



An Assessment of Nigeria's African Policy under President Goodluck Jonathan

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Abstract

Since independence, Nigeria has made Africa claim the first attention in her external relations. Till today, successive governments in Nigeria have remained committed to the policy. This paper examines the African Centre-Piece of the Nigerian State under President Goodluck Jonathan's Administration. The study focuses on how the Jonathan Administration had pursued the African Centre-Piece Policy of the Nigerian state. Data for this work were gathered from primary and secondary sources, while the theoretical framework that guided the work is power realism. The major findings of the work are: Jonathan visited several African countries striving for consensus and unity among each other but numerous claims and challenges, notably the Boko Haram issue that his government faced, had lowered his accomplishment on the foreign scene; unhealthy economic condition of the state incapacitated his efforts at promoting Nigeria's African Policy; The state's poor economic condition under President Jonathan had an adverse effect on his pursuit of Nigeria's African policy. The paper, therefore, recommends that: Nigerian state should pay more attention to numerous domestic issues in order to rebuild its image on the international scene; the obvious lack of interest in international issues displayed by Jonathan's Administration needs to be corrected so that Nigeria's interest in the world and in Africa in particular will bring up the desired gain. The paper concludes that the Nigerian state has a lot of hidden gains to make from the international system, and that can only be realisable if Nigeria is economically vibrant in order to perform its expected role on the continent effectively and also peacefully at home.

Keywords: Nigeria-African Policy, Foreign Policy, President Jonathan, Domestic Factors

Introduction

Since its inception as an independent state, Nigeria has focused on African-centeredness as one of the principles of its foreign policy. Several factors compelled the adoption of the African centre-piece policy in Nigeria. One of these was the hegemonic consideration in which Nigeria believed that she should be a major player on the African Continent as an expression of power and influence level in the continent. Nigeria desired and still desires to be a major event controller in Africa. Her African Centre-Piece Policy expresses the country's concern for her fellow Africans in terms of sharing her wealth with them through her relatively God-endowed resources.



Over the years, Nigeria's foreign policy has distinguished itself in terms of certain strands that have come to characterize its conduct irrespective of the regime in power. One of these has to do with the African centre piece, which came into being under the first republic. Since then, subsequent governments either military or civilian, have found it a desirable block in Nigeria's foreign policy. In view of some scholars, it is the main string that holds Nigeria's foreign policy. To corroborate this, Dr Jaja Wachukwu emphasised that: Nigeria is an African country, and they are independent in all ramification, but neutral in any issue that affect the condition of Africa. Once any Africa nation is affected Nigeria is automatically involved. It is significant to note that, the peace of Africa is the peace of Nigeria (cited in Dede 2012:205) Some factors compelled the adoption of the policy of Africa- centeredness. Nigeria's relative resource profile, her geographical size, and hegemonic desire of Nigeria to be dominant and controller of events in Africa were some of the considerations. With a giddy economy at home, there have been calls on Nigeria to either sack the policy or reduce its preoccupation with it. They argue that it makes no sense for Nigeria to do what some consider as Father Christmas outside while the economy has consistently been underperforming. Not only are Nigerians found in all corners of the globe sometimes engaging in disgraceful acts to make both ends meet, but the apparent failure of the state to reap from its pre-occupation with African issues has fuelled the feeling that it is high time Nigeria withdrew from global visibility.

In the midst of this controversy, the Jonathan's government took over power and ruled for about five years as the executive President of Nigeria. He continued with the African centre-piece of Nigeria, which, which was evident in his mediatory roles in African countries such as Guinea, Mali, Sierra Leone and Niger. However, opinions differ on the actual impact of Jonathan's Administration in the Africa centre piece policy. This has encouraged the writing of this paper which seeks to examine the level of the impact made by the Jonathan Administration in pursuing Nigeria's African Centre-Piece Policy.

The objective of this paper is to find out whether the Jonathan government was able to maintain the Africa as the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy reached the bar of performance in his efforts. Data for this work were sourced through secondary sources which include; Textbooks, Newspapers, Journal articles, speeches made by relevant personalities and agencies, online materials and library materials. The qualitative analysis method was used to evaluate the data gathered. To guide the research, the theory of power realism was settled for. It is considered to be the most appropriate because the whole essence of Nigeria's African Policy has to do with power consideration, even if it is not on all occasions.

The work is divided into five segments: an Overview of Nigeria's African policy prior to Jonathan's Administration; factors for the adoption of the policy; critique of the Nigerian African policy; the coming to power of President Jonathan; achievements of the Nigeria African policy under President Jonathan; failure of the policy under President Jonathan and major factors responsible for the failure of the policy of African centredness under President Jonathan. In view of the above this paper will address the following research questions: i. What were the reasons behind the adoption of the policy? ii. What were the levels of successes achieved by Jonathan administration in the pursuit of the policy? iii. What were the factors that limits his efforts in the pursuit of Nigeria's African policy?



