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AN ASSESSMENT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION AND MANAGEMENT OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY: A FOCUS ON BORNO STATE OF NIGERIA, 2015-2019

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Abstract

Most West African countries are weak in exercising control and authority in locations that are far away from their national capitals. This weakness of these states offers sanctuary and an enabling environment to terrorist movement within Africa and beyond. The ungoverned remote areas of West Africa and vast empty land of the Sahel regions provide safe haven for international terrorist organisations. The wide spread and diffusion of insurgences and acts of terrorism have sensitized governments and their agencies to not only consciously identify the roots causes of these phenomena but to put a collaborative and complex mechanism to address the problem. This paper therefore examines the effectiveness of regional cooperation against the Boko Haram insurgency with the focus on Borno State of Nigeria especially during the first tenure of President Mohammed Buhari from 2015 to 2019. The paper is anchored on the Security Complex theory. In terms of research method, the paper relies on the Explanatory Design and utilizes empirical data generated from official records and data from secondary sources with descriptive analysis. The paper argues that the West African sub-region between 2015 to 2019 has improved members cooperation to enhance security through the formation of a multinational joint task force to fight insurgents though, the situation still remains fragmented and fragile with serious humanitarian consequence. The paper therefore recommends that beyond military approach, there is also the need to improve the quality of lives of the people and humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and socio-economic development programmes of the affected and ravaged region.

Keywords: Boko Haram, insurgency, regional response, regional security, terrorism.

Introduction

The ongoing counter terrorism and counter insurgency (CTCOIN) operations in the North east of Nigeria in particular and Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) countries in general has undergone several transformation aimed at improving its operation to make it more efficient and result oriented in order to restore normalcy in the region.

However, most West African countries are weak at exercising control and authority in locations that are far away from their National capitals. This weakness of the state offers sanctuary and an enabling environment to terrorist movement within Africa and beyond. The ungoverned remote areas of West Africa and vast empty land of Sahel region provide safe haven for international terrorist organisations. The widespread and diffusion of insurgencies and acts of terrorism have sensitized governments and their agencies to not only consciously identify the root causes of the phenomena but to put a complex and collaborative mechanism to address the problem.

The Boko Haram insurgency in particular cuts across the borders of Nigeria to Niger, Cameroon and Chad – the region known as the Lake Chad Basin. The complications of collaboration across governments and other players has made this conflict particularly confounding to these countries. Through the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the four, countries are trying to cooperate on competitive resource issues related to Lake Chad, which has been drying rapidly and losing surface area. They also face a range of challenges to their democratic order and state legitimacy; powerful business groups frequently shift their alliances between the state and the insurgents based on who they think can best protect trade and provide stability. This influential merchant class is too often overlooked in assessing conditions and the insurgency in northeastern

Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, (Ibrahim and Bala, 2018).

Boko Haram's affiliation with the self-styled Islamic State extremist movement adds the tensions of international terrorism and connections with violence in other countries of West Africa. Groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which originally operated mainly in Algeria but has extended its tentacles into sub-Saharan Africa, contribute to tension as weapons and extremist ideologies spread across the region. Even Boko Haram is fracturing, compounding the complications of resolving the conflict and establishing stability.

The Boko Hara insurgency, furthermore, is both a symptom of state fragility and exacerbates the vulnerability. Long or repeated struggles against a range of economic, social, and political forces have sapped the Nigerian government's capacity to carry out basic constitutional functions, such as providing for the security and welfare of its citizens. As a result, the social contract between the state and its citizens is frayed, and the government's legitimacy is eroding.

Ibrahim, et, al, (2018) observes it that, in conceptualizing the best approach to ending the conflict in the Lake Chad Basin, especially in Nigeria, the goals cannot be limited to defeating Boko Haram. They must extend to winning the peace. State building and the cultivation of an inclusive society are vital so that citizens feel they belong and have a fair chance at a livelihood. The interrelated issues that created the crisis – state fragility, poverty, competition over Lake Chad's overstretched resources, violent extremism, and so on – must be addressed comprehensively.

One major element of such an evolution must be a transition away from the Nigerian military's dominance in the northeast and restoration of civilian control of governance and security. Such a process will be complex and needs to take into account the origin and progression of the conflict, the key stakeholders and institutions involved, and the context in which they will interact. However, this analysis is short sighted and fall short of appreciating that the insurgents are engaged in unconventional warfare whose bases are far beyond Nigeria territories and require sustained regional cooperation to degrade them, while providing comprehensive humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, rehabilitation, re-assurance and integration.

With the emergence of the “*Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad*” otherwise known as Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeastern part of Nigeria, the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 2012 mandated the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) a combined military formation, comprising of units from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency. Indeed, these regional efforts toward counterinsurgency and counterterrorism reinforce the significance of regional cooperation in dealing with insurgency and terrorism. Yet, such regional efforts are very often confronted with problems and challenges where differing national interests and priorities are generally believed to have limited the effectiveness of regional cooperation on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, (Morch, 2018). It is against this background that this paper examined regional cooperation and management of Boko Hara insurgency with special focus on Borno state of Nigeria, from 2015 – 2018.

Conceptual and contextual discourse

The idea of regional cooperation and management of Boko Haram is rooted on policy that necessitated the need to evolve a robust approach in responding the overgrowing emergence of insurgencies and terrorism in the 21st century era. Therefore, as a point of takeoff, it is imperative to examine what really constitute terrorism and insurgency. These concepts are often shrouded with controversies. Are these concepts synonymous and could therefore be used interchangeable but having inherent characteristic in the dynamic of political violence.

At this juncture, it is pertinent to suggest definitions for terrorism and insurgency. This is important for two distinct but related reasons. While some scholars explicitly state their notion of development, others proceed on the assumption that we all know what the concepts are. The

problem however is that both those who explain their definitions and those who assume them either by design or default, fall prey to several disturbing biases. As a result, most of ever-growing bodies of literature on security is more than bewildering.

The terms terrorism and insurgency have been viewed differently by different people and organisations depending on the perception and circumstance leading to such definitions. There is therefore no single universally accepted definition of terrorism or insurgency up to date. For instance, there is a popular adage that says “one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter”. Some people have also tried to distinguish between 'acts of terrorism' and 'terrorism' itself, arguing that acts of terrorism do not necessarily translate to terrorism. In like manner, ordinarily speaking, the terms militancy and terrorism seem to be used interchangeably by certain individuals trying to defend related acts carried out by them or other people.

“Terrorism” may well be the most important word in the political vocabulary these days, as was stated by one of its prominent students. Alex P. Schmid, Director of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrew (Schmid & Jongman, 2005:375). However, one could argue that little has changed since the time when the same scholar concluded in 1984 that academic researchers from many fields have spilled almost as much ink as the actors of terrorism have spilled blood and yet have reached no consensus on what terrorism is (Schmid and Jongman, 2005). After thirty years of hard labour, there is still no generally accepted definition of terrorism, concludes Walter Lacquer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Ibid 395). Even though terrorism is not an unprecedented phenomenon. It is as old as the hill... confusion prevails in the question of its nature. Terrorism indeed seems a contested and intensely political concept, perhaps not far from a catch-all political signifier (Der Derian, 2005:23). Elucidating its nature bears relevance in both theoretical and practical terms.

The central questions of why there is no agreed definition of terrorism, so much hard labor has been invested into the effort to find one, as Walter Lacquer's quote maintained. Boaz Ganor, the Director of the International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, provides a number of reasons;

- 1) Terrorism is a contested concept and political, legal, social science and popular notions of it are often diverging,
- 2) The definition question is linked to (de-)legitimization and criminalization,
- 3) There are many types of “Terrorism”, with different forms and manifestations,
- 4) The term has undergone changes in meaning in the more than 200 years of its existence. (Maikaba & Uba, 2016).

The aggregate definitions are here to stand for the outcomes of the two projects in which numerous other definitions were analyzed in an attempt to arrive at a definition that would be acceptable to the academic community. The first aggregate definition discussed by Schmid is in formal terms a “long” one and, as such, perhaps the description could be considered a more pertinent title. After having sent a draft definition to the members of the research community in the mid - 1980s, Schmid projected their reactions into the final versions, including 16 most common elements. Thus, for the purpose of this paper: -

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent actions employed by (semi)Clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (target of opportunity) or selectively (representatives of symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat – and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization)/(Imperiled) victims and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s), turning it into a target of horror, a target of demands, of a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or

propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid and Jongman, 2005:28).

The second aggregating project presented by a team of researchers comprised Leonard Weinberg. Ami Pedahzur and Sican Hirsch-Hoefler (2004), who chose the opposite approach, having analyzed 73 definitions appearing in major academic journals in the field of terrorism and political violence, studies in conflict and terrorism and terrorism. The authors decided to refrain from incorporating as many elements as possible and instead proposed of consensus definition based on the lowest denominator: “terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence which pursuit of publicity plays a significant role”.

While for instance, terrorism rarely brings about political change on its own, insurgency attempts to bring about change through force of arms. Similarly, terrorists often apply a wide range of damages when compared to insurgents. On the other hand, while conventional war involves adversaries more or less symmetric in equipment or training, insurgency involves adversaries that are asymmetric, weak, and almost always a sub-state group. Traditionally however, insurgencies seek to overthrow an existing order with one that is commensurate with their political, economic, ideological or religious goals (Gompert & Gordon, 2008:23). According to Kilcullen, “*Insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state for a group of states or occupying powers) and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers*” (Kilcullen, 2006:112).

Authority recognized as such by the United Nations, when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents. “The British Army counter-insurgency manual. Army Field Manual (AFM) defined insurgency as:

“an organized protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control”. (Petraeus & Amos, 2006:1-11)

Indeed, as Moore (n.d) aptly notes; while this definition of insurgency may be succinct, it orients on military and security actions, and fails to reflect the wider scope and complexity of contemporary insurgencies, especially their protracted and political, economic, and social; dimensions. With the emphasis on subversion and armed conflict, the foregoing definition identifies insurgency as predominantly a military problem. Yet, insurgencies seek radical change to the existing political, economic or social order through the use of sustained violence and political disruption (Moore n.d). its essence is protracted, asymmetric violence political, legal, and ethical ambiguity; and the use of complex terrain, psychological warfare, and political mobilization, insurgency as Metz (2007) notes arises when a group decides that the gap between their political expectations and the opportunities afforded them is unacceptable and can only be remedied by force. Insurgents avoid battlespaces where they are at a disadvantage often the conventional military sphere and focus on those where they can attain parity, particularly the psychological and the political (Metz, 2007).

Moveh (2018) observes that counterinsurgency can simply be seen as the opposite of insurgency. It involves a combination of measures undertaken by the legitimate government of a country to curb or suppress an insurgency. Thus, while insurgents for instance try to overthrow the existing political authority, the counterinsurgent measures try to reinstate the existing political structures as well as reduce or annihilate the usurping authority of the insurgents. In the main, counterinsurgents hold monopoly of violence, legitimacy, as well as other material resources often exclusively reserved for states. In another submission the “US guide to the analysis of insurgency (2012)” defined counterinsurgency as a “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency”. Indeed, “effective counterinsurgency integrates and synchronizes political, security, legal, economic, development, and psychological activities to create a holistic approach aimed at weakening the insurgents while bolstering the government's legitimacy” (US government, 2012).

The approaches to counterinsurgency may generally be classified into two: the enemy centered

approached and the population centered approach. While the enemy centered approach focusses on the defeat of the insurgent in an essentially militaristic operation, the population centered approach emphasizes the protection of the populace not necessarily through direct military confrontation with the insurgents but through other socio-economic and political programs aimed at winning the support of the populace. These two approaches offer significant insights into the nature of counterinsurgency. Indeed, it has been noted that counter-insurgent campaigns will rarely be purely enemy-centric or population-centric, but will generally include elements of both, with the relative balance changing over time (US government 2012, Galula, 1964).

Thus, a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy recognizes that a sole military solution is not feasible, making it essential for a dual military-political solution that adopts a population-centric approach. Counterinsurgency doctrine rests on the critical pillars of protecting the local population, promoting good governance, eliminating enemy safe for a critical analysis of the subject. For instance, the issue of which organization, group or individuals are more likely to adopt terror tactics and why it is ignored. This indeed is not unconnected to the fact that various actors ranging from state to non-state actors have adopted terror tactics in achieving a diverse range of aims and objectives.

Theoretical framework

The paper is anchored within theoretical discourse of regional security complex theory (RSCT) as its frame of its analysis. This theory posits that international security should be examined from a regional perspective, and that relations between states (and other actors) exhibit regular, geographically clustered patterns Regional complex is the term coined and traceable to Waever (2003).

RSCT suggests an analytical scheme for structuring analysis on how security concerns are tied together in a regional formation where geographical adjacency is the faction of paramount importance. A regional security complex (RSC) can best be described as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another. The basic concept underpinning (RSC) is that “most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, insecurity often associated with proximity. The function of an RSC is mandated by the interaction of anarchy with geographical factors. While global security issues may at times dominate regional concerns, the latter will nevertheless always be present to a greater or lesser extent. In essence, the security of each actor in a region interacts with the security of other actors within the region, often leading to intense security inter-dependence. A “regional security complex” therefore is seen as a group of states whose primary security concerns significantly links closely together, such that their national securities cannot be realistically be considered apart from one another (Buzan, 1991:90). Buzan Waeva (2003) further argue that security complexes depend primarily on the pressures arising from geographical proximity, and the interplay between the anarchic structures as how balances of power play out in the system. They view the international system as coexisting of regional clusters, whereby security complexes are magnified within these clusters.

“Regional security complex” is that a theoretical construct used to reveal the inevitability of interdependence existent in regional sub-systems. They represent an analytical category, or more precisely, units of analysis whose secularization processes are so interconnected and are best understood within the context of such interconnection. It is also important to note that the boarders of “regional security complexes” are defined according to desirable patterns of amity and enmity which is facilitated and deepened by physical proximity.

The theory appears to pay more emphasis on geographical location and adjacency in the realization of security concerns over economic consideration and other determinates of cooperation in the international system. Notwithstanding, the theory is found to be more relevant

considering the idea of a regional cooperation in the management of Boko Haram insurgency in Lake Chad region represents a regional security.

Thus, this laid theoretical and philosophical foundation for the management of regional cooperation in management of Boko Haram insurgency which is the main thrust of this paper.

Methodology

To realize the broad objectives of this paper, it was situated on a sound methodological plane. Literature that abound on regional cooperation and management of Boko Haram insurgency in West African region with particular interest in Lake Chad Basin and similar literature was reviewed. The paper built on elements of past research, verifiable evidence on the issue and observation in order to promote and embrace theoretical unity. Relevant documentary sources for proper analysis included conference papers, relevant topics in textbooks, academic journals, scholarly articles, newspapers, memos, archival records and papers on contemporary argument on the subject matter

Regional Cooperation and Management of Boko Haram Insurgency.

The counter-Boko Haram mandate of the MNJTF embraces several objectives, including ensuring a safe and secure environment in the Lake Chad region, putting a stop to the violence against civilians, supporting the stabilization programs to reduce the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in the region, and providing efficient assistance to the affected populations. This mandate was designed as a goal driven process, divided into two phases. Offensive Operations: Isolate and neutralize Boko Haram factions; disrupt command and control and communication systems; cut supply lines; shut down traffic circuits; and reduce the potential for military operations. Stabilization Operations: Facilitate the return of displaced persons and refugees; support the restoration of administrations in areas where they are no longer present; support the restoration of public security mission by the security forces in areas of concern; and contribute to the initiation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DOR) process of illegally armed individuals.

Ibrahim and Bala (2018) observed that, the Boko Haram insurgency cuts across the borders of Nigeria to Niger, Cameroon, and Chad-the region known as the Lake Chad Basin. The complication of collaborating across governments and other players has made this conflict particularly confounding to these countries. Through the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the four countries are trying to cooperate on competitive resources related to Lake Chad, which has been drying rapidly and losing surface area. They also face a range of challenges to their democratic order and state and the insurgents based on who they think can best protect trade and provide stability. This influential merchant class is too often overlooked in assessing conditions and the insurgency in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region.

Boko Haram's affiliation with the self-styled Islamic State extremist movement adds the tensions of international terrorism and connections with violence in other countries of West Africa. Groups such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which originally operated mainly in Algeria but has extended its tentacles into sub-Saharan Africa, contribute to tension as weapons and extremist ideologies spread across the region. Even Boko Haram is fracturing, compounding the complications of resolving the conflict and establishing stability.

The Boko Haram insurgency, furthermore, is both a symptom of state fragility and exacerbates the vulnerability. Long or repeated struggles against a range of economic, social, and political forces have sapped the Nigerian government's capacity to carry out basic constitutional functions, such as providing for the security and welfare of its citizens. As a result, the social contract between the state and its citizens is frayed, and the government's legitimacy is eroding.

Mahmood and Ani (2018) pointed out that, Cameroon's response to Boko Haram's expansion was initially slow and unfocused. This quickly changed as Boko Haram grew more powerful in Nigeria

and began to threaten Cameroon's sovereignty in its far north. Beginning in 2012, Boko Haram started carrying out limited raids in the far north region of Cameroon, primarily in Fotokol, Amchidé, and Dabanga. These attacks, sometimes deadly, were isolated cases and appeared to be largely ignored because Cameroon's government perceived the Boko Haram threat on its territory to be low. Cameroon focused on preventing smugglers from trafficking in illegal goods, and its slow pace of its defense forces' deployment against Boko Haram militants became a source of tension between Cameroon and Nigeria.

Two particular events set the stage for Cameroonian military operations against Boko Haram. First, on May 17, 2014, the heads of state of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin met in Paris with French President François Hollande, and they approved a regional approach to combating the spread of Boko Haram. This agreement paved the way for a more coordinated effort between countries, in addition to a greater response by each individual country toward the Boko Haram threat. Second, on May 22, 2014, the UN Security Council placed Boko Haram on its terrorist list. This decision convinced the Cameroonian government that there was an urgent need for action against this insurgent group.

The initial Cameroonian security strategy against Boko Haram rested on three pillars. First, Cameroonian forces would pressure Boko Haram at the border with Nigeria. The area of operation would have a limited depth in order to contain the threat close to the border areas. Furthermore, self-defence committees in border villages would be part of the Popular Defense Forces and help with this effort. Second, Cameroon would focus on a broader military deployment throughout the region. To protect the civilian population in these remote areas, Cameroon defense forces would stress tactical mobility, including the capacity to patrol, and its ability to engage in kinetic operations through specific equipment deployed, including MI17 and MI24 helicopters. Third, the Cameroonian government initiated coordinated inter-departmental action with the aim of improving collaboration across sectors. This coordinated effort would allow the population to resume social and economic activities and emphasized the need to go beyond security, as expressed in the report of the Ministry of Justice on the state of human rights in Cameroon in 2015.

In order to execute this three-pronged approach to countering Boko Haram, the area of operations of the Cameroon Army in the far north region was divided into two zones: Zone North and Zone South. First, Operation EMERGENCE 4, which commenced in August 2014, was executed in the northern sector. With the 41st Infantry Brigade (41 BRIM) of the Cameroon Army as its nucleus, it brought together Special Forces squads, various specialized units, amphibious infantry battalions, and artillery battalions. Omar Mahmood, an expert on security issues across sub-Saharan Africa, points out that these security operations succeeded in disrupting food and ammunition supply lines between Boko Haram's strongholds and their different combating units. Furthermore, Operation EMERGENCE 4's achievements were instrumental in the reopening of certain critical regional trade routes, particularly between Fotokol and Garoua, and even the reopening of specific cross-border corridors between Maiduguri, Bama, Banki, Amchide, and Limani (Mahmood and Ani, 2018)

Secondly, Operation ALPHA was executed in the southern sector and controlled the Kolofta, Limani, and Amchidé regions. In addition to the existing forces, several elite infantry Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) troops deployed in this area as the scope of the missions widened. Operation ALPHA established intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) observation posts for monitoring and reporting on activities at the borders. Moreover, Operation ALPHA opted for constructing barriers as part of its operations, digging a series of trenches over a distance of about 100 km along the border between Cameroon and Nigeria. This tactic resulted in a significant decline in cross-border insurgent activity. (France, 2018)

Mahmood and Ani (2018), argue that, despite these efforts, deliberate attacks on civilians in border villages in Cameroon did not stop. The districts of Kolofata, Waza and Mayo Moskota

were targeted the most, which is not surprising, given the fact that Boko Haram recruited and trained numerous young men from these densely populated Kanuri districts, many of whom joined to escape poverty. Mahmood observes that, in the far north, sections of the population have gradually resumed their economic activities thanks to the involvement of the Army. Yet, the population was also frustrated by the lack of effective coordination between Operation ALPHA and Operation EMERGENCE 4, which undermined efficiency and results. Cameroonian operations against Boko Haram are summarized in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Major Cameroonian Operations against Boko Haram since January 2016

Source: - Adapted from Kerins and Mouaha-Bell, 2018

Beginning in 2014 onward, Boko Haram's violence in Borno State forced thousands of refugees to flee north into Niger, specifically its far eastern Diffa region, which shares many of the same ethnic, religious, and economic characteristics of the population in northeastern Nigeria. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as of September 2017, over 115,000 Nigerian refugees live in Niger's Diffa region, and 122,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) left their villages since the beginning of the insurgency in Nigeria. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mark Lowcock, observes that, "most of the 250,000 displaced people in Diffa live in 140 informal settlements alongside vulnerable communities, which are feeling the economic and social strain of this large influx of refugees." For example, N'Gagam, located near the border with Nigeria, originally had a population of 1,000 but, as of 2018, accommodates around 13,500 refugees and IDPs fleeing Boko Haram attacks.

Niger, like its neighbours, has executed a number of military operations aimed at diminishing the effects of Boko Haram in its country. In the aftermath of the 2014 Paris Summit, Niger launched Operation INGAR (which means "shield" in Kanuri) in the Diffa region. The operation was designed to halt the northward advance of Boko Haram and protect the population in Diffa in particular. Niger's Minister of the Interior, Hassoumi Massaoudou, described INGAR as "the largest military operation ever mounted in Niger" to face the most urgent problem at that time. Operation INGAR placed the police, gendarmerie, National Guard, and military operating in the Diffa region under one command. Furthermore, Nigerian troops, in cooperation with Chadian armed forces, carried out multiple cross border offensives into Nigeria in 2014 and 2015 to

prevent

Boko Haram from establishing bases in the Nigeria-Niger border region. Despite the remoteness of the Diffa region, Niger was able to halt Boko Haram's advance into the country through a dedicated, well-organized and long-term operation.

Chad also began to take military action against Boko Haram beginning in 2015. Chad has a long history of political turmoil, military coup attempts, and armed rebellions. Initially, like Niger and Cameroon, Chad had not identified Boko Haram as a significant threat until its rapid expansion and seizure of territory in 2014. The rise of Boko Haram threatened two critical assets in particular: Chad's capital city of N'Djamena, which was less than 50 miles from Boko Haram-controlled territory in Nigeria, and several key trade routes critical to Chad's access to the coast that ran through Borno State and the far north region of Cameroon. Beginning around 2014, the Chadian Army responded to Boko Haram's attacks, and gained a reputation throughout Africa as a strong counterinsurgent force.

Assanvo (2018) argue that, Experts in African security interpreted these postures as absence of true solidarity among Lake Chad Basin studies. The implication of this creates therefore, the need for a coordinated effort to counter terrorism and Boko Haram insurgency after each country's independence strategies failed to rid the region of the insurgent threat. One of the challenges that has continued to feature is the observed differences in the operational doctrines of participating contingents which is said to features during combined operation. Whereas the Anglophone countries emphasize on the principle of maintenance of momentum and easy of efforts among others the francophone countries focus on concentration of forces. However, one key principle of war that can address this challenge is flexibility. Participatory countries need to be more flexible and be willing to accept suggestions aimed at achieving more results.

For instance, in 1998, a Multinational Joint Security Force was put into operation, however, it remained limited to infrequent and insignificant patrols on the shores of Lake Chad. Overall, the joint security forces were ineffective in achieving a genuine improvement in the overall security situation because Cameroon did not participate, given a border conflict with Nigeria since 1993 over the Bakassi peninsula. This dispute made Cameroon reluctant to cooperate with Nigerian forces and the patrols were halted in 2000

In reality the security cooperation between the states affected by Boko Haram was very weak until the Paris summit of 2014, when key countries agreed to security issues of regional interest and the Multi-National Joint Task Force appeared as the only instrument available to support these goals. The intractability of the Boko Haram insurgency compelled the LCBC member states and Benin to reactivate the Multinational Joint Security Force on October 7, 2014 to fill the gap left by the regional inertia of the past decade and was rebranded the "Multinational Joint Task Force" (MNJTF). Although the MNJTF was created under the leadership of the LCBC, only four of the six member states – Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria – constituted the joint military force along with Benin, which is not a member of the LCBC (Creta Galecizzi, 2018).

The Multi-National Joint Task Force then became a coalition of states united around a common goal: defeating Boko Haram,




Figure 2. MNJTF Organizational Design

Source: - Adopted from Kerins and Mouaha-Bell, 2018

At their 469th meeting on November 25, 2014, the African Union's Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) fully endorsed the Multi-National Joint Task Force's activation. However, it was not until its 484th meeting, held on January 29, 2015 that the AUPSC authorized the creation of a MNJTF force strength of up to 7,500 military personnel, which it later increased to 10,000, (Tchoffo Kodjo, 2018) noted that, most notably, the troops of the Multi-National Joint Task Force primarily operated in their own country with some arrangements for cross-border operations. This rather made it more of a fragmental approach, and entirely a mandatory affair neglecting social, economic factors. Furthermore, the financial agreements between the regional states were unique and mandated that contributing countries cover a large share of their own operational expenses. The member countries established three components to the MNJTF-military, police and civilian, (Tchoffo Kodjo, 2018).

However, as of 2018, only the military component had been completely activated. The member countries have struggled to put the other components in place and to receive the funding they need to activate the police and civilian components.

