protests that occurred on 18 December 2010 in SidiBouazid, following Mohamed Bouazizi's self

–immolation (burnt himself alive) in protest of police corruption , brutality and ill – treatment of the citizens . This protest led to the downfall of Ben Ali who ruled Tunisia from 1987 to 2011. Moreover, in Morocco, the Hirak protests of 2017, the economic boycotts of 2018 and the feminist Nmasaktach campaigns have all dominated the media sphere and public discourse. Likewise, the walk to walk protests of Uganda in 2011 may have been quelled ,but in August 2018, the protest started again calling for the freedom of musician and member of parliament Robert Kyagulanyi (aka Bobi Wine) whose song was taken off the air in 2017. The Malawi anti – corruption protests had also taken place in various cities led by a coalition called the Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC) (Policy Brief, 2018).

From the above, it could be gleaned that protests and agitations had become potent instruments of venting frustrations by the citizens against the government and its agencies over anti-people policies.

Thus, the outbreak of the #ENDSARS movement in Nigeria, calling for its disbandment as a result of its brutality took a dramatic change on 21 October 2020 with the allegation of military using live ammunitions on the protesters after many days of protests thereby spreading like an harmattan fire across the country. However, the #ENDSARS phenomenon as bad as it could be is just one of the many sundry issues confronting the Nigerian state. Therefore the condemnation and allegation of indiscipline against the security outfit should be viewed as part of the issues that had grown over the years in the Nigerian State. The vexatious issue which took the front burner in national discourse resulted in the big question about how SARS came to be (Vanguard, 2017). Ordinarily, the SARS was formed in 1992 to douse the tension revolving around armed robbery, kidnapping , looting and killings in the country as its core mandate that seems to have been consumed by the sailing issues confronting the country. Hence, the issues of concerns run deeper and larger than ending SARS alone rather have to do with everything that is wrong with the economy and the governance of the country which seems to have emboldened the SARS operations and abuses of human rights ranging from their merciless killings, dehumanization of suspects and engagements in extortion spree.

The aim of this paper therefore is to analyse the challenges posed by the Nigeria's Anti-robbery Squad (SARS) that necessitated the outbreak of the #EndsarsMovement. The paper presupposes that activities of SARs and that of the #ENDSARS are reflections both defined by the conditions in the Nigerian state. To give a deeper understanding of the issues, the paper after the introduction is structured as follows: The next section makes a review and overview of the conditions of the Nigerian State in relations to the SARs and that of the #ENDSARS movement. This is followed by a review of the formation of SARs security outfit, origin, activities and mandate. The section four covers the operation of the SARs that necessitated the ENDSARS initiative. The section five gives an overview of the #ENDSARS movement and the challenges of the Nigerian State. The section six identifies the impacts of the #ENDSARS on the Nigerian State. The section seven profile ways towards addressing future protests while the section eight forms the conclusion and recommendations.

REVIEW OF THE NIGERIAN STATE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH SARS AND ENDSARS MOVEMENT

The frequent cases of violent crime of armed robbery in contemporary societies (including Nigeria) have continued to send goose pimples down the spine of men and women every minute of the day. As social environment develop, crime also increases in the same direction thereby posing serious threat as well as insecurity to life and property (Ugwu, 2019). Consequently, fear of crime is often associated with fear for one's personal safety, especially when one is alone and in the dark.

Fear of crime undoubtedly may keep residents off the streets and other public areas. It may also constitute a barrier to participation in the public life of cities (Wekerle & Whitzman, 1995).

Crime, of course, breeds destruction of live and property as well as terrifying fear of insecurity. Most nations of the globe are looking for additional techniques of fighting the soaring wave and growing sophistication of urban violence. A 1990 review by the United Nations unveiled that while most countries of the developed economy spend an average between 2 and 3 per cent

of their annual budgets on crime prevention, those of the developing economies spend an average between 9 and 14 percent (United Nations, 1990). Studies have shown that residential neighbourhood crimes have grievous consequences (Dugan, 1999). Complaints from victims of robbery attacks attest that burglary have unattendant consequences that could take several years to overcome. Amongst the effects include:

- i. it could lead to psychological effect of fear which over time results in health impairment;
- ii. loss of life; and
- iii. frequent burglary attacks has been found to add to residents' house maintenance budget as they will need to expend money to fortify the building; spend extra money to replace burgled home items and all these add up to reduce the level of productivity of the residents (Gibbons, 2004).

The upsurge of violent crimes such as armed robbery in many parts of the country, "has become so frightening in its dimension that some concerned citizens have wondered whether the nation is under siege." (Banjoko, 1998). In fact, the National Bureau of statistics (2017) posits that crime statistics on reported offences reflected a total of 134,663 cases out of which about 68,579 was against property. While the remaining was reported as 53, 641 cases against persons. Out of the report, Lagos state had the highest percentage share of total cases reported with 50, 975 (37.9 %) cases recorded followed by Abia and Delta states with 12, 408 (9%) and 7,150 (5.3%) cases recorded respectively.

Sadly, no day passes by without a record in the newsprints or media of some gory tale on the menace of armed robbery. For instance, the Police Public Relation Officer, SP EbereAmarazu reported of the killing of a notorious armed robber, Ogonna Casmir in Enugu (Punch, 2019). The incidence are innumerable and a daily occurrence of inhuman activities with horrible outcome of death, maiming and loss of properties on a daily basis (Ugwu, 2019). Findings showed that armed robberies have become the dominant crime in Nigeria, contributing to about 50% of an overall 8,516 deaths between June 2006 and September, 2015 nationwide. Lagos, Rivers, Ogun, Benue and Imo

State reported as the most affected crime states (Ukoji, et. al., 2016).

There is evidence that no state in the contemporary Nigeria is spared from the ravages of armed robbery menace.

Most people, particularly the rich feel helpless and can no longer rely on the security arrangements and assurances of the police. The thought and possibility of becoming “the next victim” of armed robbery seems to generate a pervasive atmosphere of fear, anxiety, insecurity and restlessness among the general population of Nigeria (Igbo, 1998). Yusuf Alli (2009) quoting from the report of the National Bureau of Statistics (2008) based on armed robbery cases reported to the police as at the end of 2007 stated the armed robbery occurrence in Nigerian states in 2007: Oyo (224); FCT (172); Imo (176); Rivers (145); Cross River (137); Kano (108); Ogun (107). Others are: Gombe (27); Benue (27); Plateau (26); Kwara (25); Sokoto (24); Jigawa (16); Kebbi (20); and Yobe (20). Also, Abia (89); Adamawa (96); Akwa Ibom (88); Anambra (96); Bauchi (41); Bayelsa (54); Borno (41); Delta (63); Ebonyi (51); and Edo (79). Still, others are: Ekiti (85); Kaduna (40); Kastina (31); Kogi (41); Nasarawa (36); Niger (32); Ondo (58); Osun (51); Taraba (80) and Enugu (44).

Igbo (1998) contended that the armed robbers in Nigeria blame their actions on the “mismanagement of the Nigerian economy which has given rise to massive unemployment”. The robbers accuse the “rich and the politicians of scandalous consumption and insensitivity to the hardship and suffering of the poor and the less privileged”. Igbo believed that “all these accusations have serious consequences for high rate of armed robbery”. Other factors influencing armed robbery includes poverty, social inequalities, drugs, alcoholism, political unrest and quest for quick wealth. Armed robbery as defined earlier refers to the activities of a group of persons conforming to the ethics of their group”.

In an effort to reduce the upsurge of crime of robbery, the Federal Government of Nigeria promulgated the Armed Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Decree No. 47 of 1970 in which death penalty or long prison sentences for offenders was the central point. The government further strengthened the efforts of the police force by supplying new patrol vehicles and other logistics like information gadgets, modern weapons, and so forth. The police were also

empowered to shoot the robbers at sight while they are engaged in the act or suspected to be on the run. As if these measures were not enough, there exists other Paramilitary units like the Highway Surveillance Patrol, Operation Fire for Fire and Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) to complement the efforts of the police (Ugwu, 2019).

In spite of all these tough measures, armed robbery does not appear to have declined or become less pronounced. Rather indications from the police, media, victims and witnesses are that not only is it on the increase but that it has also become extremely more severe (Igbo, 2001).

According to Simeon DanladiMidenda, one major incident that prompted the creation of SARS was when Col. Rindam, a military officer from Plateau State met his death at the hands of police operatives at a check point in Lagos. Upon discovery of that, the army took to the streets in Lagos in search of policemen.

As a result, policemen abandoned the streets in Lagos and withdrew to the barracks. Robbers then had a field day in Lagos, operating with impunity. It took two weeks of talks before the military and police authorities succeeded in convincing the army chaps to return to barracks and for the police to come back to the roads (Nnadozie, 2017).

The Federal Government of Nigeria has repeatedly promised to reform SARS. On 14 August 2018, the Nigerian Vice-President ordered an immediate reform of SARS, citing the widespread public outcry against their conduct, as the basis for the order. He also directed the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to set up a judicial panel to investigate SARS alleged unlawful activities. Hours later, the police authority announced a list of reform measures aimed at increasing SARS' public accountability for its actions. The measures include the change of name from Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) to Federal Special AntiRobbery Squad (FSARS), the appointment of high-ranking police officer to supervise the operation of FSARS and the restriction of FSARS operations to the prevention of armed robbery and kidnapping (Amnesty International, 2020).

Despite these promises of reform and accountability for violations, this report shows that SARS officers continue to subject detainees in their custody to

torture and other forms of ill-treatment with total impunity. Amnesty International believes that the ongoing impunity enjoyed by SARS officers for human rights violations points to deficiencies in policing practice and the absence of an effective police accountability system. The Nigerian government adopted a law criminalizing torture in December 2017. However, to date, no SARS officer has been convicted of torture in a Nigerian court. Perpetrators of torture continue to act with impunity, as if they are above the law (Amnesty International, 2020).

The hashtag #EndSARS began trending on social media on October 4 2020 and the immediate trigger was a video that showed a SARS officer shooting a young motorist in Ughelli, in Delta state, then pushing his body out of the car and driving off with the dead man's Lexus SUV. Within days, crowds of young people gathered in Nigerian cities to demand the abolition of SARS. As previously mentioned, the protest followed previous activism and government announcements that SARS would be demobilized in 2014, 2015 and 2017. Yet, SARS officers continued to act with impunity, committing armed robberies, rapes, other acts of torture and extrajudicial killings like the one in Delta State (George, 2020). On October 11, 2020, government leaders announced that SARS would be disbanded, but crowds of protesters grew bigger- even in the face of violence and intimidation. Since the protests began, estimates are that at least 100 individuals have lost their lives; 48 of whom were killed on Black Tuesday alone (George, 2020). It was based on the above gory experiences and unwarranted brutality that informed the outbreak of the Endsars movement, a protests by the Nigerian youths clamouring for the disbandment of the SARS personnel.

Nigeria's Special Anti –Robbery Squad (SARS): Origin, Mandate and Activities

The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARs) was a special branch of the Nigerian Police Force created in 1992 to deal with crimes associated with robbery and firearms (Osborne, 2020). Prior to this formation, Anti – Robbery as a modus operandi of the Nigeria Police Force for combating armed robbery has been as old as the Police Force itself (Vanguard, 2017). SARS, is one of the 14 units under the Force Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department , FCIID

headed by a Deputy Inspector – General of police (Usman,2020). As a unit,anti-robbery had existed in all Criminal Investigation Department (CID) at the Force Headquarters, Zonal and State Command levels (Vanguard, 2017). Hence, anti-robbery was the responsibility of the Nigerian Police Force generally. Other special units established at different times with different names include the intelligence response team, Special tactical squad, counter terrorism unit and force intelligent unit, all formed to tackle rising violent crime following the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970 (Aljazeera, 2020).

The vexatious issues that culminated into the death of Col. Rindam, a military officer from Plateau State at the hands of police operatives at the check point in Lagos led the army into streets search of any policeman in retaliation of his death thereby leading the policemen to abandon their duties, flashpoints and withdraw into the barracks.

According to excerpts from Midenda's interview by the Vanguard newspaper in 2017, such situation gave robbers a field day in Lagos, operating with impunity. For instance, it was this period that witnessed the reign of terror by the Shina Rambo robbery gang in Lagos. This was the situation until the military and police authorities were able to reach amicable resolutions leading to returns of the police to the road duties and the military to their barracks respectively. Consequent upon the nefarious activities committed by the armed robbers and bandits in Lagos did the Inspector General Alhaji Aliyu Attahseek a transfer of the Police officer Simeon Danladi Midenda (who was in charge of the anti-robbery unit of the criminal investigation department in Benin) to Lagos. This was as a result of the successes recorded in combating armed robbery in Benin thus earning a recommendation. Having been transferred to Lagos, Midenda was tasked with uniting the three existing anti-robbery squads operating in the former federal capital into one unit in a bid to break the stronghold of armed gangs. As the new sheriff in town, Midenda had Mr. Taiwo Lakanu appointed as his Second in Command and the security outfit was formed. It was equipped with 15 fully armed men and two plain coloured Peugeot station Wagons (Vanguard, 2017).

It is worthy of note that there were already three anti-robbery squads operating in Lagos, One, that of Force CID, Alagbon Close but based at Adeniji – Adele,

one attached to Zone two command and the third at Panti, Lagos state CID (Vanguard, 2017). Midenda formed an amalgamated unit and named it the special Anti – Robbery Squad (SARS) 1992. The secret behind the successes recorded by the SARS during the period of its early formation was identified to be its modus operandi of facelessness in handling complaints, using of plain vehicles and clothes and the idea of not openly carrying weapons. They were barred from carrying Walkie-Talkies and guns openly in order not to destroy their element of surprise (Usman, 2020). Retrospectively, the SARs in the 1990s helped to provide security against robberies and violent crimes but as from the early 2000s it became synonymous with abuse of power and human rights violations including torture, arbitrary arrest, and extrajudicial killings(Miller, 2020).

But over the years, the unit has been accused of becoming the very groups it was meant to stop (Olurounbi, 2020).

The first agitation surrounding the activities of the SARS unit came from its extension to other States Police commands from where it started deviating from its modus operandi. Consequently, the SARS whose operation was shredded in secrecy became visible in every nook and cranny of every state of the federation brandishing their weapons openly. In June 2020, the Amnesty International released a report titled “ Time to End Impunity” suggesting SARS officers continued to commit human rights violations , including at least 82 cases of torture , ill –treatment and extrajudicial execution between January 2017 and May 2020 (Osborne,2020). Nigerians were outraged by the systemic human rights violations perpetrated by the SARS with impunity (Usman, 2020). The security outfit was accused of deliberate profiling and targeting of young Nigerians especially those with tattoos, dreadlocks, and visible possessions such as phones and laptops (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Thus, SARS has become infamous for targeting well–off young people who they allegedly suspect of making money through illegal means. For instance, if you are 18 -35, have an iphone, tattoos , drive a nice car or carry a laptop, you could be a target and could be beaten up, robbed , tortured and extorted (Rotinwa,2020)

The latest protests that culminated into eventful and unforgettable harrowing

experience started in October 3, two days after Nigeria celebrated 60 years of independence, a tweet by Chinyelugo (@Africaofficial2) went viral, sounding an alarm that 'SARS just shot a young boy dead'.

Hours later, mobile phone recordings with the hashtag #EndSARS began trending, documenting the gruesome scene of the unidentified young man's lifeless body abandoned on the roadside and citizens pursuing the officers, who they witnessed steal the man's Lexus SUV (Strong, 2020). Since October 8, tens of thousands gathered to protest against police brutality, calling for the abolition of Nigeria's Special Anti-Robbery Squad known as SARS which they accused of making unlawful arrests and engaging in harassment, theft, extortions, rape, torture, and murder (Ani, 2020). For a period of two weeks, protesters in 26 of Nigeria's states had organized daily mass demonstrations/vigils, a sit-in of the National Assembly, and blockades of airports and major roads – until the tragedy on October 20 in Lagos which heightened sustained protests across the Southern part of the country. However, the government swiftly announced that it was disbanding SARS and replacing it with a new Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team (Uwazuruike, 2020). Rather than this coming with a heap of relief, it further fueled the demonstrations across several states in Nigeria as several previous efforts by the government had not yielded meaningful results. For example, in December 2017, the then Inspector General of Police announced that the SARS had been banned from conducting stop and search operations after several reports of human rights infringements.

Also, Nigeria's acting president's order for the overhauling of SARS, calling Human Rights Commission to investigate cases of abuse and the follow up statement for the creation of a centralized new version of the SARS code-named Federal Special Anti-Robbery Squad (FSARS) under the supervision of the Inspector General of Police were all efforts in futility.

Consequently, what began as a protest coalesced into Black Tuesday in 20 October at the Lekki tollgate plaza in Lagos as the protests spread across the streets of Lagos, from Lekkitoll gate to Agege, Iyana Oworo, Ikorodu, Iyana Ipaja, Oshodi, Fagba, Mushin, Alakuko. Youths in these areas with their counterparts in Benin City, Osogbo, Federal Capital Territory, Onitsha, Oyiibo

brought a new dimension to the protests (Abati, 2020). In response to the rising pressure, on October 11, the Nigerian government announced that SARS had been disbanded with a further promise to release detained protesters, prosecute abusive police officers, compensate families of victims of police brutality as demanded by the protesters

SARS OPERATIONS AND THE END SARS MOVEMENT INITIATIVE

It is a known fact that Police operations are vital towards maintenance of peace, security, law and order in the country. The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) officers get themselves involved in crime prevention activities. They review and redefine strategic approaches towards crime control and organize raids to combat criminal activities (Abiodun&Abah, 2020). According to Spokesman of the Police Force, JimohMoshood, SARS is one of the 14 units under the Nigeria Police Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department which was created to arrest, investigate and prosecute people involved in violent crimes such as armed robberies, murders, kidnappings, hired assassinations and other forms of extreme criminality (Okogba, 2017). Combating armed robbery has been as old as the Police Force itself. As a unit also, anti-robbery had always existed in all Criminal Investigation Departments at Force Headquarters, Zonal and State Command levels.

The Police all over the world are state authorities vested with the responsibility of law enforcement and maintenance of order in the society. In discharge of their responsibilities, the police may, as the situation demands, need to apply some degree of force. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Police Act, international conventions, professional ethics and other statutes regulate and as well constrain the use of excessive force by the police in discharging their statutory functions (Abiodun&Abah, 2020). Despite these regulations, the police in many societies resort to the use of extreme force beyond the limit permitted by law. As a result, the rule of law is disregarded leading to extra-judicial killings, torture and inhumane treatment meted out to citizens (Segun, 2016). Many unlawful killings happen during police operations. In other cases, the police shoot and kill drivers who fail to pay them bribes at checkpoints. Some are killed in the street because, as the police later claim, they are “armed robbers”. Others are killed after arrest, allegedly for

attempting to escape. Many disappear in police custody – and are likely to have been extra-judicially executed (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

As a result of these incivilities, incompetence, indiscriminate shootings and unprofessionalism on the part of officers of Nigerian Police Unit known as the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), lots of families have been thrown into eternal sorrow by unlawful killings of their family members. SARS officers, in particular, have been identified to uncontrollably and unlawfully kill innocent citizens or individuals who they usually allege attempted to escape (Source: Field Survey, 2019). They violate the right to life, as guaranteed by Nigeria's Constitution, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Sometimes, arrested persons disappear while in custody (Osuyi and Oritsedere, 2012). Records show that a high number of innocent civilians have been unlawfully killed by drunk and trigger-freaked SARS police officers especially in Lagos, Ogun, Oyo and Osun States (Segun, 2016). SARS officers would storm any location be it checkpoints on inter-state roads, beer parlours, cinemas, club houses and a host of others to enforce unlawful arrests in the name of looking for “yahoo-yahoo boys” or internet fraudsters and criminals in the states (International Centre for Investigating Reporting, 2018).

There are several instances of killings during operations, raids, in police detention and many others committed by SARS officers. The growing pattern of unlawful killings by officers of the SARS manifests itself in various dimensions and the methods in which they are involved in the dastardly act often times seeks to serve as a cover up for the crimes committed (Source: Field Survey, 2019). Unnecessary and unlawful use of firearms by the Nigerian Police is not a question of a few isolated cases, but of a widespread phenomenon. For instance, some SARS officers shoot and kill drivers who fail to pay them bribes at checkpoints. The Nigerian citizens are rough-handled, mishandled and brutalized in various ways. Even without proof of the crime committed, they are subjected to horrific experiences while in detention. For instance, testimonies of victims who were lucky to scale through the ordeal shared stories of them being beaten, tortured, handcuffed and even in dire cases maimed in a bid to forcefully excerpt confession and extortion of gratification

(Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Pathetically, a large portion of these cases are concealed by the Nigerian Police officers in their stations. Evidence is destroyed and proof of any such acts is hidden from the public (Taiwo, 2018). This is actually pursuant to the fact that the victims' family members many a times would be denied justice when they seek a redress in court of law. Unfortunately, there have been numerous criminal charges brought and public protests against the Officers of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) of the Nigerian Police in recent times. High numbers of innocent civilians have been unlawfully killed and eliminated by drunk and trigger-freaked SARS police officers in Lagos, Ogun, Oyo and Osun States respectively (Segun, 2016). Testimonies of those brutalized by SARS personnel were compiled by Amnesty International (2018): On 1 January 2018, Tim Elombah (an online journalist) was arrested alongside six members of his family by 15 armed SARS officers at his home in Anambra State. Elombah said he was detained for 25 days and subjected to several forms of ill-treatment, after he was accused of publishing a defamatory article against the IGP on a website. Ebun Timilehin, a nine (9) year old boy who fell a victim was eliminated by a SARS officer, named Razaq Alowonleon 13th June 2013, when the latter attempted to stop a commercial bus for breaking traffic rules in the area.

Another case of brutality is that of a commercial motorcyclist, Ademola Moshood, who was shot dead by a SARS policeman near his Surulere residence when he allegedly refused to part with the sum of N200 as bribe. In the same vein, on March 18, 2019, 18-year-old girl, Hadiyat Sikiru, was killed via a stray bullet fired by a police officer in Adamo Community in Ikorodu, Lagos (Source: Field Survey, 2019). Many of the lawyers Amnesty international spoke to in the course of this research expressed their frustration with the way senior police officers try to ensure that officers responsible for alleged torture escape punishment. Some of the tactics employed by some senior police officers include the transfer of police officers accused of torture to other states and the intimidation of victims and their lawyers (Amnesty International, 2018).

The Rivers State Civil Society Coalition, a human rights group based in Port Harcourt, said it had brought at least 20 cases of torture and extrajudicial execution by SARS officers to the notice of the police authorities between January 2018 and February 2020. The group noted that no SARS officer has been prosecuted as a result of these cases, but rather, many of the officers responsible for the alleged torture were transferred to other states to avoid prosecution (Amnesty International, 2018). In major cities like Lagos, Abeokuta and Ibadan youths are mostly the victims of unwarranted police brutality and unlawful killings. According to a report, at least, not less than 18 innocent Nigerians have been killed by officers of the SARS within a short period of time. In another instance, Police operatives from the Trinity Police Station, Ajegunle, on Saturday, 15 April, 2018, killed a 20-year-old lady named Miss Ada Ifeanyi and a young man, Emmanuel Akomafuwa suspected to be her fiancé. (Source: Field Survey, 2019).

Two weeks after, a teenage girl was killed by a stray bullet in a shoot-out between officers of the SARS and some cultists in Ikorodu, while on Thursday March 25, 2019, an Okada (commercial motorcycle) rider was shot dead in Kilo, Surulere area of Lagos. The victim who was identified as Moshood Ademola, who was a few meters away from his apartment when he got shot by an officer attached to Soloki Police Station, Surulere, Lagos State (Source: Field Survey, 2019).

One peculiar case of police brutality was that of a man named James Ute who was brought home from Ketu Divisional Police Station on 15 December 2008 at around 4.00am by police officers from the Anti-Robbery Squad. Apparently, he was beaten seriously all over his body with an iron bar and a rifle-butt and he was seriously foaming at the mouth. Before losing his consciousness, he informed his family members that he had been beaten by officers of Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS). Shortly after, he passed away right before his family (Source: Field Survey, 2019). The cases of police misdemeanor especially that of SARS is in- exhaustive. Year by year, cases of brutality from the officers of the law continue to increase. This upsurge in the menace, torture and inhumane treatment of citizens in the society by the officers of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) compels a need for the appraisal of the criminal

justice system (Bakare, 2018).

The #EndSARSmovement started as a call for the disbandment of Nigeria's Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a unit of the Nigerian Police Force that has earned notoriety for its brutality and human rights violations (Uwazuruike, 2020). The coinage of #EndSARS was first used in 2018 to raise awareness of allegations of violence and exploitation by SARS officials (BBC news, 2020). The government announced structural changes to SARS but the alleged human rights violations and exploitation continued. In October 3 2020, reports of an unprovoked shooting of a boy in the streets of Delta State by SARS operatives were shared on social media. Although the Nigerian Police denied the shooting in this particular case, it was not enough to quell public anger as more videos of police shootings were shared across social media platforms (BBC news, 2020). The video allegedly showing an F-SARS officer killing a man went viral on social media, encouraging numerous users to share their own stories, including graphic footage of abuse allegedly suffered by members of the police unit under the hashtag #endSARS. F-SARS is indeed one of the most notorious police units. Consequently, calls for its disbandment and comprehensive police reform have been voiced repeatedly in recent years. As of 8 October, 2020 the hashtag had transformed into quickly growing protests across several urban agglomerations, most notably in and around Lagos – where protesters blocked parts of the Lekki Expressway – but also extending to the capital Abuja and other cities (BBC news, 2020).