Theoretical Framework

This paper relies on and uses the power realism as the theoretical perspective that underpins it. This theory has a long history, being evident in Thucydide's Peloponnesian War. It was expanded on by Machiavelli in *The Prince*, and others such as Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau followed. The theory was given great dramatic portrayal in Shakespeare Richard III. The assumption of this theory stemmed from the conviction that might is right. The main thrust of the realists is that nation-states are the primary actors in the international system. They all agree that power is central in the affairs of nation-states in their relations with the international system and that without power, no nation-state can be relevant. According to Morgenthau (1972:27), one of the great proponents of power realism, he posited that:

International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power..., whatever the ultimate aims of international politics; power is always the immediate aim. Statesman and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of religious, philosophic economic or social idea. They may hope that this idea will materialize through non-political means such as technical co-operation with other nations or international organizations. But whenever they strive to realize their goals by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power (Morgenthau, 1972:27)

He further explained that international relations can only begin to make sense once the realist orientation is understood. To Morgenthau, there are only three foreign policy courses open to states. They are; (a) Struggle for power (b) increase power and (c) demonstrate power. Nigeria's adoption of the policy of Africa-centeredness was largely premised on the intention to remain a powerhouse among developing states (Sani, 2008:70). She has the desire to swim in line with the direction of international politics, which centres on power realism (Saliu, 2008). The country saw power as a crucial instrument for any nation to be relevant in the international system.

Nigeria's relevance and feasibility in Africa are not by accident. She has assumed the status of the Giant of Africa based on her investment in Africa. For example, Nigeria was able to champion the cause of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone during President Babangida regime due to her economic and military power. Also, Nigeria was able to wield a lot of influence in the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U. now A.U.) because of the perception by other African countries that the country is a powerful one in terms of population, economy, military and so on. Also, the little influence and power that Nigeria was able to wield in the A.U. despite the challenges the regime faced were due to her powerful roles in African Affairs.

Reasons for the Adoption of the Policy of Africa Centeredness

Nigeria's adoption of the policy of African-centeredness was legally premised on the intention to remain a powerhouse among developing states (Sani, 2008). She has the desire to move in the direction of international politics, which centres on power realism (Saliu, 2008).



The country saw power as a crucial instrument for any nation to be relevant in the international system. In fact, without adopting the policy of Africa-centeredness, regional leadership would be difficult to attain, and her foreign policy would have been without substance. Saliu (2008) observed this rightly when he asserted that without the objective of Africa-centeredness, Nigeria's foreign policy would have 'lost its meaning, focus and steam'.

More importantly, Nigeria's population in Africa which is still the highest in Africa prompted her to adopt the policy. Nigeria's population is still the highest in Africa (Saliu, 2016a). Nigeria's population has steadily grown beyond the 150million captured in the 2006 population census, and this is considered a huge resource base which gives a considerable measure of military power to Nigeria and which, in return, serves as a source of benefit to the entire continent (Saliu, 2005). In fact, the country's military strength enables her to contribute meaningfully to various peacekeeping operations both within and outside the continent.

Additionally, Nigeria's resource profile serves as an impetus for her to adopt the African policy. Nigeria is the most naturally endowed country in Africa. She has the resources to dispense on the less endowed African nation when the occasion calls for it. In fact, going by her naturally endowed resources, Nigeria had no option but to accept the continent's leadership (Sani, 1995 cited in Saliu, 2005).

Based on Nigeria's strategic location in Africa and her resources, there had been global pressure coming from international friends of Nigeria to accept the manifest leadership role which nature has bestowed on her. Going by the stupendous natural resources of the country, Nigeria has no rival in Africa (Saliu, 2005). These, among other factors which could not be mentioned here, have greatly influenced the adoption of the policy of Africa-centeredness by Nigeria. Having understood this, the next is to look at the various ways Nigeria has demonstrated this African policy before Jonathan's administration.

A Review of Nigeria's African Policy Prior to President Jonathan's Administration

Nigeria has been a great carrier of African burden, her strategic location in Africa and her providential resource has left her with no choice but to accept the leadership of Africa. Singlehandedly, Nigeria carries Africa's burden even to the detriment of her citizen and of her existence as a nation. Nigeria has contributed enormously to protecting other African countries' interests in several ways. Some of her specific roles include:

Decolonization of the African Continent: The most important effort here was in Nigeria's aggressive commitment to the dismantling of the Apartheid regime in Southern Africa, most especially South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. Huge material and financial support from Nigeria were constantly directed to the liberation movements targeting the hegemony of the colonialist. Nigeria spearheaded the suspension of South Africa from the membership of the Commonwealth in 1963. She nationalized British Petroleum and the Barclays Bank in 1978 and 1979, respectively (Akinterinwa, 2005:114). These roles quickly and clearly identified Nigeria as a frontline state.

Also, Nigeria organised and hosted the first United Nation's Conference against Apartheid in Lagos in 1977 and chaired the U.N. Anti- Apartheid Committee from 1970 up till its dissolution in 1994. Nigeria set up a Southern African Relief Fund (SARF) for general contribution to the liberation struggle; National Action Committee Against Apartheid



(NACAP) was established to disburse relief materials and to facilitate the transfer of Southern African youth. Nigerian youth were taught the evils of apartheid. Nigeria spent \$61 billion during the Soweto uprising. Murtala government gave a sum of \$20,000 to the MPLA government and a further promise of \$100 million to the liberation of Angola, while Alhaji Sheu Shagari donated \$10 million to the freedom of Zimbabwe. (Agbu 2010; Zabadi, 2007) Nigeria remained steadfast and resolute until all of Southern Africa was liberated from colonialism, and our continent became really African.