The Multi-National Joint Task Force also received financial and training support from the European Union. Additionally, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom had a role in providing technical assistance to the Multi-National Joint Task Force and region states to effectively implement the counter-terrorism initiative in the Lake Chad region.

The transformation of the LCBC from its initial mandate to a counter Boko Haram mission received considerable skepticism because the organisation had not handled a crisis of such magnitude, and the LCBC's initial mission was development and environmental policy in the Lake Chad Basin region. Assanvo (2018) further points out that, although its mandate allows it to carry out and sustain security operations, the LCBC has very narrow and limited experience of military organization. Consequently, it was necessary to provide specialized and multidimensional support to the MNJTF to improve its effectiveness as a counter-Boko Haram force. In addition to the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the European Union, the African Union (AU) became an essential partner to provide this support by offering technical assistance and

coordinating partner support.

Overall, the MNJTF has had considerable success in countering Boko Haram. Some of the most successful military operations took place at the border between Cameroon and Nigeria. From February 11 to 14, 2016 a combined joint offensive as part of Operation ARROW FIVE forced scores of Boko Haram militants to surrender in the Nigerian town of Ngoshe. At about the same time, Operation DEEP PUNCH 2, a sweeping operation in Nigeria's Sambisa Forest that included 497 Cameroonian soldiers positioned in Pulka, Nigeria, completely disrupted Boko Haram's network in the area and cut its main supply routes in the southern part of Borno state. Furthermore, from May 10 to 16, 2016, in the Madaya Forest in Nigeria, the MNJTF Sector 1 offensive combined with Cameroon troops in Operation EMERGENCE 4 to secure the release of hundreds of civilian hostages. Overall, in the first five months of 2016, the MNJTF freed nearly 4,690 civilian hostages, according to figures from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), (Assanvo, 2018)

However, the MNJTF has also had some significant setbacks. The first occurred between January 3 and 7, 2015, in what became known as the "Baga Massacre", which included the death of 2,000 civilians at the hands of Boko Haram. The massacre was due to several causes, including poor planning and a lack of coordination between the regional states. In addition to the large loss of civilian life, the MNJTF command post of the time, located in the town of Baga, Nigeria on the shores of Lake Chad, was completely wiped out by Boko Haram. This event left the MNJTF in disarray.

Assanvo (2018) further explained that, in response to the Bosso Massacre, the MNJTF initiated Operation GAMA AIKI in June 2016, its first comprehensive multilateral campaign. A MNJTF officer explained that GAMA AIKI's priority area of operation was a 10km-wide band of land 65 km long along the border between Niger and Nigeria, around Damasak and Malam-Fatori. It was the first time that Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria worked together on a common operation under a single command and control. Its mission was to destroy Boko Haram last strongholds in the Damasak area. Operation GAMA AIKI took place through August 2016, with the main effort focused on disrupting Boko Haram's leadership and logistical organisation and preventing fuel and small arms smuggling, (Conflict Armament Research, 2018). Ultimately, Operation GAMA AIKI succeeded in destroying insurgent assets in the Metele and Garere areas and completely took Boko Haram by surprise, forcing it to reassess its strategy. Assanvo notes that the concentration of MNJTF forces in a specific place made it possible to liberate the border from Boko Haram, particularly Damasak.

Nigerian Cooperation and Management of Boko Haram

The ongoing discourse on regional cooperation and management of Boko Haram Insurgency to a wider extent derives from global concern because in recent years, there has been a surge in both tempo and range of global insurgencies and terrorism. Virtually, every continent has filed this growing security challenges. Nigeria is one of the latest to be added to the list of states by sectarian insurgencies.

Amid this complex web of issues, the government of President Muhammadu Buhari is seeking to consolidate military gains against Boko Haram by implementing a sweeping program of humanitarian relief and social and economic assistance, known as the Buhari plan, it was unveiled in June 2016 and is "designed to achieve the peace, stability, socio-economic rehabilitation, reconstruction, and long-term sustainable economic development of the region".

The mission is daunting. The government estimates that the conflict with Boko Haram has affected some 14.8 million men, women, and children, Lamb and Gregg (2016). The complexity of the conditions faced by local communities and the national and international authorities and organisations seeking to help them rebuild raises a number of specters, including the prospect of backsliding and recurring conflict. "In complex wars, it can be unclear what winning might even

look like” (Lamb and Gregg, 2016).

One of the most important lessons from the war in Afghanistan is that defeating insurgents or terrorists is not an end in itself. The United State was able to wield its military “shock and awe”, alongside local forces, to dislodge the Taliban regime in 2001. But the lack of a comprehensive peacebuilding agenda to consolidate those gains has allowed the conflict and associated violence to continue, (Barfield, 2016).

In conceptualizing the best approach to ending the conflict in the Lake Chad Basin, especially in Nigeria, the goals cannot be limited to defeating Boko Haram. They must extend to winning the peace. State building and the cultivation of an inclusive society are vital so that citizens feel they belong and have a fair chance at a livelihood. The interrelated issues that created the crisis – state fragility, poverty, competition over Lake Chad's overstretched resources, violent extremism, and so on – must be addressed comprehensively.

One major element of such an evolution must be a transition away from the Nigerian military's dominance in the northeast and restoration of civilian control of governance and security. Such a process will be complex and needs to take into account the origin and progression of the conflict, the key stakeholders and institutions involved, and the context in which they will interact.

Some 15 countries surveyed in 2011 by the U.S department of State, Nigeria ranked fifth. It also ranked the 15th in terrorism with 17 kidnappings reported (Ibrahim and Bala, 2018).

The first assumption of this paper is that the ongoing eleven-year Boko Haram insurgency is one of the most violent, destructive, and debilitating of the nation's internal security challenges since independence. The civil war of 1967 to 1970 often known as the Biafran War, had higher levels of casualties but was not as protracted.

The position is in tandem with Zulum (2019), who for example posits that:

The citizens driven out of their homes and villages, and, thus, denied their means of livelihood most important, the displacements, killings and destruction of the properties tore the fabric of the society and ushered in fear, feelings of insecurity, hopelessness and despise among the victims of insurgency and generality of the populace at large (p.42-P.43)

For a country and Lake Chad Basin region at large, security imperative should take over precedence over other objectives of public policy. It should include both immediate, medium-term and long-term strategies to manage, ameliorate and resolve the problems of insurgency in the region. This should include immediate livelihood needs of the populace, including adequate security for especially victims of insurgency and putting in place a social mechanism for reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation action plan for political solution through dialogue with all the stake holders.

The second assumption of this study is that, most West African countries and Lake Chad region in particular are weak in exercising control in locations that are far away from their National capitals. This weakness off sanctuary and the resurgence of Boko Haram activities and led to their control of the island of (Tumbes) of Lake Chad Basin and their alliance with members of Islamic State in the West African Provence (ISWAP). This is compounded by lack of government resources in these areas such as education.

Fundamentally, the assumption implies that the pursuit of regional cooperation and management of Boko Haram insurgency and the extent to which each state in the Lake Chad basin had different security responses to Boko Haram insurgents which created concerns over lack of coordination and cooperation was aimed at successfully countering Boko Haram insurgency.

Kerins and Mouaha Bell (2019) observes that, as the Boko Haram insurgency intensified around 2012, the countries of the Lake Chad Basin initially took different approaches to counter this threat, focusing on their own national interests.

Assanvo, (2018) asserts that, “Whereas Nigeria had carried out a military offensive to halt Boko Haram's territorial gains and retake the localities under the group's control from February 2015 onwards, Cameroon, Niger and Chad had sought instead to contain its expansionist tendencies.” These independent approaches limited the success of countering Boko Haram.

The Nigerian government's response therefore, has evolved from a limited police security operation to a large-scale, joint, combined security and civilian operation aimed at overcoming the country's limited capacity and geographic constraints. This multi-pronged approach began in 2012 with Operation RESTORE ORDER.

Nigerian military personnel, together with police units and the Department of State Security Special Forces, took part in Operation BOYONA. Its mandate was to secure the country's borders, destroy Boko Haram camps, and neutralize the organization's leaders. A number of interviews with soldiers in the Nigerian military, conducted in 2018, noted that this operation suffered from bureaucratic problems and lack of effective coordination, resulting in less-than-convincing results against Boko Haram. Consequently, in August 2013, this task force was supplemented by the creation of the Nigerian Army's 7th Division.

In July 2015, Operation ZAMAN LAFIYA was reorganized and later renamed Operation LAFIYA DOLE, which means “Peace by Force” in Hausa. Initially, Operation LAFIYA DOLE was successful in regaining control in some of the areas lost previously to Boko Haram, (International Crisis Group, 2014). Its accomplishments gradually created conditions that encouraged the return of civilians, governing officials, and civil servants to some parts of Borno State. This progress, however, was limited to some towns and small cities found along the major highways. LAFIYA DOLE prioritized the securing of transport routes and sought to avoid dangerous operations in populated areas. Operation RUWAN WUTA, launched in September 2017, involved extensive air strikes and achieved success in dispersing large groups of Boko Haram fighters. Operation DEEP PUNCH in the Sambisa Forest, also significantly degraded the logistic capability of Boko Haram.

Although the Nigerian military response reduced the potential impact of Boko Haram, overall security in Borno State lags far behind the rest of Nigeria. Nigeria's military operations against Boko Haram are summarized in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Major Nigerian Military Operations Against Boko Haram

Source: - Adapted from Kerins and Mouaha-Bell, 2018

Successes of Operation YANCIN TAFKI

Operation YANCIN TAFKI was aimed at conducting major offensive operations to destroy Boko Haram Terrorist's enclaves along Marte – Chikin Gudu Axis and Dorona Baga – Duguri – Tumbun Rago – Tumbun Gini Axis among other operational tasks. Following the marrying up of the Chadian troops of Sect 2 Multi-National Joint Task Force in March 2019, it was commenced with long range patrols by the combined troops of (Chad and Nigeria) which led to the neutralization of a key Boko Haram Terrorist Comd Mallam Mousa on March 19 alongside with some fighters and capture of another Commander Suleman Mohammed Garba aka Mallam Nasir and his 2 wives in March, 2019. Subsequently, Cross Kauwa was recaptured. The combined troops thereafter cleared critical staging areas such as Daban Masara, Ali Sherifti and environs. On 16 April 2019, BHTs launched an all-out attack on the combined troops at Cross Kauwa with the intent to recapture it. However, the BHTs assault was defeated with heavy casualties in men and

equipment as 40 BHTs were neutralized while 2-gun trucks, 9 AK47 Rifles, one HK 21 Machine Gun and 4 RPG tubes were captured. Similarly, in June 2019, troops of 145 Battalion in collaboration with troops of MNJTF (Niger) cleared Malkonory, Tumbun Rago and Arege neutralizing 23 BHTs and capturing 4-gun trucks while one VBIED was destroyed, (Biu 2019, p.4).

In June 2019, combined troops of Chad and Nigeria conducted further offensive operations into Baga and Doron Baga where 13 BHTs were neutralized while ammunition and fuel dumps discovered were destroyed. Additionally, in June 2019, the combined troops conducted clearance operations into Doro Naira. During the collaboration of the combined troops of Chad and Nigeria also yielded several dividends. Among the dividends is the stability and restoration of public confidence in major towns like Monguno, Gajiram, Gubio and Damasak. This has been achieved through combined long-range patrols to the notorious areas such as Badu and Gudumbali and physical deployment in Gajiram. Additionally, the security of main supply routes (MSR) such as MSR Monguno – Gajiram – Maiduguri have been enhanced by the regular combined patrols along the MSR and enclaves of BHTs. As a result, in October 2019, the BHTs were beaten in their own game when they ambushed the combined troops. The Chadian swift response emboldened own troops and together they dealt a decisive blow to the terrorists. Resultantly, 15 Boko Haram Terrorists were neutralized, 2-gun trucks were destroyed while one-gun truck and 4 AA guns were captured. So far over 149 BHTs/ISWAP members have been neutralized from March 2019 till date when regional cooperation commenced in earnest. Thus, the success story of Operation **YANCIN TAFKI** goes on and on vindicating the good intention of Head Quarters Multi-National Joint Task Force in conceptualizing the operation, (Biu, 2019, p.5)

Implication

The implication of this study on Borno state of Nigeria has brought to fore that political leadership under the presidential system of government in Nigeria since 1999 is typical of political leadership across the states of the federation. However, in the Northeast of Nigeria, especially Borno state, the nuclear of Boko Haram insurgency, it is a different ballgame. The emergency of insurgency was a game changer. Over the period of more than one decade of insurgency, both the political leadership itself and the security system were actually challenged and over stretched to say the least. Notwithstanding, the incalculable range on infrastructure. The governance resources and critical installation became under siege and weakened while citizens were displeased.

Despite the enormous success recorded so far in the conduct of regional cooperation, there have been some challenges that have hampered the smooth conduct of operations. Notably among the challenges have been funding, inadequate troops, dearth of equipment and lack of efficient coordination and utilization of air assets.

Most crucial of all, the loss of lives, displacements, hopelessness, despair and destruction of properties went beyond the coping mechanism of the state apparatus. These are fundamental realities that made leadership a game changer in Borno state from the rest of the countries not ravaged by Boko Haram insurgency.

Conclusion

Boko Haram insurgence's expansion and its cross boarder sporadic attacks into Niger, Cameroon and Chad have improved the relationship in countries of the Lake Chad region which has yielded several dividends. Among the dividends is the stability and restoration of public confidence in major towns like Monguno, Gajiram, Gubio and Damasak. This was basically realized through regional cooperation of troops contributing in Lake Chad Basin through effective patrol in

notorious and deadly places such as Badu and Gudum Bali. The regular troop patrols have been enhanced. With the establishment of Multi National Joint Task Force in 2016, the five countries of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin improved significantly. The conflict in northeast Nigeria is similar to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria, where jihadist groups have remained resilient against significant military operations to defeat them. While military operation can achieve temporary security, they do not address the underlying causes and grievance that produced the insurgency. A political solution is required for that, this does not mean, however, that the military cannot be part of the solution, or even lead the way. Through consultation and coordination of collective efforts with people and their community leaders by discussing with all stakeholders, including development partners, in exploring avenues for a lasting political solution. The concept of operations is no doubt comprehensive enough but regular review is necessary to achieve effective results. However, despite tactical successes against Boko Haram and increase in coordinated Multi-National operations, the Multi-National Joint Task Force is still plunged with resource issues, internal conflict, inadequate troops, dearth and command structure.

After several Multi National operation such as Rawan Kada and Amni Fakat which degraded Boko Haram insurgents considerably, the Multi-National Joint Task Force has not been able to fully defeat Boko Haram or IS-WA, and both organisations remain a threat to the stability of Lake Chad region.

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AN EXAMINATION OF DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

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Abstract

Nigeria is the largest democracy in Africa. In 1999, it returned to civil rule after years of military interregnum. The return was greeted with excitement, fanfare and expectations. The paper seeks, therefore, to interrogate the journey so far in Nigeria's democratic experience. The study adopts qualitative method with emphasis on secondary source of data gathering. Data was analysed using content analysis. The study finds out that democracy is not equal to development, and at the same time not a threat to it. It concludes that democracy has not brought expected development to Nigeria due to failure of both the leaders and the followers to build a system that engenders development. The paper, thus, recommends developmental democracy, democratic institutionalization, and socio-political restructuring among others for a positive democracy-development relation.

Key words: Democratic Governance, Diversification, Development, Toutocracy, Fourth Republic

Introduction

Democracy as a system of government is common in almost all countries of the world – both developed and developing. Globalization on cultural hybridization among nations has accentuated democratic trends. Democratic practices are becoming universalized as both equalitarian and majoritarian rule (Eke, 2005). Many scholars have reasoned that democratic principles are sine-qua-non to national development. This is, perhaps, after putting into consideration such democratic principles as liberty, rule of law, freedom of speech, etc. but most countries, especially in the developing countries, only sing democracy without adherence to its principles (Osi, 2003). Elections have been identified as an indispensable foundation of democracy. It has also been connected to development. Both democracy and development have been two of the major preoccupations not only in scholarly circles, but also in policy, development and advocacy environs in the last couple of decades. All the three –elections, democracy and development- have been troubled, most especially in practice and delivery on their promises, in both developed and developing democracies (Omotola, 2021).

The global trend of accepting democracy as the preferred form of government prompted the African political elite to embrace the paradigm shift from authoritarian regimes to civil rules. Although, there are still cases of authoritarianism in some states within the continent, the wider acceptability of democracy cannot be undermined. The popular pressures for entrenchment of democracy in Africa necessitated Nigeria's move to embrace civilian government devoid of military autocracy. Since Nigeria's political independence in 1960, the political transition has always been truncated via military incursion in the country's politics. However, the return to democratic system in 1999 after series of military rule ushered Nigeria to the current fourth republic which has been sustained for over two decades (Udeoji, 2021). *There has been contention whether development is a precondition for entrenchment of democracy or rather democracy serves as catalyst for development, which is very much unclear. Regardless of the answer, since the prodemocracy charges hit Africa since 1990s, democracy has not made substantial strides. There have still been huge issues of underdevelopment, corruption and mal-administration. Many*

have started scrutinizing the possibility of democracy been ideal for Africa.

Africa's economic performance remains dismal and prospect for the new millennium is bleak. The continent, consisting of 54 countries, is the least developed continent of the Third World despite its possessing immense wealth of mineral and natural resources. Compared with the Third World, development indicators of Africa have lagged persistently behind (Siyum, 2018). It is an indisputable fact that many decades after self-rule, a number of African countries are mired in a vicious circle of development crisis, characterized by poverty, stagnation, misery, violence and disruption, and these are often blamed on lack of resources. Unfortunately, the lack-of-resources thesis fails to explain why some natural resources-rich African countries such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola, among others, are shining examples of dysfunctional developmental failures.

Nigeria welcomed the reign of democracy in 1999. For her, the model of democracy that has been seen to have helped in transforming lives in the Western, Northern and other parts of the First World had come to stay. Thus, 1999 was an opportunity for Nigeria to also practice that paradigm that enabled development to emerge in such entities. Although Nigeria paved the way for democratic rule roughly two decades ago, the people still struggle to locate or fathom tangible dividends of this system of governance. Rather, what is glaring is the near failing state situation as manifested in the cases of injustices, insurgency, ethnic and other forms of rivalries, to mention but a few (Obinyan & Otoide, 2021).

Scholars like Friedman (1962) and Sylvia (2002) in Udeoji (2021) posit that durable democracy is strongly correlated with economic development, implying that political freedom is a function of economic freedom. Sharing the same view are the purveyors of neoliberalism and its political correlate such as: the international financial institutions; the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F), the World Bank; the African Development Bank (AfDB); and the international organizations like the Common Wealth of Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), among others. These international capitalist driven institutions are in unison that there is no substitute to a free-market economy and liberal democracy; and that both must go simultaneously.

The modern trend of scholars and practitioners' contention revolves around the usefulness of democracy to development. Basically, the paradigm is being shifted towards developmental indices as justification for the functionality of democracy as a system of government. This dimension reflects in Osagahae (2001) submission that democracy is contested across different regions within the global community. The point of Osagahae is that what is democratic in western societies might not be accepted to be democratic virtues in Asian region. To him, the Arab world understanding of democracy differs from the European analysis of the concept. Be that as it may, the best mechanism to measure democracy is development.

The synergy between democracy and good governance has been explored. Classical thinkers such as de Tocqueville (1961) viewed liberal democracies as the embodiment of reason and advancement that would greatly empower the labouring and disadvantaged sectors of society to press successfully to redress the gross socio-economic and political disparities.

It on the foregoing postulation that, this paper attempts to examine Nigerian democratic journey from 1999 to 2022.

Methodology

This paper adopted qualitative method using secondary sources like articles from reputable journals-local, national and international, gazette from government agencies, data from inter-governmental and non-governmental organization to examine democracy and development in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. It used content analysis in analyzing the data.

Theoretical Framework

This research work finds it suitable to use two theories in examining democracy vis-à-vis development of the Nigerian state in the Fourth Republic. The theories are: Motor Park Theory of Democracy and the Hanging State in Nigeria.

Motor Park Theory of Democracy

A South-eastern political scientist, Prof. Jonah Onuoha is the exponent of motor park theory of democracy. The Nigerian brand of democracy has given world intellectuals and local political think-tanks a reason to think that their basic or elementary definition of democracy is, after all, questionable and inadequate. Nigerian politicians, revere culture of impunity, snatch ballot boxes, loot public treasury, kill or kidnap their political opponents, engage in vote-buying and intimidation of the electorate. What type of theory can explain this political behaviour? Despite this obvious gap in the literature, Nigerian political scientists seem not to be worried (Onuoha, 2020). This theory is a novel effort to develop a framework that explains striking abnormality in the behaviour of leaders and followers in Nigerian political space. Motor park touts are a bunch of illiterate thugs, extortionists and notorious young men who work in the motor park. The theory identifies three personality traits about them (motor park touts). They are shameless, fearless and ruthless. On a deeper reflection, the theory likened average Nigerian politician with these touts as they have commonalities and share the same traits. It also identifies three categories of tout – tout-touts, corporate-touts and chief-touts. The strongest of them is chief-touts - they are political gladiators with paraphernalia for controlling the machinery of politics.

The tout theory is an attempt to explain our collective experience as a nation. The theory establishes that Nigeria practices *toutocracy* not democracy. That is, government of the touts, by the touts and for the touts. It is a perverted version of model democratic theories and practice. The theory is a relevant lens that could be used in viewing democratic character of Nigeria and predominant culture of Nigerian political players at all levels.

The Hanging State in Nigeria

Wale Are Olaitan, a Nigerian born and bred professor of Political Science evolved the hanging state theory of state/Nigeria. This theory is an attempt to give a new conception of the Nigerian state as a result of inadequacies of the existing conceptions. The theory identifies vagueness and lack of empirical roots in those conceptions. It is rooted on specific history, movement and growth of the Nigerian State, thus the theory is a concrete and historical intellectual elucidation (Olaitan, 1993).

The thrust of this theory is commercial capitalist nature of the Nigerian state; a situation where a country principally rests on commercial capitalism with a tangential relation to the process of production. It derives its revenue from imposition of import duties and other forms of tariff than taxes on the people and services. The Nigeria state survives mainly not from revenue derivable from productive sector of the economy, but on oil rent. Put differently, the theory explains a scenario of a state not surviving on the principal process of social reproduction within its territory. That is, Nigerian state and Nigerian society are not productively linked. Thus, Nigeria survives largely because of the goodwill it enjoys from international system, instead of getting its life sustenance from society. The hanging status of the Nigerian state is that, it is not productively linked to its society; it does not survive primarily on the productive contribution by its citizens but, it relates tangentially to the process of social reproduction of the vast majority of its citizens. It barely concerns itself in activities outside the oil sector where most of its citizens derive their livelihood.

The implication is, citizens regard the state with indifference and antagonism. The resources are regarded as nobody's resources within the notion of clientele politics and impunity. The state does not possess moral basis to legitimately enforce its laws; and people do not respect the laws. The theory asserts that relationship between the state and society in Nigeria has really been

characterized by disharmony, contradiction and lack of recognition of the necessity of interdependence because of nature of the state. As such, Nigerians are not interested in paying tax since the state does not affect their productive process. Citizens are not critical on how government revenues are expended; a situation that fertilizes corrupt practices; inhibits good governance and endangers democracy and development.

The hanging theory is a valid and relevant framework in discussing democracy and development in Nigeria as the citizens (both the leaders and the followers) and the state determine path to development or ruination of state.

Development

Development is a multi-dimensional process involving major changes in social structures, political attitudes and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of absolute poverty (Ersson, 1997). It is basically about the people reaching an acceptable standard of living, a condition possible only when they have the basic things on which they need to live decently. These include housing, shelter, clothing, food-nutritionally balanced diet, portable water, clean environment, etc.

The concept of development has been variously defined by scholars as such there is no one acceptable definition of development. The earliest conception of development was based on economic development. Economic development was the main feature of development. It was believed that economic growth would not only result in an increasing personal income but also a higher quality of life. Economic growth is measured using the Gross National Product (GNP). This is an approximate measure of the total value of goods and services produced by an economy for a year. Overtime, it was discovered that the correlation between economic growth and improvement in standard of living was inconclusive. Therefore, it became unjustifiable to use economic growth as a measure of development. This fact is caused by an uneven distribution of gains from economic growth as those who were rich became richer and the poor became poorer. This led to a shift to a more holistic definition of development (Ugbem, 2019).

Development is a multifaceted concept encapsulating widespread improvements in social as well as material wellbeing of all in society. The United Nations (UN) views development as follows: A more equitable distribution of income and wealth for promoting both social justice and efficiency of production, to achieve a greater degree of security and to expand and improve facilities for education, health, nutrition, housing and social welfare, and to safeguard environment. The qualitative and structural changes in society must go hand-in-hand with rapid economic growth, and existing disparities – regional, sectoral and social – should be substantively reduced. These objectives are both determining factors and end results of development (Ugbem, 2019). This definition is inclusive as it focuses on qualitative and quantitative improvements in standard of living of individuals and a society. It furthermore underpins the elimination of conditions that inhibit social and economic wellbeing and also emphasizes the distribution of public goods in such a way that disparities are significantly reduced.

Todaro (2009), defines development as a multidimensional process involving the reorganisation and re-orientation of the entire economic and social systems. To him, development is a physical reality as well as a state of mind which society has through the combination of social, economic and political process secured the way of obtaining a better life. Rogers and Rogers (1994) conceive development as a long participatory process of social change in the society whose objective is the material and social progress for the majority of population through a better understanding of their environment. This definition furthermore emphasizes the organisation of resources in society to ensure equitable distribution of goods and services as well as the enhancement of the standard of living of the members of the society. The definition also shows that development is a process as well as a condition.