THE #ENDSARS MOVEMENT AND QUAGMIRES OF THE NIGERIAN STATE

To understand the Nigerians public's outcry towards SARS better, there is need to also take a cursory look at issues that bothernot only on the SARS but revolving around accountability, social injustice, bad governance, discrimination, crime, corruption and inequitable distribution of the naturally distributed resources of the country among the few privileged ones which have all brought decadence that inspired the Endsars Movement in Nigeria. These are parts of the frontburner issues that informed the agitations, cascading into #EndSARS movement and bringing the country down to her knees.

Undoubtedly, EndSARS must be seen as a more of a call for a better, inclusive and participatory society where bottled neck grievances are holistically and painstakingly addressed. It must be understood that #EndSARS is a much deeper cry in response to chronic poverty, food inflation, economic instability and weak institutions (Olasupo, 2021) which has given room for immorality to fester. Consequently, the SARS scuffle should only be seen as the last straw that broke the camel's back. To capture the existing problems in the country in which the agitations were laid, the following becomes crucial:

- i. **Poverty:** Poverty among the people most times is a contributory factor to crimes and criminality. Beyond solving Nigeria's very obvious policing problems, the country struggles with severe poverty (Adeshokan, 2020). The rate of poverty in the country has kept the crime rate exceedingly high. This is evident in the rate of migration, fraud and general insecurity. The challenges of poverty played out with the attack on warehouses where COVID -19 palliatives were kept when many Nigerians went to bed hungry and woke up without assurance of meals in the wake of the COVID -19 pandemic lockdown and organized attacks on the homes and properties of politicians even innocent entrepreneurs (Abati, 2020). The multidimensional nature of poverty facing the young people has pushed them to go extra miles to feed and access basic amenities.
- ii. **Corruption/bad governance:** The continued and systemic corruption facing the country has made lives truly unbearable to large chunk of the Nigerian youths who are victims of the decadence. Nigeria has massive oil wealth and is one of the Africa's largest economies, yet many of its more than 200 million people face high poverty levels and lack basic services because of rampant graft (Associated Press 2020). Those at the helms of power have pillaged and are still pillaging the resources of the country to their advantage and at the detriment of the good numbers of the downtrodden. Thus, the country is soiled with corrupt activities to the extent that SARS perceives any young Nigerians with signs of wealth without obvious linkage to power as suspects of illicit wealth. Consequently, they are regularly targeted,

arrested and extorted and only released after paying large sum of money to them perhaps as their own proceeds of the decadence. Hence, in both ways the #EndSARS agitation could best be seen as a channel to defend crimes on the part of criminals and at the same time to register citizens displeasures about the gory cases of corruption in the country.

- iii. **Getting Rich Quick–Syndrome:** The act of getting rich quick syndrome is a mentality that has grown so widely in Nigeria especially among the youths of nowadays in which the SARS personnel themselves are not left out. Therefore, the irrational arrests and extortions of the suspecting victims of crimes are both products of getting rich quick syndrome prevalent in the country. The nature of crimes have gone in astronomical proportions as a way of getting rich quick among some Nigerians both civilians and uniform men.
- iv. **Insecurity:** Security is pivotal to nation building and its absence is destructive to the process. Consequently, the numerous insecurity challenges confronting the country in the recent times have created palpable tensions, despair and an atmosphere of uncertainty for any meaningful human engagements which is a threat to collective human living. For example, in the Northeast there remains raving and unfinished work of the Boko - Haram disturbing activities while the North –West has kept faith with, kidnapping, cattle rustling and banditry activities. Also, the Southern part of the country is not immune from different securities skirmishes ranging from kidnapping, killings and maiming of the citizens. In all these, citizens have been victims with the blame of governments at all levels doing little or nothing to combat the challenges and protect lives and properties of the citizens being its primary responsibilities. Hence, the end of SARS was emboldened by the unfathomable insecurity quagmires facing the country.
- v. **Unemployment:** The growing unemployment rate of the youth is disturbing. Nigeria's skyrocketing unemployment rate of 27% means there are more than 21.7 million unemployed Nigerians (Adegoke,

2020). More than a third (35%) of 15 to 34 – year – olds are currently unemployed (Whiteside, 2020). The rate of joblessness among the youths has undoubtedly increased the levels of insecurity confronting the country on every side. Nigerian youths make up over 70% of its workforce, but the same demographic are unfairly targeted by police on the basis of them being responsible for committing crimes.

- vi. Human Rights Abuses: Although the #EndSars protests began with a focus on police brutality, it has also extended to other dimensions of corruption, human rights violations and underdevelopment in Nigeria (George, 2020). Despite government's promise to reform and restructure the unit of SARS several times, human rights abuses have continued unabated. The level of human abuses and citizens' rights violations among the uniform officers are alarming. The human rights abuses witnessed during the days of the military are not totally rescinding even when the country is practicing democracy. There are daily reports of human rights violations by government agencies with impunity.
- vii. Immorality/Criminality: Morality of the African race and Nigeria particularly abhors all forms of crimes and criminality (Tribune, 2021). To say there was a re-enactment of aged long gangsterism, immorality and criminality during the #EndSARS protests is nothing than reinforcing the obvious. Immoral and criminal acts reign supreme in the country especially when the atmosphere is devoid of peace. For example, even when the government started addressing the grievances that led to agitation of the #endSARS, there was daylight robbery as some protesters wreaked havoc on individual houses; carted away properties acquired with their earned resources in the name of protests. What could be the essence of setting vital public infrastructures such as BRT buses, local governments, police stations, courts and other government institutions ablaze when calling for the end of police brutality? This is a show of criminally minded society where institutions are weak with lawlessness reigning supreme.
- viii. Social Inequality: Nigeria is a divided country across all lines: ethnic,

demographic, religious and geographic with tension. The discrimination of the children of the highly placed and that of the poor in the areas of education, employment and better opportunities is playing out. The Nigerian youths constitute more than 60% of the entire population but majority of them are the most neglected, uncared for and the downtrodden. They have no hope of self-actualization therefore they are disillusioned and angry with the only toy they have ever played with in their lives being a wrap of marijuana, a shot of cocaine, tramadol, a gun and a bullet (Abati, 2020). Existence of social inequalities have been a contributing factor to the festering of crimes among youths over the years.

IMPACTS OF THE ENDSARS MOVEMENT ON THE NIGERIAN STATE

The #EndSARS movement was not just a cry for an end to impunity within the police force but rather a call for a revolution in the governance of the country as a whole. Despite a system that has been unresponsive to their needs, the youth of Nigeria have spoken up. From October 1, 1960 being the official date of Nigeria's independence from British rule, sixtyyears down the line, young Nigerians are still demanding freedom from repression and agitating for better governance. The #EndSARS protest began with a focus on police brutality, but later extended to other dimensions affecting the country like corruption, human rights violations and underdevelopment in Nigeria (Washington post, 2020).

In September 2016, Amnesty International (AI) followed in on the trail of widespread complaints by citizens and published a report accusing the Squad of subjecting its detainees to horrific torture in form of hangings, beatings, humiliation, shootings, mock executions and extortions (Vanguard, December 6, 2017). However, the levels of sustained agitation and mobilization of the youths across the country and financial support from Nigerians in diaspora has proved to governments at all levels what the strength of the youth populations could achieve. It has registered in the minds of political elites and political office holders across the country that a youth population is a threat when not empowered and developed to service the economy, participate in policy making and included in the act of governance.

The resultant effects of the protest on businesses was huge, leading to some ripple effects on the economy. While the protest went on, the economic consequences for the people began to mount. A drop in consumer spending on non-essential goods was one of the most visible signs of its impact. A protest that shut down most of the major activities of Nigeria's busiest airport. Also, major roads were blocked and activities brought to a halt. The effect of the #EndSARS protest on businesses in Lagos is unimaginable. Retail stores across the countries were looted and goods carted away. The long list of destroyed public and private property in Lagos includes the Lagos High court, Ojodu Berger BRT terminus, Lagos State Public Works Corporation, Lagos City Hall, the Nation Newspaper, TVC, Shoprite Lekki amongst others (Entrepreneurs, 2020). It was reported that an estimate of at least 10 billion was lost daily during the protest.

Similarly, Lagos Chamber for Commerce (LCC) reported that the Lagos State government lost at least 234 million to the closure of Lekki tollgates since the commencement of the #EndSARS protests. At the backdrop of the destruction of public and private properties in the wake of the #EndSARS protest, business owners have been counting their losses. The replacement cost to the Lagos State Government that was the worst hit by the crises was put at ₦1 trillion. More so, the overall cost to the private businesses has been put at several billions of US dollars (Entrepreneurs, 2020).

The effect of the protest was not restricted to Lagos alone. A release by the Anambra State Police Relations Officer, SP Haruna Mohammed showed that 21 police divisions were attacked by hoodlums while seven of the stations were burnt down. Other government property burnt or destroyed includes High Court Ogidi, Idemili North LG Secretariat; while Zik Statue at DMGS roundabout Onitsha was vandalized (Entrepreneurs, 2020). The total police stations destroyed were counted to be about 205 and killings of 22 policemen across the country. More so, police vans and other utilities vehicles meant for patrols were all burnt across the nation. In some towns in Ondo State like Okitipupa, there was a total burn down of government infrastructures and buildings including the local government secretariat, court, pension office, VIO office, Independent National Electoral Commission's building and the

police station.

According to interview granted by a CSP Police officer who preferred to be anonymous, he affirmed that burning of police stations and killings of policemen most of whom were not SARS personnel has affected their perception and patriotism in the discharge of their duties. He said such outrage on the policemen left many of them injured and shattered during the period. This he conceded would undoubtedly affect their morals in the discharge of their responsibility of protecting lives and property as well as maintaining law and order for the public who do not like them (Interview, 2021). For fear of being attack by hoodlums many police officers refused to go to work at some point and this decision further emboldened the miscreants, parading as civilized youths, to perpetuate their barbaric act (Entrepreneurs, 2020).

Monumental destruction of government edifice in Lagos and some other cities. For instance in the nation's capital Abuja, Kano, Oyo, Ogun and Plateau states witnessed destruction, death and looting. In Kano state, rampaging youths went after shops and homes of residents in the area carting away valuables and setting some ablaze. Several vehicles were also burnt. In Plateau state, banks and shops were destroyed (Entrepreneurs, 2020).

The looting of stores for food again brought to the forefront the economic plight of many Nigerians. In 2018, Nigeria was reported to have overtaken India as the poverty capital of the world with an estimated 90 million people (about 50% of the population) living in extreme poverty i.e. on less than \$1.90 a day (Adebayo, 2018). Critics faulted the government for simply storing relief materials and failing to distribute them to the needy (Lawal, 2020). But when analyzing the factor that could warrant attacking individuals and carting away their properties by some of the youths in the name of EndSARS especially in Lagos, one could see the levels of immoral abyss the country has fallen into.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Recommendations

In a bid to curtail the prevalence of crimes and gain public trust and support, the

Nigerian government needs to carry out comprehensive reforms and massive re-orientations of the Nigerian Police Personnel and other security units in handling cases, crimes and professional conducts in line with the global best practices. The following recommendations are made to address the gory experiences and abate future challenges:

- The SARS should be reconstituted and re-organized to operate in line with its original modus operandi of facelessness, plain vehicles and without carrying around arms and weapons to intimidate innocent citizens;
- Restitution of victims should be openly and publicly done with thorough sanctions of those SARS personnel found guilty and wanted of the alleged accusations.
- Extra Judicial killings, report of violence, undue torture and evidence of systemic abuses of civil and political rights by police and other government agencies should be frowned at by the government and thoroughly investigated through transparent means such as public inquiries and inquests. Victims should be compensated and erring officers sanctioned accordingly .
- There is need for urgent re-prioritization and massive re-investment in education and youth empowerment to engage the country's teeming youths, especially aged below 30 years, in productive vestures since they account for 70% of the total population of the country.
- The challenge of poverty and hunger also needs to be urgently addressed if Nigeria must experience peace.
- The brutal killings of 22 policemen, 205 police formations and stations set ablaze with operational vehicle may affect the sense of patriotism of the Nigerian police. Hence, there is urgent need for peace building strategies, to calm the nerves of the agitators and re-orientate both the police personnel and other security units and the general masses on the centrality of their engagements with the people and society at large

- A country that fails to invest in the future of its youths is bound to count the cost in the shape of anarchy. Therefore, the governments at all levels must make conscious efforts to improve the health sector and the economy if the country must discourage criminality and stem the tide of insecurity.
- Development of Intensive Human Rights training to address the systemic abuse of civil and political rights of the citizenry. This is necessary to ensure protection of the civilians and ensuring compliance of human rights by security agencies.
- There is need to mount CCTV cameral across major cities to monitor activities of police personnel and the public in respect to violence, torture and extrajudicial killings and its reports handled with the seriousness it deserves.
- The police should be continuously re-trained especially on psychological aspects of dealing with the public inevent of crisis situationand the qualifications for recruitment should be raised above secondary school education.
- The police as a matter of necessity should undergo mental evaluation continuously to ascertain their preparedness to interact with the populace
- Officers should be instructed and trained on intelligence gatherings rather than invading the private space of citizens, snooping through their phones or personal gadgets.
- There should be a standby awareness and feedback mechanism,reporting the activities of the police and at the same time receiving feedbacks from the citizens on their daily experiences with the policemen and other security units through the media platforms.
- The government should provide a conducive environment to boost and encourage creativity and productivity as doing so would enable more youths to become entrepreneurs and ultimately employers of labour.

- In addition to CCTV cameras, all Police/SARS officers in special duties should be mandated to be fitted with body cameras so that every action taken is captured for review.

Conclusion

The #EndSARS that began as an agitation against police brutality, surprisingly received support of many Nigerians especially within the youths circle beyond the shores of the country. These overwhelming protests across the major cities with record vandalization of government properties, burning of police stations and killing of policemen have demonstrated the strengths and of the youths population. More so, it has shown the interconnectedness of Nigerians in the diaspora to issues at home and their readiness to support urgent reforms that would herald good governance. Retrospectively, #EndSARS, was a rising concern of the citizens to call for the disbandment of SARS personnel in Nigeria in a bid to put a final end to the brutality and abuses of human rights. However, it morphed into the demand for social justice, accountability and good governance thereby showing the levels of frustration of the citizenry regarding the approach of governance in the country. Importantly, the protests revealed the levels of decadence in the society even among some of the youths clamoring for a good governance. For instance, some of the teeming youths- victims of unemployment, poverty and bad governance- advocating for a functional society (where rules and laws are applied and justice is upheld) were also seen using the opportunity of #EndSARS to cart away private properties of those who were also victims of SARS brutality in a way. While the activities of SARS are highly condemnable, their attitudes could not be divorced from the conditions obtainable in the Nigerian society. The Nigerian society is soaked with every orgy and gory of immorality as some of the abandoned youths now embrace cutting corners to survive the harsh economy imposed by poor governance and unsavory attitudes of those at the helms of affairs. The implications of not engaging majority of the Nigerian youths were seen during the EndSARS and the future implications best captured in the statement once credited to the former president Olusegun Obasanjo sometimes in 2017 that with the prevailing numbers of the youths in Nigeria unengaged, 'we are all sitting on a keg of gunpowder'. The astronomical level of poverty and

its severity due to the lockdown of COVID -19 pandemic has undoubtedly heightened the tension facing the Nigerian youths. Thus, the #EndSARS could be seen as the last straw that broke the camel's back as within few days of protests, activists were able to secure helplines that could respond to emergencies, provide legal services to those in need and sets up radio stations with finance from crowd funding platforms within and outside the country. All these are all indications of what the youth strength could achieve when not galvanized into the economy or included in the process of drafting key economic policies.

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POWER AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: INTERROGATING THE ROLE OF POLITICAL ELITES

Aminu Idris Ph.D
Aruwa Saino Harun

Abstract

The struggle for power among the Nigerian political elites has been reduced to a violent contest or what is commonly known as "a do-or-die affair". Consequently, election-related violence in Nigeria has claimed the lives of thousands of people, displaced millions of citizens from their homes, and creates political instability in the country. Scholars have provided various explanations on why political violence persists despite several measures taken by successive governments to contain it. Some of these explanations include the circulation of Small and Light Weapons (SALW), youth unemployment, illiteracy, widespread poverty, among others. However, the vast literature on political violence neglects whether or not political elites are part of the reason why political violence persists. With the aid of elite theory as a theoretical framework and thematic method of data analysis, this article relies on secondary sources of data and elites' interviews with relevant stakeholders such as security agents, seasoned academics, traditional leaders, members of the civil society organizations among others to examine the role of political elites in perpetuating political violence in Nigeria. The main finding of the article reveals that the lack of track records by the political elites is mainly responsible for the manipulation of religion, ethnicity, and regionalism as the instrument of the campaign to win and retain power. As a solution, the article recommends issue-based politics rather than ethno-religious politics that currently dominate Nigeria's political landscape.

**Aminu Idris Ph.D Department of Political Science Faculty of Management and
Social Sciences Federal University Gusau Zamfara State Aruwa Saino Harun**

Keywords: politics, power, political violence, election, manipulation of religion

Introduction

Broadly, politics is the management of human affairs by the governing elite (Lerner, & Balana, (1997). This suggests that every society is divided into two classes namely; the class of the governing elite and the governed. This implies that as a citizen you are either an elite in the circle of governance or you are been governed by the elite. Usually, the class of the governed are the majority of ordinary citizens who surrender their liberty to the government in return for security and welfare. The government is made up of few political elites who governed on behalf of the majority of citizens. To be in the circle of governance, you need the consent of the governed either through election or selection. In the modern states system, indirect or representative democracy has prevailed over other forms of government. It is seen by the majority as the best form of government, thus, every nation claimed to be democratic and every leader wants to be seen as a democrat. One of the key ingredients of representative democracy is periodic elections. In other words, there cannot be democracy without the election and vice versa. The election enables the citizens to elect those who represent their interests to preside over the affairs of the state. This suggests that at different intervals, depending on the constitutional requirement, citizens go to the poll to elect political leaders who governed them. This requires politicians to have a political platform through which they campaign and canvass for votes from the electorates by convincing the majority of the citizens (Urbinati, 2008); (Kölln, (2015).

The benefits that come with occupying a political office such as power, wealth, and influence particularly in Nigeria, occupying political offices are highly competitive. In this context, attempts by Nigerian politicians to acquire power and political relevance have often created intense competition which often degenerates into political violence. This unhealthy competition among the political elites has created hostility among different political elites in the society. Specifically, the quest for political power in Nigeria's political landscape is so intense leading to all manners of political violence that have threatened the peace and stability of the country. Thus, Nigeria has been

confronted with political violence frequently. The first large-scale political violence erupted in Nigeria's First Republic which later degenerates into civil war shortly after the country got its independence from Britain in 1960. Since then, this form of political violence has been manifesting in different dimensions (political, economic, and socio-cultural) across the country. Political violence, in particular, is becoming a recurrent phenomenon that Nigerian state and its citizens are held hostage by these smashing political realities which are quite unfortunate.

Scholars on political violence have made several attempts to explain the causes of political violence in Nigeria. Prominent scholars such as Obadare, (1999); Guichaoua, (2009); Abdullahi, (2013); Ladan-Baki, (2016); Anweting, & Ogar, (2018); Yusuf, (2019) argues that pervasive poverty particularly among the youths, lack of internal democracy in the political parties, high rate of bribery and corruption, over-reliance on oil revenue, youth unemployment, illiteracy, religion, ethnicity, regionalism, domination of the minority by the majority ethnic groups, lack of integrity of the security agencies and electoral empires are the leading explanations for widespread political violence in Nigeria. Other scholars such as Emmanuel, & Onyige, (2019); Igwe, & Amadi, (2021) have attributed Nigeria's political violence to social and political marginalization, unemployment, underemployment, proliferation of arms and ammunition through the country's porous borders, and political intolerance as the major drivers and enablers of political violence in Nigeria.

Ezeibe, (2021) study's looks established a causal linkage between hate speech and political violence in Nigeria using 2011, 2015, and 2019 presidential elections. The study reveals that an ingrained culture of hate speech has been the major source of political violence in Nigeria and suggests that enforcing current anti-hate speech laws in Nigeria just like elsewhere provides a chance to defend minority groups' rights, promote political inclusion, and reduce electoral violence. Seiyefa, (2017) blamed the heterogeneous political culture of the diverse peoples of Nigeria and the high level of political intolerance as the main factors perpetuating political violence in Nigeria.

The political atmosphere, ethnicity or tribal politics, the insincerity of the political leaders, and electoral fraud are some of the major elements that

contribute to violence in Nigerian politics. Similarly, unguarded statements or utterances can motivate strong hatred and fuel political violence against a particular individual or ethnic group, particularly in a multicultural society like Nigeria. The ramifications of political violence are huge and are in every element of Nigeria's national life. Rotimi (2020) argues that the church's intervention could minimize political violence and save the country from the current state of violence and the insurmountable challenges that come with it Rotimi, (2020).

Nigeria's elections are generally becoming violent or what is commonly referred to as "do-or-die affairs", where every contestant tries to win at all cost by undoing his perceived political rivals through all the available means. The evil desire of Nigerian elites has led to all kinds of political violence such as assassination, ethnic cleansing, banditry, kidnapping, intimidation, ballot snatching, election rigging, thug, physical assaults to mention but a few. Thus, Nigeria has experienced political violence of varying magnitudes that at various times push the country brink of disintegration. However, against all the foregoing explanations, political violence is increasing exponentially across Nigeria. Hence, there is a need to explore alternative explanations by uncovering an aspect that has been forgotten and neglected by the literature on Nigeria's political violence.

Conversely, this article relying on qualitative dominant approach argues that from independence to date, political violence (in form of ethno-religion crisis, electoral crisis, insurgency, terrorism, communal crisis) in the country has escalated not just because of the socio-economic conditions of the people or the environmental factors but rather the manipulation of secondary issues such as religion, ethnicity, regionalism among others by the political elites for their selfish gains. The articles argue that in an attempt to win or retain power, the elites exploit all avenues, including manipulation and sponsoring of violent organizations such as the Boko Haram in the North-East, farmers-herders clashes in the North-Central the ethno-religious crisis in Jos- Plateau state, and the cattle rustlings in Zamfara state (Okoro, 2014). Against this backdrop, this article examines the role of political elites in the persistence of political violence in Nigeria.

Conceptual and theoretical framework

Many concepts are central to the discourse of this article. However, this section intends to conceptualized power, political violence, and political elites for a better perspective. As a theoretical guide, the article adopts elite theory to analyze the role of the Nigerian elite in fueling political violence in Nigeria.

Power: This is one of the most popular and crucial concepts in political science and social science discourse. The concept of power has sparked numerous debates about the political implications it implies. Hence, scientists have yet to come up with a universal definition of power that can be used in the systematic study of politics. The tendency to associate power with conflict rather than cooperation is part of a larger trend of negative attitudes toward power. However, in broader terms, it connotes the capacity of a society to mobilize the loyalty of its membership and the efficacy of its organization as well as the role of the elites in keeping the political system in equilibrium. In a symbolic notation, power is described in terms of a relationship between people. A declaration of power comparability, or the relative degree of power held by two or more people. In the context of this article, it connotes the ability of one or more actors to cause a change in the behavior of another actor (s) (Dahl, R. A. 1957); French and Raven, (1959); Wrong, (2019).

Political violence: The use of force or threats by an individual or group of persons to accomplish political goals or objectives is known as political violence. In other words, is a politically violent event in which one or more parties use force to achieve a political goal, while other occurrences - such as protests and non-violent activities - are captured as potential sources of violent conflict that may result in political violence (Wolf, 1969); (Ikyase and Ebgeri, 2015). From the definition above, political violence is goal-oriented. It refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors including competing political groups as well as incumbents or its policies (Gurr 1970). According to Anifowose (1982), political violence is the use of physical threats by individual or individuals within a political system against another individual or groups and property, with the intent to cause injury or death, damage or destruction of property, and whose objective, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstance, implementation, and effects

have political significance, that tends to modify or change the behavior of others in the existing arrangement. David, (2015) asserts that political violence may take the form of arson, torture, kidnapping, killing by any means, destruction of property, and blocking of ways. Political violence could be an expression of aggression between individuals, groups against an individual, or individuals against a group.

Political Elite: Are the most powerful and prestigious members of society. The term "elite" refers to those who are widely acknowledged as great leaders in their fields. As a result, there are elites in politics, religion, science, the military, business, and the arts. They are usually small minorities who play an extraordinarily influential role in the affairs of society especially in specialized fields (Körösényi, 2018). The elite are the decision-makers whose power is not subject to regulation by any other body in society. They are those who have control over the fate of society due to their superiority. Members of an elite group have a significant impact on the beliefs and attitudes maintained by their social group. They are those who make major decisions, who can actualize their will even if others object, and who have the most of what it takes to have money, influence, power, and prestige Blondel, & Müller-Rommel, (2007).

Elite Theory

As mentioned earlier, this article adopts elite theory as a theoretical guide for analysis. The term "elite" originally meant "best," "good," "noble" and it still does in many instances. After the Italian theorists, Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto adopted the term as a core premise, since then it became widely employed in social science analysis. Mosca claimed that in all cultures, 'two types of people appear – a class that rules and the class that is ruled. At its early stage of development, Pareto conceptualized "elite" as those individuals who have the highest indices of excellence in any given activity, whether it is in fishing, politics, or major businesses. However, Pareto split these various elites into a governing elite, which includes all leaders who directly or indirectly have a role in society's governance, and a non-governing elite, which includes the rest of the elites. Although both Pareto and Mosca regarded elite rule as the supremacy of those who are best at governing over the non-elite or masses at times, they swiftly abandoned the idea that the ruling elite is always a genuine

aristocracy in practice (the rule of the best). Military, religious, and commercial aristocracies are the most common types of ruling elites. A ruling elite's social base might be open or closed, but it is always vulnerable to challenge or displacement by a counter-elite: "History is the graveyard of aristocracies" (Pareto, 1966, p. 249 cited in Dunleavy, & O'Leary, 1987). In the context of this study, the political elites are the political actors who are responsible for the operation of the Nigerian political system. In other words, they are saddle with the responsibility of the authoritative allocation of societal resources.