The Voice of the African Continent: Nigeria has been the spokesman for Africa since the era of apartheid and colonialism (Saliu, 2005). She has also spoken on various issues such as Malaria, H.I.V./AIDs debt forgiveness, and her views have been given reasonable consideration in the world (Saliu, 2005). Notable in this regard was General Obasanjo's government campaign for debt relief in Africa, which was granted to several African countries, Nigeria inclusive. Amazingly, Cameroon was so happy about her own debt relief that the government had to declare a national holiday to celebrate the feat (Saliu, 2012)

The Use of Oil Diplomacy to Assist Needy African Countries: Oil proceeds have played important role in the manifestation of Nigeria's African policy. Nigeria has spread its petrodollars at a subsidized price to many African countries, including Ghana and Kenya (Jega 2010). Based on this oil diplomacy, oil becomes cheaper in some African countries like Chad, Niger, etc. (Aluko1981 cited in Saliu 2005). Oil proceeds have been generously made available to needy African countries (Garba, 1978: cited in Saliu, 2005).

Nigeria and the Test of Atomic Bomb on African Soil: Nigerian African policy has equally manifested in the area of using Africa as a testing ground for Atomic Bombs, and this consequently strained her diplomatic ties with France in 1961 (Akinterinwa, 2005). The French decided to experiment their nuclear test in the Sahara Desert in June 1957, but Nigeria stood against it considering the health implication on the people of Africa. No other African country had done this except Nigeria (Osuntokun, 2013). Ghana though protested against it but could not go as far as severing her diplomatic ties with France (Akinterinwa, 2005)

Nigeria and International Organisations: Nigeria's ceaseless efforts towards making Africa relevance in the international forum has led to the formation of international organisations such as O.A.U. in 1963 and later A.U. in 2000, ECOWAS in 1975, A.E.C. in 1991 and NEPAD in 2002. Since their formation, Nigeria has remained the major financier of the Organisations. Nigeria was the main driver behind the creation of NEPAD. Landsberg (2008:211) concluded that the establishment of NEPAD would not have been possible if Nigeria and South Africa had not intervened. Nigeria made available for these African countries a trust fund in the African Development Bank for poorer African countries with little or no interest.

Calderisi, in his own view, observed that Nigeria is to some of these small African states just as the U.S. was to Britain in the immediate post-first world war years (cited in Tyoden, 2012). The ECOWAS Secretariat, which was moved to Abuja, and the regular payment of the organisation's staff salaries, as demonstrated by General Abdul Salami in 1998, was made possible through Nigeria resources (Saliu, 2005).



Peacekeeping and peace-building roles: Nigeria feature strongly in Peacekeeping and peace-building roles based on one of the objectives of the African Union which is promoting the peace and security of African states (Tyoden 2012) and to further demonstrating Nigeria's commitment to Africa's Peace, Nigeria joined the peace keeping operations of the U.N. (Musa,2010). She started by participating in the Congo peacekeeping mission (1960-1964), a contribution which makes Nigeria the fourth largest troop-contributing nation in the world (Musa, 2010).

Since then, Nigeria's peacekeepers have been in all OAU/AU-sanctioned peacekeeping operations. Today, "Nigeria has participated in more than fifty Per cent aside other bilateral, sub-regional and continental peace keeping operations in Africa" (Musa,2010). Nigeria's commitment to peace and security promotion in Africa is regarded as her heaviest leadership role in Africa (Tyoden, 2012:264). On this, (Zabadi 2008) added that Nigeria is far above any other African countries regarding world peace keeping.

Critiques of the Policy

Nigeria's relentless role in Africa is not without criticism. Nigeria, in the course of carrying the African burden, has been "condemned, commended and sometimes unsung" (Saliu 2005). Despite Nigeria's great roles in demonstrating her love for Africa, the country has not been duly appreciated by other African countries. This opens the policy to a series of criticisms.

One of the criticisms is that the policy lacks reciprocity. According to Akinyemi, former Nigeria's Foreign Affairs minister, Nigeria's support had been taken for granted by other African states simply because Nigeria proclaimed Africa as the centrepiece of her foreign policy (cited in Aribisala, 2012). As a result, she receives little reciprocal benefits for its support of African causes (Aribisala, 2012).

Nigeria's African policy is equally criticised based on her inability to define what constitute her national interest clearly. Nigeria is still playing an active role in the A.U., NEPAD and APRM, but she has not been able to define her real national interest as regards African policy (Akinterinwa, 2014). The moment Nigeria finishes her intervention in a country, she leaves without considering any interest (Saliu, 201). A clear example of this was the Nigeria's involvement in Sierra Leone. According to Jega (2010), "When peace returned to Sierra Leone, other countries moved in to reap the dividend of a US\$10billion reconstruction programme while Nigeria simply packed her baggage's and left".

The policy is equally criticised based on her poor domestic economy. Many Nigerian citizens do not support the continuation of the policy due to the negative effect of the poor domestic economy on them. Economically, living standards have become unbearable for Nigerians at home and abroad (Saliu, 2016). Thus, there is a widespread feeling that Nigeria should reduce her level of international involvement and focus on the welfare of citizens (Saliu, 2016b)

However, the above views notwithstanding, successive regimes in Nigeria have found the policy of African centredness of the Nigerian state as a means of demonstrating the "giantism" of Nigeria. This position could be buttressed by the expression of Akinterinwa when he pointed out that Nigeria's interest in Africa was beyond a healthy economy. Still, a kind of sacrifice and burden sharing in the spirit of African brotherhood (Akinterinwa, 2000). President Jonathan's regime in this regard is not an exception. The next concern is to look at



the emergence of President Jonathan and his various achievements in the pursuit of Nigeria's African policy.