On the whole, development refers to a planned process of social change as well as a condition of qualitative and quantitative social wellbeing. Various theoretical explanations have been advanced by development scholars. The modernisation perspective which owes its origin to the western scholars emphasizes a top-bottom approach to improvement in standard of living and structural differentiation while the dependency perspective owes its origin to scholars of the developing countries. It advances external causation to third world underdevelopment and emphasizes a bottom approach to development. These two perspectives have formed the basis of many development strategies that have been adopted in many developing countries over time. Many times, these efforts have been manned by corruption, nepotism as well as lack of proper planning and implementation.

Democracy

Eke (2005), perceives democracy from the prism of representation through a periodically organized free and fair election. Roskin, in Eke (2005), aptly states that democracy is a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office. Shively in Eze (2015), views democracy as a state in which all full adult citizens vote at regular intervals to choose, from among alternative candidates, the people who will be in charge of setting the state policies.

Appadorai (1968), in Ofoeze (2002), categorizes the fundamental principles of democracy to include political equality and majority rule. From these definitions of democracy, it is easy to believe the liberal scholars that democracy facilitates national development as its nature connotes. However, viewed from the Marxists prism democracy is seen as a government practice that guarantees the control of policymaking by those who control the substructure of society. To the Marxists, what the liberals see as the majority is a reflection of the few. The view of the Marxists on democracy is actually what plays out in developing nations.

According to Osi (2003), the liberal democratic formula was not the appropriate panacea for the development of Nigeria considering her endogenous factors. Perhaps, there would have been some embellishments to get it ("Africanized"). Uga (2000), argues that democracy is not a potted plant, which can be transplanted into any soil and grown without work. That implies that Nigeria democracy must be natured before it entrenches, to warrant any form of development. Ejiiofor in Eke (2005), corroborates this position, that the premise of the social condition of democracy in developing depends on the enabling capacity of these societies to harbor the tenets of democracy as a necessary first – steps to development.

For democracy to engender national development, there must be sincere effort at institutionalizing democracy which leads to turning the economy around, redressing our battered educational system; mending our traumatized psyche, replacing current disillusionment among our people with healthy skepticism; ensuring rapid expansion of our technological bases, tracking the current unacceptable and intolerable level of poverty; transforming our rural areas into centers of production; and cementing unity rather than fanning the embers of disunity in our country (Osinachi, 2009).

Democracy is a *political movement that involves incremental improving in accountability, electoral competition, activism and expansion of civil liberty* (Potter, 2000). For Whitehead (2002), in **Ogbulafor, Iwundu, Fidelis, Emmanuel, & Mojirayo (2018)**, democratisation is a complex process that involves political competition and the transition from one state to the other can be brought about rapidly, unambiguously and permanently, provided some of the prescribed institutional changes are implemented. Such changes, when effected, are expected to yield a democratic society where democratic ideals will prevail (Omotola, 2007).

What then makes one society democratic and the other not? To effectively engage such elements, it

is apposite to begin with a conceptualisation of democracy. Democracy as a system of government stresses the sovereignty of the people. Schumpeter (1967) in Omotola (2021) opines that democracy entails that 'institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions, which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals, who are to assemble in order to carry out its will'. Held (2006) shares similar views when he views democracy as a 'means to self-fulfilment', as 'a means to an end', which 'serves to protect the liberty of citizens and to maintain the minimum public goods (the rule of law, electoral politics, a safety net, security) necessary for citizens to go about their self-chosen ends and objectives.

Diamond (2008) submits that a system would be classified as democratic if it ensures the following attributes:

- Substantial individual freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, broadcast, assembly, demonstration, petition, and (why not) the internet;
- Freedom of ethnic, religious, racial, and other minority groups (as well as historically excluded majorities) to practice their religion and culture and to participate equally in political and social life;
- The right of all adult citizens to vote and to run for office (if they meet certain minimum age and competency requirements);
- Genuine openness and competition in the electoral arena, enabling any group that adheres to constitutional principles to form a party and contest for office;
- Legal equality of all citizens under a rule of law, in which the laws are “clear, publicly known, universal, stable, and non-retroactive”;
- An independent judiciary to neutrally and consistently apply the law and protect individual and group rights;
- Thus, due process of law and freedom of individuals from torture, terror, and unjustified detention, exile, or interference in their personal lives, by the state or non-state actors;
- Institutional checks on the power of elected officials, by an independent legislature, court system, and other autonomous agencies;
- Real pluralism in sources of information and forms of organizations independent of the state; and thus, a vibrant “civil society”;
- Control over the military and state security apparatus by civilians who are ultimately accountable to the people through elections.

These attributes are important in locating the level of democratic ethos imbibed a a country and her citizens for an all-inclusive development.

Democracy and Development in Nigeria

The debates revolve around whether democracy promotes or retards development. There is a revolving debate whether democracy enhances or retards development. The legendary Political Scientist, Samuel P. Huntington, appropriately classified this dichotomy into the 'compatibility' and 'conflict' perspectives. Empirical illustrations are drawn from key indices of the economy to show that Nigeria's brand of democracy has not really promoted economic development. Specifically, I focus on data for the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), poverty level, inequality, life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, unemployment and debt crisis (Omotola, 2021).

a) Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth Rate

GDP growth rate is one of the major indicators of economic growth, which sets the foundation for economic development of any country. According to study conducted by Omotola (2021), fluctuation in GDP has been evident from data attributable to Nigeria since the return to

democracy in 1999 till 2020. In particular, the real GDP growth for 2020 was -1.8%. However, it has tended to decrease through 1999 to 2020 period ending at -1.8% in 2020. Equally, the country experienced a negative value of -1.6% in 2016. It was in this year that the country experienced a negative growth for three consecutive quarters, leading the country into a devastating economic recession. Again, it was equally discovered that the growth rate of the GDP turned upward after the debt forgiveness in 2005 up till 2010 before it started declining. The reasons for the decline and fluctuations between 1999 and 2020 are many, notably the mono-economy nature of the country, weak institutions, lack of mutual interaction between democracy and development and lately, the effect of COVID 19 pandemic across the globe (Omotola, 2021).

b) Poverty Level

Poverty is a major indicator of underdevelopment. Data were presented in a multiple bar chart to compare different levels of poverty in Nigeria for selected years. It shows that the percentage of the population leaving below \$1.90 per day rose under the military rule from 22.8 in 1985 to 28.6 in 1992 and 32.4 in 1996, but declined under democracy to 23.2 and 23.4 in 2003 and 2009 respectively and 12.4 in 2018. Although the percentage of the population captured in poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 appears to be higher, similar trend can be observed (Omotola, 2021).

The percentage of the population under \$5.50 poverty headcount significantly show the enduring level of inequality that will be further discussed. The high number of people living in poverty is indicative that all the anti-poverty interventions of the government have been counter-productive.

According to report by the World Poverty Clock (2018) indicates that Nigeria has not only “overtaken India as the country with the most extreme poor people in the world”, but has remained the top most country with extreme poverty in Africa. Thus, no fewer than 86.9 million Nigerians, representing nearly 50% of its estimated 180 million population now wallows in extreme poverty. The current efforts to lift more Nigerians out of extreme poverty is clearly indication that the successive Nigerian governments mismanaged the country's vast oil riches via incompetence and corruption, though the present regime is yet to actualize its mission on poverty reduction (Udeoji, 2021).

c) Economic Inequality

Economic inequality is inimical to political and economic development. Economic growth becomes meaningful and translates into development when the proceeds are fairly evenly distributed among the populace. It was revealed that as at 2018, the highest 20% of Nigeria's population holds or controls 42.4% of total national income. The data also showed that the proportion of national income held by the lowest 20% class of the Nigerian population averaged 5.32% from 1985 to 2018 for about 10,393,684 of the overall population. Surprisingly, the income share of the highest 20% of the Nigeria population averaged 48.03% over the same period, representing 9,384,272 million of the total population, which is substantially less than those in the lowest income share. These data indicate that the gap between the lowest 20% and the highest 20% is very wide, amounting to 175, 592, 044 million. That is, the gap between the lowest income and the highest is 17 times.

The situation in Nigeria suggests that income inequality is widespread, with the proportion of those in the lowest rung of the ladder large enough to undermine democracy and development. The lowest 20% of the population controls only 7.1% of national income during the same period, 2018. When aggregated, while the highest 20% of the population controls 42.4% of national income in 2018, the remaining 80% put together holds 57.6%. This is the crux of the matter, underscoring widespread inequality in the distribution of economic growth (GDP). This equally contravenes the Median Voter Models as posited by Persson and Tabellini (1994) in Omotola

(2021) which suggest that democracy generates the redistribution of income in a country, if properly harnessed.

d) Life Expectancy

Life expectancy at birth is an indicator of the average number of years one is expected to live. The data for Nigeria since independence in 1960 as presented in Figure 9 have been disturbing, standing at 37.41 years in 1961, and incrementally rose to 54.6 in 2019. For the first decade of democracy under the fourth republic, it was always below 50, except in 2009 when it stood at 50.4 years.

According to the above source, for instance, in 2019, Algeria had the highest life expectancy in Africa where a new born infant was expected to live for 78 years. This was followed by Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritius, each with a life expectancy of 76 years. Of the 54 countries included in the database, 42 of them had a life expectancy of 60 years and above. Nigeria's 54.6 years during the same period ranked among the lowest, occupying the third last position, after Central African Republic and Lesotho with a life expectancy of 53 and 54 years respectively over the same period (Omotola, 2021).

e) Education (Adult Literacy)

Education is an important determinant of democracy and development. It is a pre-requisite for the survival and success of democracy. It is also seen as a fundamental factor of development because of its abilities to raise people's productivity and creativity, and promotes entrepreneurship and technological advances (Brende, 2015). Level of education of any country is usually measured by a number of indices such as school enrolment and adult literacy. Using both indicators, Nigeria has not really fared well. As Figure 10 reveals, adult literacy fluctuated across the years. After an initial positive showing of 54.7% at the national level in 2003, rising to 70.1% in 2006, it plummeted to 51.6% in 2008 and rose again to 62% in 2018. The trend was the same for male and female, the only difference being that the literacy level of male was higher than female's; and higher than the national average in all cases.

The situation seems worse for school enrolment. As at 2013, data from UNICEF reveal that 'one in every five of the world's out-of-school children is in Nigeria'. The data further reveal that about 10.5 million children aged 5-14 are not in school in Nigeria; and that 'only 61 percent of 6-11 year-olds regularly attend primary school and only 35.6 percent of children aged 36-59 months receive early childhood education'. This is in spite of the fact that primary education is officially free and compulsory in the country (British, Council, 2014; UNICEF, 2013). The situation may have been accentuated by years of Boko Haram insurgency and rural banditry in the north east and north west/central respectively (Omotola, 2021)

e) Unemployment Level

High level of unemployment is an indicator of underdevelopment. Though always on the high side, the situation would appear to have been deteriorating under democracy, especially since 2014. The total number of labour force in Nigeria rose from 32 million in 1990 to 62.2 million in 2020. It is evident from the study that a large proportion of this population is not gainfully employed. Specifically, the total percentage of unemployment of the nation was between 3.5% and 4% of the total labour force between 1991 and 2013. The trend of the percentage of the unemployed labour force surpassed 4% in 2014 and 2015, and rose further to 7.06% in 2016. It was between 8.39% and 8.53% of the labour force between 2017 and 2019, and 9.01% in 2020. By implication, more than 5.6 million of Nigeria's labour force (working age) are unemployed in 2020. This did not account for those that are underemployed, which constitute a significant portion of the employed labour force (Omotola, 2021).

Daniel Treisman posits that economic development set the stage for democracy (Achemoglu, Naidu, Restropo & Robinson, 2019). Contrarily, Robert Barro asserts that democracy is not the key

to economic growth as more political rights do not influence growth. China is the case study available for this. China is only second to the USA in terms of GDP and it could surpass it soon if it continues with the pace it runs (Schmidt, 2019).

There is a definite correlation between the lack of democratic practices, development in African politics and the deteriorating socio-economic conditions. If governments are not accountable to the people, then they are less likely to pursue socio-economic development. The linkage that exists between democracy and economy is therefore two-dimensional. While democracy has a tendency to lead to economic development, it can also be argued that without a sound economic base democracy can hardly survive in any social formation. By and large, democracy and development in Nigeria is seen to have reflected limited progress in revitalizing economies or alleviating poverty in the country.

A political scientist, Professor Emeritus, Richard Sklar's view on 'developmental democracy', is that democracy is the best type of government with the most noteworthy ability to ensure advance and development of Africans. Developmental democracy, then again, holds that the estimation of democracy lies in its commitment to national and individual improvement. Essential qualities of democracy are freedom of speech, and commitment regarding the improvement of individual, allowing citizens to get involve in governance (Bassey & Udoudon, 2018). Linz and Stephen corroborate that democracy guarantees development in any society. They contend that the essentials of a democracy include its ability to regulate social conduct, the creation of strong political institutions, the presence of a strong civil society and pressure groups, a strong and rational bureaucracy and an economic regime with a strong private sector base, increased production and economic growth (Linz & Stephen, 1997).

Contrarily, the USAID's report (2012), posits that democracy is not strictly essential for development just as bad governance is possible under formal democratic structures. It however concedes that free, fair, and competitive elections do make it possible to remove bad or corrupt political leaders. Obinyan and Otoide (2021), aver that democracy whose templates and practice have helped in liberating, emancipating, developing other nations appears to have failed in Nigeria, reason being that democracy and its processes have been hijacked by a set of people who are not capable of anything but overseeing bad governance. Instead of practicing the ideals of democracy that have led to massive development and growth in other climes, a caricature of that democracy is what is been practiced.

Equally, Gberegbyie (2009), asserts that past governments failed in the area of development and peaceful co-existence of Nigerians due to their non-adherence to democratic values and application of the principle of true fiscal federalism. Ogbonna (2012), amplifies this that even though Nigeria has recorded a long breadth of democratization, the development imperative of democracy is not only thin, but the polity suffers from the potentialities of reversal. Babalola (2018), notes that as long as Nigeria keeps having followership that demands patronage, handout and favours, search for true leadership will be long and winding. He queried, how can a society get a true leadership fix when the people celebrate failed leaders? Economically, Nigeria is dependent – it is also a mono-cultural and consumptive economy (Udoh, 2017). Political instability resulting from a dysfunctional economy and insecurity has reduced foreign investment. So also is institutional decay and complete inundation of the social, legal and general business environment. Unsteady power supply and high crime wave all hold Nigeria economy stagnant. Lack of industrialization, inability to diversify, and under-developed rural segments, have combined to undermine economic development (Bassey, 2016).

Summarily, Omotola (2021), Obinyan and Otoide (2021), and Gberegbyie (2009) observed that democracy has failed to engender economic development in Nigeria. Babalola (2018) considered inanity of the follower ship is the bane to development. A situation where citizens applaud failed leaders for sentimental and selfish reasons. USAID (2012) contend that

democracy is not a guarantee for economic prosperity as less democratic regimes eg, China, favourably compete with liberal democracies. This view was also affirmed by Robert and Barro (in Bassey Y Udoudon, 2018). It can be inferred from the above that, what brings development is beyond democracy, and democracy is not a hindrance to development. High quality of followership is as important as good leadership. Development does exist in the blue; this underlies development-friendly policies and environment. Thus, democracy is not the problem of Nigeria; but Nigerians, both leaders and followers are problems to democracy and development.

Discussions

Challenges to a viable democracy and development in Nigeria are similar to those of other African countries. These challenges include lack of civil society involvement, absence of political will, institutional weakness and corruption among others. From our findings in the course of this paper the factors hampering a successful democratization in Nigeria are mainly corruption, malpractices and inadequate professionalism in the Press, weakness of state institutions, electoral malpractices and political intimidations, and weakness of the civil society.

According to Greg Mills, Africa's poverty is not because of a lack of capital, access to world markets, technical experts or the unfair global economic system, it is rather because African leaders have made bad choices that keep the continent in abject poverty (Poncian & Mgya, 2015).

It is revealed from the literature that Nigerian democratic practice is problematic and faulty. It betrays the expectation of the citizens that invested much hope in it for socio-economic and political transformation. It does not work for Nigeria the same way it works for other countries especially the First World's. From which ever perspective development is viewed, economic point of view or more holistic view, the story would not have changed for Nigerians to tell. Observing from Omotola's (2021) previously discussed analysis of indicators of development, education, employment, life expectancy and GDP among others, Nigeria is scored low. This is, in addition to other indicators of underdevelopment – corruption, nepotism, inefficiency, insecurity, ethnicity... in recent times, the disturbing political development in Nigerian democratic experience is trending national insecurity that challenges survival of Nigeria as a sovereign nation.

All this rises concern on the suitability or otherwise of democracy to Nigeria. it is an irony that Nigerians believe that past military regimes were more glorious than civil rule as witnessed from 1999 to date. It is more ironical that Nigerians experience economic hardship despite several windows of empowerment by current administration.

A reflection of the tout theory advanced by Jonah Onuoha (2020), as earlier discussed helps us to see that democracy as a system is not the crux of the matter but the idiosyncratic variables of democratic players (both the leaders and the followers) in Nigeria's political space. In reality, ethos and essentials of model democracy are virtually non-existent down here. Politicians are not restrained by any known democratic principle. Rather, their philosophy on politics is Machiavellian where the ends, justifies the means.

The second theory, the hanging state in Nigeria, vividly exposes the character of the state, the leaders and the commoners. State-economy relation is antagonistic and disarticulated; a classic case of mutual hatred where both sides failed in their responsibility. Nigerian state fails to reckon with its citizens by providing enabling environment where production thrives and citizens in reacting to that care little about what the state does or not as much government revenue is derived from the crude oil royalty typical of a profiteering rental state. Thus, democratic values of accountability and transparency as well as responsiveness are endangered.

Recommendations

Based on the foregoing, the following recommendations were made to reposition Nigeria for

socio-political and economic development:

- Propping of developmental state. The developmental states are known by emphasizing on technical education and economic nationalism. Emphasis on technical education fosters youth employment. With this, China growing population is being absorbed by domestic and foreign corporation. Developmental state is characterized by development-oriented political leadership bound together by a powerful economic and political ideology focused on development.
- The culture of over-dependence on oil rent for survival is not sustainable, there is serious need for economic diversification and industrialization; this will not only make the country viable but also improve governance as citizens/tax payers will be interesting on how their contribution to national coffer is spent.
- To record meaningful development, politico-economic restructuring is a desideratum. The culture of centrally pooled revenue has made component government to be complacent and indolent by ignoring inward potential to generate revenue for development of their respective states. Fiscal federalism will strengthen democracy and foster accountability, responsibility and development.
- Democratic institutionalization should be focal point of all stakeholders in governments. The implication of this is independent judiciary and electoral body, legislative functionality, press freedom... To achieve this requires a strong, capable and committed leadership that will preside over the constitutional engineering, if need be, to this regard.

Conclusion

This paper explored synergy between democracy and development in Nigeria. It is established that Nigeria is underdeveloped notwithstanding its democratic claims. All indicators of good governance are abysmally negative, which is a striking revelation that democracy is not equal to development and Nigeria's democracy is highly deficient. China, Russia and other remnants of former USSR have significant record of economic development in spite of their abuse of democratic fundamentals. Also, there is possibility of bad governance in a formal democratic structure. The paper concludes that, democratic practice has not lived up to the expectation of the masses. It has not resolved development crisis in Nigeria, nay, it is a tortuous experience with unsettling challenges. Democracy is not an end in its self, but a means to an end. Nigeria's inglorious economic status is a political problem that involved both leaders and followers for their inability to foster a system that engenders development, being it democracy or non-democratic.

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HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A NIGERIAN PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

This paper examines human trafficking and its implication on and national security from a Nigerian perspective. Data are collected from secondary sources while the content is critically analyzed and human security approach adopted as a theoretical framework. It observes that a significant relationship exists between human trafficking and national security globally due mainly to the fact that human trafficking thrives on corruption on the part of the government, greed on the part of the traffickers because of the mouth-watering profit it attracts, and poverty, lack of freedom to live in dignity and without fear of want on the part of the victims. From a Nigerian perspective, the paper argues that since national security is undermined by the inhuman acts, illicit wealth and transnational organised crimes that go *pari passu* with human trafficking, the international community should raise above sentiment and sincerely collaborate to end it as it did to the transatlantic slave trade. It recommends that since Nigeria is one of the signatories to most international treaties against human trafficking, hence, it should try to beef up its national security, and collaborate effectively with the international community to end the illicit business.

Keywords: Human security, human trafficking, illicit domestic and international business, national security, Nigeria

Introduction

Trafficking in humans is one of the fastest growing illicit activities and businesses in the contemporary world which although is different from the historic Trans Atlantic Slave Trade (TAST) has an aspect of it. "Traffickers' exploitative practices affect every country in the world,...by diminishing and destroying our communities, sense of security, and the global economy" (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Human trafficking is considered to be the third largest source of profit for organized crime apart from drugs and arms (UNI-ICR, 2000). Human trafficking, like money laundering, advanced fee fraud, cyber scams and illicit trade in arms and narcotics has elicited a great concern as a contemporary social problem worldwide (Poulin, 2004). The United Nations in 2008 estimated that nearly 2.5million people from 127 different countries were being trafficked into 137 countries around the world (UN 2008). Researchers and experts also concur that human trafficking is nothing but organized crime with the total market value estimated at about \$32 billion (South African Government Information, 2009).

International awareness of the scourge of human trafficking has over the years especially since after the Cold War when attention has shifted from state security to human security increased considerably following the fact that "Whether in the military or non military dimensions, human security is the most important strategic goal and the value of any responsible and responsive

government" (Akpuru-Aja, 2020, p. 35). Human trafficking is inimical to human security anywhere it takes place in the world in the sense that it is against the human persons security and that is why responsible governmental and non-governmental institutions, agencies and organisations the world over are against it. The illegal trade occupies a prominent position among the social ills that pervade the Nigerian Society (Ofuoku, 2010) as well as some countries in the world. While it may appear that the problem seems more endemic in the southern part of Nigeria, there are indications that no part of the country is completely immune to this social malaise that has ravaged many countries in the world (UNICRI, 2004).

Human trafficking for many people, observes the U.S. Department of State (2021), evokes images of women and children being forcibly taken and sold into slavery by strangers, or of people locked in rooms or vehicles far from home. In a wider sense, it includes so but can better be understood if it is also conceived largely as a form of modern slavery on account of its resemblance to the Trans Atlantic Slave Trade. This is largely behind the usage of terms such as "human trafficking," "trafficking in persons" and "modern slavery" often interchangeably in referring to "a crime whereby traffickers exploit and profit at the expense of adults and children by compelling them to perform labour or engage in commercial sex" (U.S. Department of State, April 26, 2022)." Slavery as an institution was abolished in the 19th century, and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibiting slavery or servitude recognizes the rights of all human beings to live a life of freedom and dignity. Following the abolition of slave trade more than two centuries ago, about 300 international protocols and conventions prohibiting and criminalizing slavery and slave trade in any form have been signed and adopted by nation states (Goliath, 2008; Time Magazine, 2001) including Nigeria. But the recent global economic crunch, poverty, social and political conflicts, wars, natural disasters and the contemporary climate change have profoundly influenced the alarming dimension with which people are being pulled—up as clients for human traffickers (UNHCR, 2000). This alarming increase in human trafficking and the social, political and economic ills that it engenders have induced considerable attention of the international community such as the United Nations Organization (UNO), International Labour Organization (ILO), international Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Children and Education Fund (UNICEF), the United States among others. Thus, it is to contribute to the effort at addressing this protracting issue of concern to the world at large and Nigeria in particular that this article is written hence its title, human trafficking, human security and national security: a Nigerian perspective.

From the Nigerian perspective, the paper argues that since human and national security are in jeopardy in Nigeria and elsewhere, human trafficking being a contributing factor to this because of the threat to human lives, outright loss of human lives and the associated social and economic crimes that go with it, national governments, international governmental and non-governmental organizations should collaboratively fight the illicit business to a decisive end as was done during the historical Trans Atlantic Slave Trade (TAST), the benefits notwithstanding. Nigeria should strive to be part of this history when it will be made. Until this end is achieved, the issue of human trafficking will continue to be a subject of grave concern to the world and as such, a subject of research for scholars, policy makers, human security crusaders and the like. Obviously, we are talking and will continue to talk on human trafficking because it is a trendy issue. For the sake of comprehension, the paper is structured from here in the following order: methodology; theoretical framework; conceptual analysis; trends and patterns of human trafficking in Nigeria; effects of human trafficking on human and national security; conclusion and recommendation.

Methodology

This research is qualitatively approached as it is observed that qualitative analysis in separate literature on the issues of human trafficking, human security and national security do exist. What is scarce though is extant literature on the nexus between human trafficking, human security and national security especially as they pertain to Nigeria. Data for the paper are dominantly from secondary sources. Against this backdrop, the *ex post facto* (after the fact) research design is considered suitable for the paper as critical content analysis is employed to provide an exploratory and descriptive analysis of the secondary data collected. This follows the steps adopted by some social scientists in their various studies which have been widely accepted and acknowledged as being authentic and reliable. For instance, Nnam, Ugwoke, Njemanze and Akwara (2020) have adopted the step in their study of the matters arising from the nexus between boko haram terrorism and human security in Nigeria citing some other scholars such as Haralambos, Holborn and Heald (2008). The relevance of citing these sources lies on the fact that when conducting a research of this nature according to Nnam, Ugwoke, Njemanze and Akwara (2020), the main focus is on content analysis, particularly thematic analysis, which Pawson as recorded by Haralambos, Holborn and Heald (2008, p. 842) described in the following words: The usual strategy is to pick on a specific area ... and subject it to a very detailed analysis in the hope of unearthing the underlying purposes and intentions of the authors of the communication (see Nnam, Ugwoke, Njemanze and Akwara, 2020, p. 8).