Methodology

As stated in the introduction, this article employs a qualitative approach through secondary sources and elite interviews with key stakeholders such as religious and community leaders, seasoned academics who specialized in democracy and electoral violence, members of the Nigerian security forces, and civil society groups. These respondents were selected purposively due to their knowledge, role, expertise, and experience in electoral violence. Furthermore, some of the respondents were selected because they represent groups with firsthand information on the threats of political violence on the socio-cultural, economic, and political development of Nigeria as well as measures taken by key stakeholders such as security agencies and the electoral empires to contained political violence.

To analyze the data collected, the article adopted the thematic method. This method is considered because its versatility enables the study to have a picture of the data in a condensed manner by categorizing the data into themes and sub-theme using a descriptive coding method for clarity (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). A thematic method, like other qualitative approaches, has numerous approaches. This study used Braun and Clarke's 6-step approach for this analysis, which included familiarity with research data, production of codes, search for themes, review of themes, the definition of themes, and write-up (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The data was collected from June 2020 to February 2021. For ethical reasons, the names of the respondents were anonymized while the date, affiliation, and place of interviews were disclosed.

What does the current literature say on Nigeria's political violence?

For a fairly long time, Nigerian politics has always been characterized by violence even during the colonial era when state repression was certain. For instance, the Aba women's riots of 1929, the general strike of 1945, the Enugu Colliery Strike of 1949, and the Kano riots of 1953 are some of the examples of political violence in pre-independence Nigeria (Anifowose, 1982). However, in the early years of Nigeria's independence, distrust among diverse ethnic nationalities has further nurtured political violence in the Northern and Southern regions. The political violence that ensued thereafter eventually led to the collapse of the First Republic and later civil war that lasted for 3 years. The intervention of the military in politics in 1966 also escalated the violence on an unprecedented scale. Not only did political assassinations become the order of the day but the massacre against Easterners residing in the Northern region. The civil war which lasted from 1967 to 1970 has claimed the lives of over 2 million Nigerians. Nigeria's civil war was an indication of the desperation of the elites for power and the extent they could go to acquire and maintained it (Ikyase & Egberi, 2015:37).

Despite the bitter lessons learned, the current democratic dispensation is confronted with similar tragedies which manifest in the area of Niger-Delta militancy, Boko-Haram insurgency, rural banditry, widespread kidnapping, farmers-herders conflict, ethno-religious conflicts, succession threats to mention but a few. These challenges individually and in combination are indications that Nigeria is still under the threats of political violence. The factors that were responsible for the outbreak of Nigeria's civil in the 1960s are now manifesting more than ever before. The question is why Nigeria's level of political violence is on the increase despite government commitment to contain it.

Causes of political violence in Nigeria

The phenomenon is as complex as the country itself. Broadly, scholars on Nigeria's political violence identified illiteracy and the mass poverty occasioned by the socio-economic crisis of under-development as the main source of political violence. The worsening poverty in the country enables the Nigerian elites to commodify the political conscience of an average Nigerian for a peanut to perpetuates political violence. (Ikyase and Egberi, 2015:36).

Umar (2016:147) assert that the prevailing commentary on youth and political violence is that the exclusion and lack of job opportunities faced by young people lead to their disillusionment and, in some cases, their participation in political violence. He further argues that unemployment, insufficient educational opportunities, poor governance, and social marginalization have led to the deep disaffection of youth in society thereby increasing the likelihood of youth resorting to anti-social activity and political violence. According to Olusola (2007), political violence occurs in Nigeria as a result of the government's incapacity to deal decisively with perpetrators of violence, particularly the Boko Haram insurgency (Olaekan, 2017).

Politically, numerous factors that are responsible for political violence. These include election rigging, political intolerance, perception of elections and contesting for a political position as a do-or-die affair, electoral maladministration, and fraud among others. Often, election rigging aided by the electoral empires has equally contributed to political violence in the country, most especially the Northern and Eastern Nigeria. Election rigging in collusion with either security forces or electoral officials by the ruling party or the incumbents has become a norm. This often-provoked opposition parties to stage a protest which often leads to political violence. Experience has shown that rigging has been the single most important cause that pervades free and fair elections and it has been responsible for democratic instability in Nigeria. The insincerity of the electoral officers seems to overshadow the inadequate control mechanisms and poor logistics which all enhance manipulation of results through electoral fraud. Politicians often bribe electoral officers and when it becomes public knowledge, it triggered a great deal of political violence in the society. Meadow, (2009); Fafchamps, & Vicente, 2013).

Similarly, political intolerance and the tendency of political elites to see the election as a do-or-die affair has immensely contributed to political violence to the detriment of democratic stability, Ikyase & Egberi, (2015:36). Most politicians view a contest for political office as a zero-sum game. For instance, in Maiduguri during the 2019 election, there was evidence of bomb blasts and political violence in some parts of the state. Of all the presidential elections and candidates Nigeria had, only former President Goodluck Jonathan concede

defeats in the 2015 election after the ballot. Another important factor that contributes to worsening political violence in the country is weak political culture. Ezeani and Ezeibe, (2011) argue that when the political culture is low, the rule of law becomes weak and political violence ensues. The perpetrators of political violence usually take the advantage of the weak political culture and unleash mayhem on society. Thus, youth participation in political violence has eroded the possibility of a democratically peaceful country. They further posit that, failure of political leadership to prioritize a nation's needs and respect the virtues that bond society and promote political instability is partly responsible for the political violence.

Obadare, E. (1999) argues that there is a nexus between the legitimacy of a regime and the level of political violence. He argues that when a government emerged through a popular mandate, it enjoys support of the people and the possibility of political violence is likely to be very minimal. However, if the electoral process that brought a regime into an office is flawed, the higher the likelihood of political violence. From independence to date, most of Nigeria's regimes emerged through an electoral process marred by irregularities and violence. The majority of the election results have been contested in courts for various electoral malpractices. Many were won and the majority of the cases were lost not for lack of substance but on technical ground.

The Guardian (2018) attributed political violence in Nigeria to the upsurge in the proliferation of small and light weapons in the country. In 2018 the Guardian reports indicate that there are over 350 million illegal arms and ammunition in the hands of unauthorized persons. These weapons are used to perpetuate political violence and create new cycles of violence and crime. The weapons also undermine the work of humanitarian and relief organizations and militate against sustainable development. Small arms threaten peace, sustainable development, democracy, and human rights if acquired and used illegally and these arms have found expressions negatively on our electoral processes and outcomes (Emmanuel & Onyige, 2019).

Effect of political violence in Nigeria

Since Nigeria's independence in 1960 to date, political violence has been a big

stumbling block to the country's growth. With the restoration of democratic government in May 1999, there were high hopes that the new democratic system would minimize the risk of political violence in Nigeria while also accelerating the country's economic and social change. However, despite the return of democratic governance, Nigeria has witnessed an unprecedented level of political violence, crippling national development efforts. Consequently, political violence deters domestic and foreign investment in our economy, causes government revenue leakages, and leads to the election of incompetent politicians, all to the disadvantage of the country's economic and social advancement (Anweting, & Ogar, 2018).

In the last two decades, Nigeria has seen a slew of political bloodshed and religious or political wars, all of which have had a profound impact on the sensibilities of every rational person on the planet. This had a terrible and catastrophic effect, especially on the children and the elderly. The kidnapping of nearly 200 schoolgirls from a government college in Chibok, Nigeria, by Boko Haram insurgents has provided terrorism and other forms of criminal violence in Nigeria a new dimension and trend. It also depicts a serious threat not only to Nigerian children, but all Nigerians (Chinwokwu, & Arop, (2014). From December 2020 to July 2021, almost 1,000 students and pupils have been kidnapped in Nigeria. Although most have been released following agreements and payment of ransom, several students whose parents cannot afford ransom remain detained. Only recently, gunmen abducted 140 students from a boarding school in North-Western Nigeria, the latest in a trend of mass abductions targeting students. In North-West and Central Nigeria, heavily armed criminal gangs frequently assault communities to plunder, steal cattle and kidnap people for ransom, but they have been increasingly targeting schools and universities since the beginning of the year. (The Guardian, Nigeria, July 5, 2021). Abduction of school children has affected the psychology of parents to choose from either withdraw their children from schools or live in perpetual despair and trauma of their children been abducted.

According to Global Conflict Tracker, Boko Haram killed 37,500 people, abducted hundreds of schoolgirls and women, displaced 2.5 million people, and forced 224,000 Nigerians to flee their homes between 2011 and 2020 to

achieve their goal (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020). This is in addition to cycles of other forms of electoral violence that claimed thousands of lives and properties worth billions of US dollars. For instance, in 2011, 17 people lost their lives during the post-presidential poll violence in Gombe. In Bauchi State, 10 youth Corpers who served as election ad-hoc staff, a Divisional Crime Officer (DCO), and a Policewoman lost their lives. Over 4,500 people were displaced following the mayhem unleashed on the residents of Bauchi town by the political thugs. Four INEC offices in Bauchi, Dambam, Misau, and Jama'are local government areas were burnt down while 500 laptops used for the voter registration exercise were looted.

In Taraba State, many people were allegedly shot dead by the police during a protest at Mutum-Biyu Headquarters of Gassol Local Government Council. In the Ardo-kola Local Government Area of Taraba State, four cars were burnt following the alleged attempt by one of the political parties to tamper with the presidential election results. Those who lost their lives were the youth that took to the streets over the alleged manipulation of the presidential election results. The Secretariat of the PDP in the Gassol Local Government area was not spared as the entire building was burnt down by protesters. The protest escalated tension and paralyzed economic activities in Jalingo, the State capital Bambose, (2012:215) opined that; "in Nigeria, political violence has caused the country a lot of human and material resources. It has caused a significant set-back in the socio-economic and political development of the country". The funds that would have been used for the rehabilitation, rebuilding, and reconstruction of the infrastructures consumed by political violence should have been channel into other developmental programs such as the construction of roads, schools, hospitals, and so on. Hence, the need to interrogate why political violence persists and what must be done to contain it.

However, the vast of the literature reviewed mainly focuses on issues such as weak governance, poverty, illiteracy, corruption, weak penalties for the perpetrators of the violence, proliferation of arms and ammunition, the ineffectiveness of security forces, culture of impunity, unemployment among others as dominant explanations for the persistence of political violence in Nigeria. However, this work argues that the role of the political elites in

perpetuating political violence has been neglected by the existing literature.

The political elites and Nigeria's political violence

The history of Nigeria's political violence will be incomplete without mentioning the role of the political elites. Moreover, in every political system, elites are the drivers of either stability or instability within the political system. In other words, peace and security depend on the nature of the elite's struggle for power. The healthier the struggle for power the more peaceful the political system is likely to be and vice versa.

However, the violent quest for political power and influence among the Nigerian political elites is one of the major enablers and explanations for political violence in Nigeria. Conspicuously, this explanation has been neglected by the literature on Nigeria's political violence. Often, political power tussles between politicians instigate a great deal of political violence. In the process of contesting for one political office or another, political elites become violent and perceived each other as threats. They treat politics and electioneering as a zero-sum game and never believe an election can be won and lost. This suggests that they employ every means available irrespective of whether it's legal or illegal, moral or immoral (Interview with a Nigerian senior academics in one of the Universities in Nigeria, Sokoto, Sokoto State, August 2020).

This opinion was corroborated by a member of the civil society organization who argues that “in an attempt to capture or retain power, political elites manipulate ethnicity, religion or regionalism to accomplish their private gains” (Interview with a member of a civil society organization in Abuja, Nigeria, December 2020). In a similar vein, Umar argues that *“Politically motivated violence occurs in every society at some point during its existence, Young people are known to have invariably played a significant role in perpetrating acts of violence against society. Indeed, in many weak and emerging societies, political 'leaders' oftentimes play what many have described as a subversive role in manipulating and mobilizing young people to violently actualize, realize and further their selfish political objectives. Mobilizing youth to commit political violence is not an inherently African problem, but is common in many*

societies around the world.”(Umar, 2016:147).

While agreeing with Umar that political violence is not peculiar to underdeveloped countries and that perhaps it occurs in every political system, a respected traditional ruler argues that it is more pronounced in Africa. For instance, in Nigeria elections offers the political elites an opportunity to mobilize youth for political thuggery to serve their selfish agenda. They often supply arms and ammunition to youth to protect their political interests. In the process, most of these youth are either incapacitated or get killed by the opposing groups. In many instances, youths are used for political assassination, blackmail, and abduction of opponents (Interview with a respected traditional ruler in Kano, Kano State, Nigeria, June 2020).

Elections in Nigeria have been monetized, a vote is treated by the political elites like a commodity. During elections, elites use the money to lure the youth and other categories of electorates to vote for their candidates. In many of Nigeria's pooling units, party agents buy every vote cast in their favor. As soon as the elections are over, they disappear and only reappear during another cycle of elections leaving the jobless youths in the hands of nature.(Interview with a religious leader in Abuja, Nigeria, June 2020). Often, there are cases of political thugs becoming terrorists and religious fundamentalists. The Boko Haram terror group evolved through the elite's financial inducement of youth as political thugs. For instance, the Boko-Haram, bandits, and Niger Delta militants continue to cause mayhem to the society due to the financial support they received from political elites (Interview with a senior military officer in Abuja, Nigeria, September 2020).

Furthermore, youth unemployment and underemployment have created an opportunity for the Nigerian elites to recruit able youths as mere instruments of political violence such as bandits, kidnappers, political thugs among others. In Zamfara State, for instance, political thugs are used by the political elites to kill, injure and destroy opposition party offices and billboards. This form of violence is common and attracts neither attention nor sanction from the government and or security agencies. Those arrested by the security agencies are often described as mere political thugs and released to the politician who is their sponsors (Human Rights Watch 2003). This has further triggered

confrontations against the state as different organized groups are instigated and sponsored by various elites against each other. Therefore, genuine opposition capable of keeping the government on right track is lacking because opposition parties exist at the mercy of the ruling parties. They are victims of the dictates of incumbents and are subjected to all forms of restrictions and intimidations that are sometimes not in tandem with the democratic norms and rule of law.

Consequently, Nigeria's opposition has taken both violent and non-violent means to oppose government draconian policies. The violent opposition has posed many questions to Nigerian democratic stability and development. This has made some people conclude that the Nigerian state is drifting towards a failed state that it will not amount to an overstatement to say that opposition in Nigeria is synonymous with political violence among different groups, political elites, and parties (Interview with seasoned academic on democracy, Federal University Gusau, Zamfara State, August 2020).

Another manifestation of the role of political elites in perpetuating political violence is in the area of godfatherism which has become one of the most prominent features of Nigerian politics. Thus, desperate politicians seeking to win elections frequently look up to godfathers. Political godfathers are powerful and highly influential members of the governing elite that utilize their power, money, and influence to choose who should rule or hold a particular political post, and then impose these leaders on the people. The masses are often forced to follow the leaders by intimidation, harassment, and the use of enormous amounts of money. Political godfathers provide a financial backbone for politicians who are desperate to go into politics. Such political office holders are frequently tethered to their godfathers' apron strings (Aderonke & Awosika, 2013).

The political godfatherism syndrome has impacted the body politics of the country's political virtues, which are now posing a threat to the country's democracy. Often, in attempts to cover up their wrongdoing while out of office, political elites smuggle their loyalists irrespective of whether they are qualified or not to take over their offices. In the process, electoral laws and party guidelines for internal democracy were abused to ensure victory for their candidates. In other instances, due to the desire of political elites to occupy a

political office at all cost, party tickets are usually given to the highest bidder to enable them to buy votes, bribe the security agents and electoral officials. The implication on Nigerian politics is that the country has yet to achieve significant progress in terms of transparent administration since the godfather's interest stamped Nigeria's democratic growth and development (Interview with a senior member of the civil society organization, Gusau, Zamfara State. November 2020).

One other issue related to godfatherism in the recruitment and funding of political thugs. Nigerian politics has been marked by thuggery and bloodshed since the pre-independence General Elections of 1959. Political elites exploit unemployment and poverty to financially induce youths to serve as political thugs and snatch ballot boxes, intimidate voters, gangsterism, assassinate opposition members, and physically assault opponents. Political thugs are armed with guns, machetes, and other dangerous weapons to protect their godfathers' campaign offices, billboards, and residential homes. Sometimes, they engage in a physical confrontation with opposing gangs or groups, resulting in loss of lives and destruction of properties (Interview with a senior officer of the Nigeria Police, Kaduna, Kaduna State. January 2020).

Above all, the Nigerian political parties controlled by the political elites have succeeded in monetizing party politics. It is difficult if not impossible for the younger generation particularly women and youths to contest political offices. For instance, while the minimum wage is pegged at 30,000 naira, the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC) costs for gubernatorial aspirants' forms are N22.5 million, senate N7 million, House of Representatives N3.85 million, and state assembly N850,000, Emmanuel (Ikechi & Nwali(2018). Female and physically challenged candidates would pay half of the prescribed fees for each of the slots listed above. The monetization of party politics led to the exclusion of youths and women that constitutes the majority of Nigeria's population. Hence, youth and women clamoring for active participation in politics sometimes degenerate into political violence.

From the data collected from both the secondary sources and the interviews conducted with the various stakeholders on Nigeria's political violence, this article argues that there is a need for more literature on how the activities of the

Nigerian ruling elites fuel political violence in the country.

Conclusion

Nigeria's political environment has been characterized by political violence orchestrated by the political elite. Against the conventional explanations such as poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy among others, this article argues that the role of the elites in areas such as funding political thuggery, monetization of party politics, and politicization of religion and ethnicity has been neglected by the literature. The article relying on primary and secondary sources of data argues widespread political violence is primarily because the political elite perceived politics and elections as a zero-sum game, or what is commonly known as a "do-or-die affair". The lust for power among the political elite has made it practically impossible for them to accept electoral defeats. Again, instead of seeking redress through the lawful means stipulated by law, they armed the youths to resort to political violence which often led to the loss of lives and properties. The elites were able to achieve these goals largely because of manipulation of identity, religion, ethnicity, and regionalism among others. Furthermore, the socio-economic conditions of the people, particularly youth in areas such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, underemployment, have been the enablers of various violent agitations across Nigeria by Boko Haram insurgents, Niger Delta militants, bandits, successionists, among others. Consequently, Nigeria has been pushed to the brink of disintegration at one time or the other which made the socio-economic and political development of the country a daunting task or even impossible.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations were made.

- a. First and foremost, the government should continue to educate the youths through relevant agencies such as the National Orientation Agency and civil society organizations, and other partners on the dangers of political violence.
- b. Since there is a causality between youths' socio-economic conditions and political violence, the government should focus on programs and

policies that are geared towards reducing the rate of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy

- c. Government should boost the capacity of the Nigerian security agencies such as the Police, Army, Airforce, Navy, and other paramilitary services to contain political violence.
- d. There is an urgent need for electoral and other related offenses tribunals for speedy determination of election-related cases.
- e. Politicians and party leaders should be required to sign peace agreements before electioneering to strictly adhered to the electoral laws, particularly on campaigns funds limits and vote-buying.
- f. It is common knowledge that the bulk of the arms used for the violence comes through Nigeria's porous borders, Nigeria must intensify both regular border patrol and intensive digital surveillance on the country's land borders to drastically reduce the proliferation of arms and ammunition into Nigeria.
- g. No doubt, religion plays a significant role in the lives of most Nigerians, therefore, religious and traditional institutions must go beyond the teaching of salvation but inculcate moral values to the political elite
- h. The electoral empire most closely monitors internal democracy within the Nigerian political parties and ensures that rules and regulations governing the conduct of party primaries are strictly adhered to. This will promote the inclusion of the larger segment of society in politics.
- I. The literature on the role of the political elite as regards political violence is sketchy. There is a need for further studies to examine other ramifications of the elite's role in Nigeria's political violence.

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PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICAN TRADITIONAL CULT SYSTEMS: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRADITIONAL RELIGION IN PRE-MONOTHEISTIC AFRICAN SOCIETY

GajereYakubu Tula

Abstract

The early African society was socio-economically and politically controlled by a number of traditional religious values deeply embedded in the customs of respective ethnic groups. Prominent among these was the cult systems that regulated the day-to-day life and activities of members of each society. The exercise of the powers of every cult in a society was not open to every member, but some few individuals deemed to have been ordained by the ancestral spirits or the god of the land for designated responsibilities. For ages, before the advent of the two monotheistic religions (Christianity and Islam), African societies though governed by the various cults of divinities, had had the belief of the existence of a Supreme Being who responded to the divinations offered through the various cults as well as the belief of a reward for a good deed and punishment in the afterlife.

Key words: Cult, Traditional, Religion, Monotheism, Supreme Being

Introduction

The African societies from time immemorial had evolved cultures which helped to shape the life of not only members of the societies, but the overall application of law and order, socio-economic and political affairs. Many facets, if not all, of the organizational structure of African societies were centered on the belief in ancestral worship and the cults of different divinities for the daily providence of health, security and economic benefits. These beliefs entails that the societies were governed and admonished through their respective affiliate cultural values. Also, the general attachment to many other cults was hinged on the belief among various African societies that some special needs can only be supplied by some dedicated spirits or the ancestors of either families or clans. It is thus believed that in every second of the African life, the ancestral spirits guide over the members of the family or clan. Through times, African culture was germane to the actualization of most of the needs of the people by way of traditional religious belief for rewards and immediate sanction. In spite of the deep attachment to traditional beliefs, in almost all African societies, there was existed of the belief of the Supreme Being who had all other deities subordinated to Him. It is on this note that this paper sets out to examine the significance of traditional religions in Africa in sanctioning the society, as regards the efficacy of ancestral cults and divinities in pre-monotheistic African society. It is thus intended that the result will enhance an understanding of the importance of the African traditional religion amidst the proliferation of Western cultures as a result of the global technology.

CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

Cult

The word "Cult" was derived from the French word *Culte*, or the Latin *Cultus* which means "worship." The BBC English dictionary defined the term cult as a religious group with special rituals regarded by many people as extreme or dangerous. It however further observed that when a person, object or activity becomes cult, they become very popular or fashionable. The oxford dictionary on the other hand defined the term cult as a relatively small group of people

having religious beliefs or practices regarded by others as strange or as imposing excessive control over her members. It implies a misplaced or excessive admiration for a particular thing such as the cult of pursuing money as an end in itself. The Cambridge dictionary on its part define the term as a religious group, often living together, whose beliefs are considered extreme or strange by many people. It is thus opined by other religions that when people hear the word cult, they often think of a group that worship Satan, sacrifices animals or takes part in evil, bizarre and pagan rituals. In the Christian context, the definition of a cult is specifically, a religious group that teaches doctrines that if believed will cause a person to remain unsaved.

Cult is a religion regarded as unorthodox or spurious, a body of adherents and a great devotion to a person, idea, object, movement or work. It is a system of religious beliefs and rituals as well as the cure of disease based on dogma set for by its promulgator employing methods regarded as unorthodox or unscientific. It equally denotes an instance of great veneration of a person, ideal or an object, especially manifested by a body of admirers, religious sect generally considered to be extreme or false with its followers often living in an unconventional manner under the guidance of an authoritarian, charismatic leader. However, in the sociological context of the society, and as posed by the different definitions above, the deep obsession of a person over a particular phenomenon entails his cult of personal obsession to it. Cult can therefore be of religious or secular obsession and or, depending on a persons' extreme desired affiliation to such any phenomenon in his mind.

Traditional

The term traditional is derived from the word tradition which is defined as part of the social and cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation and preserved over an extended period in a given society, class or a social group; the process and methods by which a society's heritage of material and nonmaterial wealth is transmitted. It denotes a set of such customs and usages viewed as a coherent body of precedents influencing the present which are not written down in the sacred book of religion such as the Bible or the Quran. Tradition can also be a style or a method of behaviour or practice, especially of artistic expression that is recognized and sometimes imitated. Traditional

elements include certain social institutions, norms of behaviour, values, beliefs, customs and rituals. Traditional elements are not limited to its most stereotyped manifestations such as customs and rituals; rather, it extends over a much wider range of social phenomena. As traditions are passed down from generation to another generation, especially by oral communication, it is often adapted to African cultural contexts and belief systems. It implies adherence to the past practices or established conventions in which the role of humanity is generally seen as one of the harmonizing nature with the supernatural. Tradition in its diverse nature is not limited to a way of African belief, but the cognitive syndrome of modern style of life synchronized towards western imperialism, capitalism and worst, the pervasive American dream.

Religion

Religion is not just set of beliefs about the supernatural, but the sacred and unquestionable culture in which the societies lives, the class or caste position to which people belongs, the attitude they hold towards other people and the morals with which they adhere. It is a part of lifestyle, gender roles and peoples place in society, which they could often defend with their lives. As a result therefore, information about the earliest stages of religion comes from archaeological materials which are quite scarce. The controversy of the most ancient religious life of the early ancestors lingers on even though some scholars maintain that religion was inherent in man from his outset. In this regard, modern orthodox theologians, compelled to recognize that man evolved from the ape, asserted that only man's body originated from the animal world, his soul was created by God and supposedly his first religious ideas – belief in God – developed at the same time.

Religion being set of beliefs, feelings, dogmas and practices defines the relations between human beings and the sacred or divinity. It means the voluntary subjection of oneself to a god (God). A given religion is defined by specific elements of a community of believers. The majority of religions have developed starting from a revelation based on the exemplary history of a society, of a prophet or a wise man who taught an ideal of life. Religion can be defined with three characteristics; belief and religious practice, faith and then unity of a community who share the same faith. The word religion is derived

from Latin word "religio" (attachment of moral bond, anxiety of self-consciousness). The origin of religion is debated since antiquity which Cicero said came from the Latin word "relegere", meaning "to carefully consider the things related to the worship of gods".