The Emergence of President Goodluck Jonathan as President of Nigeria

Goodluck Jonathan, born 20th November 1957, was the 4th civilian President of Nigeria, 2010 - 2015. Goodluck Jonathan was a gentleman from Bayelsa state and a minority group in the country. His journey to political power began as a running mate of Diepreye Alameieseigha in the Bayelsa state gubernatorial election. As Deputy Governor, much was not heard of him. As luck would work for him, Alameieseigha had a fallout with President Obasanjo, and he was caught by the web of the EFCC (Nwakwo, 2013), and he was charged for money laundering in the United Kingdom. Thus, Alameieseigha was impeached, and Jonathan was sworn in as the governor of Bayelsa state on 9th December 2005, in accordance with the law of succession to serve for the remainder of the term. People were expecting that he would contest for his own term of the governorship, but Obasanjo picked him as the running mate to the sickly Umaru Yar'adua upon his failed third term Agenda (Nwakwo, 2013).

The Nigerian senate consequently transferred presidential powers to Vice President Goodluck Jonathan on 9th February, 2010 and declared him as Acting President of Nigeria because of President Yar'adua's protracted medical leave in Saudi Arabia (Ishowo, 2015: 74). President Goodluck Jonathan was eventually sworn in as the President of Nigeria on 6th of May 2010 upon the death of President Yar'adua on 5th of May the same year as the 4th Executive President of Nigeria. President Jonathan presented himself as a candidate for the 2011 election, which he won and was sworn in for another four-year term on 29th of May, 2011. From 2011 to 2015, he remained the President of Nigeria until another election was conducted in 2015 and he lost to President Muhammadu Buhari which he accepted in good faith.

However, between 2010 and 2015, President Goodluck Jonathan's Administration went through a turbulent period of domestic crisis and insecurity. The most worrisome of them is the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northern part of the country. Despite the turbulent period his administration went through, President Jonathan consolidated the past leaders' efforts to promote the Nigerian African policy. To what extent he was able to achieve this is our concern in this work.

The Achievements of the African Policy under President Jonathan

Nigeria's commitment to African Centred Piece Policy and her leadership role in international organisation has allowed her to influence events among African countries. It was equally based on these roles that Nigeria is receiving support over her bid in the proposed U.N. Security Council seat. President Jonathan, realising the power and influence of the country in her commitment to Africa-centred piece policy, did all he could to promote the policy. Many would agree that the Jonathan Administration witnessed serious internal crisis and a decline of fortune, yet the President did not allow these to hinder Nigeria's role because he did not want Nigeria to lose its prime place as the giant of Africa. Instead, Nigeria continued with these roles though with some challenges, especially the peacekeeping roles, even to the detriment of her citizen welfare. This could be seen in her various peacekeeping roles in countries like Mali, Sierra Leone, Dafur, Cote d'Ivoire, etc.



President Jonathan in his own capacity though with challenges tried to return Nigeria back to the international scene and tried to prove to the world that Nigeria is still the Giant of Africa despite the internal security challenge and the domestic problems that Nigeria was going through then. President Goodluck Jonathan's efforts in defending and promoting Nigeria's African Policy have been costly financially, materially and in terms of human resources, especially in the area of conflict management on the African continent and peacekeeping process.

First, Nigeria expended a lot of resources on the Malian civil war and the eventual restoration of peace in the country. Nigeria under President Jonathan spent nothing less than \$34million for the deployment of 1200 troops and logistics support to restore peace in Mali (Adetayo 2013:12). In his speech, President Jonathan said:

Nigeria has commenced the deployment of 900 combatant soldiers and 300 air force personnels to Mali as part of AFISMA. Nigeria has so far provided about \$32million and \$2million has been spent on relief and humanitarian materials prior to the \$32million.

Apart from the soldiers, 140 Nigerian Police were equally deployed to Mali to support the ECOWAS and the African Union led peace project in Mali (Tsokar, 2013). This act drew different views from different quarters of the country. Some questioned Nigeria's interest in Mali, while some shared concern for the cost of Nigeria's previous engagements in wars like Liberia, Sierra Leone and so on in the 90s. Despite all these arguments, President Jonathan used the opportunity to strengthen Nigeria's African Policy, and the relative peace restored in Mali was a meaningful success to the Jonathan Administration.

Nigeria under President Jonathan also intervened in the peacekeeping process in Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire apart from the Mali intervention. Nigeria, under the umbrella of ECOWAS, of which President Jonathan was the head, strove hard to stabilize the situation in Cote d'Ivoire. This shows a mark of commitment to peace in the sub-region (Deru, 2011). When the situation in Cote d'Ivoire was getting out of hand, that is, when President Laurent Gbagbo refused to relinquish office to the elected President, Alassane Quattara, Nigeria and France sponsored the global resolution to oust him (Akande, 2011). The eventual restoration of Alassane Quattara was equally a success of the Jonathan's Administration.

Nigeria equally participated in the Sudan crisis. Nigeria not only played a key role in mediating the Darfur crisis but also donated the bulk of her troops to the AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping in Darfur. Nigeria, under President Jonathan, played an outstanding role in supporting Southern Sudan towards achieving independence. Nigeria under President Jonathan was appointed as both the special representatives of U.N. secretary –General on Darfur and the Force Commander (Saliu, 2016b:278). This shows her commitment to the peace process in Darfur.