On this ground, the secondary data used in this work are those that are publicly and widely accepted as authentic and reliable sources of information which in no narrow ways, have been scrutinised and licensed by national and international authorities. In making this paper, these secondary data were further scrutinised and critically analysed by the authors before arriving at the point of presentation. The secondary sources through which the facts were collected include those from the print and electronic media such as books, journals, newspapers, government official publications such as those of the U.S. Department of States, international organisations publications such as those from the UNDP, UNHD Report, UNODC, UNESCO.

Theoretical Framework

This paper is approached from the Koffi Annan's three pillars of human security as articulated by Akpuru-Aja (2020) namely; freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. Human security is a pre-21st century concept which according to Nnam, Ugwoke, Njemanze and Akwara (2020) was officially introduced in the early 1990s by peace and security advocates following the end of the Cold War. Since then, an increasingly large voices of people, students, scholars and diplomats have been calling for the placing of people, the human persons at the centre of domestic and international relations, a fact which is embedded in Koffi Annan's call that there is need for the entire international community to work together in order to better the lives of the people who are still left behind due to problems of war, poverty and their like. As a reminder to that call, many years after, this paper is calling on the Nigerian state and the international community to work together in order to better the lives of these vulnerable people who easily fall prey to the traffickers because of their conditions especially at this critical moment when the state of human insecurity (for example fear, poverty, hunger and want) in Nigeria is worsening and by so being, making many people to be desperate for survival, and the traffickers and their collaborators having a field day.

The shift from emphasis on traditional concept of security which entails the absence of threats, danger or crisis in a nation-state to human security whose goal is people centered is predicated on

the belief that without human security there cannot be stability within and outside the state. In essence, human security to a large degree determines the stability of the state. A deduction from this is that a human-centred security network within and outside the state has the potential of providing national security in Nigeria and by extension, internationally. The paper applies human security as a theoretical framework to its analysis due mainly to the fact that human trafficking as a subject and issue of concern to many has a disturbing relationship with human security framework which centres more directly on the protection of people, the scope of their freedom within society, their access to market and social opportunities (UNDP, 1994). Nigeria is indeed in a state of worsening national security and this consequently has generated human security issues that beg for urgent solutions, one of them being human trafficking. Based on this, the concept of human security attempts to provide an overarching framework through which the fundamentally interconnected and cumulative nature of the global processes and their impact on people's security on a world scale can easily be understood (Ahmed, 2004) and addressed.

Conceptual Analysis

Human trafficking

Human trafficking is the illegal trade in human beings for the purposes of commercial, sexual exploitation or forced labour. "The Trafficking Protocol defines human trafficking as:

The recruitment, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of (above) vulnerability, of the giving or receiving of payment or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery servitude or the removal of organs (United Nations Protocol to prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in persons especially Women and Children)

The crime of trafficking in persons is carried out by different types of traffickers, ranging from individuals exploiting their partner to organized criminal groups operating across national borders. Trafficking in persons is usually thought of as a transnational organized crime (United Nations Protocol to prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in persons especially Women and Children). And indeed, many trafficking outfits meet the criteria of transnational organized crime groups, as spelled out in the United Nations Convention against Transnational organized Crime (United Nations Protocol to prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in persons especially Women and Children). Aspects of the crime are often committed in different countries by criminals not necessarily from the same country where the crime was detected. These criminals organized themselves to a greater extent. In some cases the complexity of the crime requires a relatively high level of organization. In other cases, victims may have been trafficked by an individual or group of individuals operating in a local community.

Profits generated from human trafficking serves as the prime motive for criminals who exploit other people. In fact, as Profit potential is an important consideration for most legitimate business, so it is for traffickers, who have a strong financial incentive to operate where profits are high. Traffickers choose to carry out their exploitation in a location where there is more profit. They have taken into account costs and risk of detection, which tends to increase as more territory and international borders are traversed. In 2005, Patrick Beiser of international Labour Organization estimated a global annual profit of \$31.6 billion (Belser, 2005). For example, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) focuses on the criminal justice element of crimes that include human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants. In 1999, it proposed a "Global Program against

Trafficking in Human Beings” that would focus on the role of organized crime groups in smuggling and trafficking and on time development of criminal justice— related responses (UNODC, 1999). In May 2011 it issued a report on organized crime's role in smuggling West African migrants into the EU (UNODC 2011). The UN office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights states at the outset On its website that

At a time when some 214 million people are on the move globally, the UN Human Rights office has identified migration as a priority and is working to identify the protection gaps in law, policy and practice that leave migrants vulnerable to abuse at international borders (UNODC 2011:25).

The vulnerability of prospective victims is exploited in many respects; the victims most of whom are pre-teens, teenagers and mostly females are taken away from their homelands to cities within or their countries.

Many of them are engaged in cheap labour as domestic servants, hawkers, beggars, and commercial sex workers. A common narrative on human trafficking is one of organised criminal networks run by gangs of profiteering criminal often involved in other forms of organised border crime such as drug smuggling or gun running as the image from Dr Helga Konrad head of trafficking at the OSCE depicts:

People are abused as commodities by a transnational criminal industry-the profits of which have been found to be so high that some of the criminals are moving away from drug trafficking into this modern form of slave trade or profit even further by using the trafficked persons as manpower for other criminal purposes such as trafficking or selling drugs or weapons' (Konrad, 2005:15).

Organised criminal networks are well developed and play a role in many trafficking cases in Nigeria. There are three types of trafficker:

1. Professional Traffickers: Typically they approach victims or their family with offers of facilitating travelling abroad; in many cases they are strangers, unknown to the family and are able to link in with networks or exploiters in Europe. In this scenario when the victim or their family is approached by a stranger, there may be no direct social link. Rather than trafficking in an opportune way, preying on someone within their social network to exploit them for their own gain, there was evidence of people targeting vulnerable people for example orphaned girls, homeless shelter, on the streets or directly from prison. Sensing the desperation of the victim, they would then promise them the possibility of employment or education in Europe.
2. Personal Traffickers: Many people particularly those trafficked for domestic servitude were known by someone intimately known to them. These traffickers appeared not to be responsible for trafficking of multiple victims; rather they would be involved in the trafficking of one person. The mechanisms for this could vary: They have been account of an associate visiting the family household and promising to take the victim to a better life abroad. These traffickers were mainly involved in trafficking for domestic servitude.
3. Personal linking Traffickers: In a small number of cases personal traffickers would appear to be involved along with others. Friends or relatives would be involved at the stage of recruitment and migration; however, the exploiter would be unknown to the victim. Even in these cases the number of people involved appears to be small and the work of the trafficker to be opportune (taking the opportunity to exploit a relative's need for support rather systematic or a pattern of repeat behaviour.

There are close linkages between poverty and widespread illiteracy as well as unsafe and uniformed migration. Due to the high rate of poverty, many Nigerians of school age are not in school because they cannot afford it, thus those with minimal education and who lack the skills

required to secure good jobs often fall easy prey to traffickers who deceive them with tales of good jobs in the cities in case of internal trafficking and greener pastures abroad for trafficking across borders. The triggers that make people more susceptible to trafficking arise from broad social issues. However, poverty provides some explanation. It does not necessarily capture the complex dimensions that has contributed to making certain groups more susceptible to trafficking (Sesay, 2004). Wider exclusion is also significant particularly gender inequality. Most victims are either women or children, and many time both (Okojie, 2009). Traditional gender roles, gender inequality (UNDP, 2011) and Customs such as polygamy and child fostering increase these groups vulnerability (Caning, 2006). These not only provide the factors that drive irregular migration in general, hut also the added dimensions of coercion and exploitation that distinguish trafficking. Even when many of these young people have some education hut are not able to get jobs, they feel that they could find jobs elsewhere and of course and this makes them very vulnerable to the manipulation of the traffickers who capitalize on their desperation. However, unemployment has been identified as another causative factor of human trafficking. Citizens from other Africa countries who have intra-state conflicts in their countries end up as refugees and some of them ending up doing menial jobs or fall prey to traffickers. No doubt the political and economic situations in various African countries contribute to rendering African people vulnerable to human traffickers (Aghu, 2003).

Gender is one of the primary dimensions of vulnerability to trafficking. Unemployment is especially high among women, with labour markets tightly structured and gender hierarchies (Truong, 2006). Gender discrimination is wide spread (UNDP, 2011) and this results in many women being highly dependent on others, in particular men, and sometimes entering into sexual relationships with them (Carling, 2006). It also leads to objectification, domestic violence and the lower status of girls within a family, generally the first to be removed from education if money is tight (UNESCO 2006, Okojie, 2009, Attoh, 2009). Well established patterns of violence can permeate women's lives from early childhood and extend well into their adult lives. Children, like women are also high vulnerable to trafficking. The practice of polygamy as well as lack of information and access to family planning can result in multinucleated families with large numbers of children that the woman remain responsible for if the families break down (Okojie,2009,Attoh,2009). The death of a parent or carer is also a frequent trigger of childhood vulnerability particularly as Nigeria has a markedly low life expectancy of 52 years of men and 53 years for women (United Nations Statistic Division). Children who are orphaned, especially those with HI V/AIDS are particularly susceptible to trafficking (UNESCO, 2006).

Human trafficking is a crime against all known laws. It contravenes both natural and sacred laws. Because of the cross- border nature of the crime of trafficking and in order to suppress these p:actices and bring perpetrators to justice, the response at national and international levels have put in place a number of laws, treaties, conventions and protocols dealing with human trafficking (Goliath, 2008). It is true that some of these legal instruments may not specifically address or mention trafficking, however, it is useful to observe that certain elements of these legal instruments revealed that trafficking has always been seen as not different from slavery, being primarily for sexual exploitation or forced labour (Goliath, 2008).

At the international level, there are a number of treaties, laws, protocols and conventions that Nigeria is signatory to. Prominent among these are the United Nations Convention on the Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the United Nations Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979); the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention on Forced Labour and Minimum Wage (1999); the United Nations Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, especially on the Sales of a Child, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (2002); and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000). Others include the African Charter on Human Rights (1980); the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (1981);

Africa Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) Declaration and of Action against Trafficking in Persons (2001). At the national level, the 1999 constitution provides for the respect and dignity of human persons. It provides in section 34(1) that no person shall be subjected to torture, in human or degrading treatment or held in slavery or required to perform compulsory labour.

The rights of the citizens to the dignity of the human person against slavery, servitude, forced labour, prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation is also enshrined in the criminal Code of the Southern Nigeria (Cap 42, 1990) and the Penal Code of the Northern Nigeria (Cap 89, 1963); Labour Act (Cap 198, 1990); and the Trafficking in Persons Law Enforcement and Administration Act (2003). The anti-human trafficking act is the most recent and crucial because it specifically addresses human trafficking. This anti-human trafficking law was a laudable move that culminated in the establishment of the National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP). There are several provisions (Sections 11 to 29, 32 and 46) of the antihuman trafficking act of NAPTIP prescribing different punishment ranging from one year to life imprisonment for serious offences such as exportation or importation of girls under the age of 18 years for prostitution, forced labour, servitude or removal of organ by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud or deception. The seriousness of this law is underscored by its section 61(1) which provides for: where an offence under the act is committed by any citizen or person granted permanent residence in Nigeria, she/he maybe prosecuted in respect of such offence as if it was committed in any place within Nigeria. This law also vests the power to arrest, search and seize on police, immigration, custom and National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) officials. Similarly, the federal and state high courts have concurrent jurisdiction to try any of the offences under the law.

Trafficking in humans is one of the fastest growing criminal activities in the world. Human trafficking “targets the trafficked person as an object of criminal exploitation” To be considered trafficking, the act must contain an element of coercion, fraud or force unless the victim is under eighteen and is involved in commercial sex acts. The purpose of the trafficking enterprises is to profit from the exploitation of the victim. It is estimated that human trafficking yields between seven and ten billion dollars a year falling behind only weapons and drug trafficking. In 2005, Patrick Belser of international Labour Organization estimated a global annual profit of \$31.6 billion (Belser 2005). For example, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) focuses on the criminal justice element of crimes that include human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants. In 1999, it proposed a “Global Program against Trafficking in Human Beings” that would focus on the role of organized crime groups in smuggling and trafficking and a new development of criminal justice—related responses (UNODC 1999). In May 2011 it issued a report on organized crime's role in smuggling West African migrants into the EU (UNODC 2011). The UN office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights states at the outset on its website that “At a time when some 214 million people are on the move globally, the UN Human Rights office has identified migration as a priority and is working to identify the protection gaps in law, policy and practice that leave migrants vulnerable to abuse at international borders” (UNODC 2011). The vulnerability of prospective victims is exploited in many respects; the victims most of whom are pre-teens, teenagers and mostly females are taken away from their homelands to cities within their countries. Many of them are engaged in cheap labour such as domestic servants, hawkers, beggars, and prostitute.

National Security

National security literature and definitions of national security is copious and is still growing (Oche 2005; Okodolor, 2004; Imobighe 1998; Buzan; 1983 Mattew, 1989; Brown, 1977; and McNamara 1968). The proliferation of definitions of national security is essentially because the process of discursively 'securitising vulnerable referent objects (i.e. individual, nation- state or the

global system) and defining particular risks, is therefore a political one (Weaver, 1995), which usually depends on who is grappling with the subject. It is therefore common to see reference being made to human security, national security, international security, state security, regime security, corporate security, among others. The conception of national security in this paper identifies with the revisionist thinking on the subject matter (Gambo, 2008; Onuoha, 2007), which sees national security¹ from the point of view of human security. According to Onuoha (2007:4), human security entails: Freedom from actual and potential threats to human life, safety and survival which may arise as a result of human actions or inactions, or from natural disaster such as flood, earthquake, famine, drought, disease and other non-man-made calamitous events resulting in death, human suffering and material damage.

National security is therefore understood in the context of this writing to mean the ability of the state to protect its citizenry from hunger, poverty, ignorance, disease, and all forms of defenselessness (Okoli, 2012). This entails protecting the citizens from all forms of social, political, ecological, territorial, as well as cosmic vulnerabilities. This conception of national security marks a radical departure from the orthodox perspective which conceives of national security merely from defence/military centric point of view (Alkali, 2003). As relevant and fundamental as the concept of security is to human societies, it has not only defied any consensus but has created a "battleground of ideological contention". No matter the conception of security, an important point is that it underpins human existence. Thus, states define security within the context of their core values, interests, culture, prestige and socio-economic order. Transformations in the global arena have produced certain mutations in the conceptualisation of national security: the focus has moved from an emphasis on protecting and maintaining the state to a focus on the well-being of the people, that is, human security. Within this context, therefore, national security is equated with, and denotes, physical safety of individuals and groups and freedom from threats, anxiety or danger. This people-centric focus of contemporary national security presupposes that the state must facilitate unfettered access to, and enjoyment of, fundamental human rights by citizens. In other words, actions that tend to abbreviate or abridge fundamental human rights constitute insecurity.

The task of maintaining national security is as much the responsibility of the government as it is of the citizens. For the state to play its role as an impartial restraining force and thus maintain the delicate balance that could trigger insecurity, it ought to be aloof and non-aligned in the resolution of recurrent conflicts of interest within the polity. What has happened in Nigeria is that the state immersed itself in the class struggle instead of rising above it, and thus became a target of aggression arising from feelings of deprivation. 70.82% of the total population in Nigeria live under extreme poverty (less than \$1 a day) and Nigeria is the of 8.03% of the world's poor; the death rate is 13.48 deaths/1000 population; 51% of girls are out of school; the average life expectancy is less than 1000 live birth; under-five mortality rate of 138/1000 live births; maternal mortality rate of 840 deaths/100,000 live births; insignificant drugs; human development index is one the lowest in the world? This is in spite of the fact that Nigeria is a wealthy nation, earning over \$400 billion of oil revenue alone over the years of our existence. In fact according to a New York Times report "Nigeria is the World's 6th Most Populous and expected to hit 300 million in 25 years at the rate of 2.553% growth.

What plans do we have for education, healthcare, food, employment, drinking water, housing, electricity, etc? Meanwhile a reporter from the NY Times made an observation of the living condition she saw somewhere in Lagos in which:

...a typical apartment block known as "face me, face you"...whole families squeeze into a 7-by-11-foot rooms along a narrow corridor Up to 50 people share a kitchen, toilet and sink though the pipes in the neighbourhood often no longer carry water... At... primary school, more than 100 students cram in most classrooms, two to a desk.. As graduates pour out of high schools and universities, Nigeria's unemployment rate is nearly 50 percent for people in

urban areas ages 15 to 24 driving crime and discontent...(The New York Times, 2012).

Governments all over the world, particularly those of developing countries, are increasingly recognizing that threats to national interests/security are more likely to stem from internal than external sources. Such threats can assume different forms in different countries at different times. Against this background the question is how does one evaluate the implications of human trafficking for national security in Nigeria? One must begin by acknowledging the fact that it is the sole responsibility of a government to guarantee the security of its citizens, and as a matter of fact, it is this responsibility that gives any government its legitimacy. In the case of Nigeria, the responsibility to protect and guarantee security is clearly spelt out in Sec 14(2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution which states that "the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government (Federal Government 1999 Nigerian constitution)." This is the basis for the social contract in which we as citizens of Nigeria surrender some of our freedoms in addition to submitting ourselves to the authority relating to governance in order for us to enjoy the full protection of our remaining rights. These rights which include those of life; dignity of human persons; personal liberty; fair hearing; private and family life; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression; peaceful assembly and association; freedom of movement; and freedom from discrimination, are enshrined in sections 33 to 43 of Nigeria's Constitution.

Trends and Patterns of Human Trafficking in Nigeria

Nigeria is the most populous country with an estimated population of 150 million and over 250 ethnic groups. Since the last decade Nigeria has emerged as one of the fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2001 and 2008, Nigeria sustained an average annual growth rate of six per cent (UNDP, 2011). Nigeria is recognised in countries both within Africa and Europe as a vibrant centre for art, music and culture. In respect of significant progress, the country still faces ongoing challenges. Wider measures of human development have not kept pace with improvements in growth. As at 2011, 61 per cent of Nigerians or 112.519 million people live in absolute poverty (National Bureau of Statistics 2011). The country also faces many other challenges in its transition to democracy. Corruption is reported as a problem across many governments (Transparency International 2011). The country is ranked in the bottom quartile across many of the World Bank Governance indicator, including rule of law, control of corruption and political stability (Kaufman et al 2010). Insecurity, poverty and free movement around the ECOWAS area in West Africa have all contributed to a range of long term migration challenges in Nigeria. Millions have been internally displaced, particularly in cities across the north, due to religious and ethnic conflicts. This insecurity also accounts for the many Nigeria people seeking refuge and asylum each year.

According to UNHCR, Nigeria was the seventh highest country of origin in the world for refugees just below Iraq and Afghanistan (UNHCR 2009). This well established history of migration, combined with other facilitating factors such as inequality and instability has led to concerns around the instances of trafficking in persons from Nigeria. Due in part to the large size of Nigeria's population, the country has been named by the United Nations Organized Drug and Crime (UNODC) as one of the top eight countries of origin for human trafficking alongside Thailand, China, Albania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. It is a global demand driven business, with a huge market for cheap labour and commercial sex. It involves exploiting vulnerable people like needy women, children and young men with offers of employment and better life abroad. The suffering and indignity meted out to trafficked victims in the process of transporting them and at the various destinations, especially those abroad, had become a huge source of embarrassment to Nigeria's integrity as a nation with responsibility to safeguard the interest of her nationals. There are forms of manifestation of these indignities prostitution, child labour and under aged domestic services. According to the Swedish Institute, estimate 40,000-50,000 women were trafficked from Nigeria between 1990 and 2005 (Swedish Institute 2010).

According to a report from the United States State Department of Trafficking in persons, Nigeria is a source, transit and destination country for women and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labour are commercial sexual exploitation. Within Nigeria, women and girls are trafficked primarily for domestic servitude and commercial exploitation (US Department of State Trafficking in persoll Report 2012).

From Lagos in South West Nigeria to Enugu, Anambra, Akwa-Ihom and Kano States, there have been reports of the National Agency for Prohibition and Trafficking in persons and other Related Matters (NAPTIP), arresting or detaining suspects over human trafficking. According to UNESCO (2006) in its research report entitled, "Human Trafficking in Nigeria: Roots causes and Recommendations" by a team of researchers, it gav a figure of 1,800,000 orphans living in Nigeria. The report said these children are vulnerable to trafficking. The report mentioned domestic help 'Diya' or blood money, begging and baby harvesting as purposes people engage in human trafficking while it said various factors are responsible for it.

Kuta lamented that Nigeria's notoriety as a veritable source of the human commodity was such that baby factories were springing up in illegal hospitals and maternity homes where expectant teenagers were harbored with a view to selling off their new horn. In fact, UNICEF has estimated that at least 10 children are sold daily in Nigeria and will ultimately he subjected to inhuman treatments and other forms of involuntary servitude in Europe and other parts of the world, he said (Kuta, 2011). He adds that "the mode of operation of the human trafficking cartel entails deception, forgery, bribery, and other despicable acts of illegalities in carrying out the recruitment, transportation, smuggling, transfer, incarceration, harboring or receipt of human beings for the purpose of exploitation" (Kuta,2011).

Nigeria trafficking is also part of a well developed globalised market with a wide international reach. However Europe is a major destination region of people trafficked from Nigeria. The majority of people trafficked to Nigeria are trafficked to other West Africa Countries such as Ghana. Incidences of people being trafficked from Nigeria to North Africa including Morocco (MSF 2011), the Middle East (including Gulf States such as Dubai) and Central Asia have also been reported. Trafficking methods and routes continuously evolve in response to immigration controls and anti-trafficking initiatives. The scale and volume of human trafficking originating from Nigeria should not he understood simply as a 'national' phenomenon. The incidence of human trafficking varies considerably across different regions and the nature of the trafficking and destination country is strongly determined by the specific context. In particular the paper identified that trafficking victims who come to Europe originate from the state of Edo in the South Central part of the country and the Niger Delta (Buker, 2007, Attoh, 2009). Benin City, the capital of Edo State is widely regarded as the central hub of Nigeria's trafficking particularly to Europe. There is also evidence to suggest that women are trafficked from some big cities in Nigeria such as Lagos, Ibadan Sapele and Warn (Buker, 2007). Trafficking from the northern largely Muslim part of the country is carried out particularly between Nigeria and Gulf Countries such as Saudi Arabia under the cover of pilgrimage (UNESCO 2006). This has been used to traffic girls for sexual exploitation, men for labour exploitation and children for a range of reasons. People living in border regions such as Sokoto are also overrepresented in incidences of trafficking. Furthermore, trafficked victims are more likely to he recruited from rural rather urban areas where residents have greater access to education and employment and where traditionalist structures are less determinist. The targeting of rural areas is felt to have increased as awareness has risen in urban areas (Caning, 2006; Okojie, 2009).

The driving force for human trafficking in Nigeria is multifaceted, poverty though identified as the major cause cannot fully explain it. As mentioned earlier on unemployment, ignorance, collapse of protective environment are contributory factors. However, the worst form of motivation for human trafficking is greed and quest for quick wealth on the part of the traffickers who go to any extent

to deceive victims. They are the ones who flaunt their life styles of unexplained wealth and use it to lure their victims.

Effects of Human Trafficking on National Security in a Globalized World

It is argued that on some levels, most, if not all, crimes have a negative effect on a people's way of life. However, there are a few crimes that are so caustic to a society that they can bring down the collective rather than just individuals. One of the major drawbacks of globalization is that it could adversely affect national security by contributing to the causes of terrorism. Perl (2000) stated that "the globalization of the international economy, the internationalization of market and the integration of organized criminal activities into this changing market structure have transformed largely domestic criminal issues to issues with broader implications." The traditional barriers of time, distance, space are broken down in this connected world of open borders, deregulation and free movement of people, money and services. This connected world allowed criminal organizations, terrorists, drug traffickers, and human traffickers to operate in environments that are not highly regulated. In addition, globalization and modern communication systems have opened the door for smaller groups and private individuals to accumulate wealth at levels that were generally attainable only by nation states.

One could observe that efforts to support globalization and efforts to protect national security are at odds. As aptly stated by a migration expert," where as globalization demands and fosters the expansion of international travel, extending across all social strata and poor as well as affluent countries. National security calls for the imposition of restrictive controls that will impede movement" (Helton 2002). Trafficking in humans can become a threat to national security due to the relative ease of travel and communication in both the domestic and foreign realm. This paper does not argue that Nigeria should move from globalization to isolationism; our argument is that small world created by globalization allows the crime of trafficking in humans to thrive, and for players in unstable nations to infiltrate the borders of Nigeria and affect the country's national security.

Anytime there is a motive to illegally penetrate the borders of a country, national security questions are raised. One noticeable threat comes from common criminals who enter Nigeria illegally and may view Nigeria as fertile ground for violence. To a minor degree, the very nature of these criminals represents a national security threat because they hurt the way of life for thousands of Nigerians. The second obvious threat is from terrorists and spies. Indeed, if terrorists and spies seek to gain access to Nigeria they may do so by using human traffickers. Those who traffic humans will often traffic drugs and weapons which have long been recognized as national security threats. Once the structure is established, including the formation of professional contacts and routes, the manner in which traffickers move drugs, weapons into Nigeria becomes identical. Most crimes, on some level, depress a community and break down the fabric of society. Trafficking of humans is a crime that, by its very nature, breeds more crime. Every time a trafficked person is brought into Nigeria, a crime has been committed. Every time a sex slave is forced to have sex or a trafficked worker is forced to work, another crime is committed. When a trafficked individual is beaten to comply with his handler's demand, a crime is committed. Indeed, every second an individual is being held against his or her will, a crime is being committed. These criminal acts against the people and state and the latter's inability to put a halt to them have generated calls for the international community to work collaboratively (see Annan, 2000) in order to end human trafficking that they are associated with.

Conclusion

From the facts presented it is indeed obvious that there exists a significant relationship between human trafficking, human security and national security. In Nigeria, human trafficking is fast becoming an organized international crime. It stimulates and continues to thrive because of poverty; ignorance, selfishness, greed, corruption and lack of state policy capacity to translate

policy into action, in fact, worsening human security. The result of the harsh economic realities in Nigeria such as limited job opportunities for both skilled and unskilled labour, lack of welfare package to cater for the needs of the unemployed, get-rich-quick syndrome and ignorance have contributed to its sustenance.