The concept of Faith in the African Traditional Religion (ATR)

The traditional religion has significant influence in the political, economic, social and ethical life of the African. In politics, there is the belief in the divine status of the king or chief; in the economy, there is the belief that crop failure for example is caused by malevolent forces; in the social sphere there is the belief that success depends on supernatural forces like magic and medicine; and in the ethical field, the fear of instant punishment from the divinities and the ancestors forces the average African to conform to the values and norms of the society. The orthodox religions (Christianity and Islam) also hold these precepts in high regard. In the political order of the orthodox religions, kings or chiefs occupy important positions in their respective communities. The economic role of the kings or chiefs is leading the people in the drive for economic welfare and request for rains during drought period for good crop yield. In the social sphere of the orthodox religions, there is the belief that success is both from the Supreme Being and other forces like magic and medicine. This belief does cause adherents to resort to the use of charms and sacrifices of both humans and animals in order to create wealth or to avert impending disasters. The ethical essence of the traditional religion provided for immediate supplication of penance for the fear of instant punishment. This belief is not in tandem with the belief on the judgment day which the orthodox religions propagate.

In the traditional African religion, God is not of the rank and file of the divinities. He is the supernatural ultimate, wholly and is therefore not of the same status with the other gods. He is above the pantheon, and not part of it, the divinities were brought into being by Him and therefore derive their authority from Him. Some of them are agents of creation and intermediaries of the supernatural. Hence they are only means to an end and not an end in themselves. It is because of such belief that from the emergence of many culture groups in Africa, the concept of the Most High God was conceived and believed. For instance, the Tula believed and calls on *Kwamanabadiye*, the

Tangale, *Yambaki tong*, which all mean 'God in Heaven'. The concept of God in Heaven by the African traditional religious believer had existed before the dream of any contact with either of the two most popular orthodox religions in Africa. This signifies the African astute faith on God as the Supreme Being of providence above all other divinities.

In consequence therefore, a careful study of the traditional religion is geared towards a scientific comparison with the popular orthodox religions widely practiced in Africa. This is hinged on three basic tenets of religion; the belief in the ultimate reality of a creator and controller of the universe, man's closeness to his creator and subsequent separation from his creator due to man's fault and the attempt to reconcile with the creator for the various ways and means of salvation. The traditional religion in all aspects of her existence demonstrates these three basic tenets common to all religions. The traditional religion has since conceived the belief of a Supreme Being who is the creator and controller of the universe and its entire contents. In consonance to this, the African traditional religion, in keeping to the ways of the Supreme Being, always invoke the various divinities to mediate with the Most High God so as to reconcile with Him and subsequently gain His favour on earth and in the afterlife.

This infers that the fundamental goals of the various religions are the same, but only differ in means put in place to achieve them. Biblically, in the Old Testament, the most dominant view was that sacrifices promises man forgiveness, immortality in heaven in the abodes of God. He who sacrifices thus obtains perpetual prosperity, renown and conquers himself a union with God; thus the practice of such in the traditional religion was hinged on the belief of obtaining at least longevity and dwelling in the same abodes with the gods (God) in the afterlife. As a result sin was regarded as alienation from the gods (God). There were moral sins as well as ritual sins, therefore, consciousness of it called for propitiatory sacrifices and penances. Some religious doctrines, especially the two monotheistic religions, could influence sections of the population with large success, playing the role of uniting people hitherto of diverse backgrounds together. The fact that the oppressed mass populations were the ones who primarily felt the need for religious consolation,

in Africa, each traditional religion was closely linked with local conditions of societal harmony and cohesion.

The Belief in the Supreme Being and Heaven in the African Traditional Religion

This was very obvious in the minds of ancient Africans that high above existed a Supreme Being whose power surpasses all other divinities. It has been demonstrated by the traditions of the various ethnic groups, for instance, in the Tangale-Waja area of Gombe State, all ethnic groups have always made reference to a God in Heaven and continued to uphold His divinity centuries before they came in contact with either Christianity or Islam. But with European incursion into this area in the early 20th century, the African religion, as portrayed by the Europeans, became the most misconceived, misrepresented and misunderstood than any traditional religion. In order to buttress their misunderstanding and misrepresentation, the Europeans invented terminologies such as animism, paganism, fetishism and so forth to describe African religious beliefs. They saw the African priest as a fetish priest echoing the ignorance and prejudice of a false sense rather than a representative or mediator of a peoples' traditional sense of supplication to a Supreme Being.

The notion of fetishism as often associated with Africa was deemed to have been the accepted term for religion among all the African peoples. The imaginary acceptance of this assumption infers that fetishism was paramount in the religious life of the ancient African, rather than a worldwide phenomenon. Fetishism had existed all over the ancient world and still does; and the fetish cult either in Africa or elsewhere in the world, at least the personal fetishes, which were the majority not only among Africans, but all over the world, developed as an unusual form of individualization of religion. Fetishes are of different forms and are deemed to have performed different accomplishments for individual adherents. As a result therefore, any object that captures a person's imagination after an accomplishment, keeps it for himself as a personal god for further accomplishment and protection, hence a fetish. It was equally clear that fetishes gained universal patronage, especially among European societies where modern cult system has obviously erased the concept of the Supreme providence in their circle. Suffice to say that in the 21st century,

atheism is more common in the Western world than in Africa and Asia put together.

The African explains the world around him both temporal and spiritual in religious terms. His culture and social behaviour are influenced by his religious beliefs and practices. He is convinced that by following the right practices and rules of sacrifices, the gods can be compelled to confer grace and victory. Also that the kingdom of the dead is in heaven and the dying man is comforted by the belief that after death, he will live with God in the highest realm. There was therefore the belief that the soul survived after the body which had enclosed it had passed away. With the conception that there was a Supreme Being in the highest realm, it was believed that the good, the brave and the generous were to enjoy a new life of happiness into which the soul of the deceased was transformed after death. It was also believed that the soul of the good passed after death into heaven of light where God lives to lead a blissful life in the company of the fathers, hence, death to the African was not absolute, but a posterity of life after.

Western perception of the African Traditional Religion

This has perhaps been an area of gross misconception of the African traditional religion in the age of ignorance when the Europeans practically knew nothing about Africa and her peoples. It was an era which they classified Africa as a dark continent filled with savages who had no history, no past, culture and religion. Even the 19th and 20th century missionaries seemingly seen to be religious saw Africa as the stronghold of Satan. An instance of this was the statement attributed to the missionary, Robert Moffat, during his evangelical activities among the Hottentots, Bechuanas and the Bushmen of southern Africa in which he asserted that;

"Satan has erased every trace of religious impression from their (Africans) minds"

Ancient religious beliefs in any part of the world are subjects of controversy as there seem to be no evidence of the existence of religious beliefs among, especially, the Europeans. Even as it was, there is no adequate knowledge of religious beliefs among the most ancient ancestors who lived several hundreds

of thousands of years ago. They perhaps had none, and could not have because the most ancient representatives of humankind all over the world led such primitive social existence. As a result therefore, their consciousness's have been oriented towards practical matters and are incapable of creating religious abstractions. This entailed cultural bankruptcy among ancient societies especially in Europe, being that culture was a necessary pre-requisite for evolving traditional beliefs and Africa had many centers of early cultural civilizations before Europe could overcome their primitive ways of life. Traditional religion among ancient African societies, as expressed by the European religious 'thinkers' asserted that the religious African was the;

Heathen who in his mind bows down to wood and stone; and that they were the primitive and savages who have no intellectual capacity to conceptualize theologically; hence they lack the knowledge of God

A perverse ignorance of the African traditional religion was much attributed to the comment made by Emil Ludwig who remarked that;

How can the untutored African conceive of God? Belief in deity is a philosophical concept of which savages are incapable of framing.

From the foregoing, some researchers who tried to challenge claims that the pre-literate African societies had no concept of God, came to the conclusion that "there was no society in the world, however primitive, without any knowledge of God". Resistance to this took the form of challenging the credentials of those researchers rather than those who made the false claims about African religions in the first place. Yet Ellis added his voice to the claims when he said that;

The Supreme Being is really, borrowed from Europeans and only thinly disguised.

And Leo Frobenius stated that;

Before the introduction of genuine faith by the Arabs, the natives had no, strictly speaking, Religion.

With these perceptions in the western minds and their cohorts, many

derogatory terms were used to describe the African religion and the African himself. The use of derogatory terms was the attempt to portray in their minds and even among Africans alike that the study of African traditional religion is of no significance in the contemporary world. It equally sought to portray the existence of the traditional cult systems among African pre-monotheistic societies as the only African way of life. This also denote that there has been nothing like a religion that conceived of Supreme Being (God) in the pre-literate African societies until the advent of the two foreign religions into Africa.

In another context, the view of Africa as a continent without history gained almost universal currency in the colonial period thereby clearly justifying the European occupation of Africa. For a people characterized as one without history or culture, indulging in abhorrent practices such as human sacrifice and cannibalism according to them were clearly in need of European tutelage. This European stereotype of the African strongly suggests that the people were saved from themselves by the benevolence of their colonial rulers. This portrait of Africa as painted by the colonialists was one of a people who on the eve of colonial occupation were practically decentralized, living in small villages, often naked, dominated by witchcraft and living in terror of their neighbours. Thus the blessings of colonialism and their auxiliaries, the missionaries were the establishment of security in the form of central authorities that would prevent inter-tribal wars and free the people from the bondage of traditional religion by converting them to Christianity or Islam. Such stereotype was acceptable in the outside world that colonial domination was beneficial to the African rather than the colonizers in spite of the pillaging of African resources with impunity for the development of their home states.

Despite the efforts of some European explorers of whom Heinrich Barth was an outstanding example, the Europeans, especially the colonizers, were for the most part ignorant of the people they were subjecting to colonial rule. Indeed, many of them sincerely believed that Africa was a dark continent and that they were bringing the first light of civilization to a benighted people lost in primitive barbarity. The notion remained that the Europeans were of great service to the African by not only establishing central authorities to knit the

peoples together, but that the missionaries had brought out African peoples from the strong hold of the spirits of darkness. Now the contradiction is, the West is deeply imbedded in agnosticism of the Supreme Being, high up in occultism and series immoralities. It is the Africans that are now working round the clock to bring them out of the strong hold of the spirits of darkness in the 21st century in an age of high technological development.

Significance of the African Traditional Religion to her society

The African traditional religion was critical in unraveling mysteries of the societies as well as the hub of running state affairs. Without the traditional religion, certain values in the society that were upheld in the past would have been meaningless. Traditional religion has been the fulcrum of family values, shaping and molding its adherents into one cohesive community with a common identity as a platform for the various expressions and agitations. It was the center of societal system with all other institutions including the family revolving around it. In every society there are some moral values that are transmitted from one generation to another through the family as an agent of socialization. Amongst these values includes discipline, humility, obedience to elders, honesty, patriotism and courage. Other values are inherited from the family through generations. These include occupational values, time value, work value, family image value, ethics, conduct, moral and power and gender stereotypes values.

The imperative of the traditional religion in pre-literate African societies was of great significance. It teaches the young ones sense of justice, corporate existence, industry, hospitality, truthfulness and forthrightness. Traditional values and norms provided for an objective and continuity of sound value orientation. It was the only significant social institution charged with transforming a biological organism into a human being. Before other religions would have been introduced to shape the individual in other important ways, traditional religion had already accomplished much of the transformation. It had taught him how to speak and play out social roles in society through the provision of security and opportunities for the development of society.

In the African traditional life, each person lived or was part of the family where

individuals are closely bound to each other within the moral order of society as fundamental moral duties which are taught and practiced at home. Home was the basic unit that teaches a child the basic moral values imbedded in the mother tongue which was the basis for socio-linguistic identity of any society, either African or elsewhere in the world. Traditional religion in the African context was the harbinger of classical development of the societies. It encompasses all the tenets and etiquettes of morality and sense of communal co-existence which transcends to inter-communal obligations of African alliances. It was therefore worthy of note that the traditional religious values and her attendant norms provided a platform for objectivity, continuity and sound value orientation. This denotes that her custodians would strive to see to its continued transmission through generations as well as its compliance by every member of the society. In current parlance, this is acutely lacking in the Western societies where the basic moral, objectivity and sound value orientation has been eroded by the absence of firm traditional subjection.

Conclusion

The relevance of traditional African religion cannot be over emphasized as it formed the basis of African socio-economic and political developments. The traditional religion cemented the people in social values and respect to constituted authorities as well as to the attainment of societal sanctity. The advent of the monotheistic religions and its acceptance by the African population does not in any sense brought the idea of Supreme Being closer to the people, but an added projection to life after death. African traditional religion had to contend with the prejudices of the Euro-centric and perhaps the acculturation of Africanism into the web of global cultural imperialism. So much of the African explanations to the diverse phenomenon of pre-literate societies have been significantly shattered by the advent of the two monotheistic religions. As a result therefore, what is now being paraded as African culture and tradition, has remain, largely obscenities and dark patches of African heritage as a result of the Western imperialism. In the most part, what became the display of African culture is represented by outrageous display of masquerades, expensive life style and the near lack of the Holy spirituality whose judgment day monotheism upheld.

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EFFECT OF CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE NIGERIAN BANKING INDUSTRY IN ABUJA

Dr. Nana Bature
Adebayo Olaolu Adebowale
Iwegbu Ifeanyi Cyril

Abstract

The current marketing emphasis has shifted from satisfying customers to building relationship through a long term value creation. The study examines the effect of customer relationship management and organizational performance in the Nigerian banking industry. The study involves a survey research using four selected deposit money banks in Abuja with a population of 4100 comprising of customers (3822) and staff (278) of the selected banks and the sample size was derived using Taro Yamane formula which was 364. Data were collected using copies of questionnaire which were presented and analysed in tables and simple percentage. Ordinary least square of simple regression was adopted for the test of hypotheses. Findings revealed that there is positive significant relationship between customer relationship management and the selected deposit money banks performance. It was also discovered that friendliness of employees affects the organizational performance more than proper record and adequate information. The study therefore recommended that the banks management should encourage pursuing customer relationship management programmes with rigour such as meet the customers forum, festivities gifts and community social corporate responsibilities so that they can survive in the competitive business environment.

Dr. Nana Bature, Adebayo Olaolu Adebowale, Iwegbu Ifeanyi Cyril
HOD, Department of Business Administration, University of Abuja, Gwagwalada
–Nigeria 2 Ph.d. Student, Department of Business Administration, University of
Abuja, Gwagwalada –Nigeria, 3Ph.d. Student, Department of Business
Administration, University of Abuja, Gwagwalada –Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Businesses are in constant race to increase profits, keep current customers and gain or poach new one, competing for customers on a globalised market like never. The market condition and business environment of the 21st century is witnessing rapid change (Chary and Ramesh, (2012). Business often must respond to this rapidly changing environment. However, contemporary companies have realized that customers' relation is the life blood of business performance; business survival largely depends on customers (Adejoke and Adekemi,2012). The realization of this fact has made it possible for companies to have a competitive advantage. Customers are therefore better satisfied through a competitive superior product and services beyond their expectation. Satisfying the customer eventually graduate into a relationship where the company sees the customer's opinion as a better way to render services and satisfy customers' need.

Having every detail of organization's customers brought about the marketing concept known as Customer Relationship Management (CRM). Customer Relationship Management is the process of carefully managing detailed information about individual customers and all customer “touch point” to maximize customer loyalty. (Sharma 2011)

A customer touch point is any occasion on which a customer encounters the brand and product from actual experience to personal or mass communications and casual observation. Customer Relationship Management is an improvement on the database marketing of the 1980's, which was simply a catch phrase to define the practice of setting up customer service groups to speak individually to all customers of a company on the satisfaction that was derived from the service.(Day, G.S.2015)

In the past, creating and maintaining a good relationship with the customer was comparatively easier than what is obtainable today because businesses were much smaller and customers identifiable. (Aulonities, Bourne and Oliver 2019). Today the extended size of the business and the wide range of customers have compelled banks to explicitly manage good customer

relationship if they want to be successful.(Khadwalla 2011).This study investigates the Customer Relationship Management and Organizational Performance in the Nigeria bank industry, to increase customer satisfaction, and customer loyalty. The study used First Bank Nigeria PLC, United Bank of African PLC, Diamond Bank PLC and Guarantee Trust Bank PLC at central business area of Abuja in Nigeria as a case study.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Nigerian Banks had fallen short of the expectations of their customers in recent time. Customers have experienced challenges ranging from delay, non-availability of staff at service points, poor standard of records or improper information, failed promises among others. Customer service in our banking industry can be mistaken to mean customer delay and frustration, almost every Nigerian bank encounter similar problem in meeting customers' expectation of service and customer satisfaction.(Ajayi, 2005)

The issue of the long queues and huge crowds in the banking halls can be highly devastating and discouraging most times, especially towards weekends. Most time, these long queues are because of the breakdown of computers used by cashiers, sometimes it occurs as a result of the cashier pushing duties to one another, as to who is to attend to the customer or not (Ndubisi,Wah and Ndubusi, 2007).

The management of the deposit money banks in Abuja in order to win customers satisfaction and loyalty in the competitive environment are engaged in various forms of customers' relationship management such as proper record and adequate information and friendliness to customers. However, these may not have yielded the desired result as there still exist low customers satisfaction and loyalty in the selected deposit money banks in Abuja resulting in customers movement to other banks.

Based on the problems above, this research investigates the *effect of* customer relationship management and organizational performance in the Nigerian banking industry with emphasis on selected deposit money banks in Abuja.

1.3. Research Questions

1. To what extent does customer relationship management (friendliness of employees) affect customer loyalty of the selected deposit money banks in Abuja?
2. To what extent does proper record and adequate information influence the customer satisfaction of the deposit money banks in Abuja?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The major objective of the study is to investigate the effect of customer relationship management and organizational performance in the Nigerian banking industry. Other objectives are to:

1. examine how customer relationship management (friendliness of employees) affect customer loyalty of the selected deposit money banks in Abuja
2. assess the influence of proper record and adequate information on the customers' satisfaction of the deposit money banks in Abuja.

1.5 Statement of Hypothesis

Ho₁: Customer relationships management (Friendliness of Employees) does not have positive significant effect on customer loyalty of the deposit money banks in Abuja.

Ho₂: Customer relationships management (proper record and adequate information) does not influence the customers' satisfaction of the deposit money banks in Abuja significantly.

1.6 Significance of the Study:

The study centre on the Customer Relationship Management and Organizational Performance in Nigeria banks industry. The study enlightens bankers on factors that are important to be considered when designing and implementing customer relationship management in their organization in order to avoid excessive investment in customer relationship without getting

significant reward in return. This study is important for customers, employees, banks, academia and government. Customers will have access to better and qualitative service from the banks

Employees can also have improved conditions of service due to better Bank performance .Banks can gain in terms of superior performance and it will increase turnover. The research can also benefit the academia in terms of addition to knowledge and as reference material hence better understanding of the usages of customer relationship management in Nigeria banking industry.

2. Literature Review

Concept of Customer Relationship Management

Baran and Galka (2013) revealed that customer relationship management is a protective marketing strategy that focuses on managing the customer experience by understanding their needs and purchase behavior. It is an efficient way to strengthen the relationship between a company and its customer, transforming links into friends and partners. CRM as defined by Payne and Frow (2004) as the implementation of an integral series of technology and strategies developed purposely for creation of shareholders value via maintaining strong long-term relationships among customer (both current and potential customers). Rababah et al (2011) describe CRM based on three different perspectives; business philosophy, business strategy and technology towards effective and successful adoption and implementation. Therefore, CRM is considered as making use of people, process and technology to retain existing customers, attract new customers and create value to the customers as well.

Customer Relationship Management in the Banking Industry

Banking system is known as the backbone of financial intermediation through the mobilization and channelling of financial resources (Bello 2005). Banks in performing their pivotal role in the economy, facilitate financial settlements through the payment system, influence money market rates and provide a means for international payment. The efficiency and success of this financial intermediation is predicated on a sound marketing policy and programme.

With the advent of universal banking in Nigeria and the subsequent consolidation which has impacted tremendously on the balance sheet size and capital base, the subsequent mega banks now have massive customer base and competition has continued to increase amongst the existing banks (Ajayi, 2005).

Koch (2014) asserts that bank customer asset typically has four basic wants namely: faster service, convenient business hours, feeling wanted, and prompt and fair resolution of problems. He concluded that banks generate revenue by “keeping existing customers, broadening their banking relationship by cross-selling services, and attracting new customers. Again, without a customer orientation, other institutions will entice customers away by offering the relationship they desire.

Impact of Customer Relationship Management on Banking Performance

There are sound financial reasons for the growth of Customer Relationship Management. Research has shown that the cost of attracting a new customer is estimated to be five times the cost of keeping a current customer happy. From the research conducted it has been observed that Customer Relationship Management has a place in the banking industry especially in the area of customer satisfaction, retention and profit of the organization. The study conducted by Adejoke & Adekemi (2012) revealed that, Customer Relationship Management significantly affects performance of banks in Nigeria. Their study shows that, Customer Relationship Management can explained variation on banks performance by 77.3%. This means, an increase in Customer Relationship Management led to increase in performance of banks in Nigeria. The result revealed that top management and marketing managers place more premiums on relational benefits followed by relationship quality for better Bank performance than other relationship marketing construct.

Managers can increase profitability of their organization if they adopt proper Customer Relationship Management strategies and allocate their resources more efficiently. The overall purpose of Customer Relationship Management is to improve marketing share and to enhance mutual value for the parties involved in the relationship. Improving values can be achieved by increasing

marketing efficiencies and/ or enhancing marketing effectiveness.

Cravens & Piercy (2008) stated that CRM covers managing all possible ways that an organization uses to interact with its customers from initial contact to the delivery of the product and services. CRM is a sound business strategy to identify the bank's most profitable customers prospects and devotes time and attention to expanding account relationship with those customers through individualized marketing, reprising, discretionary decision making, and customized service through the various sales channels that the bank uses. A greater focus on CRM is the only way the banking industry can protect its market share and boost growth. With intensifying competition, declining market share, deregulations, smarter and more demanding customers, there is competition among the banks to attain competitive advantage over one another or for sustaining the survival in competition.

2.3 Empirical Review

Abubakar, (2015), the study investigated the impact of Customer Relationship Management on organization and found out that CRM has direct positive relationship to the performance of the organization. A critical review of extent literature was conducted and complemented with surveys where questionnaires were prepared and administered to employee of Barclays Bank. The responses when analysed supported the claims by many authors that CRM impacts on the overall general performance of the organization and revealed three different types of CRM. operational, analytical and collaborative CRM.

Elaheh, Asghar, Seyyed and Asadolla (2013) carried out a study on Customer Relationship Management and Organizational Performance: A Conceptual Framework Based on The Balanced Scorecard (Study of Iranian Banks). Data were collected from primary sources through a structure questionnaire which was design in 5-point Likert. The results of data collected were analyzed through Chi square/degree and regression. The study found out that CRM processes have a positive effect on organizational performance. The study recommended that Bank management should understand who are the valuable potential customers and focus on them

Balakrishnan and Krishnaveni (2014) examined the level of satisfaction on

customer relationship management practices in selected private sector banks. The tools used for this study are Percentage analysis, Likert's point scale analysis, Mean, Ranking method, Correlation and Chi-Square test. The study reveals that proper CRM practices will increase the customer satisfaction and builds relationship with present and prospective customers. Thus the banks need to improve the customer satisfaction in the utilization of various modern banking services and should provide more customer friendly services to make the modern banking activity a delight for the customer to use.

Love Kumar Patwa and Kush Kr. Patwa's (2014) examined the relative Customer Relationship Management (CRM) performance and evaluates its collision on customer retention between the private and public banks of Uttar Pradesh. Stratified random sampling technique is used for present study for administrating the questionnaire. The sample had been collected from the 04 banks situated in Uttar Pradesh. It was found that the private sector banks have been able to implement the CRM practices more effectively when compared to their public sector counterparts.

3. Methodology.

This study adopted descriptive survey and analytical research design were the researchers gathered information from the respondents on the effect of customer relationship management and organizational performance in the Nigerian banking industry in Abuja. Employees and customers of the selected banks were consulted in carrying out this research work, covering a period of 5 year (2016-2020). The researchers believe that this period is adequate for the study because this period accounted when the company experienced some conflict situations.

The population of the study was 4100 respondents. *Taro Yamane formula was used to determine the sample size (362). The population was stratified into staff and customers before simple proportion was applied to determine the actual number from each stratum. Out of the 364 copies of questionnaires that were distributed, 314 (representing 86.3 % returned rate) were retrieved and used for analysis. Ordinary Least Square was used to test the formulated hypotheses in line with the objectives of the study.* The validity of the

instruments was done through pilot study. Copies of questionnaire were administered to respondents having characteristics very similar to the final target population. The result revealed the scale was easily understood and unambiguous. In testing the reliability of the instrument, Cronbach's alpha was used. The result of the reliability test shown an average of 0.7, the result of the Alpha is reliable because it is more than 0.6

3.1 Model Specification

A simple regression model was employed to estimate the effect of customer relationship management and organizational performance in the Nigerian banking industry in Abuja as developed below:

$$CL = a + b_1FOE + U \dots \dots \dots \text{Equation 1}$$

$$CS = a + b_1PRI + U \dots \dots \dots \text{Equation 2}$$

Where: Customer loyalty = CL and Customers' satisfaction = CS (dependent variables) and friendliness of employees = FOE and proper record and adequate information = PRI (independent variables)

4. Test of Hypotheses

Table 3.1: Hypothesis One

Dependent Variable: CL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 02/20/20 Time: 15:01
Sample: 1 314
Included observations: 314

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.015621	0.022161	0.070312	0.9440
FOE	0.489408	0.023098	0.609716	0.0171
R-squared	0.693486	Mean dependent var		2.193750
Adjusted R-squared	0.685576	S.D. dependent var		1.451509
S.E. of regression	0.813913	Akaike info criterion		2.456825
Sum squared resid	102.6804	Schwarz criterion		2.552924
Log likelihood	191.5460	Hannan-Quinn criter.		2.495847
F-statistic	87.67146	Durbin-Watson stat		0.851538
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Source: Data output using E-view, 2021

From the regression result coefficient for friendliness of employees (FOE) is positive and significant in increasing the customers' loyalty of the deposit money banks in Abuja. The P-value of 0.01 is less than the t-statistic value of 0.60 and the standard error value of 0.02 is less than the t-statistic value. This implied that, there is significant relationship friendliness of employees between the customers' loyalty of the deposit money banks in Abuja

The coefficient of determination (r^2) of 0.69 shows that 69% of variation in the the customers' satisfaction of the deposit money banks in Abuja can be explained by friendliness of employees. The remaining 31% can be explained by other factors not noted in the regression model. The F-statistic value of 87.6716 is significant at P-value of 0.00. This implies there is an existence of linear relationship between friendliness of employees and the customers' loyalty of the deposit money banks in Abuja. Therefore, we accept the alternative hypothesis that, friendliness of employees significantly affects the customers' loyalty of the deposit money banks in Abuja significantly.