However, Nigeria did not achieve all these without a price. For example, according to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, 7 peacekeepers were killed in Cote d'Ivoire (Ki moon, 2012). He further lamented in his speech that “these soldiers have died in the service of peace and that other peacekeepers remained in danger”. Despite all these, Nigeria U.N. peacekeeper



remained in Ivory Coast up till the restoration of Alassane Quattara (Nigerian Tribune, 2012:7). This is a demonstration of big brother support to restore peace in the region and also a confirmation that Nigeria is a regional power.

On the part of Sierra Leone, Nigeria's role in the development of peace and stability of Sierra Leone was commended. The Sierra Leonean ambassador to Nigeria, MR. Macaulay, while appreciating Nigeria's effort in Sierra Leone, said that Nigeria is a major stakeholder in Sierra Leone's development and stability and that Nigeria made a great impact towards halting the war in Sierra Leone. To this, he promised that Sierra Leone will partner with the Federal Government to tackle her security challenges (Macaulay, 2013). All the above indicates that Nigeria has become a point of reference in solving problems in some part of African countries at the international realm.

Apart from involvement in peacekeeping operations, Nigeria, under President Jonathan, was actively involved in the politics of international organisations such as the Common Wealth, the U.N. and the African Union. President Jonathan, through a mix of diplomacy, was able to secure the U.N. non-permanent Security Council seat in 2013 for the fifth time and with overwhelming support (Saliu, 2015). This was a remarkable achievement because it was won without resistance, unlike other previous attempts which were not without stiff resistance from some West African countries. Nigeria was also able to win the chair of A.U.'s Commissioner for political affairs in person of Hajia Laraba Abdullahi after three failed attempts (Saliu, 2016b).

President Jonathan, in his efforts to promote Nigeria's Africa policy, also promotes the Good Neighbourliness policy. He used regional approaches to manage to some extent, the insecurity caused by Boko Haram in the country. He was able to sensitise and capitalise on global support to gain the assistance of twenty countries in 2014 to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency in the country particularly to recover the over two hundred abducted Chibok girls by the Insurgents (Saliu, 2015). Although, they were not recovered then, the effort at getting neighbouring countries to rally round him was an achievement.

Furthermore, apart from the policy of seeking elective positions in some of the international organisations, Nigeria under President Jonathan discharged her financial obligations to these international organisations. Till today she still remains a major financier of the A.U., ECOWAS, Chad Basic Commission and other international organisations (Saliu, 2015a:18). No wonder she is elected to head some of them. Nigeria's financial commitment to these International Organisations has earned her the recognition of being the first country to call to resolve Africa's conflict.

Indeed, going by all these efforts, one can say that Nigeria's foreign policy, particularly Nigeria's African policy, had been really promoted. Some scholars have even concluded that the U.S. criticism of the country on peace and security apart, a more important outcome of his foreign policy was his ability to provide leadership for Africa in African and global affairs (Ojo, 2014:384). Based on these efforts, the President was accorded recognition as one of the 100 most influential leaders in the world in 2012 (Time International Magazines cited in Nwakwo, 2013:218). However, there are some strategies put in place by President Jonathan to achieve the above achievements. Some of these will be explained below.



President Jonathan's Strategies to Achieve the Objectives of African Policy

Every successful policy is a function of a good strategy. President Jonathan, in his bid to record great achievement in his Nigerian African Policy, embarked on a series of strategies which greatly contributed to the recorded achievement. Some of the Strategies, as highlighted by Saliu, include granting of loans, technical assistance, joint ventures and being a spoke-person for Africa at international fora (Saliu, 2016a). Others include: troop's contribution to peace keeping operations in the region and in the U.N., shuttle diplomacy, economic diplomacy and so on. Some of these strategies related to the Nigerian African policy are:

Troops contribution for peace keeping operations: Nigeria, under President Jonathan, contributed troops to resolve conflict in various parts of the world. Nigeria contributed troops to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Sudan, and Darfur, among others, due to her peacekeeping operations. Nigeria was recognised internationally as one of the leading nations in peacekeeping operations. For example, Nigeria was ranked fifth globally and second in Africa in peacekeeping operations (cited in Saliu 2016a). In 2013, Nigeria had over 6,020 troops serving in various U.N. peacekeeping operations (Ashiru, 2013).

Promotion and consolidation of democracy: Another strategy employed by President Jonathan was the country's support for the promotion and consolidation of democracy. In partnership with the A.U., Nigeria made strenuous efforts to lead the process of entrenching democracy in Africa. In furtherance of this hallowed principle, Nigeria has provided material and other forms of support to the democratic electoral processes in Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Niger and other African countries. (Ashiru, 2013). Nigeria spread her crusade for democracy in Sierra Leone, Liberia and other countries in Africa through the establishment of a powerful network of electoral managers to share experiences on election management across the sub-region (Saliu, 2016b).