The causes of trafficking in Nigeria are complex. Many people are involved, not all of whom fit the persona of an evil trafficker. Trafficking networks involve people from multiple countries. However, the nature of these connections is often different due to the complex, corporate structure of organized criminal networks. Trafficking from Nigeria is carried out at household level. Trafficker and exploiter are habitually friends. Relatives are also connected to some degree with the victims. The role of organised criminal networks should not be underplayed, particularly with respect to sexual exploitation. Considering the implication of this foregoing nexus between domestic and international trafficking in humans (in whole and in parts) to human and national security which needs to be tackled headlong, the paper agrees with Antony Blinken, the U.S. Secretary of State, that we should "stand together and press for accountability from those leaders who condone and support human trafficking, create conditions ripe for mass exploitation, and perpetuate this fundamental insult to human dignity" (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Nigeria is not an exception to this and so should not be left behind.

Recommendations

To achieve this, there is the need to reduce worsening human threats associated with human trafficking; the crime must be clearly recognized as a human and national security threat by all. The following would need to be adopted:

Firstly, there is the need for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) to strengthen cooperation among member states in efforts aimed at combating human trafficking in the continent.

Secondly, there is the need to enhance human development such as investment in basic social services, education campaigns in schools, vocational training and offering alternatives to parents with large families in form of micro credits schemes in order to reduce unemployment and quick urge to travel outside the country.

Thirdly, it is important for National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) to facilitate the work of Non Governmental Bodies and other governmental agencies to ensure that the response to trafficking addresses the fundamental drivers of trafficking namely, greed, corruption and get-rich-quick syndrome prevalent in the country.

"Far more illuminating is that human security...should be an all-inclusive threshold" which should in reality underscore the three pillars identified by Koffi Annan namely, "i) freedom from want; ii) freedom from fear and; iii) the freedom to live in dignity" (Akpuru-Aja, 2020, p.61).

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QUALITY WATER AS A PREVENTIVE MEASURE OF WATER BORNE DISEASES: A STUDY OF IBRAHIM BADAMASI BABANGIDA UNIVERSITY LAPAI WATER SUPPLY

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Abstract

Water is integral component of life essential for human survival it's also borne some diseases, WHO, UNICEF reports have ascertained poor water access is associated with many water illness, food in security, lost productivity and poor school attendance especially for women and girls. The rapid urbanization and agricultural domestic needs of water supply in African Sub Sahara. In Nigeria most state, organizations and institutions could not meet up with provision of sanity quality portable water. The United Nation universal human right declaration of access to clean portable water remains unattainable to most State in Nigeria. The study is carry out in Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University Lapai main campus to certain the access of quality water school supply to its users and especially the student, households and the relation to common ailment the study adopted a qualitative laboratory water analysis of the school bore hole the major source of water in the main campus in sample A (water drills from the ground) sample B (water from the Tank after drilling) and sample C (water collected from Tap ready for use) structured key informant interview was administer on the Director personal and planning, and the director school clinic. The findings reveals that the sample of water collected are unfit for human consumption, Borehole the major source of water supply have not been adequately flush to maintain the water quality to meet up the required standard, the connection between student common ailment and the water in uses. The study recommends the provision of an independent water treatment plan source, water treatment, and regular flushing of bore hole to meet the required standard water quality.

Key words; sanity water, unfit for consumption, underground water, common ailments, access to clean water, water borne Disease water sanitation.

Introduction

In the year 2013 WHO and UNICEF reports estimated the population of 768 million people in world who lack access to an improved water source, and more than 80 % of this population lives in the rural areas. The Poor water sanity and lack of its access is attributed to caustics water-related illnesses, food insecurity, lost productivity, and poor school attendance for women, and girls. The daily need for clean water is necessary for domestic uses i.e. drinking, cooking, washing, and bathing. In rural areas access to clean water is critical for livelihood and human activities, such as horticulture and crop irrigation, livestock-raising, brick-making, and small-scale commercial activities in semi urban areas. In the year 2010 Kurian Mac Carney observed that water enhance household's income and food security for livelihood due to rapid urbanization. In the year 1990 Amar Klemesu also estimated urban agriculture could provide 15-20% of world food produces. The formal recognition of water as a basic right by the United Nation and state in 2010 is a significant milestone to address the lack of sanity water and its provision in developing countries. The provision of sanity water for uses includes its hygiene and sufficiency for other domestic activities. This objective is not only in public health perspective but priority for domestic uses as enshrine in human rights law. This interpretation ignores the range of socio-economic human rights which the water plays. In general, terms the implementation of the human right to water could

achieved by providing water services that are planned and designed for domestic uses only.

The Right to water sanity.

In the year 2010 Gupta et al and Meier et al report stressed the United Nation General Assembly recognition of human right to sanity water as essential and basic for human right in the Resolution of article (64/29)UN 2010b,p.2.The article brought significant international political notion as an independent human right also the Article 25 of 1948 (UDHR) Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Articles 11 and 12 of the 1966 (ICESCR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the 1966 (ICCPR) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are all collectively known as the "International Bill of Human Rights. Which are enshrining as a normative basis for provision of sanity water and other water-related human rights evolved in international laws stipulated the state to oblige the objectives. The access to reliable and sanity water and its services are widely accepted as essential mechanism to realize a healthy productive life. In the years of 2006, 2011 and 2012 the UNDP, WHO and UNICEF respectively Prior to the UN General Assembly's formal recognition of human right to sanity water the trio considered it as a prerequisite for attainment of other human social development. In 1998 Gleick and in 2006 the UNDP attributed the lack of recognition of such rights to water to lack of political will and poor mobilization of resources compare to investment in other sectors. The United Nation General Assembly's Resolution UN (64/292), the UN Human Rights Council (2010, p. 3) called upon states to "develop appropriate tools and mechanisms to include legislation and comprehensive plans with financial strategies for the sectors to achieve the human rights obligations of sanity water and its services to include the current unsaved and underserved areas. This declaration oblige the states to acts and target sufficient quality water to public, investments and sanitation sector in the provision of quality water. The provision should be monitor and prioritized and other related human rights.

Water provision in African Sub-Saharan.

In the year 2006 WHO estimated 59% of African population in the world likely to face inadequate access to sanity water and its sanitation systems and 75% failure to achieve the Millennium Development Goal by 2015 with nearly half a billion people in the world population. The access to clean water and its sanitation in 2004 was critical especially in rural areas of Africa it is more than the previous statistics of WHO in (2006) which indicated that only 16% of people in the African sub-Saharan had access to sanity water through in door connection or tap in the yard. Water is only available in small towns with risks of contamination due to several factors. When wells are built and the facilities for water sanitation they are not properly maintain to due to limited financial resources. Water quality testing and treatment is not properly performed always and with the ignorance among the users who believe the source of the water is safe. When water is provided its quality is no longer given attention. In the year 2009 Awuah etal also reported the challenges of clean water provision in Africa which is characterized with limited sources of water to provide for the entire population. The Surface water sources are often highly polluted, and the infrastructure to pipe the clean sources to arid areas are often costly. The groundwater is the best resource to tap and provide especially for people in rural Africa, and the groundwater has a natural protection from bacterial contamination and it is reliable during droughts. The high costs are associated with the drills and the technical activities involve providing large sources enough for the population needs. The Groundwater is a safe resource when it comes to water sanity. Some contamination common in water are heavy metals, and bacteria's which may course leakage of septic systems or contamination of wells therefore require frequently monitored which may be costly it's also requires technical abilities that may not be present in rural areas. In 2006 Metwally etal, VanRooijen etal 2009 observed the consequence of contaminated water which may result to dehydration, malnutrition, diarrheal illnesses and cholera which could be prevented with clean water and good hygiene. The rampant spread of cholera is attributed to wet season.

The Women and young girls play the major role in search for water for use which often prevented them from income work or school and spent their day searching for water for daily uses in the process face great risk and threats of violence due to great distance and in security. Urban areas face different challenges in access to clean water and sanitation due to rapid growth of urban areas, especially in African sub-Sahara which has the large volumes of water extracted from the sources but could not be properly manage due to pollution of the natural water bodies. It is also compounded with the influx of population to urban centers in addition to waste water used in irrigation, irregular water supply, and the concerns for aquatic life. The urban slums and overcrowding make it difficult to control its sanitation and disease outbreaks due to exposure to raw sewage. In 2007 Fotso et al reported that the underprivileged populations in urban areas pay exorbitant amounts for water and often not suitable for consumption and those living in wealthy urban areas are heavily subsidized the wealthy pay less for clean sanitary water.

The Provision of water in Nigeria.

It is the responsibility which was shared between the three levels of government in Nigeria i.e. Federal Government, State Government and Local government. The federal government is in charge of water resources management the State governments are responsible for urban areas and Local governments are to provide for the communities and rural areas. The Water supply service and the cost for recovery are very low, water tariffs and the water users do not pay their bills regularly. The Service providers rely mostly on occasional subsidies to cover their operating costs.

In 2015, WASH reported that 67% of the total population had access to basic water supply which was against 82% of the urban population and 54% of the rural population. In 2015, the population of 60 million people lacked access to "at least basic" water supply and sanitary water, only 33% of the population had access to basic sanitation. This accounts for only 39% of the urban population and 27% of the rural population. In 2017 WHO, UNICEF approximate 122 million people lacked water access and basic sanitation. In urban areas, access to standpipes to access water in adequate the available sanitation is typically in the form of septic tanks without central sewerage system, except in Abuja and some part of Lagos. In Nigeria Abuja the capital receives its drinking water from the lower Usuma dam which has the capacity to treat surface water from the dam's reservoir; it was in the process to increase its supply in 2012 to cater for the growing population. In 2012 also the Guarara dam, was under construction and it is expected to increase water supply to mitigate the risk of drought. The capacity of the Wastewater is 131,200 cubic meters per day and the plant at Wupa. It was also reported by USAID in 2007 that only 1% of Lagos households were connected to sewers. In the work of Gandy in 2006 Lagos has only four water waste treatment plants rehabilitated in the year 2010. In 2011 the state planned to build ten new "mega water treatment wastewater plants in five years with the help of water Corporation investors in Lagos has not been completed. There is no single sector monitoring the statistics on access to water which lead to conflicting statistics has a result of divergent definitions, indicators and methodologies applied by different agencies. The study carried out in 2006 by Gandy estimated only 1% of Lagos households were connected to sewers. The Amnesty International in September 2006 also reported that the Shell oil company and the Government of Rivers State, in the southern Nigeria are not pro active in provision of clean water in Areas. In Ogale, in Niger Delta the right to clean has long been violated. The residents are forced to buy water at exorbitant price due to the company's activities and state government neglect. One of the Nigerian largest city Lagos which is surrounded by sea water and lagoon its clean water provision is 81.32% but since lagoon water is polluted it channeled its supply from River Ogun and River Owo. The city's oldest water treatment plant was built since 1910, located at Iju River the plant was expanded to the capacity of 45m gallons per day. In Nigeria Abuja the capital receives its drinking water from the lower Usuma dam which has the capacity to treat surface water from the dam's reservoir; it was in the process to increase its supply in 2012 to cater for the growing

population. In 2012 also the Guarara dam, was under construction and it is expected to increase water supply to mitigate the risk of drought. The capacity of the Wastewater is 131,200 cubic meters per day and the plant at Wupa was completed in 2007. The Federal Capital Territory and the Abuja Environmental Protection Board, has contracted private operator to run the plant. Another smaller plant was built at Ishashi on the Owo River in 1970 and the biggest plant was commissioned in 1991 in Adiyon with the capacity of 70m gallons per day. It also channeled its supply from River Owo. There are seven mini-waterworks channeled from local sources with the combined capacity of 18m gallons per day. The Lagos Water Corporation also produced a plant meets with the standards supplies of sufficient and regular clean water quantity to over 12.5 million people in Lagos. The water supplied is often contaminated in the process of distribution and people distrust tap water quality. The Electricity supply interrupts the treatment plants frequently from operation although in 2012 12.15 MW power plants were under construction to supply power to Adiyon, Iju and Akute water treatment plants. In the year 2012 Stimson Global Health Security observed that Households rely on numerous private source of water such as shallow wells Or Street vendors, which create a thriving market for "sachet water" or purified water packaged in polyethylene pouches. In year 2012 also Vanguard reported that the Water vendors are popularly called *Mairuwa* who sells water from tanks and drums or on carts, some sell water to other vendors who carry buckets or jerry cans. The research of Kunniyi in the year 2014 observed that the supply of water by the state Water Corporation is 'metropocentric' i.e., centered on the metropolis while the rural areas lack access to sanity water. In the year 2012 PBS reported that 25-30% of the population in [Makurdi](#), Benue State, are under served with water and its inhabitants fetch raw water in buckets from the polluted River Benue. The plan to construct water treatment plant in 2008 was uncompleted and due to corrupt practices the officials could not account for the USD 6 million spent. According to Nat Apir, involving an independent water consultant in water provision, lack the modern distribution network which always leads to pipes burst and under utilizing the plant capacity. In Kano the supply of water is from the local rivers and the groundwater which is over-exploited. The Public water supply is deficient; to the extent the private water selling points are multiplies to generate profits for the private operators (Abubakar, 2012). The Kaduna state receives its drinking water from the River Kaduna. Ibadan receives its drinking water supply from Eleyele dam.

Water borne diseases

In the year 1973 Lucas and Gilles observed that Water borne diseases are one of the major causes of illness and deaths in developing countries. The global spatial distribution show that Africa and Asia account for a large percentage of water borne diseases, such as cholera, typhoid fever, paratyphoid, bacillary dysentery, amoebic dysentery, gastro-enteritis, and infective hepatitis. In the year 2005 USAID reported that water borne disease account for Children mortality of children of less than five years and 15-18% of such mortality is attributed to diarrhea, adults are not spared from the scourge of the same diseases. Generally, water-borne diseases are easily transmitted through the ingestion of water and food that are contaminated by faecal materials that carry infective dose of various pathogens. Some of these diseases that are acquired through the gastro-intestinal tract occur in epidemic form. The diseases tend to affect people who share common source of water supply in a wide area. The prevalence of these diseases is linked to the dearth of potable water in most parts of the developing countries. The diarrheal diseases are caused by contaminated water with inadequate sanitation or poor hygiene in human population. The availability of potable water in most developing countries is inadequate to meet the demand of the rapid growth of population. The population resulted to source water from questionable water points. The dry season coincides with dry public taps the urban dwellers utilize water collected from alternative sources such as boreholes, wells and streams for domestic uses. In the year 1994 Lyon reported that in Ibadan metropolis in Nigeria statistics shows that the inhabitants suffer from diarrhea, gastro-enteritis, malaria, measles,

tuberculosis, cholera and typhoid fever. In the early 1980s, Alagiah indicated that 500 million related diseases are of water borne diseases and 30,000 people die daily, half of these deaths are of infants and 50% of the of hospital beds are occupied by patient of these diseases. In the developing countries, 80% of human ill-ness is attributed to water contamination. In 1980 Lamka et al stressed the effort of the researchers to investigate the quality of water samples which was drawn from private wells and Oregun springs in Lagos the result shows that *Escherichia coli*, *Citrobacter freundii* and *Klebsilla pneumoniae* are frequently found from most of water samples tested and *Staphylococcus aureus* and *Aeromonas hydrophila* were isolated from total plate counts. Similarly, in 1996 Fagede and Osho conducted a research and identified *E. coli*, *Klebsilla aerogenes*, *K. edwardsii*, *K. rhhonsleromatic*, *K. stlantae*, *Entrobacter spp* and *Citrobacter spp*. Present in the collected samples from wells of Ago-lwoye town in Nigeria. All these isolated bacteria are indicators that water from these various sources are contaminated and therefore unfit for human consumption. In 19192 Swerdlow stressed on the observations made by Snow in 1894 of environmental factor causes water contamination which resulted water borne diseases such as diarrheal disease and or lack of personal hygiene. The diseases are in relation to the water quality and other factors that could assist in the apparent nature of these diseases spread in most cities in Nigeria. One major challenge is the inability for both rural and urban Africans to access a clean water supply.

Study locale.

The research was conducted in Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University Lapai, Niger State. The University has seven Faculties of Natural Sciences and Social Sciences with the total population of fourteen thousands student.

Study Design. The study adopted interview technique and laboratory water analysis of the motorized bore-hole water supply in the University. In-depth interview technique with structured questions was administered on the Director personal and planning on the provision, treatment and distribution of potable water in the university community. The sample of bore hole water labeled A, B, and C from the under Ground water, the water from Tank and the Tap water respectively. The 3 samples were carefully fetch as early as possible in the morning and subjected to Test in Lower Usman Dam laboratory in Abuja. The samples for analysis must reach the laboratory within 24 hours of the day. The result obtained was interpreted by the laboratory specialist in the Dam. The domestic house hold water users and water user in the University were interview on the quality of the water .and the result was carefully analyzed

Theoretical frame work

The research adopted Behavioral construct 23 of Health Believe Model 23 with assumptions that an individual's motivation to taken actions results from their perceived susceptibility to severity of problem and perceptions outcome expectations. Modifying factors, such as internal and external cues to actions for example, mass media and individual confidence in ability to take action (self efficacy) further influence the likelihood of behavior exchange 14, 24, 25...

These construct can help us understand human behavior and in turn to address complex health issues such individual under saved with in sufficient quality water, and the need for water for survival and the alternative source of water in the mist of perceived threats of contracting water borne disease individual cues to actions the alternative source water for use which health implication

Data presentation and analysis

s/no	Parameters	SAMPLE (A) UNDER GROUND WATER	SAMPLE (B) WATER FROM THE TANK	SAMPLE (C) WATER FROM THE TAP
1	PH	7.0	4.0	6.9
2	TEMPERATURE	26	26	27
3	TURBIDITY (NTU)	8.36	4.23	2.87
4	CHLORIDE ION	8.52	15.62	12.78
5	TOTAL HARDNESS	58	56	44
6	TOTAL ALKALINITY		22	
7	PHOSPHATE	0.15		0.23
8	SULPHATE	3		2
9	IRON	0.22		0.03
10	CONDUCTIVITY	69.3	41.6	40.7
11	COLOUR	BR	BR	BR
12	BACTERIOLOGY			
(A)	MPN	>16.0		>16.0
(B)	E.COLI	+ve		
(C)	OTHER COLIFORMS	+ve		

NOTE

BR=Below ran
 +v=positive

Interpretation of results (June 2021)

- (1) All the physio-chemical parameters analyzed in the bore-hole water (A) were within the WHO guideline and Nigerian standard for drinking water quality except turbidity (8.36 NTU). The bacteriological analysis showed coliform contamination. The water is therefore not safe for human consumption.
- (2) All the physio-chemical parameters analyzed in the tank water (B) were within the WHO guideline and NSDWQ except PH (4.5) and iron (0.64mg/l) and the bacteriological analysis also indicates coliform contamination.
 Therefore the water is unfit for human consumption.
- (3) All the physio-chemical parameters analyzed in the tap water C where within the WHO guideline and NSDWQ but the bacteriological analysis showed coliform contamination. The water is therefore unsafe for human consumption.

Recommendations;

Regular treatment and flushing of the water drill from the ground for uses and consumption

Findings

The findings reveals that the sample of water collected from the bore hole underground water, water from the tank and the water from the tap are all laboratory tested and found unfit for human consumption. The study also revealed that the drilled Boreholes are the major source of water in the school and domestic consumption and other uses. The drilled bore hole in use has not been adequately maintained to provide quality water despite the natural quality of the water drilled from bore holes its gets contaminated due to some environmental factors such as surface ground running water after rain. The school water has no apparatus in place for water sanitation before uses. The management of the school has planned to channel water from the Dam to meet up with the users demand. There is also some linked between students in the campus, common ailment such as typhoid fever, malaria, dyhreria and other water related disease with the water in

uses. E students and the water users the school resulted to alternative source of water such as water sachets 'called (pure water) and bottled table water for consumption.

Conclusion and recommendations

The provision and supply of portable water in Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University on the Preparation stage, Lapai town have no standard functional water board for alternative water supply. The university there fore needs to take more adequate measure to meet the ever increasing population of the school community. The study suggested the following, Provision of independent water treatment plan for only the school and its community for provision of adequate portable and quality water. There should be adequately flush treatment of the auxiliary borehole in the school in accordance with the required standard and maintenance practice. .With the resent accreditation of additional courses by National University Commission of Nigeria the University should give emphasis to provision of portable drinking water.

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PARTY CRISIS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA: ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS (APC) OGUN STATE IN FOCUS (2018-2019)

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Abstract

Party politics is an integral part of a democratic society. However, intra-party crisis has undermined the significance of political parties in Nigeria. This paper investigated intra-party crisis and democratic consolidation in Nigeria using the APC Ogun State between 2018 and 2019 as a focus. It made use of secondary sources of data and adopted the Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RGCT) as its theoretical tool of analysis. The paper observed that intra-party crisis is an age-long affair in Nigeria's political landscape, which was evident in the pre-independence politics of the nation and has evolved through political development to date. It argued that intra-party crisis witnessed in Ogun state APC between 2018 and 2019 had terrifying effect on democratic consolidation in the state and the nation at large. It argued that the efforts made by the stakeholders to resolve the crisis in APC Ogun state proved abortive. Available records indicate that the APC intra-party crisis weakened party growth and mobilisation capacity in Ogun state. It initiated political instability through party defection, excessive monetised politics, electoral violence and other electoral irregularities. It concluded that intra-party crisis frustrated the move towards democratic consolidation in Ogun state. The paper recommended, among others, that APC Ogun state should display openness and transparency in the process of selecting party flag bearers and party executives while members should be given opportunity to participate in party activities. Also, the party should establish an unbiased conflict management and resolution mechanism for addressing intra-party crisis while the Ogun state APC should strictly uphold party internal democracy and comply with provisions of party constitution.

Keywords: All Progressive Congress, Democracy, Democratic consolidation, Intra-party crisis, Ogun State

Introduction

Political party plays a critical role in the democratisation process of any nation because parties are considered as the major lubricants of democracy (Okonkwo & Unaji, 2016). This is due to the fact that, parties are expected to participate in political socialisation, contribute to the acquisition of political power, facilitate recruitment of political leadership and serve as a unifying force in a culturally segmented political environment (Okonkwo, 2015; Omotola, 2010).

But taking a cursory look at Nigeria's political system since inception, it is observed that party crisis has been the order of the day. This makes political activities to be characterised by hatred, enmity, victimisation and suspicion, resulting in bitter struggles among party members in their quest to achieve their vested interests. The inordinate ambition of some of the party stalwarts, to determine

'who takes what, when and how' in party calculations and reward system has created political problems in the polity (Olorungbemi, 2014). Therefore, the contemporary incidences of intra and inter-party squabbles associated with party politics in the country is nothing but a throwback to the past, which was replete with schisms, bickering, backbiting, intrigues, violence, packing and sacking (Olaniyan, 2009).

Intra-party crisis was perceived as a schism of great distress, trouble and pain created within a political party due to the failure of the party leaders to peacefully resolve internal disagreements or conflict of interests (Eme & Anyadike, 2011). It has to do with individual or group violence against party leadership or officials and supporters (Olorungbemi, 2014). Intra-party crisis is characterised by the notion of contestation for political power, unnecessary competition and rivalry among political elite which are antagonistic to the democratic principles and values (Landman, 2005) though democracy presumes the legitimacy of some opposition, the right to challenge the incumbents, existence of free and fair elections, and a consolidated party system (Omotola, 2010).

Since the inception of democratic governance in 1999, Nigeria's political parties have witnessed frequent discords, unresolved political intrigues, recriminations, threat of impeachment of executives, treacheries, flagrant breach of party rules, carpet-crossings, inter-communal rivalries and resurgence of factional cleavages, which have continued to threaten the functioning of democracy (Anifowose, 2004). Essentially, the gamut of activities that take place in political parties make it inevitable for their members to articulate their common or divergent interests and this sometimes engenders intra or inter party conflicts, which consequently create factionalisation within parties or some sort of intra-party crisis (Momodu & Matudi, 2013).

The character, nature, behaviour and performance of political parties in the current Fourth Republic were not that different from the previous republics. Consequently, political parties are driven by the spirit of faction and factions are ubiquitous. Ultimately, factionalisation creates the incentive for the political elites to align and re-align their political interests and forces. Besides, the nature of party relations, within and among political parties has been strained to the extent that these have negatively affected their performance to engender good governance, development and democratic consolidation (Momodu & Matudi, 2013).

The emergence of All Progress Congress (APC) as an alliance of prominent political parties, such as Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) and a faction of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) in 2013 ushered in a new era in Nigeria's democracy. Since its emergence, the party has been experiencing internal crisis at both the federal and state levels. Shortly after its emergence, the Ogun State chapter was polarised into two factions as a result of rift between former governor, Chief Olusegun Osoba and the then governor, Senator Ibikunle Amosun. The crisis, which divided the party into two camps in the state generated a lot of tension and remained unresolved till after the 2015 general elections (Olatunji, 2014).

The crisis that rocked APC in Ogun State between 2018 and 2019 was associated with the mode of governorship primary election slated for October 2018 and the choice of flag-bearer. Amosun-led faction of the party adopted AbdulKadir Adegunle Akinlade as the consensus candidate ahead of the primary election, while the other faction rejected the choice. Consequently, two parallel party primary were held. The State party executives declared Adegunle Akinlade as the winner of the primary election against the declaration of Dapo Abiodun by the National Working Committee (NWC) of the party (*Awoyinka, 2018*).