Table 3.2: Hypothesis Two

Dependent Variable: CS

Method: Least Squares

Date: 02/20/21 Time: 15:01

Sample: 1 314

Included observations: 314

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.027547	0.060494	0.085368	0.6495
PRI	0.208708	0.027431	0.056437	0.0020
R-squared	0.755906	Mean dependent var		2.193750
Adjusted R-squared	0.755058	S.D. dependent var		1.451509
S.E. of regression	0.307714	Akaike info criterion		0.505393
Sum squared resid	14.77136	Schwarz criterion		0.582273
Log likelihood	-36.43146	Hannan-Quinn criter.		0.536611
F-statistic	127.2807	Durbin-Watson stat		0.935243
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Source: Data output using E-view, 2021

From the regression result, coefficient for proper record and adequate information (PRI) is positive and significant in increasing the customers' satisfaction of the deposit money banks in Abuja significantly. The P-value of 0.00 is less than the t-statistic value of 0.05 and the standard error value of 0.02 is less than the t-statistic value. This implied that, there is a significant relationship between proper record and adequate information and the customers' satisfaction of the deposit money banks in Abuja significantly. The coefficient of determination (r^2) of 0.75 shows that 75% of variation in the customers' satisfaction of the deposit money banks in can be explained by proper record and adequate information. The remaining 5% can be explained by other factors not noted in the regression model. The F-statistic value of 127.287 is significant at P-value of 0.00. This implies there is an existence of linear relationship between proper record and adequate information and the customers' satisfaction of the deposit money banks in Abuja significantly. Therefore, we accept the alternative hypothesis that, proper record and adequate information positively influences the customers' satisfaction of the deposit money banks in Abuja significantly.

4.1 Major Findings

The result of the analysis indicates that the effect of Customer Relationship Management and Organizational Performance in Nigeria banks industry is significant. This implies that Customer Relationship Management (proper record and adequate information and friendliness of employees) significantly influences the Organizational Performance (customers' satisfaction and customers' loyalty) in Nigeria banks industry. Therefore, the study is in tandem with the modern theory of conflict which recognizes that conflict between human in the organization is normal, desirable and healthy for organizational performance.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

The study reveals that proper record and adequate information and friendliness of employees) significantly influences the Organizational Performance (customers' satisfaction and customers' loyalty) in Nigeria banks industry and when well managed contribute significantly to the performance deposit money banks in Abuja.

5.2 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions of the study, the following recommendations were made:

- i. The management of the management should encourage pursuing customer relationship management programmes with rigour such as meet the customers' forum and festivities gifts.
- ii. The management of the banks should intensify community social corporate responsibilities so that they can survive in the competitive business environment.

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A STUDY OF ECOLOGY AND CULTURAL ADAPTATION AT THE OLD TAFYAN SITE, NIGER STATE NIGERIA: A PRELIMINARY REPORT

Abubakar A. Muhammad

Abstract

Archaeological researches in the Bida basin have been very scanty to give a clear picture of the antiquity of modern human groups in the area. This dearth of empirical data has expectedly led historians to speculate about much of the area's remote past. For instance, it is common knowledge that early studies on the nature of precolonial cultural ingenuity among inhabitants of the area have often been hinged on the premise that they had developed in response to either direct contact with outsiders or the stimulating effect of long-distance trade. To correct this notion, this article has combined both archaeological and historical methods in order to provide substantive evidence and insights into the prehistory of the Bida basin. This current study therefore, argues that there were thriving independent human societies in the area and that much of the cultural developments witnessed came about as a result of the need to adapt to the physical and social environment.

Abubakar A. Muhammad Department of Archaeology & Heritage Studies
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria

Introduction

Over the years the geographical area under study has been known by several nomenclatures among experts in the physical, environmental and social sciences (like geology, geography, anthropology and history) as the Nupe basin, Bida basin, Upper Niger area, Middle Niger area and so on, depending on their research interests. Notwithstanding, the above classifications have been used interchangeably in academic circles to refer to the same area. For the purpose of this research however, the area under study will be referred to throughout this article as the Bida basin with occasional references (where appropriate) made to the larger Middle Niger area which encompasses the Bida basin.

The history of human occupation in the central belt of Nigeria has for a long while remained patchy, with most researches on the archaeology of the area being largely concentrated on Nok, the Jos Plateau, Benue valley, the Lake Kainji area and Okun region. All these have been done leaving untouched very large areas of the Bida basin unexplored. As such, there has been little information available on the archaeology of the Bida basin, which is presently occupied by Nupe, Gbagyi, Kambari and Hausa groups in small agrarian and fishing communities on the banks of the rivers Niger and Kaduna. The earliest historical information available on the occupation of the area does not extend beyond the 15th century when concrete evidence of early social organization and interactions evolved – as obtainable from oral tradition and written sources. The reason for this dearth in information on the area is not farfetched as archaeological research interests received less attention. This is despite early researches in the Kainji area by scholars like Soper (1962) under the auspices of the Federal Department of Antiquities, Breternitz (1968; 1975), Hartle (1970) and Priddy (1970a, 1970b) during the Kainji Rescue Archaeological Project (KRAP), to recover some vital cultural information of the displaced villages to be flooded by the Kainji Reservoir (Nzewunwa 1983).

By the turn of the last four decades onward archaeologists like Shaw (1978; 1986), Obayemi (1979), Nzewunwa (1980; 1981a, 1981b, 1981c) and Aiyedun (1987; 1994) carried out pockets of excavations across the area. Over the last decade however, few undergraduate (Yakubu, 2006; Sani, 2006; Ndagi 2011;

Abubakar 2011; Atser 2012) and postgraduate (Aiyedun 1989; Abubakar 2016) archaeological researches on settlements across the Nupe hinterland were recorded, representing the available archaeological literature on the stretch of human occupation in the area. It can thus be said at this point that the archaeological study of this area is in its nascent phase and has had a limited representation when compared with other forms of studies in the humanities.

Background

There has always been an excuse for the neglect of the precolonial history of Sub-Saharan Africa by early non-African scholars, because according to them (Hegel, 1899; and, Trevor-Roper, 1965 cf. Stahl, 2014) it seemed both obscure and doubtfully relevant. As such, the region's history has as a consequence suffered what Wrigley (1987) terms 'Academic apartheid'- the 'coloured' emphasis largely on the period in which Sub-Saharan Africa has been subordinated to outsiders. A period which is only a small fraction of its actual history that needs to be studied holistically and in multifaceted ways: if Africa's history is to be properly understood. This is however changing rapidly as result of the re-assessment of earlier researches, adoption of more appropriate methodologies and a careful consideration of current research designs and models.

Although there exists very scanty archaeological and historical data on the Bida basin before the 15th century, the available data suggests that this area has been occupied as early as 200 BC (Weise 2013; Aiyedun & Shaw 1989; Jimada 2016) by highly itinerant hunting, gathering and fishing communities along the banks of its major rivers (Niger and Kaduna rivers). As a follow-up, this current paper investigates the cultural material aspects of the human-environment relationship in the Bida basin.

This paper has also investigated and contributed to the current state of knowledge on the archaeology of the Bida basin through an appraisal of relevant literature and material culture from surface surveys and excavation. This it has done in order to examine the current state of knowledge, thereby setting up the rationale for the research. In the same vein, this study has been situated in the broader context of the continuing dialogue on the development and nature of early settlements in West Africa. This approach is essentially necessary for the Bida basin area which has not been well researched when compared with other areas.

This research is thus important as it contributes to knowledge in the following aspects: firstly, understand the nature of early settlements and adaptive strategies of inhabitants of old Tafyan site. Secondly, examined the build-up of material culture and established the occupational sequence of the settlement under study. Lastly, this research has been able to identify regional and subregional networks through pottery decorations and motifs at the Tafyan site.

Physical setting

The role played by the environment in the evolution of cultures has long been a key question in African archaeological research especially as it relates to cultural adaptation and its resultant effects on the development of societies. Udo (1980) for instance remarkably posits that the place of the natural environment in the study of the history of any society will be incomplete until the need to appreciate the part that geographical factors of location, climate and distribution of resources are considered – as an integral part of a society's survival and development. In furtherance, Connah (1987) specifically notes that African societies have over the years interacted with their immediate natural environments to thrive culturally probably longer than in any part of the world. Available evidence suggests that for perhaps two million years, or more African peoples have been learning how to get the best out of the natural environment. Despite these dynamic interactions (and its antiquity) on the continent it is important to note that environments have not determined what these societies could do, nor have they been able to ignore its influence. Characteristically, over the last 3000-4000 years or more there was a rapid growth of intergroup dependence which was probably brought about by a combination of increasing sedentism, ecological diversity, and an uneven distribution of natural resources. These led to the evolution of exchange networks, increased specialization and social stratification.

Hence, this paper investigates the relationship between ecology and cultural adaptation in the Bida basin area using Old Tafyan site as case study. With emphasis on the environment and material culture dynamics of this site, this study aims to contribute to a regional reconstruction of the human-environment relationship and material culture history of the Bida basin area. In line with this latest approach, questions; on what role did the exploitation of natural resources play in the choice of Old Tafyan site as a settlement? what constitutes its material culture history? and, what were the modes of subsistence and/or survival strategies? form the basis of this research.

The Bida basin in Central Nigeria is an area stretching along the NW-SE intracratonic sedimentary basin extending from Kontagora in the North-western part of Niger State to an area slightly beyond Lokoja to the south in present day Kogi State. This basin is delimited in the northeast and southwest by the basement complex while it merges with the Anambra valley (to the south) and Sokoto basins (to the north) in the sedimentary fill comprising post orogenic molasse facies and a few thin unfolded marine sediments. It is a gently down-warped trough whose genesis may be closely connected with the santonian orogenic movements of south-eastern Nigeria and the Benue valley (Obaje *et. al.*, 2011).

Geographically, the Bida basin is situated in a transition zone between the arid savannahs of the north and the southern forest belt. It is a considerably low-lying and softly undulating landscape not exceeding 200 meters above sea level in most parts. The basin lies in an area subjected to long periods of erosion and peneplanation. Superficial deposits mostly sand, alluvium(silt), laterites and gravels cover the geology of the area (Nadel, 1946).

The commonly visible soil types in the study area are the ferruginous tropical soil and the hydromorphic or waterlogged soil (fadama soil). The ferruginous soils are basically derived from the basement complex rocks, as well as from old sedimentary rocks underlying the area. These ferruginous tropical soils that occur as by-products of the geology are ideal for the cultivation of cereal crops today: Guinea corn (*Sorghumbicolour*), Millet (*Pennisetumglaucum*) and Maize (*Zeamays*); Legumes: Cow pea (*Vignaunguiculata*) and Bambara nuts (*Vignasubterranea*). The hydromorphic soils on the other hand are poorly drained and are generally greyish or sometimes whitish in colour due to the high content of silt. This soil type is best suitable for the cultivation of rice (*Oryza glabberima*), which is the staple crop of the area (Abubakar, 2016).



Figure 1: Soil Map of Nigeria

Source: ArcGis 10.4

The area lies in the guinea savannah zone of Nigeria; bounded to the north by the Sudan and Sahel savannahs, representing increasingly drier conditions, and in the south by forest and mangrove swamps, representing moister and wetter conditions. The unstable amount of rainfall from year to year is a major feature of all savannah environments, the guinea savannah inclusive, which introduces a high degree of uncertainty with which plant, animal and human populations have to contend (Aiyedun & Shaw, 1989).

Connected to rainfall is the role both the Niger and Kaduna Rivers play in the vegetal and faunal life of the area. These two major waterbodies form the two geographical axis which combine to form an efficient natural communication system for societies inhabiting the area. Across the area, fishing and other riverine activities are commonplace. It is therefore little wonder that early




Figure 2: Multidirectional Interface

Subsistence pattern in relation to cultural ecology is probably the largest percentage of studies in cultural ecology literature. For the most part, a common feature among these studies is analysis of the energy involved in the procurement of food resources. An analysis that often does not delineate clearly between maximal subsistence from minimal energy expenditure or an energy consuming struggle for sustenance (that is, pressure on resources) through the study of adaptive technologies (Gunn, 1980). It also provides no clear model for explaining how cultural features originate and persist since some cultural traits 'are determined to a greater extent by purely cultural-historical factors – by random innovations or diffusion' (Milton, 1996). To address these shortcomings of cultural ecology theory, historical and ethnoarchaeological frameworks are deployed.

Site Characteristics

Tafyan site is located between Latitude $08^{\circ}59'58'' - 08^{\circ}60'04''N$ and Longitude $005^{\circ}52'60'' - 005^{\circ}54'0''E$ on a cultural mound surrounded by the highly fertile flood plains of the Kaduna River with an elevation of 101 meters above sea level. Tafyan like other mound sites along the Kaduna River studied by Shaw and Aiyedun (1989) is held in belief as one of the first sites founded by the Bini-Nupe people as they migrated into the area from the near east, and a one-time capital of the Nupe confederate system. This site is presently uninhabited and under cultivation with huge traces of cultural materials (artefacts) on the site

surface.

1.5 Methods of Research

➤ Collection of Oral tradition

Often employed as a method by Africanist researchers is oral tradition, which though very useful has painted a somewhat disjointed picture of the precolonial history of the Bida basin. This Obayemi (2011) and Jimada (2016) have both attributed to the deep antiquity (that is, autochthonous) of the current ethnicities in the general area of the Bida basin. Although, some form of later internal migrations from within the Nigerian area is favoured by Jimada (2016). These researchers (Obayemi, 2011; Weise, 2013; and Jimada, 2016) view the confluence area of the Rivers Niger and Benue as the homeland of most ethnic groups currently occupying the region.

In a similar fashion, there appears to be a general lack of information relating to the tradition of origin of the Tafyan site among the present inhabitants of the area. Although, there is a common belief among the people, that the site once served as the capital of the Bini-Nupe confederacy (Etsuyankpa-Tafyan, 2019; Maigari-Danko, 2020). It still remains unclear why, how and when this took place. There are also those who hold the view that the earliest inhabitants of the site and ancestors of the present Nupe people had migrated into the area from the near-east (that is, Egypt) during the pharaonic periods. These earliest ancestors of the Nupe according to this version of the tradition, had journeyed through Sudan, Borno and Katsina before arriving at Tafyan (Etsuyankpa-Tafyan, 2019).

What is evident from the foregoing could be explained as the absence of a concrete tradition of origin among the Nupe which has been explained by Jimada (2016) to reflect the antiquity of the people in the area they now occupy. Also, from the last version, it is clear that there is an attempt by the now mostly Muslim population of the Nupe people to associate the remotest part of their history with perceived higher/superior civilizations and peoples. These and other claims from oral tradition so far remain largely unsubstantiated by the available archaeological data from the Tafyan site and other sites within the basin.

➤ Field walking

To identify suitable portions for excavation, reconnaissance and survey of

the entire site was embarked upon on foot, which led to the identification of industrial and living/household areas. Tafyan site as observed from the reconnaissance and survey conducted, is a gently undulating expansive artificial mound not rising above four meters at its highest points to the west and measures 213,204 square meters. A handheld Global Positioning System (GPS) device was used in surveying the site extent by walking and recording geographical coordinates wherever there was a change in coordinates. The site extent was delineated through observance of the disappearance of cultural material evidence which is restricted to the mound surface.

Tafyan site was a walled settlement in the past with remnants of the walls visible when it was visited by Fredrick Nadel in the 1930s (Nadel, 1946). Remnants of this wall were however not visible during this mapping exercise. Rather, large traces of pottery materials (especially potsherds) and an outline of a furnace base dot the mound. Few trees could also be seen on the site which were probably left standing to provide shade from the scorching sun for farmers and herders - cultivating and grazing on the site.




Figure 3:Contour Map of the site/Digital Elevation Model (DEM)
Source: Fieldwork (2020)

Surface sample collections comprising almost entirely of ceramic materials dot the mound. Of this, were five hundred-seventy (405) potsherds, three pot stands and one clay bead were collected across the site surface employing the section sampling method (SSM). This involves collecting cultural materials from four quadrants established based on the four geographical cardinal points (that is, North-South, East-West). It is largely for the systematic ease of collection and to ascertain areas of high surface material distribution. Albeit, these materials were collected on the surface, there exists a very high possibility that their original matrix has been disturbed as a result of the current intense cultivation, grazing and erosion on the mound surface. Collected samples were bagged and labelled in artifact bags for easy sorting.

➤ Excavation

The excavation of Tafyan site was conducted as a last resort owing to the fact that much of the site surface had been destroyed due to the ongoing cultivation of crops and grazing of livestock by the current inhabitants of the area. As a result of these farming activities, the primary matrix of surface finds have largely been altered and features absent. Unfortunately, this was not the case almost a century ago when Nadel (1946) visited the site. However, in line with the objectives of this research, the portions earmarked for excavation were selected based on the high presence of ceramic materials: pottery and clay beads (for the household area) and by the presence of a furnace outline on the site surface (for the industrial area). This is in accordance with the research design which seeks answer questions on the technology, adaptation and subsistence strategies at the Tafyan site.

Consequently, and in order to gain a clearer insight about the site, excavation was embarked upon with the intention of studying its archaeological cultural sequence and to recover materials stratigraphically. This was with particular attention on the human-environment relationship. To achieve this, an arbitrary spit level of twenty centimeters (20cm) was adopted since it was difficult to discern the natural stratigraphic layers at the beginning of the excavations.

Pit 1

Excavation commenced at TFN/2020/ pit 1 – an area with a surface outline of a furnace remnant and some potsherds located at the western edge of the mound on Latitude 8°59'50.8N and Longitude 005°52'49.7E. This area was suspected to be an industrial site and was therefore excavated to probe its subsurface material potential. A 2x2 meter testpit was sunk around the furnace to reveal materials in and around it. The furnace measures 141.7m (that is, westwards) to the nearby stream, which would have served as the source of water for the iron smelters during the construction of the furnace and to put out the fire after every smelting exercise (See site map below). Most importantly, this tributary of the kaduna river would have served other domestic purposes in the settlement.




Figure 4: Contour Map of the Study Area

Source: Fieldwork (2020)

During excavation, the soil at this pit was very hard, compacted and dark brown in colour (7.5YR/3/2) characteristic of a furnace area – which must have resulted as part of the furnace construction process and the high firing temperatures associated with iron smelting. From the topsoil to the first arbitrary spit level (0-20cm), no complete ceramic vessels were found. Potsherds were generally scarce and mostly undecorated. At this level, a broken pot was found located on the southern wall which could have been used in the smelting process to collect water from the nearby stream.

The spit level 20-30cm marked the end of the excavation as it was the terminating point of the furnace remnants. Potsherds also became absent at this level and the lateritic soil very compact. Charcoal and slag were collected at the centre of the pit along with some bone fragments. The soil colour at this point was brown (7.5YR/4/4). All through the excavation, there was the presence of rootlets around the furnace outline.




Figure 5: Stratigraphic profile from Pit 1

Pit 2

At just 184 meters away from pit 1, another 2x2 meter pit was sunk at the edge of the mound (southwestward) located on Latitude 8°59'48.2"N and 005°52'59.9"E. The excavation at TFN/2020 pit 2 yielded most of the materials retrieved during the fieldwork exercise. With an spit level of 0-20cm from the topsoil, the soil at the pit was basically very soft and loose. As soon as excavation commenced, a rubber bead, bone fragments and ash became visible at 10-20cm.

Between spit level 20-40cm which is the second layer, there was a high presence of charcoal, ash and daub deposit. The soil was very loose mixed with the ash from the pit. At this level, there was a concentration of potsherds and a sitting full pot located *in situ* close to the northern wall. This pot was seated on broken sherds, bones and cowrie shells. Under this pot also were charcoal and a high concentration of ash.

The spit level 20-40cm revealed a loose but wet soil with a continuation of the ash deposit. This continued until the third level at 40-60cm. The reason for the soil wetness could not be ascertained at the point of excavation but there is the probability that it could have been as a result of either anthropogenic or climatic factors. This postulation would however require further scientific probing from the potsherds found between these levels. Similarly, at this point there was a gradual change in soil colour from dark brown 7.5YR/3/2 to gray 2.5YR/5/1 which had persisted from the topsoil up until the third level.

At spit level 60-80cm the soil colour continued as gray 2.5YR/5/1 and, texture loose and wet with the presence of daubs, charcoal and ash deposits. Potsherds retrieved from spit 80cm had an observable decrease in size and thickness. Decorative motifs also decreased on potsherds which were generally becoming fewer as the excavation progressed. There was however a high concentration of fish bones, snail and other mollusc shells between arbitrary spit level 40-80cm. Other animal bones (mostly of mammals and possibly birds) were also recovered in large quantities in association with a declining ash concentration between 80-100cm. Potsherds were seen sticking out on the four walls at this level.




Figure 6: Stratigraphic profile from Pit 2

Spit levels 100-180cm yielded some pottery materials along with few animal bones and shells. The soil colour at these levels had changed from gray (which was visible from 60-80cm) to dark brown 7.5YR/3/2 (80-180cm) and the texture now looking compact and dry. Potsherds retrieved between these levels were rough in texture and very dry. At 180cm the excavation came to a close as it had reached the sterile layer which was marked by the complete absence of any form of cultural material and the compact nature of the soil.



Plate I: A drone image of excavation at pit 2

➤ Data Analyses

At the point of writing this article, results of the processed data are still being awaited from laboratories within and outside the country. For instance, potsherds and soil samples were sent to the Department of Chemistry laboratory here at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, for soil morphology and pottery organic residue analysis. Similarly, clay, glass and rubber beads have been sent to the University Central Laboratory, Umar Musa Yar'adua University, Katsina for Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) analysis, and X-ray Diffractometer (XRD) analysis of potsherd and slag samples. While, Archaeobotanical samples were sent to the Laboratory of Archaeology and Populations in Africa, University of Geneva, Switzerland, for the identification of plant remains. For the Zooarchaeological samples, they are presently being analysed at the Centre of Cultural Anthropology, Université Libre De Bruxelles, Belgium where the species would be identified. All these were done so as to aid further interpretation of data regarding the contextual and behavioural aspects of the society under study.

Area excavated	Summary of Finds									
	Spit (20cm)	Potsherds	Bones	Slag	Shells	Beads	Metal Objects	Archaeobotanical and Charcoal samples		
Pit 1 (Sterile layer: 30cm)	1 (0-20)	++	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	2 (20-30)	++	+	*	*	*	*	*	*	+
Pit 2 (Sterile layer: 180cm)	1	+++	+++	+	+	+	+	+	+	*
	2	+++	+++	*	++	+	+	+	+	+
	3	+++	+++	+	++	+	*	*	*	+++
	4	+++	+++	*	+++	+	*	*	*	+++
	5	+++	+++	*	+++	+	*	+	+	+++
	6	+++	+++	*	+	+	*	*	*	++
	7	+++	+	*	*	*	*	+	+	++
	8	++	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	++
	9	++	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	++

Key

*= Absent | += Scarce | ++ = Medium presence | +++ = High presence

Conclusion

While this research is still ongoing, preliminary results show a high degree of exploitation of natural resources (plant and animal, inclusive) characteristic of a semi-sedentary group at an early stage of upper occupation level. This phase possessed highly decorated potsherds, varying vessel forms and, slag, metal objects, glass and clay beads until there was a decline in cultural material quantity but not quality (towards the topsoil) which could easily suggest the site's abandonment.

However, towards the middle of the occupation phase there appears a high concentration of more varying intricately decorated pottery, slag, clay beads, floral and a large number of faunal remains. This characteristic feature could suggest an improved knowledge of the environment and attainment of a remarkable level of efficiency in the exploitation of resources when compared with the latter phase of occupation. In contrast, at the lower occupation level there was a general decline in the quantity of cultural materials. Additionally, some pottery forms and decorations observable at the upper levels became absent. The surface finish of potsherds at this level also appear to have been eroded as a result of subsurface geochemical reactions.

Similarly, the presence of iron working on the site as indicated by the furnace outline located faraway from the living area is another indication of a well organized settlement. Also, since the knowledge of iron working technology in the archaeological sequence of many African societies is often associated with food surplus, technical ingenuity, social stratification/complexity, sedentarism, warfare etc. it would not be improbable to suggest that Tafyan played some form of socio-political role in the past as emphasised by oral tradition.

Although, it is still not clear at this stage factors that might have influenced or encouraged the choice of settling in this semi-forested and flood-prone environment there is enough archaeological evidence to suggest that this was a society that thrived well culturally in its chosen environment.