Shuttle diplomacy: Another strategy adopted that accounted for the achievement of Nigeria's African policy was shuttle diplomacy. As a testimony to Nigeria's strategic importance in the comity of nations, President Jonathan has undertaken several trips to many countries abroad, where he was received very warmly by his hosts and the residents of the Nigerian community in those countries. One of the major challenges facing Nigeria's foreign policy is the plight of Nigerians abroad. As at now, there are about 9,945 Nigerians in various prisons all over the world. A regional seminar was convened in this regard, and it was highly welcomed by Nigerians (Ashiru, 2013). With shuttle diplomacy, President Jonathan was able to improve the level of interaction between Nigeria and other African countries, and this erased the complaint during the Yar'adua administration that the country was missing on the global scene (Saliu, 2016b: 279).

Mediatory roles: President Jonathan was actively involved in West African political affairs in other to promote the external image of the country. As the Chair of ECOWAS, he used the position to mediate in the conflict areas in the sub-region (Saliu, 2016). Notable in this regard were his mediatory roles in Guinea Bissau and Equatorial Guinea. To understand this better, (Mailafia, 2010) observed that the President himself mediated the Guinea Bissau crisis.



Failures of the African Policy under President Jonathan

As much as President Jonathan did to promote Nigerian African Policy, one still noticed some failures in the course of carrying out her responsibilities as the giant of Africa. These failures have, however beclouded, if not eroded, the achievements of President Jonathan on the Nigerian African policy. Nigeria's participation in various peacekeeping processes of the U.N. under President Jonathan was not without disappointments. In most of these interventions, it is either that Nigeria played second fiddle or a demonstration of ineffective coordination of its military.

Nigeria's role in Mali was below expectations. Given Nigeria's close border with Mali, one would have expected Nigeria's earlier intervention in Mali before any other country, but France got there before her. Nigeria did not play a unilateral role in Mali as she did in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria's inability to get to Mali before France put her in a second fiddle despite her 1200 peacekeepers while France took a pioneering role. The worse of the disappointment in Mali was the demonstration of untidy engagement and ineffective coordination of its military (Saliu, 2016b). Little wonder Nigeria was by-passed by the U.N. when it replaced the Nigerian General with a Rwandan General after the U.N. assumed responsibility for the mission (Saliu, 2015b:). This is a failure on her path, the Giant of Africa is playing a second fiddle in her own immediate region.

Nigeria's involvement in Zimbabwe did not go without its disappointment. In Zimbabwe, Nigeria equally played second fiddle. South Africa played a more significant role in the Zimbabwean electoral crisis than Nigeria (cited in Saliu, 2016b:147). Also, Nigeria's roles in Darfur and Cote d'Ivoire were equally with their criticism. According to the former defence minister, Bello Muhammed, Nigeria had committed a lot of efforts and men to UNAMID.... But the disappointment is that it was not effective (The Guardian, 2012). Nigeria has equally failed in her African policy due to her absence to intervene in some African crisis ridden countries. According to Adebajo (cited in Saliu, 2016c:107), the failure of Nigeria to honour her international responsibilities is a failure of her African policy.

Nigerian African policy failed under President Jonathan because of her inability to seize the moments on some global issues by being at the forefront of events as she used to be (Saliu, 2016b:149). Somalia, Rwanda and Central African Republic are examples of countries in which Nigeria could not register her presence through military deployment. Nigeria could not rescue the situation in these countries when the U.N. was not forthcoming in removing their calamities (Saliu, 2016b).

Nigeria's decline in power and influence in A.U. and in ECOWAS was another demonstration of the failure of the regime. Nigeria under President Jonathan lost his influence when he attempted to make Dr Jean Pong of Gabon to have a second term as the chair of A.U.'S commission. Instead, Madame Dlamini-Zuma of South Africa was voted for. Despite being the main financier of the organisation, Nigeria still finds it difficult to enforce discipline (Saliu, 2015:21). Nigeria's endorsement by ECOWAS members to serve for the fifth time at the U.N. Security Council was still challenged by Senegal and Gambia despite the overwhelming support (Saliu 2016a). This poses a challenge to her regional leadership. In this line, David Mark wondered why other African countries hate Nigeria, despite her goodwill towards them (cited in Saliu, 2016a).



Nigeria, despite being a major contributor to the A.U. could not get the support of West African countries on issues. Unlike before, when Nigeria would sneeze, and other African countries would catch a cold, Nigeria roars today and no West African Country is scampering for safety (Saliu, 2015). Nigeria's inability to rally initial support for an African position on Libya is a show of her decline in influence in Africa. Also, Nigeria had to seek France and Britain's intervention before Cameroon and Chad agreed to assist her in tackling the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria (Saliu, 2015).

Today, Nigeria is being presented as a powerhouse in West Africa, yet, most of the West African countries are working against Nigeria's interest on many occasions. The victory of Madame Dlamini-Zuma of South Africa against Nigeria's preferred option was not without the West African support to South Africa. President Jonathan equally realised this when he said in his speech to the ECOWAS Head of States in Abuja that Nigeria's position as chair of A.U.'s commission did not find favour even among her West African neighbours (cited in Saliu, 2016b).

Another show of disappointment in the conduct of Nigerian African policy during President Jonathan was the failure in its citizen diplomacy. Despite Jonathan's administration's effort to promote citizen welfare abroad, Nigerians still suffer different forms of maltreatment outside the country. America can go to war when the rights of its citizen are trampled upon on foreign land (Saliu, 2010). The contrary is the case in Nigeria. In line with this, Agbu (2010 cited in Saliu, 2016) lamented on the way Nigerians are maltreated abroad when he said, "many Nigerians have been brutalised, harassed and even killed in the name of repatriated them back to Nigeria." The implication here is that, for the citizens of the acclaimed giant of Africa to be treated with contempt by other 'smaller' African countries, it means something is wrong with the claim.