However, it is a worrisome trend that political parties in the current democratic dispensation often engaged in intra-party crisis due to the personalisation of politics, prevalence of the godfather syndrome, excessive monetised politics, poor party internal democracy, lack of viable political ideology (Akubo & Yakubu, 2014), which has resulted in party polarisation, factionalisation,

party defection, electoral malpractices and violence, among others, which continually challenged the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. Against the foregoing backdrop, this study examined the intra-party crises that characterised APC between 2018 and 2019, with its profound effect on democratic consolidation in Ogun State.

Concept Clarifications

Political Party

There is still a major disagreement among political and social scientists on how best to define political party as different definitions abound in literature on the concept. One of the earliest popular definitions of political party was coined by Edmund Burke (1939, cited in Lamidi & Bello, 2013), which defined political party as a body of men united for promoting their joint endeavours of national interests upon some particular principles in which they all agreed. The existence of political parties according to this definition must be based on the principles of promoting national interest. This is because political parties are often expected to have their membership spread across the country. This explains, for instance, why the Nigerian Constitution requires parties to reflect federal character before they can be registered.

Furthermore, political parties are often regarded as associations formally organised with the explicit and declared purpose of acquiring and to some extent, maintaining legal control, either singly or in coalition or electoral competition with other associations over the personnel and the policy of the government of an actual or perspective sovereign state. Thus, political party is described in terms of a group of people acting together to achieve some political goals, which usually is control of government (Udeuhele, 2015).

Moreover, political parties are perceived as formal associations that are formed by men and women, united for promoting their joint endeavours towards the national interest upon some particular principles and values in which they all agreed, aim at contesting, winning and controlling governmental machineries (Awofeso, Obah-Akpowoghaha & Ogunmilade, 2017). From another perspective however, political party has been conceived as an organised group of people with mutual, who aspire to control the government in a state in order to put their ideology or programmes into practice (Chidi, 2015). In other words, a political party is a group that seeks to elect candidates to public office by supplying them with a label called party identification by which they are known to the electorate (**Oyadiran & Olorungbemi, 2016**).

To that extent, it was argued that political parties stay relevant as long as they mediate different interests and offer coherent visions, which they can advocate in elections and legislatures, and pursue them as a basis for compromise with other parties (Klaukka, Van der Staak & Valladares, 2017). Thus, political parties remain inherent organizations designed to gather and unify political interests towards promoting democratic tenets in any society.

Intra-Party Crisis

One basic characteristics common to all human organisations is the interaction and interdependence among their members (Aleyomi, 2013). However, the intense struggle for political power among the political elite in a political system within and among political parties is inevitable (Mododu & Matudi, 2013). This could however, be through individual or group against party leadership or officials, philosophy or ideology, decisions or programmes, supporters and possessions (Olorungbemi, 2014).

The term intra-party crisis is coined to include all battles and internal strife within a political party that are unfavorable to normal nomination or election of party flag bearers, as against inter-party politics, which is a political activity among many political parties (Okonkwo & Unaji, 2016). Alanamu (2005) averred that party crises have low-intensity of political violence, which is categorised into two namely, intra party and inter-party clashes. To Eme and Anyadike (2011), intra-party crisis is a time of great shock, difficulty and distress created in a political party due to

the inability of the party concerned to resolve and reconcile effectively its internal differences or disputes. For instance, it is a known fact that many parties are factionalised and it is the duty of the leadership of the party to resolve their differences within the ambit of the law but when these parties fail to reconcile their differences, it degenerate into intra-party crisis or conflict.

Intra-party crisis are conflict within a given political party. It is the usual natural conflict of human beings to struggle for that limited social value within the group in terms of prestige, wealth, positions even recognitions. Most of these struggles are on selfish ground, sometimes collective but are carried out through the processes of sycophancy, name-calling, sabotage, sell-outs and other negative behaviours in order to be noted, settled or destroy the collective gain of the party. Sometimes too, they are caused by some element of usurpation, high-handedness and unnecessary rigidity of party leadership and stalwarts over members, greed and some other personal idiosyncrasies of leaders (Nmon, 2013).

In the assertions of Momodu and Matudi (2013), intra-party conflict is a conflict which occurs when members of the same political party pursue incompatible political goals or try to influence the decision making process of the party to their advantage. It often plays out in the selection of members for elective positions both within and the outside the party. Also, Boucek (2009, cited in Momodu & Matudi, 2013) highlighted three types of intra-party crisis or factionalism to include cooperative, competitive and degenerative. Looking at the nature of these identified types of conflict, Momodu and Matudi (2013) maintained that cooperative factionalisation is most preferable because it creates the incentive for the constructive resolution of conflicts between party members.

Inter-party crisis, in the words of Nmon (2013), is an obviously expected conflict because of differences in formation, leadership, manifestoes and ideologies competing to control the state in a democratic set up. The differences serve as springboard for individual ambition, factionalism, ethnic and religious bigotry, crisis of confidence and finally the quest for power control. It is the inter-party conflict that make democracy possible and thick, because it is the variegated groups wearing different ideological colours that come together to form parties. Given the internal dynamics of the parties, and the inherent ideological contradictions, political observers do predict inevitable conflict in party formations.

In line with the preceding assertions, intra-party crisis could, therefore, be regarded as the crisis among members within political parties, which occur when an individual or a group within the party perceives that one or more goals or purposes or means of achieving a goal or preference is being threatened or hindered by the activities of one or more political members or groups.

Democratic Consolidation

Democracy as a concept has been variously conceptualised by different scholars, with varying degree of perspectives and connotations. Etymologically, democracy is rooted in the Greek word “*demokratia*” which connotes government by the people, the right of all to decide what matters of general concern are and what shall be done about them. But direct representation was only practicable in a small old Greek city-state (Oluro & Bamigbose, 2020). In the thoughts of Awofeso, Obah-Akpowoghaha and Ogunmilade (2017), democracy is the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individual acquires the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote. It is the government of the people, by the people, and for the people that makes provision for every group in a state.

Democracy is an estimated system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives. Therefore, democracy is a system of government being propelled by the people towards ensuring the overall development of their state (Rosenje & Adeniyi, 2020). It was stressed by Akinyemi (2017) that democracy entails the participation of the people either

directly or indirectly in the policy making process of government, an important element which could lead to the realisation of development.

On the other hand, the basis for democratic consolidation is that the power which sustains democratic government and ensures its stability is voluntarily supported or derived from the consent of the citizens rather than reliance on force or coercion (Osaghae, 2015). Democratic consolidation implies that government is a product of the will of the people and derives its legitimacy from the people's consent. This therefore, ensures that the people willingly support the government given that the government is not arbitrarily foisted on them. In a reciprocal manner, the government carried out programmes that are in line with the interest and aspirations of the people (Alfa, 2011).

Democratic consolidation is the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation of democracy in such a way that all significant political actors believe that popular rule is better for their society than any other realistic alternative they can imagine. It also connotes the act of reducing the probability of the breakdown of the democratic system (Ukiwo, 2013). Ogundiya (2013) in his opinion explained that democratic consolidation ensures administration maintenance thereby regarding the key political institution as the only legitimate framework for political contestation and adherence to the democratic rules of the game.

Democratic consolidation according to Olorungbemi (2014) is perceived as an identifiable phase in the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic system that is critical to the establishment of a stable, institutionalised and lasting democracy. Thus, to be consolidated, democracy must become internalised in the society, manifesting itself at all levels and spheres of the social, economic and political systems with shared values (Olorungbemi, 2014). Democratic consolidation can be measured by the percentage of voters in a country who consider democracy as an indispensable way of life and are ready to go every length to protect it (Ukachikara & Elechi, 2019). Put differently, democratic consolidation thus entails widespread acceptance of democratic rules that generate political participation and competition.

Therefore, democratic consolidation implies the process by which democracy as a system of government that gives citizens equal opportunity and rights to participate in the government of their state is being generally accepted and well-practiced in the state. Hence, democratic consolidation is the transition, growth and development of government of the people, that is, government that puts citizens at the centre of affairs within a particular state. It is state of uninterrupted practice of democracy accordingly.

Theoretical Framework

A theory is a body of knowledge constructed in such a way that facts about reality are drawn together to bring about significance and conceptual meanings that are not otherwise apparent. Meaning which could not have been factually known becomes knowable through such theoretical construct (Akindele, 2011). Thus, this paper is anchored on Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RGCT). The realistic group conflict theory was propounded by Donald Campbell in 1965 and it has been expanded by Jackson (1993), Sidanius and Pratto (1999), Brief, Umphress, Dietz, Butz, Burrows and Schoelten (2005) and Baumeister and Vohs (2007) since the middle of the 20th century.

The theory explains how intergroup hostility can arise as a result of conflicting goals and competition over limited resources. According to LeVine and Campbell (1972, cited in Momodu & Matudi, 2013), the group members are often driven by their desire to possess and maintain control over valued resources. Therefore, the disadvantaged group will compete to gain resources and status, whereas the advantaged group will act against any threat to their resources. However, far-ranging cross-cultural evidence demonstrates that such power disparities between subgroups are characteristic of human societies, regardless of their era, culture or form of government (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

The theory also offers an explanation for the feelings of prejudice and discrimination toward the out-group that accompany the intergroup hostility (Jackson, 1993, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, Whitley & Kite, 2010). Insko and Schopler (cited in Momodu & Matudi, 2013) found that the group's decisions are highly competitive much so than individual's decisions under the same conditions. They however, offered two explanations for the observed competitiveness of groups. The schema based distrust hypothesis explains group competitiveness in terms of fear.

Furthermore, the theory postulates that group members compete because they expect the out-group to behave competitively and want to defend themselves against the possibility of being exploited. However, inability to channel competition within group to benefit all the group members may be counterproductive to the group interests. As Alexander, Chizhik, Chizhik and Goodman (2009) contended, groups run the risk of losing out on valuable inputs and perspectives when the contributions of lower-status members are devalued or ignored. When group members fail to offer or consider unique information, group performance and decision quality are prone to suffer. Research has, however, shown that all group members benefit if the group acts collectively in defense of its shared interests, but even moderately sensible members might hesitate before joining a possible fatal fray (Gould, 1999).

However, the theory has been criticised for only describing the results of competition between two groups of equal status. It does not explain how groups can overcome internal obstacles to achieve collective actions. It also fails to explain why members of distinct social groups see their interests as conflicting in the first place but the transition from group interest to group action is often treated either implicitly as unproblematic, or explicitly as a function of response to conflict (Gould, 1999).

Nevertheless, this theory is relevant to the current study because it explains a situation where members of a political party who feel disgruntled with party policies or programmes or are neglected by the party results in crisis with the party. For instance, members of APC in Ogun State between 2018 and 2019 who felt they may find it difficult to achieve their common goals in the party disagreed with the party leaders, which invariably led to crisis among them. The crisis eventually led to defection of Amosun's preferred and anointed candidates for the 2019 governorship election in Ogun State to APM in 2018. This has usually been the main trend behind the crisis in other political parties, such as PDP, SDP, among others, in Nigeria, some of which have been blamed on poor party discipline and ideology, and weak conflict resolution mechanisms. This situation ultimately could therefore, negatively affect democratic consolidation in the State and by extension, in Nigeria.

Historical Development of Intra-Party Crisis in Nigeria

Party politics in Nigeria has been characterised by both harmony and crisis situation with a gradual decline in the former and a kind of progression in the latter at different era of its political history (Muhammad, 2008). Among political parties of the pre-independence period, there was low salient of both intra and inter party crisis. This may partly be explained within the context of nationalist struggles for independence. But with the approach of independence, there was a total change in the operating environment of the political parties due to the need for new set of leaders to emerge among the nationalists. The change no doubt brought about serious changes in the nature and forms of inter and intra party relations (Muhammad, 2008).

With regards to inter-party conflict, it was a struggle for who controls the centre and in the case of intra-party conflict; it was a struggle for relevance, regional hegemony and overbearing control over party machineries among party members. As a result, intra-party relations thus began to assume crisis-prone leading at times to defection. Such defection is the case of several members of National Council for Nigerian and the Cameroon (NCNC) led by Nnamdi Azikiwe that decamped to the Action Group (AG) led by Obafemi Awolowo in 1951, purposely to deny Nnamdi Azikiwe and his party the majority in the Western Region House of Assembly (Adejumon, 2013; Okoosi-Simbine, 2005).

Another case of such intra-party crisis is the Action Group (AG) Crisis of 1962, which resulted from the personality clash between Obafemi Awolowo (Party leader) and Samuel Akintola (Deputy party leader and Premier of Western Region). This crisis led to expulsion of Akintola from AG as well as his removal as the Premier of Western region. Thus, the crisis degenerated into serious political conflict that claimed thousands of lives and properties worth millions of naira were destroyed. The crisis led to declaration of state of emergency by the federal government and eventually contributed to the emergence of military in politics through the January 15, 1966 coup, which brought an end to Nigeria's first republic (Oke, 2018).

During the second republic between 1979 and 1983, party politics was given constitutional recognition in the bid to ensure that only national parties rather than sectional ones would be able to function (Akingbade, 2011). Therefore, following the stipulated criteria in the electoral decree, Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) registered only five political parties – Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigeria People's Party (NPP), Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP), People's Redemption Party (PRP) and National Party of Nigeria (NPN) on the 22nd December, 1978 while Nigeria Advance Party (NAP) was eventually registered as the sixth party in 1982 (Akingbade, 2011). However, despite this precaution, the political parties that emerged were the reincarnations of the old political parties of the first republic except the GNPP. The UPN became a reincarnation of the AG, was for the West, NPP an offshoot of the NCNC, for the East and NPN a rebirth of the old NPC, for the North (Akingbade, 2011).

However, there were elements of strained relations in these parties, though it was considerably limited. For instance, in the early years of the NPN, Alhaji Aminu Kano left the party to set up PRP because his presidential ambition was thwarted when he was offered the party's national secretary. Equally, M. K. O. Abiola was denied of presidential candidature of the NPN in the run up to the 1983 general elections (Muhammad, 2008). Thus, the intra-party crisis witnessed during this period led to split in the PRP between Aminu Kano and Imodu factions. It also resulted into series of defections that occurred in the NPN and UPN. For instance, Arthur Nzeribe defected from NPP to NPN while Sunday Afolabi and Akin Omoboriowo (both deputy governors of Oyo and Ondo states respectively) defected from the UPN to NPN shortly before the 1983 general elections (Okoosi-Simbine, 2005; Tyoden, 2002).

Therefore, the same reasons that saw the collapse of the first republic can also be advanced for the failure of the second republic as political parties were parochial, regional and ethnic-based in nature. Also, the reports of riots, looting, arson and violent demonstrations that accompanied the 1983 presidential elections brought the military into power once again on December 31st, 1983 (Osumah & Ikelegbe, 2009).

Sequel to the lifting of ban of political activities in May 1989 in preparation for Third Republic in Nigeria, plethora of political associations emerged, just in line with first and second republics trends. However, Decree No. 27 of 1988 was used to dissolved all these political association while Babangida's administration forced two party system to be registered by the National Electoral Commission (NEC). Therefore, Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC) were formed on October 7, 1989 by the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) (Akingbade, 2011) to cater for the political aspiratipons of the political class.

Suffice to say that despite the short life span of these two political parties, factional feud and infighting characterised them. For instance, the SDP was reported to be characterised by struggle for party control by the unregistered People's Solidarity Forum (PSF) and the People's Front (PF) while the NRC became divided into factions such as Republican Action Committee led by Tom Ikimi, NRC Consultative Forum led by Alhaji Ibrahim Mantu and Republican Solidarity jointly led by Adamu Ciroma, Umaru Shinkafi and Bamanga Tukur (former presidential aspirants) (Muhammad, 2008). Also, Lagos state chapter of SDP was plagued with crisis during the gubernatorial election because of the inability of the party to manage the feud between Femi Agbalajobi and Dapo

Sarumi (gubernatorial aspirants). This eventually led to the victory of Michael Otedola, the NRC candidate in the governorship election (Muhammad, 2008).

The lifting of ban on party politics by the military gave birth to the emergence of Fourth Republic political parties. About 26 political associations jostle for registration with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) but only nine (9) of them were given provisional registration subject to their performance in the then forthcoming local government elections in December, 1988 as these parties are expected to score at least 10% of total votes cast in not less than 24 states of the federation (Mohammad, 2008).

Consequently, after the election, only three (3) political parties – Alliance for Democracy (AD), People's Democratic Party (PDP) and All People's Party (APP) were able to secure INEC's registration and fielded candidates for the 1999 general elections (Osumah & Ikelegbe, 2009). However, due to series of factors after the 1999 general elections, twenty-seven (27) additional parties were formally registered to contest alongside the earlier three (3) parties in the 2003 general elections, while additional political parties were given the nod by INEC in the subsequent elections in 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 general elections in Nigeria.

Emergence of All Progressive Congress (APC) in Nigerian Politics

As a result of political dynamics controlling party politics and the conduct of elections in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, and the dominance of the PDP, there was the tactical need for realignment of political forces to effect change of leadership at the centre. The All Progressive Congress (APC) was therefore, formed on the 6th February, 2013 and received approval from the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on the 31st July, 2013 as a political party towards the 2015 general elections in Nigeria (Maram, 2013; Opoola, 2013). APC was formed through the merger of the existing four opposition parties – the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), All Nigeria Peoples' Party (ANPP) and a faction of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) (Agomo, 2013; Akor, 2013). The resolution was signed by Tom Ikimi, who represented the ACN; Annie Okonkwo, on behalf of APGA; Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau, who was the Chairman of ANPP's Merger Committee; and Garba Sadi, who served as the Chairman of CPC's Merger Committee (Agbakwuru, 2013).

Thus, APC was considered a centre-left political party that favours controlled market or regulated market economic policies, and a strong and active role for government regulation. As a result, a substantial number of its political leaders are people who subscribed to the social democratic political philosophy of Obafemi Awolowo as well as the socialist and anti-class perspectives of Aminu Kano. Moreover, the majority of the APC's base of political support was in Southwest Nigeria and the Northern Nigeria (Awofeso & Irabor, 2016).

However, on the long run, the APC presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari won the 2015 presidential election in the Nigeria with total votes of 15,424,921 against the then incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan with 12,853,162 votes (INEC site cited in Olowojolu & Ake, 2015). It thus became the first time in Nigeria's political history that an opposition party unseated the ruling party in a general election and one in which power was transferred peacefully. In addition, the APC won the majority of seats in the Senate and House of Representatives in the 2015 general elections (Olowojolu & Ake, 2015) thereby seemingly creating the opportunity for smooth and cordial executive-legislature relations.

APC had a smooth birth when the defunct major political parties agreed to dissolve and form the new mega opposition party at the time. Howbeit, no sooner had the new party applied for registration from INEC than it faced its first major battle when some politicians approached the electoral umpire to register another party – African People's Congress (APC) with a view to frustrate the All Progressive Congress (APC). The All Progressive Congress won the acronym war but started to face internal crisis of forming interim executives and party leadership. In spite of this

development, the party managed to weather that storm and came out stronger and more united (Tukur & Ugonna, 2015).

Overview of Intra-Party Crisis in APC in Ogun State (2018-2019)

The All Progressive Congress (APC) since it was officially inaugurated has been characterised by crisis emanating from disagreement among aggrieved members of the party. Without exception, Ogun State chapter of All Progressive Congress (APC) has been embroiled in crisis of different dimensions. Immediately the party was inaugurated, Ogun State APC faced crisis that bore the semblance of what affected PDP preparatory to the April 2011 general election Osoba and Amosun's quarrel concerning who controls the soul of the party in Ogun State. Thus, the party was polarised along Osoba-Amosun leadership factions (Olatunji, 2014).

The crisis that rocked the All Progressive Congress (APC) in Ogun state between 2018 and 2019 was all about who becomes the flag bearer of the state. Primary election was to be conducted and the party released guidelines for its conduct after months of controversy in September 2018, where direct primary was adopted. However, the APC Ogun State Executive Committee later adopted the indirect mode of primary election for all elective offices in the 2019 elections in its resolution passed at the State Executive meeting held in Abeokuta. At the meeting, the party resolved that the APC in Ogun State shall employ the consensus option in the first instance and where that fails, the indirect mode of primary will be used to choose candidates for all elective positions in the 2019 general election (Johnson & Olatunji, 2018).

The issue stirred a lot of controversies among the party leaders and particularly, between the Osoba and Amosun factions. The party leaders in the state fought over the mode of primary election. The former governor of Ogun State, Olusegun Osoba with some other party stalwarts kicked against the mode of primary approved for the state. Also, Osoba while addressing the party's governorship, National Assembly and State Assembly aspirants warned against the danger of going into an election with a divided house (Kayode-Adedeji, 2018).

The APC governorship primary election was held in October 2018 in Ogun State. Prince Dapo Abiodun was declared the winner of the direct primary election by the Muhammed Ndabawa-led electoral committee sent by the National Working Committee (NWC) of APC. But earlier before this, the State chapter of the party had declared the Amosun-backed party executives consensus governorship candidate Adekunle Akinlade, as the winner of a primary election conducted in the state. The then APC State Chairman, Chief Derin Adebisi, who announced the results at the APC State Secretariat in Abeokuta, claimed that Akinlade polled 190,987 votes out of 201,620 valid votes casted across the 236 wards in the State. However, the results were not signed by the Chairman of the electoral committee and none of the agents of the five other gubernatorial aspirants (Omilana, 2018).

Also, another election was conducted by the NWC the following day throughout the 236 wards across 20 Local Government Areas of Ogun State. The chairman of the committee, Ndabawa said Dapo Abiodun polled 102,305 votes to emerge winner, Akinlade polled 23,443 votes, Jimi Lawal polled 51,153 votes while Abimbola Ashiru polled 29,764 votes. Other contestants, Senator Gbenga Kaka polled 17,771 votes and Abayomi Hunye polled 9,110 votes. He however noted that the declaration of Abiodun winner of the primary and governorship candidate of APC in Ogun State for 2019 governorship election is subject to ratification by the National Working Committee of the party (Omilana, 2018).

The party had been polarised following the adoption of Akinlade as a consensus candidate by the Amosun-led faction of the party ahead of the primary election. Therefore, with the internal strife of the APC in Ogun State and the outcome of the party primary election announced by the National Working Committee, Honorable Abiodun Akinlade – the governorship candidate of Amosun led faction resigned his membership of APC and defected to the Allied Peoples'

Movement (APM) alongside all the members of Amosun's faction who contested in the APC primary election for National and State Assemblies (Odunsi, 2018).

Meanwhile, a former Minister of State for Education, Senator Iyabo Anisulowo blamed the Vice President, Yemi Osinbajo and the then national chairman of APC, Adams Oshiomole for the crisis that rocked the Ogun State chapter of the party. Likewise, she accused Chief Olusegun Osoba of being complicit in the alleged plot to disrupt the governorship agenda of the people of Ogun West Senatorial District in the state, which has not produced governor since the creation of Ogun State about 40 years ago (Omilana, 2018).

The national executive of the party battled to resolve the crises thrown up by its governorship and legislative primary elections and realised that the party faced a herculean task of resolving the party primary crisis in Ogun State. Efforts to resolve the crisis and reconcile the warring factions in Ogun State proved abortive till the 2019 general elections. Two days after the Presidential election, the APC announced the suspension of Governor Ibikunle Amosun and his Imo State counterpart, Rochas Okorocha after the NWC meeting for anti-party activities and also recommended the expulsion of the suspended individuals from the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party (Busari, 2019).

Stakeholders' Efforts at Resolving Intra-Party Crisis in APC in Ogun State

One of the efforts made by stakeholders in resolving intra-party crisis in Ogun state APC this period (2018-2019) was the meeting President Muhammadu Buhari held with the then Ogun State governor, Senator Ibikunle Amosun inside the President's office in Abuja in October 2018. At the end of the meeting, Governor Amosun simply told the journalists that he would be returning with some unnamed persons for another meeting with the president (Ojoye, 2018). Prior, to the meeting with the president, he had earlier met with the vice-president – Prof. Yemi Osibajo on the rancorous primaries. At the end of the meeting, the governor did not disclose the bone of contention of the meeting (Ojoye, 2018), but it was clear that these meetings could not resolve the crisis.

Another effort aimed at resolving the intra-party crisis rocking the APC then was that of the National Peace and Reconciliation Committee (NPRC) set up to address concerns and grievances of those who lost out in the party primaries. The committee was headed by Alhaji Kashim Shettima, the then Governor of Borno state with Mr. Akinwunmi Ambode, Prof. Modupe Adelabu, Dr. Dakuku Peterside and Senator Seida Bugaje as members. It was however reported that Governor Amosun was absent during the meeting but the Chairman of Ogun state APC – Chief Derin Adebisi, Chief Bode Mustapha and Mr. Patrick Ogunde, among others, featured prominently at the peace meeting. Thus, Amosun's absence confirmed his threat to work against APC governorship candidate in Ogun State (Sobiye & Akinsanmi, 2018). However, it was glaring that the committee was unable to persuade the aggrieved members to sheathe their swords.

Also, President Muhammadu Buhari sent a Reconciliation Committee to Ogun state to meet with the 26 APC State Assembly candidates towards resolving the crisis that emanated after the party primaries in the State in November 2018. The committee was led by Princess Sandra Oladele, who in her address at the APC secretariat in Abeokuta spoke about how the president was concerned about the crisis and bent on ensuring reconciliation (The News Matrix, 2018). Furthermore, it was reported that Dr. Femi Majekodunmi appealed to Governor Ibikunle Amosun to play the role of a statesman in resolving the controversy that trailed the party's governorship primary in the state. He advised that the governor should reconcile with Dapo Abiodun and not work against the interest of the party in the 2019 governorship election (Coffie-Gymfi, 2018). However, the failure of stakeholders to resolve intra-party crisis rocking APC in Ogun state led to the decisions taken by the 26 candidates for Ogun APC assembly who lost at the primaries and Honourable Abdulkadir Adekunle Akinladeto dumped APC for Allied People's Movement (APM) in November, 2018.