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ANARCHY AND REGIONAL ORDER IN THE SAHEL REGION OF AFRICA: AN ASSESSMENT

Oladimeji Talibu (PhD)

Abstract

The article assesses the seeming anarchical socio-political climate of West Africa, most importantly in the Sahel Savannah area. It endeavours to examine how order can be maintained in the tense and rudderless socio-political atmosphere, where there is no clear-cut state and non-state actor under which political tranquility can be observed. The region has become a haven for various insurgent groups trying to assert control over countries like Mali, Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Northern Nigeria. The near-breakdown of law and order in the region therefore needs assessment to discern how such can be mitigated. The region is like waiting anxiously for any willing actor to fill the leadership vacuum that seems elusive in the region. Unlike the Savannah grassland area of West African region where international order is maintained by Nigeria and other external powers, the immediate revelation of who controls the Sahel region is impossible without historical and contemporary analysis of events in the region. This is the essence of this paper and it attempts to produce a framework pertaining to the future direction of international order in the region. Thus, the articles suggests the need for the would-be state actors to intensify efforts in arresting the seeming insecurity situation in the region. In terms of methodology, the article adopts textual mining and latent content analysis in interpreting the existing documents, newspapers articles, journal articles and media outputs.

**Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
Al-Hikmah University, Ilorin, Nigeria.**

Keywords: Anarchy; International Order; West Africa; Sahel region; Security

Introduction

West Africa as a whole has received the attention of scholars and policy makers in the field of security and international order but there is a sub-region within West Africa that needs serious attention in order to prevent the rampaging terror groups from worsening the security situation. The Sahel region generally has received scanty attention in the international order literature; possibly because of the unclear leadership structure in the area. It would be amiss to think that West Africa is synonymous to Sahel region. The region known today as Sahel region is a border between the Sudan savannah in the south and the Sahara desert in North Africa. It is in fact a bridge between two groups of African people-the blacks and the Arabs. It has been for a long time a starting point of Trans-Saharan trade route which had its end route in countries like Morocco, Libya, Egypt, and Algeria. The trade along this route was prosperous and profitable until the diversion to the Atlantic Ocean in the 16th century by the Portuguese explorers and traders. This diversion reduced the flow of traffic and trade along this route which was the mainstay of commerce for plundering Tuaregs and other inhabitants of Sahel and Saharan regions. The partitioning of the area by the Europeans in the late 19th century further worsened the security situation of the Sahel region as neither French nor British could bring the entire area under effective control. This is because the existing empires and city states that were in charge of maintaining relative peace and order were dismantled whereas the created nation-states are not viable enough to govern the entire area.

Countries like Chad, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso which are the core part of the Sahelian states were powerless and resource dearth to maintain any system of order in the region after independent. In fact, the nature of order broke down totally in the 1960s when some of these countries gained their independence from France. Such seeming anarchy could explain the rationale behind the France's decision to test Atomic Bomb in the area in 1962. The French government was adequately informed of the lack of effective government structure in the area and testing of Atomic Bomb in the area would invite little or no criticism. Nigeria, seeing itself as protecting the interest of African states

reacted against the France's seeming impunity to test the Atomic Bomb in the area. Under the government of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria severed diplomatic relations with France to protest against the testing of Atomic Bomb in the area.

It should be stressed here that the French government or any other imperial powers from Europe had never gained total control of the region. This is most notable in the way and manner French fought Samouri ibn Lafiya Toure, a Mandika warrior and a state builder, who engaged French soldiers in a fierce battle that lasted for a decade. It was so difficult for French to conquer Mandika, an empire that extended to countries like Mali, Senegal and Gambia. Samori resulted to using scorched earth warfare strategy and guerrilla warfare which made it difficult for the French army to subjugate the area totally. Eventually when it was conquered in the late 19th century, not all the Sahel region came under the French control. Thus, the Sahel region had always been under the control of various groups- itinerant traders, Islamic preachers, plunderers, desert guides et cetera. It is this socio-political condition that prevails until today and the desertification, deforestation, overgrazing, famine and drought have aggravated the security situation.

Although it may be wrong to assume that the problems listed above are contemporaneous; it has been part of the geographical feature of the area for centuries. The present population increase in the area has created a situation of stiff competition for the meagre grass and arable land available. It needs to be mentioned here that apart from the core four countries in the Sahel, there are some other few countries like *Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Algeria, and Sudan, and South Sudan* which are also categorized as geographically belonging to the area. It therefore suggests that Sahel goes beyond the confine of West Africa region. Sahel region therefore encompasses parts of West, Central, East and North Africa. This spatial coverage shows that the region is located at the centre of African continent which makes it a safe haven for all sorts of crimes like drug trafficking, child trafficking, insurgency, terrorism, and arms proliferation. This article is divided into four sections i.e. definition of key concepts, historical milestone of European expansion and international order, Sahel region, anarchy and

regional order, *and concluding remarks.*

Conceptualizing Anarchy, Order, and Security

The concept of anarchy is a condition under which there is no effective government apparatus in place to maintain peace and order. Anarchy can take place at both national and international settings. At state/national level, it is usually caused by the illegitimate operation of government who is neither the choice of people nor democratically elected to the position of governance. When this occurs it tends to create an atmosphere of political stalemate which may lead to anarchy. This kind of political scenario pervades the socio-political geography of most developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This anarchical national setting explains why some states are categorized as weak, fragile and unstable within the global political system. Where government is not effective enough to take total control of a state, anarchy is usually the end result. This is because the crime rate will be so intense that it will undermine the role of government in the state. The enduring solution to this national anarchy is to evolve government apparatus, in a legitimate manner, to respond to governance issues within a state. Branches of government like legislature, judiciary and executive are particularly relevant in this case. Each arms of government needs empowerment to manage the affairs of government to prevent anarchy within a national settings. Police and Armed forces as crucial executive arms should be formidable enough to maintain peace and order at national level.

It needs to be stressed that the operation of police and armed forces must be within the purview and prescription of national constitution in order to prevent “second-stage anarchy”. Thus, if this government apparatus can be maintained within a state the condition of anarchy may be mitigated and as such prevented. At international level however, the national setting is clearly different from global political climate. This is because at national level there are instruments of governance that maintain order whereas at international level such instrument is lacking. This position is reinforced by realist proposition that international political arena is anarchical in nature and that states should not rely on the multilateral institutions that present themselves as alternatives for guiding the global affairs of states.

The realist prescription is based on the assumption that there is no international government in place as it happens at national level that can maintain law and order within the global system. This position makes the realist to assert that the international political system is a “survival of the fittest” and it is an arena where shrimps are not safe from the overbearing power of whales. In this case, the international political system as postulated by the realist is anarchical in nature and states must be militarily and economically strong enough to maintain its security and survival. This kind of political nature is what exists in the Sahel region where some states within the political space cannot maintain order within the national setting. If some of these states cannot maintain orderliness within their borders how are they going to maintain such within the international level in the Sahel region? In a way therefore, the concept of anarchy as espoused by realist theory can be applied to the study of security situation in the Sahel region.

The anarchical political settings can be dangerous to human habitation and peaceful co-existence. To offset this therefore there is need to evolve political decorum where order can be maintained. In this way, for anarchical political environment to be peaceful order is needed. This explains the nexus between anarchy and order. Order can be fashioned out to offset the condition of anarchy at both national and international levels.

The maintenance of such orderliness can be unilateral or multilateral in nature. If it takes the form of unilateralism it suggests that there is an overwhelming powerful state in the name of hegemony within the global political space that maintains such global order. Multilateral maintenance of international order operates within the precept of international cooperation among all state actors. In this kind global order maintenance, states collaborate together under international institutions to ensure peace and order are maintained. This approach is what is popular within the liberal tradition. The global multilateral institutions like UN, WTO, IMF and OPEC maintain global order in the areas of security and economy. It also needs to be stated that at regional and sub-regional levels of international system, order is also maintained by multilateral organizations. In Africa, for example, AU, ECOWAS, CEN-SAD, and Maghreb Union are some of the multilateral bodies that are charged with the

responsibility of maintaining order in Africa, especially in the Sahel part of the continent. The multilateral mechanism in the maintenance of order has been proved to be effective for the last 75 years of international interactions between and among states. Such decorum is maintained and sustained by the UN and its specialized agencies. The fruit bore by the resilience of UN is security. Since 1945, the end of the Second World War and the year of the formation of the UN, there exists relative peace and security within the international system. At national level, the multilateral organization has been helpful in mitigating insecurity in weak and unstable polities. Where persistent threats to security are observed the UN in its characteristic manner maintains order and security through peacekeeping and peacemaking. This is expedient as there is a link between order, security and anarchy. Where the national/international order is compromised the result is usually insecurity which ultimately leads to anarchical political setting. Security therefore is a condition of being free from fear, intimidation, peace and freedom in conducting legitimate economic and commercial activities. Security at both national and international levels can be compromised by many agents like terrorists, insurgents, hijackers, internet fraudsters, child traffickers, drug traffickers, pirates and global health challenges. All these agents can compromise the international security which inhibit the peaceful social and political atmosphere at global level. In the contemporary global settings, security of any state and by extension, international system, can be compromised by the totality of the aforementioned agents. Where states are lagging in providing necessary welfare facilities for their citizens, those citizens may in turn result to illegal activities that will undermine the security of a state. This is the condition prevalent in most developing countries of Africa. Quality health facilities, education and job opportunities are not readily available in most of the countries in Africa and where this occurs people take to only way open to them, crime. Such crime may in turn hunt the state and undermine both national and international security. This is the condition prevalent in the Sahel part of West Africa.

Historical Milestone of European Expansion and International Order

The global system since the time of signing the Westphalia Treaty (1648) has been passing through many stages of international orders which seem to

suggest the intricacy of the global political terrain. The emergence of state system, rooted in the Westphalian tradition, serves as a fertile ground for the proliferation and emergence of states in the international politics; and from the lens of realist tradition, state assumes the position of the most important actor in the global system (Sorensen and Jackson, 2013:71-72). The corollary of this submission is that by 1648, states emerged as having corporate existence in the management of its domestic affairs in the European international system.

It is the spirit of statehood that impelled the European powers to venture into overseas territories between 16th and 18th centuries. Each European powers scrambled to share the land mass of Asia and Africa among themselves because of the need to maintain their hegemonic bids (Gilpin and Gilpin, 1987). This is the first phase of international order based on colonialism and mercantilism. It was these two important institutions that sustained the international system until early 20th century when the colonized territories began to demand for their independence (Gathii, 2000:2017). Throughout most of the periods between 16th and 18th centuries Spain, Portugal and France (through Napoleon Bonaparte) exercised hegemonic predominant over the entire global land mass while the Dutch and the British launched their hegemonic predominance in the early part of 18th century until the outbreak of First World War (Anghie, 1999:1-2).

Thus, the twin-mechanism of colonialism and mercantilism sustained the global order until the outbreak of the First World War. In between these periods also emerged some mechanism like balance of power, concert system, collective security and containment. For example, after the upset of balance of power in Europe by Napoleon in 1789, the European powers namely Prussia, Russia, Britain and Austro-Hungarian formed an alliance that eventually saw the defeat of Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo. The aftermath of the defeat was the emergence of the Concert of Europe which occurred in 1815. The Concert System became the sole international mechanism until the outbreak of First World War in 1914 (Sorensen and Jackson, 2013:17).

With decolonisation in motion after the First World War in Africa and Asia, the number of independent nations proliferated. The emergence of new states in the Balkans and other eastern European states further complicated the nature of

order in the international system. This complication, again, resulted in the Second World War which engulfed the entire globe. The offset of international order of League of Nations further compounded the issue as the world body could not avert the looming danger. The end of the war therefore saw the new global order in the name of United Nations and Cold War signified by the emergence of the US and USSR as the global hegemony. It was these two global orders that directed and dictated the behaviours of states in the international system until 1991, the year of dissolution of USSR.

The Cold War which governed the pattern of state behaviours in the international system affected different part of the globe differently (Wright, 1998:136-140). For example, the Asian continent became the theatre of the Cold War most especially in Vietnam, Korea, Middle East and central Asia. The Africa was a little bit experienced stabilization most especially the West African sub-region. The relative stability experienced may be attributed to the political insignificance attached to Africa by the two superpowers (Otunla, 2005:324). Nevertheless, the effect can be felt in southern part of Africa most especially in Zimbabwe, Angola, apartheid South Africa, and the Congo. The little impact of Cold War was also felt in West Africa with the elongation of Nigerian civil war (Ogunbadejo, 1976:45). The Nigerian civil war (1967-1970) was also greatly affected by the Cold War rivalry as both powers trying to take side in the war. The USSR later supported the federal government side and the war ended in 1970 in favour of federal government. The Cold War by all indications provided a modicum of tranquility and peace in Africa most importantly in the West Africa sub-region as the bipolar global system make the balance of power possible to maintained and sustained (Wohlforth, 1993).

Thus, the concept of international order can be employed to refer to global condition under which political tranquility and orderliness are maintained. Alagappa (2003) asserts that international order is a mechanism through which the states' activity at international level is guided in order to avoid anarchy in the conduct of relation between and among states. In this way, Alagappa identifies many mechanisms through which such order can be attained.

Sahel Region, Anarchy and Regional Order

The security situation in the Sahel region of West Africa has been a chronic one. It has nearly affected the cooperate existence of states in West African region who are close to the theatre. Many terror groups have been trying to assert control in the region while others are using the area as a transit point to states like Mali, Senegal, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), and Ansar al-Din, Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa province (ISWAP) have all been key players in the region since 2013 conflict that broke out in northern Mali and they have been considered as terrorist organizations by international communities because of their stated radical objectives and the use of terror and violence as only means to achieved their goals. The common and primary goal of all these terrorist groups has been the establishment of an Islamic State, most especially in Mali. The Mali regions that are affected by this development are Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. Although these terrorist organizations are known to the world because of the important role they played in the conflict in northern Mali. It should be said that the presence and activities of AQIM in the Sahel region can be traced back to the early 2000s. According to Thurston & Lebovich,

Long before 2012, AQIM had established a presence in Mali and other parts of the Sahara and the Sahel through kidnappings, smuggling, and raids. AQIM leaders also married into influential local families, and conducted some preaching and humanitarian activities, helping establish local credibility and acceptance for their recruitment, training, and economic activities (Thurston & Lebovich, 2013).

AQIM emerged from an Algerian terrorist group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) that established a narrow presence in the north of Mali and Niger since late 1990s. GSPC was a disintegrated group from the Algerian Islamic Armed Group, a radical group that played significant role in the Algerian civil war and became well-known for its brutality and cruelty mostly toward the civilians in the name of Islam and Shari'ah. By the end of 2006, GSPC fused with al-Qaeda to create a new organization, Al Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The setting up of AQIM coincided with a period that was characterized as the beginning of the third Touareg rebellion in northern Mali. Jean-Pierre Filiu argued that “AQIM's opening strike occurred on April 11, 2007, with three simultaneous suicide bombings in Algiers, targeting the Government Palace, a police station, and a gendarmerie post”()

After its establishment, AQIM began kidnapping Westerners, predominantly Europeans, and requested for ransom, not only in Algeria but also in neighboring Mali, Niger and Mauritania. Although the joint counterterrorism forces in Algeria came into creation to counter the rise of AQIM and other terrorist groups in North African Sahara towards the end of 2010 to early 2011, it failed to stop the activities of AQIM in the Sahel and particularly in northern Mali where AQIM continued its illegal activities. Nevertheless, AQIM was not the only terrorist organization that played a devastating role in the Sahel region. MUJWA and Ansar al-Din have also taken part in the 2012 Mali conflict. On one hand, MUJWA is a radical armed group which broke away from AQIM in December 2011, possibly out of AQIM's continued dominance by Algerian nationals, which was founded and led by the Mauritanian Hamada Ould Khaïrou, one of the AQIM non-Algerian militants. It needs to be stated here that the MUJWA is fighting for the need to introduce Sharia law. The organisation agrees with the logic of the other movements: Shaba in the Horn of Africa, Al-Qaeda in Asia, the Islamic State in Iraq, AQIM and *Ansar Dine*. Ag Ghali travelled to Pakistan in late 2006 after mediating the Algiers Accords between Touareg rebels and the Malian government. In 2007, he was appointed by the government of ATT as Cultural Attaché in Saudi Arabia. However, in 2010 he was expelled by the authorities of Saudi for unspecified contacts with suspected terrorists connected to Al Qaeda. Upon his reappearance in northern Mali, he decided to run for the leadership of KelAdagh which was unsuccessful and this led him to create his own radical armed group *Ansar al Din* in reaction to his defeat. These two terrorist organizations, namely MUJWA and Ansar al Din, in addition to AQIM played significant role in the recent conflict that occurred in northern Mali. All these three groups have been declared terrorist organization by the world powers including USA, France, UK as well as the global world body, the UN. Yet, these terrorist organizations were not the only ones involved in the illicit trafficking

and illegal activities in northern Mali. According to Princy Marin George (2015), “Latin American drug cartels are known to use the region to move products (including cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine) along established clandestine routes in West Africa and through uncontrolled territories in Mauritania, Mali and the Niger, among other”. Furthermore, the regime of ATT and some government officials were also accused of being involved in these illicit trafficking in northern Mali. Some government ministers and high-ranking army and intelligence officers close to Touré are believed to have been involved in the infamous crash landing of a Boeing 727 in Tarkint (near Gao, in northeast Mali) on November 2, 2009, which originally came from Venezuela and carried an estimated five to nine tons of cocaine. The jet successfully landed first on a makeshift landing field about nine miles from Gao before the crash, an area controlled by Touareg and Terrorist groups. After being unloaded of cocaine and other drugs, it took off and eventually crashed in the desert which was latter robbed by the traffickers. This incident and others have revealed the role of some state actors in corruption and organized crime across the northern regions during the regime of Amadou Toumani Toure.

It should be recognized that the role of Joint Task Force in Northern Mali against the rampaging Azawad terror group did not achieve much. What that intervention did was a mere dispersal of terror activities to other parts of Sahel region. Between 2012 and 2021, the number of terror groups has proliferated to the extent that it is becoming difficult for states in the Sahel region to pin down who to negotiate with. Such scenario also plays out in Nigeria wherein the rampaging book haram sect has established connections with Islamic State West Africa (ISWAP), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (.ISIS) and Al-Qaeda in Maghreb (AQIM) terror groups (Robert, 2014). This kind of proliferation and cross-border terror affiliation has pervaded the socio-political terrain of Sahel region since the fall of Libya in 2011.

CONCLUSION

The research has explored the rampaging terror groups in the Sahel region of Africa. It has dissected the ungoverned place in relation to the role some states powers have played in stemming the tide of anarchy in the region. The intervention of France as well as ECOWAS Multinational Joint Task Force in

2012 was a remarkable point at which there was a recognition of presence of anarchy in the Sahel region most importantly in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria. Such recognition has not matched with required military efforts to rid the region of terror groups. The vast expanse of land in the Sahel, most especially in Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania are not effectively under the control of the governments. In this case, the activities of terror groups in the area has been intensified and more horrified as there is cross-border attacks in the entire Sahel region. Worst still, the terror groups have been migrating southwards to the Savannah grassland area to carry out their dastardly acts. In this scenario, it is incumbent on the part of states and non-state actors in the region and beyond to rise to the occasion to liberate Sahel from the pangs of terrorism.

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FREEDOM OF WORSHIP AND THE ASSOCIATED RELIGIOUS PRACTICES AS CORRELATES OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE AND VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

Charles C. Akpuh, PhD

Abstract

The multi-religious nature of the Nigerian State ultimately compelled the country's government to adopt a secular state structure at its independence on October 1, 1960. This secularity of the Nigerian State implies that the polity has no state religion, but is bound to accommodate all kinds of belief and worship practices. However, with all the reforms that the National Constitution of Nigeria has gone through, it has not had clearly defined limits of religious practices, which could define the extent of the acceptable traditions and guard against the associated and observable "malpractices" in all ramifications. For this reason, religious institutions in Nigeria carry out acts, which are actually inimical to people's wellbeing and security at will and get away with them. Moreover, most of the previous scholarly attempts to contribute to tangible analysis and remediation of recurrence of religious conflicts in Nigeria have often omitted this very vital aspect of the religious question in Nigeria. Adopting a qualitative analytical approach, this paper attempted to attend to this often-neglected phenomenon in order to bring to the limelight how the religious structure of Nigeria constitutes a form of structural violence, causing inter-group animosity and the associated conflicts. It was discovered that the situation needs urgent attention to reduce the current spate of insecurity in Nigeria. It concluded that unless the government redefines the extant constitutionally structure of belief traditions, religion would continue to generate conflict, violence, and insecurity in Nigeria. The study, therefore, suggested a constitutional redefinition of religious freedoms and intentional implementation of the adjusted policy, with attendant penalties for any breach of the rules of religious operation in Nigeria.

Department of History and International Studies Joel Awoniyi School of Education and Humanities (EAH) Babcock University, Ilisan Remo, Ogun State, Nigeria

Key Words/Phrases: Freedom of Worship, Religion, Religious Practices, Violent Conflict, Structural Violence.

Background

The Nigerian State is a complex society in various forms. The country is a conglomerate of divergent ethno-linguistic people, separated by different, but sometimes related, ethnic backgrounds, accompanied by dissimilar social, cultural, and religious identities and practices. As already observed by some scholars (Asike, 2019; Adeforiti, 2018; Salawu, 2010; Archibong, Charles, & Abia, 2009; Muhammad, 2006), this heterogenic configuration of Nigeria is a consequence of the British forced merger of over 400 ethno-cultural groups in the Niger area, through the creation and later Amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates, to form the Nigerian State in 1914. Each of the various peoples of the state had their own religious traditions. Moreover, in addition to the traditional religious practices, two major alien religions – Islam and Christianity – had been introduced by the Islamic traders and Jihadists and the Christian Missionaries who partook in European incursion in the Niger Area, respectively beginning from the 11th and 15th Centuries, AD. Furthermore, several other minor religions were also introduced from other parts of the world (even in the form of cults) beginning from the pre-independence years when citizens of the Niger Area travelled abroad for education or other purposes (Johnson & Nkume, 2009; Muhammad, 2006). Some of the minor religious sects, which partly constitute the complex religious configuration of Nigeria include: Religion of the Light and Sound of God (that is Eckanker) and the Ancient Mystical Order of the Rose and Cross (AMORC).

In consequence of the foregoing conditions, Nigeria became a country of many religions with each of the cultural groups maintaining its own belief traditions in addition to the borrowed religions. Since independence, the multi-religious configuration of Nigeria has been further emphasised by succeeding regimes (Umeanolue, 2020; Obiefuna, 2018; Ajayi, 2009), through maintenance of that clause in the National Constitution and through open debates during periods of critical discussions of issues, which border on religion and how it is or should be practiced in Nigeria. Nevertheless, religion, its practices, biases, and the interests of faith-based organisations or institutions did not usually constitute a matter of major political concern until 1977-78 when a Constituent Assembly (CA) was set up by the defunct military government of late Gen. Murtala

Mohammed to debate the establishment of a new constitution for Nigeria. The inclusion of Sharia Law clauses in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, a condition that could have invariably made Nigeria a Moslem state, was the subject of contention (Hassan-Bello, 2019). In order to avoid a situation of national disorientation caused by religious differences, the Constituent Assembly had to resolve to maintain the secularity of the Nigerian state (Ajayi, 2009). Nevertheless, the years after the 1977 debate have continuously witnessed religion as a constant cause of serious and complex socio-political conflicts in Nigeria (Garba, 2020). These have led to the loss of some millions of lives, and numerous other damages to people and the society at large (Garba, 2020; Salawu, 2010; Ajayi, 2009; Ejumudu, 2009; Muhammed and Adeoye, 2006).

Thus, before May 29, 1999, when democratic rule was re-introduced to Nigeria, conflicting religious interests of individuals and groups and their affiliated religious organisations competed so much that they constituted threats to human security in Nigeria (Nwolise, 1990). Moreover, since the reinstatement of democracy in 1999, there have been very unpleasant experiences resulting from religious conflicts (Egwu, 2001). The constitutional clause of secularity of the Nigerian state, which accommodates all religions, without appropriate means of defining and checking religious excesses constitute part of the reasons why Nigeria experiences lots of religious violence. Sometimes, the gradual provocations that result inevitably build up and later explode into the violent reactions and counter reactions that often put Nigeria in trouble. These provocations do not just evolve out of nothing but from gradual accumulations of ill feelings, which are results of the adverse happenstances permitted by the religious structure of the Nigerian state.

In consideration of the foregoing, the concern of this paper is to logically explain how the religious structure of Nigeria constitutes a form of structural violence, alongside how it combines with the prevalent religious practices from opposing religious groups to generate inter-group conflicts, feelings of discomfort and animosity, and violence, which jeopardise peace and security of lives and property in the country's Fourth Republic (1999 till date). The religious practices considered in this paper include religious festivals, modes of worship and evangelism (i.e. outreach for membership expansion). The nature of these aspects of the various religions in Nigeria in relation to how they constitute violence against non-members to each of the offending religions

form the core concerns of this paper. The entire discourse is meant to emphasise the need to remedy the situation by adjusting the existing structure.

The Problem and Goal of the Paper

With all the reforms that the National Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has gone through, it has hardly been so detailed as to comprehensively define the specific patterns and limits of religious practices, which could guard against the associated faith-based oppression in all its ramifications. For this reason, religious institutions in Nigeria carry out acts which are actually inimical to human development and security at will and get away with them. Moreover, most of the previous scholarly attempts to contribute to tangible analysis and remediation of recurrence of religious conflicts in Nigeria have often omitted this very vital aspect of the religious question in Nigeria. Whereas this often neglected area constitutes a form of structural violence, its aftermath is part of the causes of religious violence and conflicts in Nigeria. This omission often limits the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the said researches and constitutes a tangible research gap, which this paper seeks to fill. Thus, the focus herein is to highlight how the religious structure of Nigeria creates room for some unguarded religious practices and thus constitutes a form of religious violence, which ultimately graduates into build-ups of insecurity of lives and property in the country.