The challenge posed by South Africa to Nigeria's leadership status was another sign of the failure of Nigeria's African policy under President Jonathan. Nigeria has not been able to tame South Africa to her side (Saliu, 2015b). South Africa has always been on the opposing side to Nigeria on international issues. South Africa was not only on the opposing side with Nigeria in the Ivorian crisis; she stationed her warships on the West African Coast during the Ivorian crisis. She played a pioneering role in the Zimbabwean crisis. She manoeuvred her way into making her position in Libya remain A.U.'s position until Gadaffi was murdered in Libya (Saliu, 2013). The inability of Nigeria to bring South Africa, a country she had spent heavily on during her apartheid days, to her side is a mark of failure of her African policy.

To crown it, it is pertinent here to caption Shehu Sanni's expression on President Jonathan's failure on Nigerian African policy. According to him,

Under Jonathan, our leadership position in the continent slipped away..... Nigeria lost its teeth in the African Union (A.U.). Our President was absent at the 50th anniversary of the A.U. and in the continental effort to find peace in the Central African Republic, Sudan and Congo.... We betrayed the people of Palestine by abstaining from voting for their statehood in the United Nations (U.N.). We helplessly watched as thousands of



our African youths sank in the Mediterranean in attempts to cross over to Europe.... (Sani, 2017:45).

Failure of the Nigeria's African Policy under President Jonathan

Many factors are responsible for the failures in the conduct of Nigeria's African policy under President Jonathan. Attempts will be made to explain some of the most important ones, especially those that are related to the failure of African policy. One of the most important factors for the failure of the African policy under President Jonathan is the unhealthy economic conditions. Nigeria's economy has not been well managed. Despite the rebase of Nigeria's economy in April 2014, which put Nigeria's economy as the largest economy in Africa, Nigeria's economy is still ineffective in changing its citizens' lives. Poverty and unemployment have continued to increase. This harsh economic condition has greatly affected the success of Nigerian African policy under President Jonathan in many ways.

First, the poor economic condition affected the level of funding for the country's foreign policy. Nigeria committed a paltry sum of US\$232.6 million to her foreign policy in 2010, while South Africa, which has just come on board in African Affairs, expended US\$634 million on her foreign policy in the same year (Stiftung, 2012:55), an amount that is more than twice that of Nigeria. No wonder she is challenging the giant status of Nigeria. As a matter of percentage, Nigeria spent 0.83% and 0.89% between 2010 and 2011, respectively (Saliu, 2016b:158). This is too meagre for a successful African policy.

Also, the poor level of funding has affected Nigeria's peacekeeping operations. The demonstration of lack of effective coordination and ineffective participation in peacekeeping operations in Mali, which resulted in the decision of the U.N. to replace the Nigerian General with a Rwandan General, is a testimony to this. The withdrawal of 1,200 Nigerian troops from Mali, and her inability to make available her military in many crisis-ridden African countries like Somalia, the Central African Republic and Rwanda were due to poor funding of the Nigerian foreign policy. The deplorable condition of Nigeria's mission abroad is also due to poor funding for the missions. The ambassadors are usually not sensitive to the plight of Nigerians travelling abroad because they are hindered by shoestring budget (Saliu, 2015b:21). This is greatly affected by the, country's poor economic condition.

Nigeria's failure to meet her financial obligations to her foreign policy is another reason for the failure of her African policy. For instance, Nigeria was unable to fund the new A.U. secretariat. She was equally unable to maintain her 106 foreign missions abroad properly. Nigeria cannot just be accepted as a leader unless she demonstrates it, and the best way to demonstrate it is through resource deployment (Saliu, 2010:201). Nigeria's African policy will continue to fail as long as Nigeria fails to improve the funding level of her foreign policy. However, Nigeria cannot pursue economic prosperity outside when millions of her citizens are wallowing in poverty.

The poor economic condition of the Nigerian state under President Jonathan has reduced the level of participation of the citizen in the foreign policy of the country, particularly the African policy (Saliu, 2016d). Those who have an interest and that can contribute positively to the external behaviour of Nigeria are preoccupied with how to make both ends meet. Most citizens are more interested in what Stiftung (2012) described as 'democracy of the stomach.'



Then, what is the essence of her Father Christmas outside when her citizens are engaging in unholy behaviours that are tarnishing the image of the country like drug trafficking and human trafficking in various part of the continent simply for survival. Nigeria's foreign policy and, in particular, her African policy, would be less effective if major decisions were taken without adequate involvement of those who should know (Saliu, 2008:).

Another important factor for the failure of Nigeria's African policy was the issue of Boko Haram. The activity of Boko Haram has put 276 Chibok girls hostage. Pathetically, the intensifying efforts of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria had by the end of 2014 displaced 1.5 million people and more than 10,000 deaths in 2014 alone (Cilliers et al., 2015:18). Nigeria has been here and there in peacekeeping operations, and her own house is not at peace. Boko Haram has reduced the position of Nigeria on issues of African concern because, according to Saliu (2016c:107), "the liberator itself is now being liberated." It is an insult to Nigeria to have relied on France to recover the abducted Chibok girls. How can one imagine that Nigeria, which has been described as the Regional Police working tirelessly to halt insecurity in West Africa, has become a peculiar security case in the region (Folarin, 2015).