Intra-Party Crisis and Democratic Consolidation in Ogun State

Following the appraisal of intra-party crisis within the APC in Ogun State, it is pertinent to point out that the situation did not only constitute serious threat to democratic consolidation but as well affected the growth and fortunes of the party. Undoubtedly, party growth depends largely on elements, such as its degree of institutionalisation, coherence and discipline among party members. In other words, a party grows when it is able to reduce the extent of factionalism and splits through development of an effective internal regulatory mechanism strong enough to command obedience and support from members. However, where party is divided against itself, this reduces its mobilisation capacity and such party is at the risk of fading away within time (Mustapha & Isah, 2018).

Intra-party crisis accentuates absolute political instability because it instigates unhealthy party proliferation, excessive monetised politics, electoral violence and other electoral irregularities like highly inflammatory campaigns, propaganda, and hate speeches. Other accompanying consequences brought about by party crisis include political thuggery, vote buying, stealing of electoral materials, snatching of ballot boxes, harassment of voters and election observer. It invariably leads to disruption of electoral process, political killings kidnapping, and inflation of election results, among others (Awofeso & Irabor, 2016). Likewise, the increasing, indiscriminate and wanton frequency of party crisis, rather than promoting genuine competition, would reduce the political landscape to a mere field for all-comers with no focus or objective beyond self interest and it is making a mockery of the ideal political structure, which by implication reduces the chances of quality representation in the democratic practice of the nation (Oluro & Bamigbose, 2020).

Intra-party crisis constitutes a worrisome threat to democratic consolidation as it bestows hardship on the people. It is often said that where two elephants fight, the grasses suffer. In a similar vein, when there are party crisis, the people are at the receiving end. It has negative effects on the generality of the people. Apart from the fact that people would not be able to go about their normal routine, they will also live in fear of being killed. Whenever there is crisis, it is not only the party involved that suffers, but those around also share from the evils of such crisis. For instance, during the political turmoil that engulfed Ogun State as a result of the feud between APC and APM supporters, it is not the politicians alone that suffered it but the electorate who were worst hit, hence the crisis brought unlimited hardship on the people (**Akpambang & Oniyinde, 2020**).

Intra-party crisis is not only a threat to the party concerned, but also a major source of unending political adventure. Functionally, political parties performing their traditional responsibilities of internal conflict management could be purveyors of political stability in the society. However, when political parties are unable to manage disagreements within the frameworks of extant rules, they will not likely be able to perform functions that could enhance the stability of the polity (Omotola, 2010). Intra-party squabbles as characteristic of the Nigerian politics have not only institutionalised indiscipline and political vagrancy but have, as the narrative of the APC's crisis has shown in Ogun State, created an environment for political instability both within and outside the parties (Basiru, 2019; Basiru 2015; Omoruyi, 2002).

Suffice to say that intra-party crisis also played out at the horizontal level of intra-governmental relations. Specifically, such crisis creates unhealthy executive-legislature relations, especially in the spheres of public budgets and appointment ratifications (Aiyede & Isumonah, 2002; Aiyede, 2005). Theoretically, the executive and the legislative arms of government are meant to be autonomous of each other, but the realities and complexities of modern societies have made their co-operation imperative (Basiru, 2014). Although crisis between the two organs are sometimes inevitable, but these incidences could be better managed where there is a culture of party discipline and cohesion. Where such is lacking and intra-party crisis becomes so pervasive, when executive-legislative gridlocks do occur, they are often equated to brinkmanship, if not warfare and can as such hinder speedy decision-making process (Basiru, 2019).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The paper examined intra-party crisis and democratic consolidation in Nigeria using the case of APC in Ogun State between 2018 and 2019 as a focus. It examined the synergy between political parties, intra-party crisis and democratic consolidation and also adopted the Realistic Group Conflict Theory as a tool of analysis. The paper argued that intra-party crisis has become an inhere part of Nigerian politics, which has pervaded Nigeria's political history since the pre independence era to the present day political processes. Therefore, the emergence of All Progressive Congress (APC) in Nigeria towards the 2015 general elections followed the trends of the same nature and character of intra-party conflict of old to date. The case of APC is EVEN more worrisome because the emergence of the party was as a result of marriage of incompatibility of strange bedfellows from the onset. Thus, the intra-party crisis that wrecked the Ogun State chapter of the party and still wrecking the party nationally is an expected evil.

However, intra-party crisis of such nature witnessed between 2018 and 2019 in Ogun state APC had perilous effect on democratic consolidation in the state as well as the nation at large. The paper observed that the APC Ogun state intra-party crisis weakened party growth and mobilisation capacity and it steered absolute political instability because it initiated unhealthy party proliferation, excessive monitised politics, electoral violence and other electoral irregularities. All these challenged the path to democratic consolidation in the state and by extension in the nation. The paper thus concluded that intra-party crisis within APC Ogun state is unhealthy and anti-democratic, which can frustrate the quest for democratic consolidation if not well addressed in time.

Therefore, in order to curtail the frightening and escalating rate of intra-party crisis and promote democratic consolidation in Ogun state and by extension in Nigeria, the following recommendations are made:

- i. The APC as a party should put in place measures to ensure that their activities are strictly guided by the party constitution. The leadership and stakeholders of the party should therefore, act in accordance with the party constitution while members should respect and obey party decisions;
- ii. The Ogun state APC and other political parties should strictly uphold party internal democracy;
- iii. The Ogun state APC and other political parties should display openness and transparency in the process of selecting party flag bearers while at the same time ensure the participation of all-party members in the selection process;
- iv. There should be strict principles and regulations guiding political party formation, so as to ensure effective institutionalisation of political parties with a view to ensuring that ideological foundation transcends ethnic, religious, sectional and other motives;
- v. The issue of godfatherism should be addressed in order to create a level playing ground for all members, promote unity and cooperation among the party members;
- vi. The party should establish an unbiased conflict management and resolution mechanism for addressing intra-party crisis.

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FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR YOUTHS INVOLVEMENT IN VIOLENT GANGS: A STUDY OF KONTAGORA TOWNSHIP, NIGER STATE

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Abstract

Youth violence is one of the greatest social problems facing Nigerian society. Since the return of democracy in 1999, the issue of youth violence has assumed a new dimension. The phenomenon manifests itself through formation of gangs who carry out such acts like; vandalism, rape, arson, burglary, murder, robbery, ethno-religious militancy, and kidnapping etc. Politicians at times manipulate the youth into violence for political advantage. While youth violence constitutes a serious threat to our collective security; unemployment, poverty, substance abuse, Poor upbringing, support from politicians etc seems to be among the major factors responsible for youth's involvement in violent gang activities in the Nigerian cities. Youth gang is a determinant of diminishing moral fields in a society and its consequences are many, because it has some socio-economic impacts on the individual, family and community or society at large. The paper examined the factors responsible for youth involvement in violent activities in Nigeria. The study utilizes primary data (questionnaire and in-depth interview) were used as the instruments for data collection. The study recommends that employment opportunities, youth empowerment and poverty alleviation programs should be put in place in the country. Equally, good parental care, admonishing by faith based organizations should be given consideration to mitigate the persistent increase youth violent activities.

Keywords: Gangs; Violence; Violent gangs, Drug abuse

Introduction

The problem of youth violence and restiveness exists across societies and gender divides which affects their lives (Alexander, 2008). In most of cities all over the world, Nigeria inclusive most of the crimes are committed by the youths (Rotker, 2002). Consequently, since the return of democracy in 1999 there has been an increased of youth gangs violent activities in most cities and this culminate to the number of unwanted events. More worrisome is that the problem persisted under the auspices of some unscrupulous politicians who, on selfish ground, provide the youths with drug and illicit substances and even allowances and promise to secure their release when they are arrested by the law enforcement agencies. This incidence of youth restiveness is usually accompanied with a number of negative consequences, which manifests itself through the formation of youth gangs that carry out such criminal acts as vandalism, rape, arson, burglary, murder, robbery, ethno-religious militancy and kidnapping among others.

This work is both topical and timely because it is established that *youth involvement in violent gang activities* perpetrates criminal acts, such as *sara-suka*, an activity, which involves molesting, assault,

burglary, destruction and disturbance of public peace and other social vices as well as violation of laws and norms of the society. This therefore led to the growing concerns by the public on the rate of violence due to *violent gang activities in Nigeria*. This study examined the factors responsible for the youth involvement in violent gangs' activities in Kontagora, Niger State.

Statement of problem

Youth are considered to be an important segment of the society because largely they are regarded as the most productive part of every nation (Ismaila and Madaki, 2008). In order to attain level of development; societies should properly and adequately orient and socialize their youth so that they conform to the societal positive recommendations and ultimately get integrated into the main developmental society process. However, youth involvement in the democratization process has witnessed the emergence of political thugs, violent gangs and the likes

In Niger State, Kolo, Gyong and Heillendend (2014) reported that neglect and maltreatment of youth ushered in by poverty, social exclusion from the side of parents are other challenges being faced by youths in the State has created stressful and negative emotional situations in them particularly when social capital that will cushion the effects was lacking from the family and the community. This type of situation could stir violence in society. Scholars have long noticed that human beings act violently-that is, they act with the intent to physically or mentally harm one another (Murray, 2011). In Kontagora, these youth are often recruited by the members of the political class to serve as vanguards particularly during electioneering campaigns. In other words these categories of youth are not constructively engaged in the democratization process. Politicians at times manipulate the youth into violence for political advantage. While youth violence constitutes a serious threat to our collective security, unemployment and poverty seems to be one of the major factors responsible for violence in the Nigerian cities. Youth gang is a determinant of diminishing moral wields in a society and its consequences are many, because it has some socio-economic impacts on the individual, family and community or society at large. Against this backdrop, this study investigated into the factors responsible for youth involvement in violent gang in Kontagora, Niger State

Research Questions

This work examines the factors responsible for youth involvement in violent gang activities in Kontagora, Niger State. Specifically, the study provided answers to the following questions raised:

1. What are the predisposing factors for youth involvement in violent gangs' activities in kontagora?
2. What are effects of youth violent gangs' activities in kontagora?
3. What are the solutions to the youth violent gangs' activities in kontagora?

Objectives of the study

The broad objective this paper is to examine the factors responsible for youth involvement in violent gang activities in Kontagora, Niger State. Specifically, the paper:

1. Identified the predisposing factors for youth involvement in violent gangs in kontagora
2. Effects of youth violent gangs activities in kontagora
3. Find out the solutions to the youth violent gangs activities in kontagora

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Both biological and psychological theories of crime and deviance blamed nature and other

internal happenings as the etiologies of deviance and crime, but the Sociological theories put more emphasis on social environment (society). They argued both deviance and crime as a social problem which their causes are found in the very nature of every society. In the view of Durkheim (1897), anomie (normlessness) is what breeds crime and deviance. Merton (1938) also built on Durkheim's concept of anomie to come up with theory of social structure and anomie. Merton explain why crime and deviance occurs in society and argues that social environment influences people's behaviours and Person's behavior shapes his attitudes towards culturally defined goals and the institutionalized means of achieving those goals. In an attempt to achieve these goals, people use different ways either by conforming to or by deviating from such cultural expectations. People who aspire for the culturally prescribed goals but are denied the opportunities to realize those goals will experience what he termed "social strains". It is because of these strains in finding access to legitimate means that some members of society turn to deviant acts such as youth involvement in violent activities.

Sutherland (1939, 1947) developed differential association theory to explain deviance and crime. He argued that deviance is learned through interactions with other people. This theory holds that deviant tend to form social bonds with other non-conforming individuals or group from whom they learn deviant sub-cultural norms and values. Individuals learn not only how to perform deviant acts but also how to define these activity. Differential association theory might suggest that crime results from those whose role molds are criminals and thus who associate with people whose behaviour is different or abnormal.

The basic assumption of the theory is that when an individual is interacting with others whose definitions favor deviant behavior, as opposed to conformity, they are likely to deviate from society's norms and values and the reverse is the case. Although, Sutherland was not the first sociologist to relate crime with cultural factors and the learning process (Tapperman, 2006). Specifically, the theory posits that deviance and criminality are behaviors learned through frequent and extended interaction with people who live in an anti-social lifestyle. For Sutherland, people imitate what they see other people doing. In communities where crime is common, accepted and even highly organized, say drug dealing and youth gang activities, normal people are more likely to engage in crime, too. Tapperman (2006) argued that differential association theory notion of environmental influence on deviance and crime by arguing that living in a high-crime neighborhood and witnessing others benefit from a criminal lifestyle increase the chances of engaging in illegitimate activities, such violent gangs. In this context, the study can reflect on the violent gang often lives according to street code that justifies gaining respect from others through violence. The possession of weapons like guns and cutlasses, as indicated by Fagan and Wilkinson (cited in Tapperman, 2006), symbolizes respect, power, identity and manhood; they play a central role in initiating, sustaining and escalating youth violence. Thus, following Sutherland, Katz and Marquette (as cited in Tapperman 2006) argued that violence becomes appropriate behavior for youths who are regularly exposed to violence; youths that are gang members themselves; youths whose family or friends are gang members; youths that have peer support for violence. The relevance of this theory is that the violent youths is exposed to gang membership and violent gang activities through interaction with individuals from within the family circle, outside the family circle or other agents of socialization

Conceptual clarifications

Gangs: Gang as a social science concept has no single meaning. However, Alexander (2008) reviewed some definitions of gang given by the police, such as Metropolitan Police (2007), which

defined 'gang' as 'a relatively durable, predominantly street based group of people who see themselves (and are seen by others) as a discernible group for whom crime and violence is integral to the group's identity'. Similarly, Sharp, Aldridge & Medina (2006) defined gangs in their study as a group of three or more people that spends a lot of time in public spaces, has existed for a minimum of three months, has engaged in delinquent activities in the past 12 months and has at least one structural feature, i.e., a name, leader, or code/rules. This is clear when looking at youths gangs in Nigeria for instance 'Yan sara-suka in Bauchi, Area Boys in Lagos, Kalare in Gombe, Jagaliya or yandaba in Kano, Banu-Isra'il and Yan-shinko in Taraba and Adamawa, Swagger boys in Niger States etc. who have existed for long, bearing different names like *sparticles* and *waju* boys, they have their leaders among them and engaged in delinquent behaviors. Dan Asabe (1991) used the term *Daba* to represent youths gangs, *Daba* is derived from Hausa, which means "group", such group would consist of people of the same age, trade or profession who gather in a particular place. However with time the literal meaning of *daba* in Kano has changed as it is now associated with social vices in the society. It is institutionalized with individuals under it as the role actors- *Dandaba*. Madaki (2002) pointed out that: "It is a deviant institution like any other institution with subculture proscriptive norms governing the behavior of its members".

Types of Youth Gangs

According to Gardon (1995) five different types of youth gangs exist. They are: youth groups, youth movements, criminal groups, criminal business organizations and street gangs. These types of gang are briefly explained as follows.

Youth groups: They are small groups of friends, who mostly hang out in public places without harming or committing any criminal activities. They are concerned about being with their fellow gang members and are mutually respecting themselves and even the parents of their friends;

Youth movement: They are a group of friends that dresses distinctively and cooperatively in the process of performing their activities. The youth in such movement can share certain codes of behavior that are typical of subculture. For example, some groups of young people are into the 'ass down' subculture or listening to some types of music like Nigerian pop and rap singers. This attitude by youth gangs is not harmful to the society.

Criminal group: They constitute a group of friends that engages in different types of criminal activities. This group mostly consists of adult persons. Criminal group as a type of gang is to some extent relevant to this study as *Kalare*, in Gombe, *Daba* in Kano, *Ecomog* in Borno, *Area Boys* in Lagos, *Yan sara-suka* in Bauchi, *Swagger boys* in Niger and other violent gang groups in other parts of the country have some characteristics of this type of gang.

Criminal business organization: This is also a group of friends usually adults and youths that participate in criminal behaviors mostly for financial gain. Many organized criminal syndicates fall under this type of gang.

Street gangs: They are a group of youths or people who form semi-organized groups for the purpose of profits. They are violent and usually identify themselves through a unique dress and give their gang a street name. Therefore '*swagger boys*' members fall under this category since they have a unique name (such as *waju* boys, *sparticles*, e.t.c). They can terrorize, harm, maim and commit other types of violent criminal acts.

Equally, Allan (2004) argued that a gang member can be identified in two different ways viz: (i) all gangs are assumed to indulge in the same disruptive and criminal behavior; and, (ii) individual action is confounded with group action. Gang membership may be unique; they have common

characteristics wherever they are.

Violence: The term violence means different things to different people, and therefore public health researchers defined violence as “threatened or actual use of physical force against a person or group that results or likely to result in injury or death” (Mercy et, al. 1993). Also Murray (2011) sees violence as an attempt by human beings to act with the intent to physically or mentally harm one another. However, Carmecheal (n.d) sees violence as that behaviour which is an uncontrolled response to some form of stimulation. According to her, violent behaviour is more likely to be a physical response to the perception that the 'self', i.e. one's sense of identity, is threatened. Being violated either emotionally or physically appears to result in a violent response. Violent behaviour can be seen as a mask which protects the 'self from pain and memories of traumatic experiences. The common denominator in all the definitions has to do with aggression, use of force or otherwise to inflict pain on individual or group.

Factors Responsible for the formation of Violent Youth Gangs

Poverty and unemployment: Poverty and unemployment have led many youths to engage in violent activities. Poverty is a situation of lacking something. Depending on the severity of the deprivation, it can be absolute or relative. The former is abject poverty and the later is a deprivation based on prevailing socio-economic standard in the environment one lives. In the European Union (EU) people are considered as poor if their living standards are below those regarded by society as acceptable. Individuals whose income is less than 40% of the income of one equivalent consumer can be considered as extremely poor , while those whose income does not exceed 60% of the income of one equivalent consumer are considered as poor (Latvia, 2015 report). People who live in poorer areas such as the inner city may have to rely on strength, threats or violent acts to gain their peers respect. Every gang-dominate neighborhood engaging in violence is part of the lifestyle of the sub-culture of violence Wofgang & Ferrcuti (1967). For Kabir (2010), popular concerns in both developed and developing world shows youth crime is on the increase because they are (among others) being exposed to gangs, extreme poverty and violence. She adds that the social and emotional needs of the youth compound the issues; majority of them in Nigeria live among the group and neighborhood where it is common to experiment with drugs and alcohol at an early age.

Cohen (as cited in Giddens, 2010) argued that youth in the lower working class are frustrated with the position they found themselves in life and these in turn led many youths from lower class family background to join the delinquent sub-culture, such as youth gangs. It was argued by O'connor (2004) that youth who cannot achieve in life according to social norms and do well in school or find good jobs, create subcultures. The idea was that youth who are school dropouts create their own way of behaving in their societies, which may include smoking, substance abuse and engaging in various types of violent crime. Unemployed youths are in most cases in the forefront of the violence that erupt peace in the oil producing areas between oil producing companies and their host communities. The youths usually hold oil company workers hostage because, they feel the oil companies must provide solutions to all their problems.

Poor parental up-bringing: Poor or improper upbringing or non-socialization has been considered as one of the reasons behind youth restiveness. A study by Cicourel (1968) on youth involvement in crime revealed that young people from the single parent families are more likely to engage in criminal acts than those from two-parent homes. This clearly shows that children from single parent homes have no or less supervision than the two parent homes. He further adds that youth from lower class families were more likely to view their offences as a result of poor supervision or lack

of proper role models. Ajaegbu states that:

The rise in violent crimes (robbery, kidnapping, thuggery, terrorism) committed by youths is a sign of gap in the society. The society already has expectations for individuals and established means of achieving them. When the means are limited as the youth unemployment is 46.5% in 2011, people are forced to achieve the goals through illegal means to fulfill societal expectations. Kidnappings are on the increase across Nigeria and the unemployed youths view the business lucrative. (Ajaegbu 2012:317).

When the means are limited such as youth unemployment, they are forced to achieve the goals through illegal means to fulfill societal expectations (Ajaegbu 2012; Muller, 2013). Some of the youth that ultimately chose gang as the best lifestyle are products of broken homes. Cohen (1965) observes that they have background problems. Some, most especially hawkers and *almajirai* (child-beggars from Qur'anic schools), take to the streets because their parents are poor; and there is no alternative other than to go to street and beg for their survival. The *almajirai* grow without enjoying the warmthness of their mothers and fatherly cares. Hence, they lack proper socialization to become cultured youth, people of good manners and/or characters that they are susceptible to take part in youth violence. For example, virtually all the members of the *maitatsine* movement in Kano then and majority of *Boko Haram* members in North East were previously *almajirai*. For Tepperman (2006), the family process and parent child relations in particular have influence on risky behavior. Thus, the influence of parents, friends and peers are the most important sources of socialization among youths.

Drug abuse: Drug and substance abuse among Nigeria youths have contributed to the upsurge in youth violence. Hard drugs such as heroin, marijuana and cocaine are often found in the possession of youths. Violent clashes often occur under the influence of drugs and other mind disturbing substances. Ifaturoti (1994) is of the view that abuse of drugs, such as cocaine, and over-indulgence in alcoholic drinks, such as gin and whisky, alter the state of the user's mind and predispose them to violence. It is clear that most of the youths who engage in violent activities in Nigeria use drugs before carrying out their activities (Saleh, 2016).

Political activities: Political activities are one of the predisposing factors that lead many youth to join violent gangs in Nigeria. The deviant activities of many gangs must be interpreted as an open manifestation of protest against the surrounding injustice and corruption with which they have to contend with on a daily basis. Such gangsters, as noted by Redl and Wineman (1951), often do not see anything wrong in what they do. They rationalize their activities by bending the general rules of the society to suit their own circumstances, which, of course, negate the accepted standards. Wunti (2012) and Halliru (2013) concluded that the availability of fire-arms under the auspices of unscrupulous politicians gives opportunity to many youths to engage in violent gang activities.

As Radda (2009) suggested in his study, politics is associated with violence in the African region and Nigeria in particular. Thus:

Nigeria witnessed unprecedented violence in the first Republic, culminating into its collapse. The Second and Third Republic was not better either. The fourth Republic turned out to be worse where armed youths were manipulated and used for violence, killing, maiming, electoral fraud etc. Nigeria's 2003 elections witnessed serious violence, political assassinations, criminal intimidation and electoral fraud never seen before

in Nigeria's political history. The atrocities were perpetrated by gullible youths that have become political thugs, recognized in Nigeria's political lexicon. (Radda 2009:39).

The above statement is an indicator that youths have been used to stir violence in Nigerian politics for many decades. The fact that people in authority are the orchestrators of this violence means that the violence by many Nigerian youth gangs is justified and rewarded as well as protected. That is why many cases of murders, assassinations and assaults were committed by these youth gangs with impunity only because of politicians' selfish interest

Methodology

Kontagora was founded in 1846 as a result of the war waged by Ummaru Nagwamatse (Musa, 2002). Kontagora town is the Headquarters of the Emirate with Wushishi, Danrangi, Rijau, Bobi, Kumbashi, Robu, Auna, Zugurma, Kaboji, Gulbin Boka, Dukku, Salka, Genu, Ibeto, Mashegu, Kontagora Gabas and Kontagora Yamma districts, respectively (Haruna, 2002).

Kontagora became the Headquarters of the then Mariga local government since the creation of Niger State in the year 1976 and later became a local government with its headquarters in Kontagora town in the year 1996. The local government covers an area of approximately 1,390.4 square kilometers. According to the 2006 population census, Kontagora has a population of 151,968 persons. The major ethnic groups in the area are Hausa, Fulani, Kambari, Dukkawa and Dakarkari. Other minority ethnic groups are Nupe, Gbagyi, Yoruba, Ibgo, and Edo who are residents of the town for commercial activities, farming, government work, marriage and educational pursuit. There are Muslims, Christians and African traditional believers in the town, but Muslims constitute the majority (NPC Gazette, 2007).

Kontagora town occupies the prime status of major junction town, a logical stopover of vehicles travelling from some northern states to southern part of the country and vice versa. Consequently, due to the numerous advantages of commercial, educational institutions, health care institutions, police and army barracks, farming and other economic activities, the town has continuously attract people from all parts of the country. .

The target population used was the entire population of violent gang members within metropolitan city of kontagora who are mainly unemployed youth and into drugs. The study was limited to six political wards within township with highest number of *members of violent* gang group (Central, Gabas, Kudu, Arewa, Magajiya and Yamma ward respectively). A total of one hundred and fifty (150) respondents were sampled using purposive and snowballing sampling technique. With the aid of informant the prominent *member* locations were identified in all the wards from which selection was made using availability of the gang members at the time of visit(s). The sample were selected from the gang meeting point/joint/chambers within the metropolis such as (sharp corner, morocco, kalakuta, pharmacy, sabon gari and tudun wada)

Questionnaire and interview instruments were used for data collection; the questionnaire was constructed in English and administered to the respondent by the researcher with the help of some research assistants. The questionnaire was administered as interview because a large number of the respondents were not literate. Equally, In-depth interview was conducted with gang leaders in Hausa language which was recorded and letter, transcribed and translated into English before the analysis. The quantitative data collected were analyzed using descriptive statistics. the major variables analyze includes age, Sex, Marital Status, Income level of the respondent and their parents, their level of education influences of inadequate parental care unemployment, poverty and political support, substance abuse among others. While qualitative data were analysed using

thematic analysis with verbatim quotations.

Results and Discussions of findings

This section present the data generated from the respondent, the data gathered covered respondent's personal profile, family background, residential condition, occupation, level of income and education.

Table 1 Age, Sex and Marital Status of Respondents

Age	Frequency	Percent
10-20 years	70	46.6
21-30 years	55	36.7
31-40 years	25	16.7
Total	150	100
Sex		
Male	137	91.3
Female	13	8.7
Total	150	100
Marital Status		
Single	115	76.7
Married	30	20
Divorced	5	3
No Response	5	3.0
Total	150	100

Source: Field work 2022

Table 1 above indicates that majority of members of violent gang in Kontagora are between 10-30 years of age constituting up to 83.3%, while the remaining 16.7% are between 31-40 years of age. This suggests that members of the gang are mainly youth who are supposed to either be in school or productive employment. The table further indicates that majority (91.3%) of the respondents are males while 8.7% are females. The females found are mostly girlfriends to the leaders of gang. The gang members in Kaontagora are predominantly youth, mostly single in terms of their marital status constituting 76.7% of the respondents unmarried.