Conceptual Framework

The Concept of Religion

The concept of religion is variously denoted in line with scholarly perceptual differences. These divergent perspectives are based on differing psychological complexes, individual theological commitments, and prejudices as explained by Otite and Ogionwo, (2006). Accordingly, Bull (1969) perceived religion as a belief system that is associated with worship and obedience to a deity that is considered to have control over human destiny. To Ejumudu (2009) religion is a way of life and relationship that relates man to the ultimate value and meaning of existence epitomized in God. Finally, Bello (2009) states that: “religion implies devotion to some principles with strict fidelity, consciousness, pious affection, or attachment”. In line with the foregoing, Alanamu, Muhammed and Adeoye (2006), Egwu (2001), Hynes (1996), and Ejumudu (2009), observe that religion can be explained from the material and spiritual perspectives. While the material aspect refers to interests in earthly outcomes, the spiritual

aspect refers to the ideas of expectations beyond the spheres of this world. The spiritual is usually considered to be more important than the material, because, satisfaction of the spiritual aspect is what manifests in the expected benefits of the material.

With all these in view, religion can be said to have an evidently ultimate control over the human person in terms of what is thought or acted out in the daily life of the individual. Thus, it has the potential of bringing about acceptable and deviant behaviours from people, if not properly managed by the individual, group, or society. Religion as applied herein, therefore, implies a movement. It is any movement in which members consider themselves as a distinct group of people with similar interests, and whose interests should be of optimum priority in every situation, with members of the group considering their beliefs, norms and practices as the right model in determining their actions, irrespective of what others feel. This is the understanding with which this paper is approached.

Conceptualising Religious Practices

Religious practices, in this context, refer to all activities, which are carried out in line with recommendations from religious authorities or sources of religious authorities to uphold religious beliefs, especially in attempts to satisfy particular deities or associated interests persons or groups. Religious practices include those particularly habitual doings or actions, which can be said to be usual or customary actions of performance or behaviour, within the confines of specific religious bodies. They constitute real acts as opposed to profession, theory, or knowledge, which are mostly abstract. These practices range from such religious worship acts like singing to clapping, dancing, conversations with individuals and/or groups in private or public settings, open air announcements and crusades, to imposition of curfews on people in particular places, just to mention but a few.

These actions can be said to be guarded or controlled where there exists a form or some forms of regulation(s), which is/are meant to help control and possibly prevent the extreme limits or excesses of such actions, especially in relation to their possible adverse effects on any component of the society. Contrarily, religious practices can be said to be unguarded when they are not regulated, in specific terms, per se. In such a case, even though they are not taboos to the society, they do not have particular regulations on how they should be carried out or the extent to which they should be applied, when, and how, in relation to

preventing the generation of ill-feelings and possible reactions from those who might be hurt or harmed in the process. The absence of this kind of regulation is what makes them to be regarded as “unguarded” in this paper. These acts can really be offensive and have the attributes of indirect violence. Sometimes, too, they go with direct violence from the offended people against the perceived offenders as will be made evident in the latter sections of this paper. When these situations occur, they can cause reactions from affected persons or groups, as well as counter reactions from the perpetrators of the acts, thereby leading to conflict and crises, which have the potential of endangering lives and property in the society.

Violence and Structural Violence

Johan Galtung, in his 1969 treatise titled “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, extensively discussed the concept of violence from many dimensions. This leading scholar in peace and conflict studies and originator of the concept of structural violence, defined violence as any condition that makes people achieve less than their actual somatic and mental potentials. He further explained that this definition of violence has some limitations, which make it not to be encompassing enough to explain all that violence entails. Accordingly, the foregoing definition merely described a situation of somatic incapacitation or deprivation perpetuated by an actor(s) whose focus is on the achievement of a specifically selfish objective. Denise (2008) added that violence is any form of human action or behaviour (whether emotional, physical, spiritual, or verbal) and institutional, spiritual, or structural framework (in the form of policies) that diminishes the full realisation of any human potential(s). This latter perception of violence aptly applies to the discussions in this paper.

Violence, as defined in the foregoing, becomes structural when it is embedded in the fabric or building block of a society's tenets. When a particular violence is built into the social, economic, and political systems of a group or groups of people, it can be said to be structural. Thus, structural violence exists when the social, economic, and political systems of a group or groups of people contain provisions for acts which are not ordinarily taboos but have the potential of limiting the achievement of any of the psychological, spiritual, emotional, economic, and political achievements of individuals and groups who may not be part of those carrying out the said acts at any point in time (Akpoh, 2021). As observed by Denise (2008), structural violence may be overt, as in the case

of Apartheid in South Africa before 1994, or overt, as in traditions of covertly and unduly awarding privileges to anyone.

How Religion Constitutes a Form of Structural Problem and Violence in Nigeria

A country like Nigeria with numerous religions cannot be peaceful, administrable, and progressive except a condition is created to accommodate all and sundry religions in it. Selecting anyone of the religions in preference to others will definitely create sentiments that can be injurious to the entire society, especially as each religious group poses itself as a movement with its members regarding their beliefs and practices as the ideal. On the other hand, accommodating all the religions without properly laid down principles on the limits of operation of each of the religious groups creates room for chaos as well. The problems of religion in Nigeria are anchored on this second condition of attempting to accommodate all the religions without preparing specific rules to ultimately guard against the excesses of religious activity and activism in the country. It is consequent upon the multi-religious nature of the Nigerian state that the government of the country has continuously adopted the principle of secularity of the country since its independence in 1960. Secularity of the state, as applied herein, does not imply a godless society as some have termed it, but the accommodation of all present religious groups (Onaiyekan, 2010; Muhammed, 2006). This principle was stated in section 10(1) of the 1979 Constitution, as well as in section 10 of the 1999 Constitution to be upheld at all levels of government in the country. For instance, subsections 1-4 of Section 38 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria states thus:

- (1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
- (2) No person attending any place of education shall be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if such instruction, ceremony or observance relates to a religion other than his own, or religion not approved by his parent or guardian.
- (3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented

from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any place of education maintained wholly by that community or denomination.

- (4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person to form, take part in the activity or be a member of a secret society.

The foregoing freedoms constitute what is herein referred to as freedom of worship. Nothing in them provides any form of limitation to the extent to which religious individuals, groups, or community can operate. The provisions endorse open-ended freedoms to religious people, groups, and institutions. Apart from prohibition of the use of direct force to compel individuals to accept or get involved in religious activities and practices that are not approved by them or their guardians, the constitution simply gives absolute freedom to people to manifest and propagate their religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance, without providing for any check for or on religious excesses. This constitutional laxity creates room for extremism of all kinds in religious practices in Nigeria. This is why any complaints about the excesses of any religious person or group in relation to the activities carried out, no matter how harmful, can be and has often been so easily painted in different shades of propaganda that often makes the complainant appear to be intolerant to other religions. So, people of different religious backgrounds and groups have often clashed with each other over such excesses. In reality, the weaving of these seemingly limitless freedoms into the structure of the Nigerian State couple with its proneness to providing rooms for inter-group oppression and limitation of human achievement to constitute a form of structural violence. This is because the ensuing aggressive behaviour and violence develop from the structural configuration of the Nigerian society as embedded in its constitutional provision.

Theoretical Framework: Frustration-aggression Theory

The frustration-aggression theory is a theory of aggression, which was proposed by John Dollard, L. W. Doob, Neal E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and R. R. Sears in 1939, in their book – *Frustration and Aggression*, published in New Haven by Yale University. Other scholars like Roger Barker in 1941 and Leonard Berkowitz in 1969, further developed the theory. Since 1939, this theory has been undergoing some modifications, which have expanded it beyond its original ideas (Gilbert & Bushman, 2017; Whitley & Kite, 2010). While the earliest and the 1941 versions of the theory were highly criticised, its

1989 version, proffered by Leonard Berkowitz, has been preferred by many scholars as the theoretical foundation for explaining phenomena of aggression in modern research endeavours.

According to the theory, frustration (which is defined as the situation that emerges when circumstances interfere with or limit the possibility of achieving a desired goal that is being pursued by an entity) often leads to aggression (Beck, 2005). This is to say that people and/or groups behave aggressively when they are being blocked, or frustrated against their efforts to attain a goal (Whitley & Kite, 2010). In other words, the frustration-aggression theory holds that frustration usually leads to aggressive behaviour and that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour, therefore, presupposes the existence of frustration. Deductively, then, the incidence of aggressive behaviour is directly proportional to the existence of frustration. Secondly, the frustration-aggression theory holds that frustration will more likely lead to aggression if the resultant aggressive behaviour is perceived to be of help in eliminating the experienced frustration. Moreover, the amount of frustration and subsequent aggression usually depends on how near the individual is to the goal before being blocked (Al-Rodhan, 2008; Beck, 2005). More explicitly, Al-Rodhan (2009) and Al-Rodhan (2008) state that fear-induced or survival-induced pre-emptive aggression is a human reaction to unjust treatments that are perceived to threaten survival. This fear is often the root of the unthinkable brutality and injustice perpetuated by human beings. This aggressive behaviour often has the likelihood of occurring at any time, even in situations that appear to be calm and under control. Where there is injustice, which is perceived as posing threat(s) to the survival of a person or group, fear of possible inability to survive will exist. The occurrence of this type of fear usually leads to pre-emptive aggression, which then causes the affected individual or group to take any action(s) they deem necessary for escaping the threat.

Nayef Al-Rodhan (2008) further argued that human beings have strong tendency towards survival-induced fear and the fear-induced pre-emptive aggression. To Al-Rodhan, it therefore implies that situations of anarchy or near anarchy should be prevented at all costs. This kind of fear and pre-emptive aggression is one of the key factors that may push both the naturally amoral and moral people to behave in immoral ways. Finally, the theory states that although frustration causes aggression, with the frustrated pouring out his or her anger on the cause of the frustration, when the source of the frustration cannot be challenged, maybe because of its not being within reach, being too

powerful to be confronted, or even vague, the frustrated individual might have his or her aggression displaced onto an innocent target. The theory explains the reasons behind the occurrence of riots and revolutions. According to the original explanation of the author, of the theory, both riots and revolutions are caused by poorer and more deprived sections of society who may express their bottled-up frustration and anger through violence (Whitley & Kite, 2010).

Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory to the State of Insecurity in Nigeria

The foregoing theory finds application in this study. The excesses of religious persons and groups often interfere with other persons and groups interests in the society, and so irritate non-members to the offending counterpart, thereby resulting in ill-bearing religious sentiments. Repetition or frequent recurrence of such offensive acts often leads to reactions meant for prevention of further recurrence of the situation. In most cases, such reactions have often brought about some forms of counteractions, especially because of the losses they bring to bear on the initial offenders, with the chain of actions, reactions, and counteractions recurring until crises and violent conflicts evolve. The frustration of the efforts of either the religious extremists or the offended parties to have their interests protected has often led to the resultant and recurrent aggression (non-violent and violent alike).

Methodology

This paper took a purely qualitative analytical approach, which adopted a desk research method, simply sourcing its information from secondary resources including books, newspapers, and Internet publications. To avoid any repetition of errors contained in the secondary data, comparison of information contained in the sources was made.

Some Cases of Aggressive Religious Practices and Violent Conflict Engendered by Nigeria's Structure of Freedom of Worship

Religious Practices that Restrict the Freedom of Non-members

Some traditional religious practices like the *Oro* festival, which is practiced in some Yoruba communities of Nigeria, restrict movement of women in the communities during the festive period. Ideally, in the case of the *Oro*, for the week of celebration, women are not to be seen outdoors from certain hours of the evening until about 7.00 am in the morning. Moreover, for the climaxing

end of that week, no woman is allowed to be seen on the streets or outside closed doors (except in well fenced and secured premises with the gate properly secured to prevent visual access to the streets) from Friday evening to Sunday morning. The condition attached to this rule is that any offender will surely have to die (Saliu, Amali, Fayeye, & Oriola, 2006). This kind of religious practice, which does not constitute a constitutional taboo *per se*, has often been a source of violence and insecurity in Nigeria. Taking the *Oro* case, for instance, it is on record that on July 1, 1999, the traditionalists who were celebrating the *Oro* festival killed a Hausa woman in Sagamu, Ogun State for violating the conditions explained above. This incidence resulted in violent clashes between the Hausa and Yoruba groups in the state, and on July 22 of the same year, there was a reprisal attack on the Yoruba community in Kano, leading to loss of many lives and property (Sampson, 2012).

A variant of the foregoing restriction of movement of non-members to a particular religion is the blocking of thoroughfares by religious groups during religious observances. During religious festivities and some general programmes, some groups are of the habit of blocking thoroughfares, which are not exclusively meant for them. Sometimes, they even react aggressively to any non-member who attempts to pass through the “restricted” route. This act is a form of violence, which is known to cause crises in Nigeria. For instance, from September 7 through 17, 2001, a religious riot broke out between Christians and Moslems in Jos, Plateau State, because, a Moslem group which had blocked a thoroughfare attacked a Christian woman who attempted to cross their barricade. A group counter attack led to the loss of over 300 lives within that period (Sampson, 2012; Saliu, *et al*, 2006).

Interfering and Offensive Modes of Worship

The two most dominant religious groups in Nigeria – Christians and Moslems – often exhibit relatively annoying modes of worship, which are not constitutionally prohibited, but constitute some sorts of violence to other groups of people in the country. The Christians have a notorious tradition of organising open-air mass crusades and revival programmes, while the Moslems have that of frequent call for prayers at different times of the day. In each case, these groups make use of externally mounted loudspeakers, which generate some kinds of noise pollution of various degrees in the society. The worshippers even engage the use of these instruments at night (sometimes throughout the night), in religious rituals commonly known as “night vigils” in

Christendom and Tafsir among the Muslims, especially during the month of Ramadan. The annoyance inherent in this tradition usually couples with the indiscriminate location of Churches, Mosques, and other worship centres like crusade and praying grounds in residential areas to trigger religious conflicts in the country, and would indeed remain a potentially potent trigger of religious violence in the country until it is attended to (Saliu, et al, 2006; Sampson, 2012). A case at hand is the June 8, 2004 violent conflict between the Christians and Moslems in Numan (a town in Adamawa State) over the location of the town's central mosque at a location that is close to the palace of the Paramount Ruler of Bachama; a conflict in which over 17 lives were lost (Sampson, 2012). The annoyances, conflicts, and violence often result from the associated noise pollutions, which deprive the non-members or non-participants of their rest (especially at night), concentration and focus on their life activities during the day, and the perceived unreasonableness of the perpetrators of these acts of violence over which the constitution made no provisions, but indirectly approved.

Use of Disparaging Comments and Dictions during Preaching Exercises

In most cases Christian and Islamic preachers use disparaging or critical comments to refer to or describe non-members and their activities. Each of these religions claim to possess the monopoly of religious. They also claim to have the absolute prerogative to eternity in heaven. The preachers of these religions apply these contemptuous faith-based claims in their public sermons. In some extreme cases, the preachers even sound judgemental and scornful, trying to delegitimise their opponents. With churches and mosques springing up almost everywhere and having access to electronic media, which covers very large areas of the society with the types of messages described above and with little or no censorship of the critical content of this kinds of sermons, some religious fundamentalists have used these media opportunities to cause serious religious disharmony and subsequent violence. Some of these offensive utterances include the use of such words as *Arna* or *Kafîr* (heathen or unbeliever) by the Moslems to refer to Christians and other religious groups, and terrorists or violence-mongers by Christians to refer to Moslems. This attitude of religious intolerance and stigmatisation has remained a potent cause of violence in Nigeria (Sampson, 2012).

Conclusion and Recommendation

Although the foregoing is not an exhaustive list of the cases in which the

structural freedom of worship in Nigeria results in unguarded religious practices and conflict in the country, they obviously serve as evidences that the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has a structural defect in terms of defining the limits of religion. Its provision for freedom of worship without setting the limits for religious behaviours or activities in and for the society is a structural defect that unavoidably breeds some sorts of violence against different categories of persons and groups in the society, without any legal implications against those who seize the opportunity to exhibit violence against their counterparts. Thus, the presence of unguarded religious practices, which cannot be legally faulted, is a form of structural violence because it emanates from the supreme legal document of the Nigerian society. It is for this reason that religion has become a structural problem in Nigeria. To this end, it is, therefore, recommended that the national constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria be reviewed with special emphasis on providing checks on religious excesses so as to limit or even eliminate the structural violence created by the freedom of worship clause.

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GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGING DYNAMICS IN POST- COLONIAL KATSINA CITY, 1960–2015

Samuel Wycliff

Abstract

Through historical methodology cutting across primary and secondary sources, the paper sought to analyse the post-colonial Katsina city by looking at its growth, development and changing dynamics. This is taken from 1960 when Nigeria got her political independence, to the year 2015 which marked the end of sixteen years of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) leadership in the state since 1999 when democracy was finally restored without any military alterations in the country. This period saw to the tremendous urban expansion, demographic changes and infrastructural developments which altogether transformed the pre-colonial and colonial settings of the city. In view of the foregoing, the major argument of this paper is that, the infrastructural developments that consequently led to the changes experienced in areas of works and housing, layouts, electricity, water supply, transportation and road networking, educational sector, health, modern markets, hotel/hospitality industry, centres of worship, as well as the emergence of small scale and medium enterprises, by the indigenes and non-indigenes residing in the city, have indeed changed the face of the city. The paper undoubtedly concluded that, push and pull factors of migration and social dependency have indeed contributed immensely to the Katsina city continuity and changes as well as its cosmopolitan nature and infrastructural development.

Samuel Wycliff Department of History Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria-Nigeria

Key Words: Katsina, City, Growth, Development, Post-Colonial

Introduction

Katsina city is located some 172 Kilometres northwest of Kano town and 260 Kilometres east of the city of Sokoto. It roughly lies between an upland area located on Latitude $12^{\circ} 5'$ and $13^{\circ} 22'$ North, Longitude $7^{\circ} 33'$ and $9^{\circ} 22'$ East in the extreme north of Nigeria along Nigeria-Niger border. The city and its immediate environs form the present study area, which is bordered by the Katsina State Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Kaita to the North (North-East), Jibia and Batsari to the North-West, Batagarawa and Rimi to the South and then Mani to the East. Hence, the growth, development and changing dynamics of Katsina city over the years, however, attracted a study on the factors that seemed to bring continuity and change. Besides, Katsina city, as it was with the whole of Northern Nigeria and Africa, its urbanization was neither a colonial phenomenon nor exclusively a post-colonial affair. That is to say that urbanization had been an all-time issue in the 21st century with cases of great transformation. In other words, Katsina as a historical Emirate in Northern Nigeria had overtime undergone transformations in various spheres. These transformative strings necessitated re-organization in both the political systems and of course the administrative set-ups. As such, the society in Katsina has indeed experienced landmark changes worth interrogating and documenting. Besides, the realities of the contemporary state system in Nigeria have also catalysed a number of significant developments that impacted on the society and are currently shaping contours of her existence as a strategic geo-political entity amongst the community of states in Nigeria. This paper therefore attempted to explore factors that led to the growth, development and changing dynamics in post-colonial Katsina city from 1960–2015. Besides, considering Katsina as an old Emirate and today being among the 36 states of the Federation, it would be of paramount importance to examine these significant developments that characterised its transformation, how they were carried out and their consequences since 1960. It is hoped that this paper will bridge the gap in literature on various aspects of Katsina city communities and more importantly, impact on policy formulation and implementation.

The Growth and Development of Katsina City

To this end, therefore, for proper understanding of the Growth and Development of Katsina City, the paper has been divided into sub-headings as seen below.

Political and Administrative Developments

Katsina city since the 15th century had been the centre of commerce, trade and Islamic scholarship of the ancient Katsina kingdom, which later became an Emirate in 1804. The grandeur of this city, significantly caused by its strategic location, prepared the ground for its designation as the capital of Katsina, both as a kingdom and an Emirate. Aware of the viability of this structure, it was further retained by the colonial administration as the colonial headquarters for Katsina Province. Continuing in this trend, it was elevated to a Local Government Council in 1976 by the post-independent government. Consequently, following the state restructuring program of the Federal Government of Nigeria which led to the creation of more states and its separation from the old Kaduna state on September 23, 1987. Katsina, maintained its position as the administrative and the economic capital of Katsina state in 1987.

In the areas of politics, post-colonial Katsina city had been a home to two past Head of State and President in persons of Major-General Muhammadu Buharias Military Head of State and Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'adua as a democratically elected President. Other Katsina dignitaries who were at the helm of political affairs in the country included the late General Hassan Usman Katsina, Major-General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, and former Chief Justice of the Federation Alhaji Muhammed Bello, two past Inspectors General of Police in the person of: Alhaji Muhammed Dikko Yusuf and Alhaji Ibrahim Commassie, and pioneer Chairman of the Bureau of Public Enterprises, Alhaji Hamza ZayyadRafindadi amongst others. Katsina is home to some of the best and brightest Nigerian public servants, politicians and military top brass. It became the centre of the State politics being the heart and capital where Katsina Emirate and State Government machineries reside, with decisions made for the present and future of the state as well as the centre of Katsina Federal

constituency. Thus, in response to the growing population and the need for easy administration of the city, Katsina State Government increased the number of wards from 23 in 1949 to 187 in 1998. This showed that the population increase had immensely added to post-colonial Katsina city urban developments. More so, appointment or deposition of Village or District Heads had to be approved by the Emir of Katsina who resides in the city of Katsina. Besides, installation of new Emirs, Swearing-in of newly elected State Governors and members of State House of Assembly in addition to the appointment of Commissioners for the various Government Ministries were all done in Katsina city. It is worthy of note that, before any Local Government Chairman, Counsellor, Governor, members of State and National Assembly (Senate and the House of Representatives) can win an election, he/she must seek the votes of Katsina city residence (indigene and non-indigenes) and its environs or urban peripheries. A good example was in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011 Governorship and Presidential elections where People's Democratic Party (PDP) sought for votes and won elections in the city. This strategy brought in Late Alhaji Umary Musa Yar'adua as Governor (1999–2007), President of Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007–2010), and Barr. Ibrahim Shehu Shema (2007–2015) all under the PDP. This was also followed by the All Progressive Congress (APC) in 2015 which did similarly and won elections of the aforementioned positions Rt. Hon. Aminu Bello Masari elected as Governor and Rtd. General Muhammadu Buhari became the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015–date).

More so, festivities like *Eid-el-Kabir* (celebrated at the end of *Ramadan* fastings) and *Eid-el-Kabir* (celebrated after slaughtering of rams) are all celebrated in Katsina city. This has made people of different categories from urban peripheries including foreign tourists to come into Katsina city. This provided a means of interaction between the people of the city and those outside it. Through such political, religious and cultural activities, political understanding, economic advancement as well as psychological satisfaction were derived. This made them make friends, exchange greetings, offer presents, and sometimes contract marriages, while many learned new ideas about Katsina city.

This showed that, there was a strong link in the relationship between Katsina

city and urban peripheries in the State which also boosted the post-colonial city's continuity and changes. In other words, Katsina as a capital city, established linkages with the surrounding areas to obtain certain consumables from the rural populace. The social surrounding areas equally benefitted from the social amenities available in the city via sending their children to schools, attending hospitals and clinics, amongst others.

Another important key factor that added value to the city of which the central aim and objective, being the promotion of the welfare of their members, culture and identity in Katsina State was the emergence of Migrant Communities and Language Associations with their Headquarters in Katsina City. These associations were registered with the Katsina State Ministry of Youth, Sports and Development under Youth Clubs/Associations Edit of 1986 and lots more. Such associations included among others, the Igbo Community Associations (ICA), Indigenous Association of Nigerians Resident in Katsina State (AIN), a body representing all Nigerians who are not *Katsinawa* (Katsina indigenes), Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) – for all Christians (indigenes and non-indigenes) in the State, Nigeria Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) for all Muslims in the state. These associations acted as instruments which were used to promote peace and progress in Katsina City and the State in general. They were also used as machineries in mobilizing votes to win elections in return for appointments and the execution of projects promised them by politicians.

Centres of Worships

In the area of religion, the city experienced tremendous increase in the number of centres of worship, especially mosques and churches resulting from Christian and Muslim missionary activities, transfers of civil and public servants from other states in the federation to the state especially from 1987 to 2015. It is important to note that before this period, there were only 2 central mosques in the city. The number however rose to more than 15 along with so many smaller Mosques, Islamiyya schools and Islamiyya medicine centres. Katsina Central Mosque, GRA and Lugga Central Mosques. In the case of Churches, there were over 70 built in the city with each having a congregation of not less than 100 to 2000 amongst which were ECWA Hausa, ECCN, St.

John's Anglican Cathedral, St. Martins de-pores Catholic Church and Living Faith Church (Winners Chapel), in addition to the number of mission schools which were established by the churches. Coupled with the rapidly expanding population in the city, there was the development of burial grounds for both Christians and Muslims respectively. Thus the infrastructural designs of the churches and Mosques added to the beauty of Katsina city and its transformation in religious activities compared to what was existed in the pre-colonial and colonial Katsina city.

Educational Development

Education had been the pivot of civilization, development or progress of any given society, be it religious, political, economic, or technological. So, education was one of the key areas that led to the significant transformation of Katsina city owing to the support it received from both the Federal and State government. For example, from 1960 to 1976, the number of Government Primary Schools in Katsina city rose from 8 to 28 and from 1987 to 2015 rose to over 50 with so many old ones being expanded/converted into storey buildings. At the same time, were being constructed new ones in order to accommodate the rising population of pupils in schools and to ensure a conducive atmosphere for teaching and learning. The enrolment of primary school pupils rose from 8,210 in 1974 to 12,283 in 1980 while in 2004 it was 3,244 as against 53,269 in 2007.