Another factor that militated against the effectiveness of Nigeria's African policy was the relationship between her and the West. President Jonathan's regime did not enjoy a warm relationship with the West, which challenged her African centre-piece policy. The President was being condemned on the basis of insecurity and violating the citizen's right (Saliu, 2015a:12). However, there seems to be a Western conspiracy against Nigeria to reduce her influence in Africa.

The non-inclusion of Nigeria in the G20 and in the BRICS which were championed by the U.S.A. while South Africa was picked at Nigeria's expense, attests to this (Saliu, 2013:187). Another one was the removal of Nigeria's name from the list of President Obama's African tour in 2013 (Saliu, 2015b:18). The result of backdoor purchase of weapons when America refused to sell arms to Nigeria was equally due to the cold relationship (Saliu, 2015a:14). This by implication shows that Nigeria needs a warm relationship with the West if her African policy will be a successful one.

Corruption is another great factor that led to the failure of the Nigerian African policy. The Jonathan administration is characterised by corruption. Contracts awarded were not properly executed, while bribery and stealing became the country's culture. Resources meant for the welfare of citizens and for developmental purposes were siphoned by the politicians and the top civil servants (Saliu, 2016d). Corruption and insurgency were the reasons for her cold relationship with the West.

Summary of the Findings

This work examine the Nigeria Africa policy under President Jonathan. The study has been able to look at the importance of the Nigeria Africa policy to Nigeria as a regional leader in the continent. It has equally been able to identify the various reasons behind the adoption of the policy vis-à-vis the population of the country, her economic resources, her strategic location and the need to remain a regional power house in Africa. It equally identify some various manifestations of Nigerian Africa policy by various governments in Nigeria. Starting from, the aggressive campaign against colonialism and apartheid regime in South Africa,



promoting of sub regional co-operation in Africa through T.A.C, participating in peace keeping operations of the U.N. and in the establishment of regional international organisation like O.A.U. (now A.U.), ECOWAS and so on.

More importantly the study has been able to identify areas in which President Jonathan has contributed to the promotion of Nigeria African policy. Some of the areas include his contribution to restore peace in West Africa countries like Mali, Cote Divoire and Sierra Leone. His active participation in international politics by contesting for elective positions which eventually fetch the country a non-permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council.

However as much as he did to promote the image of the country he was still left with shortcomings. Prime in this regard is the country's inability to checkmate South Africa which is competing for the leadership of the continent with her. Another important one is the issue of Boko Haram that is denting the image of the country. The nature of our economy is also a comma for the President to effectively perform the task among others. Based on these, we are submitting that Jonathan's Administration did not perform up to the expectation as regards Nigeria's African Policy. More still need to be done in other to maintain the giant status of Nigeria. Regional leadership needs to be earned. It is not a matter of mouth; it is a matter of power and efficient use of that power. Even with the rebase of our G.D.P., our economy is still not vibrant, going by the per capita income in the country.

There is need to revitalize the country's institutions. Most of these institutions are bad, the educational institutions, the road network, the power sectors and so on are not in good shape. The conditions of these institutions have great impact on the external image of a country and the kind of respect a nation would get across the globe. Based on these shortcomings, we are concluding that Jonathan's Administration has failed in the pursuit of Nigeria's African Policy.

Conclusion

From the above analysis, this work discovered that President Jonathan contributed meaningfully to restoring peace in West African countries like Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Darfur. He was equally able to, through a mix of diplomacy, win elective positions both at the level of A.U. and in the U.N. Security Council.

The work equally found some shortcomings which have outweighed the achievements. The most important ones were the crumbling nature of the economy, the Boko Haram saga, the cold relations of the country with the West and the inability of the country to checkmate South Africa. Based on the above, it can be established that the Jonathan's Administration did not perform up to expectation in his Africa Policy.

Recommendations

The Nigerian government should find all means of tackling Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria. This is necessary for her so that Nigeria's claim as a regional peacemaker will be meaningful. A nation that cannot guarantee the security of its citizen cannot get full respect as a leader.

The federal government should make efforts to revamp the economy of the country, which is characterised by a fall in the exchange of dollar to naira to attract direct foreign investment and to meet the future needs of the people.



The paper also recommends that the federal government recognise her interest before she embarks on rendering assistance to other countries. Charity begins at home, and it is high time Nigeria should place her priority right. It is either Nigeria should reduce her spending on Africa or probably stop it and focus on the welfare of her citizen. However, the paper is not advocating for the policy to be stopped.

The federal government should try to find a lasting solution to the development challenges that the country is facing, such as poverty, unemployment, inadequate infrastructural facilities and poor educational institutions.

The federal government needs to redeem the country's battered image by intensifying its effort in the fight against corruption, insecurity of lives and properties of citizens, which are denting the image of the country. It is our view that if corruption is reduced to the barest minimum and the lives of people are secured, the country's economy will be more vibrant, and the standard of living will be high. This will reduce youth uprisings against the government and earn her more respect as the leader of the continent.

The federal government needs to find ways of improving its relation with the West to make it warm. This is necessary for her to boost her strength in tackling the insecurity challenge facing the country and to promote her impact in the international system. This is because no developing country can have a positive image in the world when such a country is having a cold relationship with the West as they are at the helm of affairs in the international system, particularly when such a country has some flaws in her domestic affairs.

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