Furthermore, in a bid to boost education in Katsina city and the state as a whole, the administrations of Late Umaru Musa Ya'adua (1999–2007) and Barr. Ibrahim Shehu Shema (2007–2015) paid the fees for Common Entrance Examinations of primary school pupils, Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE) for junior secondary students and then complete registration fees for Senior Secondary School Certificate Examinations (SSCE) students irrespective of whether the pupils and students were indigenes of Katsina or not, as long as they were in public schools. This development attracted many migrant communities and *Katsinawa* residing in rural, semi-urban and urban places to migrate and settle in the city as well as towards the actualization of Education For All (EFA) and reduction of illiteracy and ignorance in Katsina.

Note also that, the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Individuals or group of individuals were not left behind in the educational advancement and infrastructural development of the city. For instance, the Islamic University (now renamed Al-Qalam University Katsina) being the first private Islamic university was established a few kilometres outside the city in 2005. Coupled with that also, was the establishment of private primary and secondary schools in the city owned by individuals, religious bodies and firms of which research showed that between 1980 to 2011 there were over 105 of such schools and in the year 2015 the number had risen to over 130 comprising both primary and secondary schools with each of these schools having an enrolment of not less than 100 to 2,000 for primary and then 200 to 3,000 for secondary. As for the teachers, there was a minimum of 9 to 15 for primary as against that of the public schools which had 30 to 60, while secondary 12 to 20 as against 25 to 80 for public secondary schools in the city. Therefore, the location of these institutions of learning in Katsina, apart from beautifying the city with modern and architectural designed buildings, provided more employment opportunities for teachers and non-teaching staff. There was also an increase in the enrolment of pupils and students in the schools. This added to the urban set up of the city as people of different ethnic groups, languages or religious affiliations became closely related to each other thereby promoting cross-cultural relationships and common ties among human beings of different backgrounds and races.

Health Care Services

Another aspect in the growth, development and changing dynamics of post-colonial Katsina city was health which occupied an important position in the development of any given society. Hence, after the creation of Katsina as a LGA and later, Capital City of the State, there was a high demand for medical health care facilities, infrastructure and services. This emanated from the fact that, there was an influx of fortune seekers from within and outside the state into the Katsina city. These led to the overstretching of the existing medical facilities, infrastructures and services. To this end therefore, in the process of transforming the city, the expansion and renovation of old hospitals, and clinics as well as constructions of quite a number of new ones had to be immediately

embarked upon by the state Government. For instance, in 1992 about N 100 million naira was spent in the construction of Katsina State Specialist Hospital in the State Capital and then in 1988 four (4) maternal and health care clinics were constructed within the four gates of the city (Kofar Kaura, Sauri, Marusa and Guga) addition to the establishment of Katsina State Health Care Development Agency in 2004 and then *TuraiUmaru Musa Ya'adua* Maternity and Child Hospital. Others were 250-bed space at the Ibrahim Shema Orthopaedic and Speciality Hospital (2015), and then Federal Medical Centre (FMC) (1997) and then renovation of BabbarRuga hospital (2014) which provided prompt care to patients of VVF, Tuberculosis and leprosy diseases. It is the largest centre where VVF treatment, surgery and services were provided in the whole world. The government provided the Katsina Eye Hospital in Gambarawa (Katsina city) with modern equipment and staff and is jointly run with the Tulsi-Chainrai Foundation with very good results. As at now, the hospital has achieved 100% post-surgery restoration of sight. Also, in the same vein, in order to remove the obstacle of lack of access to health care by people that were living in the remote and rural areas, Governor Shema introduced the Mobile Ambulance Scheme. Thirty-four (34) Mobile Ambulances were procured and deployed to all the LGAs with a view to providing health services to Katsina city and rural communities without health facilities.

All was aimed at easing the burden of Katsina city and to place the clinics under its control. Consequently, between 1985 to 2015 government health care centres rose from 8 to more than 15.

Further to this, private clinics such as Okmos Clinic established (1985), Alheri Clinic & Maternity Home (1991) and then K-Dara Specialist Clinic Katsina (2011) sprang up along the major roads in the city. With this development, the number of private health care centres increased i.e. from 1989 to 2000 there were 13 and the number rose to more than 22 between the years 2001 to 2015. Therefore, the increase in the number of these hospitals and clinics had positive impact a on Katsina city especially in providing recruitments opportunities for medical personnel of various specializations, security men and women, administrative officers from within and outside the city, as well as in the provision of intensive health care services as compared to what was hitherto

obtainable in the pre-colonial and colonial Katsina city.

Making of Layouts, Urban Development, Office Accommodations and Housing

Another key tool in the continuity of changes in Katsina city was the making of layout and urban development. For example, the making of urban layouts was among the numerous impacts which the creation of states had on Katsina city. This was because immediately Katsina was created, the growing population in the City pressured the government to begin to identify and provide land for the development of the Katsina city. For instance, as at 1977, the population was 115,220, 144,895 in 1980, 223,644 in the 1991, which increased to 318,132 in year 2006. Then the total population figure stood at a projected figure of 429,400 in 2016, 432,149 in 2017 and 460,375 in 2019. Therefore, the demand of the growing population to be accommodated and the need to establish a new urban centre with a new functional status as a full-fledged state capital was the major cause of the urban changes. Thus, as part of achieving this aim, the Katsina Urban Planning and Development Authority (KUPDA) was established in 1988 with the primary responsibility to plan, manage and control development across the State including Katsina City. Consequently, between 1987 and 2007, the government embarked on the provision of layouts for industrial, commercial and residential purposes which increased the size of the city. In fact, the net result of the establishment of these layouts increased the size of Katsina city area to the extent that by 2010 the total land coverage of the city reached about 500 km² with an expansion outside the walled city in all directions particularly in the eastern and southern parts. The land area had therefore exceeded the bounds of the city where it sprawled over the adjoining LGAs of Katsina, Batsari, Batagarawa, Jibia, and Rimi that are now wholly within the conflicts of the designated planning area of Katsina city especially with reference to the administration of Barr. Ibrahim Shehu Shema (2011–2015) which constructed a 40 kilometers 6-lane Ring Road surrounding Katsina City to further enhance the urban expansion of the city to avoid future urban congestion and unplanned settlements, and also to decongest traffic in the city. Consequently, with that ring road, Katsina city experienced the emergence of new layouts and residential houses, economic activities etc. Besides that, the

construction of roads network in the city led to the development of more urban transports like the Commercial Motorcycle and Tricycle (*KEKE NAPEP*) businesses which became the predominant transportation system for local running. For example, during the administration of Shema, every month, a brand new 18 seater – Toyota Bus and a Coaster Bus were bought. By 2006 to 2007, the number of vehicles rose to 56 and more than 120 vehicles different brands, sizes and specifications by the end of 2015. This boosted the general operations of Katsina State Transport Authority (KTSTA) in its intra-city and inter-city bus services that connected different parts of the Katsina city, its environs, LGAs and other cities such as Kaduna, Kano, Abuja, Jos, Minna, Gombe, Sokoto, and Gusau etc. Nevertheless, the construction of roads also enabled many people in the city to earn a living through investing and participating in commercial transportation while the government on the other hand, generated income through vehicular registration of the plate numbers and driving licenses obtained from the road users. Furthermore, the roads network construction provided linkages to important public buildings and high need/demand for a large number of unskilled labourers who moved into the city though on temporary basis, nevertheless it added to the cosmopolitan nature of the city.

Water and Electricity Supply

Water and electricity supply were other key issues. It is a well-known fact that water is life, a major constituent of all living matter and very essential to human being for the sustenance of life on earth. This is because it is one of the most important raw materials for civilization, since without it man cannot live and industries cannot be functional. Subsequently, it has become an area of priority considered by any meaningful government of Nigeria and the world at large. With the population increase in the city of Katsina and its environs concerted efforts were made by the government to boost water supply. For instance, *Ajiwa* Dam was constructed which supplied 25 million litres per day from 1974 to 1999 and rose to 50 million gallons per day in the year 2000. This showed that the capacity production had doubled to meet up with the teeming population. Besides, the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (RUWASSA) in the city was established in 2003, to assist among other things the eradication of

water born and sanitation related diseases as well as ensuring supply of portable/clean drinking water to the people and at the same time to promote sanitary facilities and hygienic practices. In addition, in order to ease the tension and quantity of water demanded from *Ajiwa* Dam, the government further made provision of solar pumping systems through its urban water supply scheme which was followed by the construction of boreholes at various centres in places like *Dutsin-Safe* Low-cost, *Barhin*, *Makera* Quarters, *Abbatoir*, and *SabuwaUnguwarKofar Kaura* in the city. By the end of 2007, RUWASSA had 30 solar pumping systems and by 2015 the number rose to over 60. This was in addition to the ones which were constructed by individuals and NGOs with a view to supporting water supply in the city. Subsequently, this development reduced the burden of shortage of water supply and at the same time, attracted people to settle in Katsina city since there was adequate water supply instead of buying from *Mai-Garuwa* (water vendors/sellers/hawkers in Gallons or jerricans).

In the area of electricity which is among the basic needs of life and highly essential for successful living as well as viable productivity, bearing in mind the changing dynamics of the city, Katsina State Government developed the idea of enhancing the supply of electricity in the city with a view to improving the quality of lives and services and also to attracting investors to the city. Hence, from 1987 to 2002, Katsina city was divided into Business Units of 36 Service Centres of electricity supply which increased to 880 Business Units and by the year 2012 since the population customers consuming electricity had risen to 52,900 which was almost ten times than in 2015 with the consumption being over 45MW. Hence, then provision of electricity in the city had indeed attracted people who utilized the opportunity by establishing small scale and medium industries which in turn facilitated as well as enhanced its urban expansion of the social and economic development.

Commerce and Industries

Commerce and industries are key requirements in the transformation of any given society in the world and Katsina city was not an exception. Sequel to the establishment of industries by investors which further transformed the city, there were more than 10 from 1978 to 2015, and among were these Katsina

Steel Rolling Mill (1978) which was later sold and renamed Dana Steel Rolling Mill (1978) and Neem Tree Processing Company (2007). Followed by government and commercial financial institutions which were over 25 as at 1987 to 2015 with some having 2 to 3 branches within the city amongst which were the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), First Bank of Nigeria (FBN) Plc, United Bank for Africa (UBA), Union Bank of Nigeria Plc, Federal Mortgage Bank, Unity Bank Plc, Guaranty Trust Bank (GTB) Plc, and Access Bank Plc. Hence, through these financial institutions, the Katsina state government generated from them revenue/taxes. At the same time, these institutions provide credit facilities and soft loans to small scale and medium industries in order to promote their businesses. Subsequently, the activities of the commerce and industries which created employment opportunities to thousands of Nigerians and foreigners in the city equally increased the living standard of the people.

More so, the Department of Small and Medium Scale Industries (2007), National Directorate of Employment (NDE) (1987) and Katsina State Youth Craft Village (2009) under the Vocational Skills Development Programmes created a large extent employment opportunities and new entrepreneurship to about 358 in 1997, 663 in 1998, 548 in 1999, 822 in 2002 and about ten times that number at the end of year 2015. In addition to that, migrant communities particularly the Igbo community, in their own way have also boosted the city through their enterprises such as Bookshops and stationaries, Timber and Building materials, Electrical and Electronics, and Hospitality industries.

Development of Markets was also central to the changing dynamics of the city as it enhanced the development of the city beyond measure. For example, from 1977 there was only one central market but subsequently with population expansion due to the influx of traders from surrounding and neighbouring areas, some subsidiary markets popularly known as road side markets began to emerge amongst others were *Yar'kutungu*, *Fimata*, *Gwangwan*, *Chake/FilinBugu*, and *KasuwaTsaye-tsaye*. Further to this, as part of the Katsina State Government's effort towards boosting social and economic activities within the State Capital, a new Katsina Central Market was commissioned in 1997 which was designed with adequate modern facilities

with a total of 2,754 stores. In addition to that was the construction of an ultra-modern international market beside Natsinta Army Barrack in 2015. In fact, all these markets accommodated traders who specialized in various goods and services ranging from consumables and non- consumables/material items. All these were boost the city's economic activities which generated revenue to the government by the shop owners.

It is of equal importance to note here that, the hospitality industry with units such as hotels, guest houses, or even entertainment parks consisting of multiple facilities had boosted post-colonial Katsina city economy. This being a sector that helped to provide jobs for job seekers, many who charted a career from it. For example, from 1980 to 2015, there were over 20 hotels and Guest-Inn of which the prominent amongst them were Lafiya Place Hotel, Katsina Guest Inn, Fadama View Motel, Al-Bhustan Hotel and then Katsina State Motel. The availability of the hospitality industry in the city further beautified it through the architectural designs of the buildings and made Katsina a tourist centre and also endeared the tourists to the land.

Challenges

Therefore, post-colonial Katsina city during the period under review, had experienced growth and development which was evident in its continuity and changes. But despite that, its expansion and demographic transformation was accompanied with a series of urban problems. First was the increase in the high rate of urban crimes and social vices/insecurity that negatively affected the conditions of the city. For instance, there was a rise in the number of thugs or area boys, political thuggery, social vices such as armed robbery, theft and stealing, kidnappings and assassinations of people which all led to loss of lives and properties especially from 1999 to 2015. These unfortunately became worst between the years 2015 and 2020. This had indeed scared away prospective investors from the city, since without security there will be no business. Secondly, there was the high rate of unemployment, underemployment and poverty that affected all and sundry. Thirdly, there was a great decline in the level of tolerance between *Katsinawa* and migrant communities on one hand and then also people of different faiths on the other hand in the city. This compounded the political and religious conflicts/violence

which were witnessed in 1987, 2000 (Sharia crisis) and 2011 (Post-Presidential election violence). This pushed away a lot of migrant communities from the city in fear of being killed or injured. Even after the conflicts/violence and their return with the expectation to continue their normal life and business activities, they discovered that most of their residential houses and places of businesses were looted sequel to the negative reaction of *Katsinawa* against the progress of migrant communities in the city as compared to theirs. Fourthly, these were also the issues of noise pollution and traffic congestion. This was because, the growth and development of the city led to a large increase in the number of vehicles plying over the major roads that led into the interior and out of the city. Fifthly, there were also the challenges of environmental, desertification, drought and sprawling of unplanned settlements in places like *CikinBirni*, *Saulawa*, *UnguwarMatawalle/Nayelli*, and *KoramNayelli*. Sixthly, inadequate water supply in the city which affected the operations of industries and of developments companies followed by the growing population which were ever increasing and posed a serious challenge in the city. Seventhly, in line with water, was the unavailability of raw materials which were potentials to effective production and cost maximization for investors.

Conclusion

In this paper attempt was made to unravel some of the major factors that were responsible for the growth, development and changing dynamics of Katsina city from 1960–2015. It had been shown that Katsina city had experienced changes and continuity in its transformation as an urban centre from its formation as a Kingdom in the 15th century, its creation as a Local Government Area (LGA) in 1976 and later to state Capital of Katsina State in 1987. This was followed by the push and pull factors of migration such as the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), hospitality and the peaceful nature of Katsina city, its economic opportunities for small scale and medium industries, its cosmopolitan nature which enhanced commercial developments and return to democracy in which the city experienced great transformation under the leadership of the PDP, coupled with the fact that two of its sons emerged as Nigerian Presidents in 2007 and 2015 respectively. Above all, infrastructural projects executed in the capital and environs were keys to its growth and

development since the *most* critical facilities for socio-*economic* and urban transformation of any *society and also* constituted the basic needs of life and essential in upgrading *societies* from their backward position to an advanced and sophisticated level of development. On the basis of all that, the paper recommended that, the government should look into the means of cooperating with migrant communities towards enhancing commercial development and also possibilities of addressing security challenges so that peace, harmony and cleanliness will prevail as icon for attracting investors and also in executing of infrastructural projects that have direct bearing to the needs and aspirations of the generality of the people.

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THE CONCEPTS OF OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY AS A GUIDE IN RECONSTRUCTING A HISTORICAL EVENT FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS AND ORAL EVIDENCE

Attahiru Y. Alkali

Abstract

One of the problems we have in the historical writing is the question of objectivity and writing should be based on solid facts, history enable one to develop a critical mind and appreciate the variety of human behavior and motives and understand politics, economics and society. Documentary sources are written materials that have been put into writing and to be literature. In the absence of other sources, oral tradition becomes one of the sole sources of writing history. History knowledge is not purely intuitive because it is derived from a critical examination of source materials and is checked by further reference to the source. Every history has his own likes, tastes, aptitude and preferences. An element of subjectivity enters at every step in the process of investigation, personal feelings thoughts, Judgements, opinions and this found much in personal essays.

**Attahiru Y. Alkali Department of Public Administration Fati Lami
Abubakar Institute For Legal and Administrative Studies, Minna Niger
State**

Introduction

Man makes history in the process of his conscious activity. The historian on the other hand is concerned with the marshalling out of events in a cadence sequence. However, to be able to marshal out events, the historian requires the capacity to identify sources and interrogate them to ascertain their certainty; in which case the tact of historical methodology comes into play. This paper interrogates the concept of objectivity and subjectivity as they relate to historical reconstruction. It demonstrates practically how historians are often faced with multiple challenges in the task of historical reconstruction given the difficulty to eliminate the subjective element in its entirety. The paper is segmented into various parts with the introduction which is ongoing. Other components of the paper include a conceptual perspective on objectivity and subjectivity as well as a guide for reconstructing historical events which encompasses selection, collaboration, interpretation and analysis of historical facts. There is also a conclusion, drawn from the analysis in the paper

Conceptualization of Terms

Objectivity

Objectivity as philosophical concept is related to reality and truth. The concept has been defined by various scholars with converging point which is anchored on the state or quality of being true outside individual's biases, interpretations, feelings and imaginings. According to Walsh, "Objectivity entails the dissociation of the investigator from the object of investigation so that independent investigators can reach the same conclusion".² This position suggests the ability (in any context) to judge without partially or external influence, which is sometimes used synonymously with neutrality.

The above stand underscores how historical facts should remain undistorted by emotion or personal bias when reconstructing a historical event by a historian or a researcher. Aggarwar reinforces the above definition when he asserts that historical objectivity is "a dispassionate, disinterested and scientific treatment of all events which would be depicted by a historian as if he was a judge pronouncing his verdict in the most impartial way without any fear or favour"³ His conception of objectivity is woven around the idea of value judgement.

Evans also corroborates the argument that;

Objective history... is history that is researched and written within the limits placed on the historical imagination by the facts of history and the sources which reveal them, and bound by the historian's desire to produce a true, fair and adequate account of the subject under consideration.⁴

However, attaining objectivity as constructed in the above definitions appears to be unrealistic. It is argued that the above definitions have raised the criteria for historical reconstruction above those that can be attained. Thus, Olubomohin advises against setting a standard that may not be attainable. He rather advises that, the crucial point should be the extent to which the human factor is either reflected or involved in the result of historical or scientific inquires and not the quest for absolute objectivity which is nearly impossible to attain in history.⁵

Subjectivity

Subjectivity is simple parlance refers to a person's personal perspective or opinion, particular feelings, beliefs and desires. It is also often used casually to refer to unsubstantiated personal opinions, in contrast to knowledge and fact-based beliefs. As a philosophical term, subjectivity is the opposite of objectivity. The term is most commonly used as an explanation to that which influences, informs and biases people's judgements about truth or reality; it is the collection of the perceptions, experiences, expectations, personal or cultural understanding and beliefs specific to a person.⁶ Specifically, subjectivity in history suggests the act where a historian's personal views, perceptions and opinions override facts of history.

Carr has argued that history is ultimately a subjective enterprise simply because the historian will always be limited by his subjective worldview. This would cast reasonable doubt on the potential of historical facts to be neutral or objective. Against this backdrop, Carr suggests that students of history must first study the historian before the historical facts—an important prerequisite considering the dangers posed by the various misuse of history.⁷

The position of Carr on subjectivity of history is based on three factors – the nature of historical events, the selection of historical events and the personality of the author, his motives intentions and temperament. This has been underscored by the fact that the historian works under certain limitations because all the facts or events are not well preserved or stored for him. The source material or evidence that might have contained facts might have been destroyed, or those who recorded the events might not have observed very well or even if they observed, they might have, deliberately omitted to record them. Furthermore, the historian himself is a victim of ideological considerations, political thoughts and commitment, group prejudice, national feelings, patriotic zeal and partisan attitude. Ideological considerations such as theological, philosophical, materialistic or any other intellectual bias might distort his vision. This is to say the historian is never free from his own viewpoint. Therefore, the subjective school of thought has seen no objectivity when historical facts are created.

Guide for Reconstructing Historical Events

In the process of ascertaining reality, the historian must appreciate the possibility that the sources he is dealing with might have been compromised. This may be as a result of fraud, inaccuracy of records or bias. Historians, while reconstructing a historical event must therefore, be careful so as not to become victims subjective history. This is because even at the process of selection of historical facts, some historians might put into consideration their personal interest and become conscious of their selection. Although absolute objectivity might not be obtainable in historical writing as postulated by Carr and his cohorts, it is plausible that at every stage or process of reconstructing a historical event, the historian must be objective. The historian must delink himself from his facts in every stage of historical documentation, ranging from theselection of historical facts; collaboration of historical facts; and interpretation and analysis of historical facts.

Selection of Historical Facts

According to Richard Evans, a historical fact is something that happened in the past, which had left traces in documents which could be used by the historian to

reconstruct it in the present.⁸ Okpeh defines facts of history as past events made by man in the course of his socio-political and economic endeavours.⁹ Indeed, facts about the past in the way they appear cannot give or tell the historian everything he needs to know about the past. In addition to being incomplete, there are always confusions and in most cases inconsistencies. Evans adumbrated that:

Doing historical research is rather like doing a jigsaw puzzle where the pieces are not all present in one box but scattered over the house in several boxes and where once it is put together, a significant number of the pieces are missing. The nature of the resulting picture will depend partly on how many boxes you find, and this of course depends partly on having some idea of where to look, but the picture's contours can also be filled in, even when not all the pieces have been located.¹⁰

Evans further suggests that for a historian to perform the operation of selecting historical facts, he must shed prejudices and pre-occupation and approach the document with open mind. In this way, the historian could escape in reconstructing a subjective history.

As a guide for historical reconstruction, the historian must ensure that he does not place any historical source above the other. Rather, he must ensure that sources (written or oral) are logical and not contradictory. He must ensure collaboration from all source materials to limit biases. Stone explained the relevance of selecting and scrutinizing historical facts when he contended that:

Documents ... we did not call them texts in those days... where written by fallible human beings who made mistakes, asserted false claims, and had their own ideological agenda which guided their compilation; they should therefore be scrutinized with care, taking into account authorial intent, the nature of the document, and the context in which it was written.¹¹

Nonetheless, in selecting and scrutinizing historical facts, a historian must be careful in order not to destroy facts. The selective instinct in the historian is therefore, an important aspect of history writing since it informs his sense of

critical appreciation of the facts. For example, while reconstructing the history of the Nigerian Civil, the number of people killed is given differently by Southern and Northern scholars. Uzoigwe, a southern scholar, claims that over 30,000 Igbo people including military officers that were based in the North were systematically and ethnically cleansed before the war started.¹² During the war proper, Eastern scholars gave various figure of the victims of war. Achebe argued that in 1968, barely one year after the war started, between 1,000 and 2,000 Igbo civilians were killed in Calabar alone, while more than 2,000 Igbo civilian were killed in a massacre when the federal troops entered Aba in that year.¹³ Other reports alleges that during the three years of the war, between 500,000 to 2,000,000 Igbo's died of starvation.¹⁴ The selection of these figures must be handled with care because it is clear that some of these accounts attach their personal sentiments while reporting the death tools of the Igbo's.

Selection of historical facts is relevant in historical reconstruction. Fisher, underlines the importance of this process in the following passage:

To write history or even to read, it is to be endlessly engaged in the process of selection. No part of the job is more different or more important...many are called, but few are consciously chosen, on implicit and rational criteria of factual significance.¹⁵

The point is that the historian's choice of an aspect of the past, the selection of the facts about the past and their interpretation all constitute the process by which the facts of history are created. That is why Barradough, argues that the history we read though based on facts, is strictly speaking not factual at all, but a series of acceptable judgement'.¹⁶ In a similar vein, Blake submitted that 'facts of history do not exist for the historian till he creates them.'¹⁷ What is more, since the historian is a student of change from the stand point of the present, his conclusions cannot amount to certainties for all times, he must write with taste of time and in this case, consciously selection of historical facts.

Collaboration, Interpretation and Analysis of Historical Facts

Apart from selection of historical facts, there are other dimensions for reconstructing historical events. These include – comparing, interpreting and

analyzing historical facts from the available sources. Although all these strategies are not devoid of their challenges, so serious is the problem of source interpretation. This is because, two historians might interpret a source (both from primary and secondary), differently. For example, the Boko-Haram problem in Nigeria is interpreted by some scholars as a religious war. Azumah¹⁸ and Agbibo¹⁹ perceive it as religious war. To other scholars, it is interpreted as having political underpinnings, while to some it is a fight against the corrupt system of administration in Nigeria.

In reconstructing a history of Boko-Haram, the historian must shed sentiments, religious or political and ethnic background in order not to be biased in his analysis and interpretation. This point somewhat casts a negative light on the argument put forward by Collingwood and subsequently elaborated by Carr that 'no document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought...'²⁰ When we read a source, Carr further contends, 'we react in our minds the thought of the person who wrote then'. Nonetheless, this argument does not stop a historian from the interpretation of historical facts. After all, the past is itself filled with facts. These facts must therefore be sifted, interpreted and analyzed for their relevance and value in relation to the prevailing historical knowledge in a neutral manner.

Conclusion

Objectivity is always a problem while reconstructing a historical event. In the process of selection, interpretation, and analysis of historical facts, the historian pays much attention on the kinds of facts he wants to use ignoring most evidences. Sometimes, he goes for facts that best suit his personal background, religious and political affinity. This is where the concept of subjectivity, the historian must delink himself from his sources or facts, and be neutral in his analysis and interpretation of historical facts.

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