Table 2 Respondents and Parents Living Together

Living Together	Frequency	Percent
Yes	30	20
No	118	78.7
No Response	2	1.3
Total	150	100

Source: Field work 2022

The table shows that 78.7% of the respondents revealed that they are from broken homes and are not living together even the remaining 21.3% who claimed that their parents are together revealed that they cannot get all daily need necessities of life from the parents because of the poor economic position of the parents or unemployed status.

Table 3 Respondents Education Attainment

Education	Frequency	Percent
Qur'anic	70	46.7
Primary	45	30
Secondary	35	23.3
Total	150	100

Source: Field work 2022

It is evident from the data that significant percentage of the respondent have not attended formal school but rather attended traditional Qur'anic school but stopped at some point this constitute up to 46.7%, even those that have attended primary and post primary schools very few of them completed the schools as such many of them are dropouts. None of the gang member was found to have attended any higher institutions or universities.

Table 4 Poverty Motivate Formation of Youth Violent Gangs

Response	Frequency	Percent
Yes	140	93.3
No	7	4.7
No Response	3	2
Total	169	100

Source: Field work 2022

The table above indicates that poverty is among the major factor that facilitates the existence of violent gang. It is evident that 93.3% of the respondents indicate that poverty is one of the main reasons why they have become gang members. This finding tallies with current wide spread poverty in the country. Many of the members of the gang are living below the poverty line pushes them to join gang group as an alternative.

Table 5 Unemployment Encourage Formation of Youth Violent Gangs

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yes	140	93.3
No	7	4.7
No Response	3	2
Total	169	100

Source: Field work 2022

From the table above it is clearly indicated that 93.3% of the respondents are unemployed which predisposes them to join the violent gang group in Kontagora. This findings is in agreement with current unemployment noticeable by our teeming young men and women who are visibly seen roaming in the streets of many Nigerian cities

Table 6 Politicians Support Formation of Youth Violent Gangs

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yes	153	90.0
No	14	8.3
No Response	2	1.2
Total	169	100

Source: Field work 2022

From the data it is evident that violent gang members enjoy some support from politicians. Significant proportion of the respondents (90%) confirmed that the kind of support they get from politicians encourage them to be in the gang. They further noted that they tend to have some

support and backing from politicians and even the political structure, as most Politicians used them during political campaigns, rallies and to some extents during elections. These politicians used to provide them with weapons in order to give them protection and attack their perceived opponents during any political activity this is directly connected with the level of unemployment among the youth.

These therefore, suggest that the respondents were unemployed and living below poverty line with no reliable source of income, low level of education and from poverty stricken broken homes which denied them to have proper and adequate parental care and good upbringing. As human beings they have needs and since they have no alternative, politicians use them as political thugs to provide favorable services in the course of their political games while they provide them with financial support, weapons, drugs etc. to perpetrate their heinous act.

Consequently, due to the support from politicians violent gang members are visibly holding weapons and experiment with drugs especially during political rallies, campaign and elections. For example, according to one respondent:

These politicians give us money, we go to them and request for it and in return we serve them as vanguards/thugs in the political process and we always advertise their interest.

These politicians give them all the necessary support and encouragement to minimize case of arrest and apprehension by the law enforcement agents and equally secure their release in case if they are arrested. So political activities influence and facilitate violent gang activities in Kontagora. In fact the violent group members have come to realize their role in the political process and some of them are beginning to think of the indispensability of gangstarism in political and electioneering process. For instance according to one of the respondent:

The politics of today cannot go without us; we help them a lot especially during elections and campaigns. So the Politicians heavily depend on us to achieve their aim.

Equally, a respondent pointed out that:

Some politicians used us as their guards during political rallies and campaigns, and whenever we are arrested they immediately secure our release.

This is in line with the submission of Dan Asabe (1991) that emergence of modern politics led to the emergence and persistence of 'yandaba in our society.


Table 7 Substance Abuse Encourages Formation of Violent Gangs

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yes	140	93.3
No	7	4.7
No Response	3	2
Total	150	100

Source: Field work 2022

As indicated in the above table, more than 90% of the respondents revealed that substance abuse is among the major factor responsible for their involvement into violent gang activities

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework: Showing Factors Responsible for Youths Involvement in Violent Gangs



Conclusion

The paper examined how youth violence is becoming an alarming issue and pose serious security threats and peace in Nigerian society. It also highlighted the negative consequences of the increasing involvement of the youths in violence activity in Nigeria. It is accompanied with a number of unwanted events socially, politically and economically. The study discovered that majority of the

youths who form gang groups and those being recruited are from poor family backgrounds. This implies that poverty, unemployment, political activities and poor parental upbringing are some of the major causes of violent youth gangs in Nigeria.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are provided for the study

1. There is the ardent need for the creation of employment opportunities, and youth empowerment, poverty reduction programmes by government. NGOs and other philanthropic organizations should complement government efforts in providing opportunities for the development of variety of skills for the unemployed youths..
2. Agriculture should be given more priority and the youths should be encouraged to participate this will empower them and improve the economy.
3. Community and religious leaders should be involved in advocating the consequences of violence and other illegal behavior here and in the hereafter since they have special recognition in the society.
4. There is need for moral and value reorientation for the youths to be law abiding citizens as the leaders of tomorrow. They need to conform to societal norms and values. They shall be thinking of how to contribute their quota to the development of their selves and the society at large.
5. There is the need for educational opportunities to be made available and compulsory for all to meet the idea of universal basic education.

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POWER ROTATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: THE ROLE OF DAILY TRUST NEWSPAPER IN THE NORTHERN PRESIDENCY

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Abstract

The perceived domination of power at the centre by people that hail from Northern Nigeria fuelled the agitation for rotational presidency. Although, rotational presidency is alien to the constitution of Nigeria, but the 1994 National Conference convened by late Head of State General Sani Abacha created six geopolitical zones for Nigeria and the conference's delegates agreed that power should rotate among the six geopolitical zones. Rotational presidency has a history that can be traced to ancient Greek hence this paper examined the role played by Daily Trust newspaper in promoting the stance of the Northern states in the debate over rotational presidency in Nigeria. This is with a view to determine how media organisations in Nigeria assist their host regions to achieve certain political goals being media a key actor in the dynamic interaction that takes place in political communication. For the fact that the clamour for rotational presidency often takes religious dimension in Nigeria, the paper employed Content Analysis and Survey Research to generate data, which revealed how news items featured by Daily Trust newspaper made the stance of the Northern states a national agenda in the rotational presidency debate and this led to the return of power to the North despite the resistance of other parts of Nigeria. The Agenda Setting Theory guided the paper in arriving at this finding. Considering the important role of the media in the peace and unity of Nigeria, the paper recommended that, Nigerian media should give emphasis to adherence to the agreed principles of rotational presidency than promoting primordial interest.

Keywords: Rotational Presidency, Religious Interest, Political Communication

Introduction

The concentration of power at the centre makes every part and geopolitical zone of Nigeria to strive to produce the country's president. This makes the concept of rotational presidency to become part of Nigeria's political dispensations despite its non recognition by the country's constitution, which is the supreme law of the land. The media as channels through which information is disseminated are used by different groups in Nigeria to clamour for shift of power from one part of the country to another. Politicians, especially, use the concept of rotational presidency to grab power, although in most cases not for the interest of the section they claim to represent.

Similarly, in attempt to achieve their goals, politicians in Nigeria sometimes use religious sentiment to ensure that power shift from one part of the country to another. In this direction, the media are important tools that are used in promoting religious and other primordial sentiments. Since political communication entails a dynamic interaction between three actors – media, politicians and audience/readers – it becomes an intellectual ground to view the role that the media are playing for different parts of Nigeria in their strive to grab political power through the banner of rotational presidency. Because of the fact that religion plays a very significant role in Nigeria's politics, political communication is also a ground to assess the role of the media in promoting religious interest as one of the yardsticks of political choice in Nigeria.

This Aristotle's postulation shows an interaction of a speaker (politician), the speech (media), the audience and the effect of the communication and this interaction is what is known as political communication during the times of Aristotle. For Aristotle, the principal goal of political communication is persuasion. According to him, there are ways of achieving this persuasion, which

are logos, ethos and pathos. Logos entails the “logicality of speaker's argument”, which is the ability of the speaker to convince his audience that what he was saying was the truth. Aside of logicality of speaker's argument where the political communication contains plausible arguments or logos, Aristotle said the political communication must be seen as credible, as well. This quality or credibility is what Aristotle refers to as ethos, which describes the audience perception of a speaker based on the speech itself. Aristotle also believes that effective political communicator must know how to stir up various emotions in the audience, and these emotions or pathos can be anger, gratitude, empathy, admiration, indignation among others (Aristotle, 384-322).

It is from the foregoing that this paper examines the coverage of rotational presidency and religious issues by the *Daily Trust* newspaper with the aim of determining the impact of this coverage on the political dispositions of the Northern states of Nigeria. Haruna, Shariff and Yusuf (2003) posited that the unfavourable stance of the geopolitical North in the information balance of Nigeria made the region to voluntarily surrendered power to the South in 1999, largely because of the pressure that the Southern-based media mounted. The Southern media, according to them, set agenda for the whole nation by making the issue of rotating power to the South very important to the unity and survival of the country. Because of the fact that the geopolitical North has no enough media outfits to counter those narratives, political leaders of the North had no other option than to succumb, as the majority Southern media had overwhelmed the polity with a lot of propaganda and this made even some indigenes of the Northern region to buy-in in the arguments.

Therefore, this paper intends to look at the impact that *Daily Trust* newspaper made in reporting and supporting the stance of the geopolitical North in the rotational presidency debate. The coverage of religious issues by *Daily Trust* newspaper was also examined in order to determine the role that religion played in the politics of rotational presidency in Nigeria. Doing this has as well enabled the research to ascertain the role played by the newspaper in bridging the gap that exists between the North and the South in the information balance of Nigeria.

Literature Review

This review surveys and discusses available literature on the paper's subject matter. Therefore, the review focuses largely on literature written on rotational presidency, political communication and religion.

Power Rotation and Nigeria's Politics

The concept of power rotation is not a Nigerian formulation. It was said to have started in ancient Greek where power was rotated among the city states. Similarly, presidency is said to be rotated among ethnic nationalities in Switzerland. Most international organisations like the European Union, Commonwealth of Nations, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among others, rotate the leadership of the organisations among member states. Therefore, many states and even non-state entities of the world practice rotational presidency in order to ensure peace, tranquillity and fairness. Rotational presidency also gives religions, ethnic nationalities, regions and individuals a sense of belonging in a particular state (Nwozor, 2014).

In Nigeria, the perceived domination of geopolitical north of the politics of the country fuelled the agitation of rotational presidency. Although Nwozor (2014) believed that the agitation of rotational presidency was more of an elite struggle for acquisition of power and wealth than ensuring equity and fairness among the regions, tribes or even religions in Nigeria.

According to Okwema (2011), agitations for rotational presidency led to many conferences in Nigeria in order to find an effective structure and polity for the country. For example, there was the 1994 National Conference under the regime of late General Sani Abacha, which took place between June 26, 1994 and June 26, 1995. The conference was called in order to address the serious political uprising that followed the cancellation of June 12, 1993 presidential election.

Although the conference was largely convened to consider the structure of Nigeria, but rotational presidency and resource control dominated the deliberations of the conference.

Therefore, at the end of the conference six geo-political zones were adopted. It was agreed that power at the centre would be rotated among these geopolitical zones with transitional period of 30 years, but this was not entrenched in the draft constitution that the conference produced. From the foregoing, the Nigerian constitutions, including the current 1999 constitution, did not recognise the concept of rotational presidency.

However, Nigerian constitution recognises Federal Character, which relatively has similarly goals with rotational presidency. Federal Character is enshrined in Section 13 (3) and (4) of the 1999 Constitution. It reads thus;

The composition of the Government of the Federation, or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies.

In addition to the above, the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the constitution established a special commission, The Federal Character Commission, as a federal agency for the implementation of the provisions of the Federal Character. It is the duty of this Commission to monitor, promote and ensure compliance to this principle by all agencies of government including parastatals, departments, ministries, police, the Armed Forces, and other security agencies. This principle also demands the states and local governments to reflect their diversity in the composition of their officials, political appointees and elected officers.

From the foregoing, despite the fact that Nigerian constitution did not recognise rotational presidency as a principle that should guide the emergence of a Nigerian president, but the constitution provided for reflection of Nigeria's diversity in all the institutions of governance through the Federal Character principle. The constitution considered the fact that, it is only through representation of different tribes, regions and even religions that peace and tranquillity would prevail in Nigeria.

Therefore, as stated earlier, one of the major factors that led to the agitation of rotational presidency in Nigeria is the perceived domination of the Hausa/Fulani at the central government. On this accusation, Nwosu (2004) said history of election in Nigeria reveals that northerners emerge as leaders because of certain circumstances. According to him, from the 1959 up to 2015 elections, it was clear that the Hausa/Fulani have to form alliance with another group to win election. Hausa/Fulani have never voted en bloc in the history of Nigeria. Even in the 2015 presidential election, President MuhammaduBuhari emerged successful through his alliance with the Southwest of Nigeria. Therefore, the assumption to power by the Hausa/Fulani either during the military or democratic dispensation was usually with support of other part(s) of Nigeria. From the foregoing, the Hausa/Fulani were able to dominate power at the centre, because of the support they enjoyed from the other parts of the country. History has shown that different Nigerian nationalities are more comfortable with the Hausa/Fulani personality at the helm of affairs of the country.

Since rotational presidency was introduced as a remedy to the perceived marginalization of some parts of Nigeria, the introduction of the six geo-political zones at the 1994 national conference was aimed at addressing the alleged manipulation of power by the north. However, Egbosiuba (2011) and Agagu (2004) said rotational presidency betray merit, objectivity and good governance. Therefore, rotational presidency has brought about oligarchic tendencies and encouraged division. This can be justified with the crises that followed the 2011 presidential elections. The north felt cheated when President Goodluck Jonathan contested and won the 2011

presidential election after the demise of President Umaru Musa Yar'adua. The argument was that President Olusegun Obasanjo, a southerner, has spent eight years in power, therefore the north should provide the president for the next eight years after President Olusegun Obasanjo. When President Umaru Musa Yar'adua died, the northern part of Nigeria was supposed to produce another candidate to contest the 2011 election, but President Goodluck Jonathan contested and won the election. This led to uprising that consumed lives and property worth billions of Naira.

Religion and Politics in Nigeria

Notable classical scholars like Socrates, Aristotle, Jean Jaques Rousseau, Karl Marx, John Locke and many others have portrayed the relationship that exists between politics and religion. From the perspectives of what a religion is or what a religion does, we can trace the importance and role of religion in politics. From the perspective of what a religion is; it is seen as a set of beliefs, while from the perspective of religion does; it deals with functions that religion have in people's lives (Anifowose and Enemu, 1999).

From the approach of what religion does or substantivist approach, religion influences the political action of an individual. Similarly, from the approach of what religion is or functionalist approach, religion influences people's political belief. Therefore, when religion is taking from any of the two perspectives, religion has strong relationship with politics (Bachelie, 2011).

From the foregoing, it is not surprising that religion is influencing politics in Nigeria. This is why perhaps religion takes centre stage in the rotational presidency debate in Nigeria and this also transcends to the media coverage of political activities in the country. Religion is a sensitive issue that makes most Nigerians to act blindly in their political choice.

It is on this basis that all elective positions in Nigeria have to reflect the religious inclination of the candidates and the electorate. For example, if a presidential candidate is a Muslim, usually the vice presidential candidate ought to be a Christian and vice versa. In recent history, it was only the 1993 presidential election that Muslim/Muslim ticket won, otherwise political offices in Nigeria reflect the two dominant religions in the country, that is, Islam and Christianity. Since media is part of Nigeria's political system and one of the major stakeholders, they also portray the political and religious outlook of Nigerians.

Mass Media and Political Communication

Political Communication entails a system of dynamic interaction between political actors, the media and audience members, each of whom is involved in producing, receiving and interpreting political messages. Viewing political communication as a system of interaction implies that all three sets of actors are dependent on the performance of the other actors of the system as a resource for achieving their own interests and objectives (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1995).

As a result of the high degree of mutual interdependence, all these actors, particularly politicians and the media, are constantly involved in a complex web of interactions and negotiations over aims, procedures and, ultimately, control of the public agenda. Not surprisingly, these interactions are frequently characterised by conflicts and disruptions, but equally by the compromises and cooperation that are required to maintain the relationship (Votmer, 2006).

Political Communication is an increasingly important area in communication and media studies. Studies have shown the importance of the media in contributing significantly to creating public awareness and mobilising participation and nation-building, especially in times of political transformation. In this type of communication, the media help citizens to reach informed decisions about what course of action to take and also offer the citizenry the enabling environment to engage in discussions on how state power is utilised by those in authority (Des, 2012).

This implies that, it is in the media that people are able to participate freely in discussions relevant to the public good, and the media assist in resolving social conflicts and defining collectively

agreed upon objectives. By playing a part of resolving social conflicts, the media become the platform that link together divergent groups, thus, becoming a stabilising element in the society. The activities of the media, as stated above, shape and reshape public opinion for formation and building of an informed political decision by the citizens of different states, Nigeria inclusive. However, in Nigeria the nature of media reportage of the issue of rotational presidency had largely made most Nigerians to inculcate regional, tribal and even religious sentiments for or against the rotation of power at the centre. (Pate, Nwabueze and Idiong, 2013).

Systemic Relationship in Political Communication

According to Voltmer (2006), success and failure in political communication are systemic rather than the result of the performance of one particular actor. Hence, the quality of mediated politics depends on both politicians and journalists, and the way in which they address the citizens. Voltmer (2006), further said that any lack of diversity in the 'marketplace of ideas', low quality of information or absence of critical discussion are not, therefore, an isolated problem of the media, but as a result of the specific constraints evolving from the media's relationship with politicians and the audience.

Citizens' understanding of political matters and the way in which they fulfil their own role as the ultimate sovereign of the democratic process is to a large extent a response to the content, form and quality of the messages they receive from politicians and the mass media. Arguably, the mass media serve as the main link between governments, political parties, candidates, etc and voters, as the opportunities for direct communication between citizens and their representatives are extremely limited both in terms of the scale of the audience reached and the scope of the issues covered.

However, the media organisations are not just channels conveying the messages politicians want them to communicate to voters; they are also active participants in the creation of political messages. Even though most of the time the media are not the immediate originators of these messages, they have a significant impact on what is communicated in the public sphere, and what is omitted, thereby setting the agenda of the political debate (Voltmer, 2006).

Equally, whether or not the media form alliances with particular parties or subscribe to particular ideologies is influenced by the constellations within the political communication system. Most media are closely related to particular political actors: either as propaganda instruments of the government or ruling party, or as clandestine media in the hands of opposition groups (Voltmer, 2006).

In Nigeria, for example, most government-owned media, Federal or State, are said to have lost their credibility because of their inability to come up with objective reportage on issues that concern government; their owners. Most Nigerians now depend on privately-owned media outfits for reliable information or even the "gossip on the internet." Unfortunately, on issues like rotational presidency, the private media give prominence to the interest of their owners or the regions they are located, among other sentiments (Haruna, Sheriff and Yusuf, 2003).

Without fair access to the media, political actors, be it governments, political parties or civil society groups, would be unable to mobilise support, and elections as a democratic mechanism of allocating power would be meaningless (Voltmer 2006). Over the past couple of decades, political communication has undergone dramatic changes, which were believed, to have far-reaching consequences for the way in which democratic politics work. Never before have politicians put as much effort, resources and sophistication into communicating with citizens as today. This is why every region, state, tribe or even religion in Nigeria strives hard to have media organisation(s) that would champion its course (Brants and Voltmer, 2011).

From the foregoing, the media and politicians are constantly involved in negotiations over the political agenda that is publicly communicated, the frames in which contested issues and political

realities are defined. Since both actors depend on each other's resources to achieve their own goals, politicians need the media for publicity; journalists need politicians as authoritative sources of information, there therefore developed an assumed overall balance in the power relationship between these actors. But when it comes to the issue of news management and political marketing, it can be seen as an attempt by political actors to regain the upper hand in the communication process. This is particularly evident during election campaigns, especially in Nigeria (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1995).

Theoretical Framework

Researchers employ theories in order to have a direction and avoid being taken over by flukes. Therefore, the frame for analysis adopted by this paper is the Agenda Setting Theory. The Agenda setting theory entails that the media houses, through their activities, engage in producing national issues for discussion among the general public. The major assumption of the agenda setting theory is that the media set agenda for the public to follow. The theory holds that most times the picture in our heads, the things we worry and think about and most of the issues we talk about are based on what we have seen, heard and read from the media. Therefore, the media have a significant impact over what the people think, discuss or worry about if the media continuously give prominence and importance to such an issue (Pate, et al 2013) and (Des, 2012).

According to Busy and Holbert (2011) the agenda setting is the foundation from which one should approach media influence in politics. Agenda setting theory refers to the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences. Agenda setting theory of the media describes the ability of the news media to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda, that is, if a news item is covered frequently and prominently, the audience will regard the issue as more important (Scheufele and David, 2006) and (Des, 2014).

Agenda setting theory was formally developed by Dr. Max McCombs and Dr. Donald Shaw in a study on the 1968 United States of America's presidential election. In the 1968 "Chapel Hill study," McCombs and Shaw demonstrated a strong correlation between what 100 residents of Chapel Hill, North Carolina thought was the most important election issue and what the local and national news media reported was the most important issue. By comparing the salience of issues in news content with the public perceptions of the most important election issue, they were able to determine the degree to which the media determine public opinion (Des, 2012).

Since this paper attempts to establish the role played by *Daily Trust* newspaper for northern states in the intrigues that shrouded the rotational presidency debate, the agenda setting theory becomes the most effective framework to guide the paper. The theory was used to determine the prominence that *Daily Trust* newspaper gave to the coverage of rotational presidency and religious issues and how that coverage assisted the stance of the northern states.

Methodology

One of the sources of data for this paper was the news items featured by *Daily Trust* newspaper. On this basis, the paper employed Content Analysis in gathering the data for the study. Content Analysis was used to content analyse the front page stories, editorials and back page columns of the editions of *Daily Trust* newspaper from 2004 to 2014. This was based on the fact that Voltmer (2006) has said that front page stories and editorials of newspaper determine its identity.

Within the period under study, *Daily Trust* newspaper, being a daily title, produced four thousand and fifteen (4,015) editions, if an average of three hundred and sixty five days (365) per year is taking into consideration. Therefore, in selecting the editions of *Daily Trust* newspaper for the purpose of content analysis, systematic sampling was adopted.

After adhering to the postulations of the systematic sampling, the research reviewed one thousand

five hundred and fifty eight (1,558) editions of *Daily Trust* newspaper, representing 77.61% of the targeted editions (population) of two thousand and seven point five (2,007.5). News items on rotational presidency and religious issues were considered in line with the objectives of the paper.


Therefore, the unit of analysis for this study were front page stories, editorials and back page columns of *Daily Trust* newspaper within the period under review. Similarly, the content categories were direction and frequency.

Again, the paper also used Survey Research in data collection. The Personal Interview Method was used. The two founders of *Daily Trust* newspaper, Malam Kabiru Yusuf and AlhajilshaqAjibola, and two columnists of the paper, Malam Mohammed Haruna and Dr. Bala Muhammad, were interviewed. Babbie (2010:254-256) offered many reasons to support the argument that personal interview is the best method of collecting primary data. Those postulations influenced the decision of this paper to adopt the method.

The selection of *Daily Trust* newspaper was informed by the fact that, it is seen by many Nigerians as a Northern media house. Since the aim of this research is to find how a Northern media outfit is supporting, or otherwise, the political goals of Northern states, *Daily Trust* newspaper has assisted this research in understanding the role that the media played in the rotational presidency debate, which sometimes takes religious colouration.

Data

Figure 1: *Daily Trust* newspaper's coverage of Rotational Presidency for Northern



Source: Field Work (2014)

Source: Field Work (2014)

Figure 1 above shows an analysis of news items featured by *Daily Trust* newspaper on Rotational Presidency. Within the period under study, the newspaper has featured two hundred and twenty seven (227) news items on Rotational Presidency. Out of this number, two hundred and ten (210), representing 92.51%, were for the Northern states, fifteen (15), representing 6.61%, were for the Southern states, while two (2), representing .88%, were neutral. This shows that, *Daily Trust* newspaper has favoured the Northern states in its coverage of Rotational Presidency.

Below are examples of the news items that *Daily Trust* newspaper featured on Rotational Presidency:

PDP, PRESIDENCY GANG UP AGAINST NORTH – AWONIYI: NO CAUSE FOR ALARM, SAYS BUHARI: The federal government and the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), were reported to have resolved to ensure that the presidency eludes the North in 2007....(Daily Trust, January 16, 2006:1-2).

2007 PRESIDENCY: WHO LEADS THE NORTH: All things being equal, it appears that the national political mood is becoming increasingly favourable to the transfer of power to the North. Expectedly, the last few weeks have seen the emergence of Northern presidential contenders in more numbers....(Weekly Trust, June 17 – 23, 2006:1-5).


2007: NORTH SEARCHES FOR CONSENSUS CANDIDATE: The political battering the North has been receiving from the South over the 2007 presidential race has encouraged elders in the region to resolve to come together behind one credible candidate that will be supported by all Northerners...(Weekly Trust, July 15 – 21, 2006:1-9).

SUMMIT OF SOUTHERN STATES: WOULD IT STOP POWER SHIFT TO THE NORTH?: PRESIDENCY IS THE TURN OF THE NORTH IN 2007 – PROF. OMO OMORUYI: At the last South-South, South-West and South-East partnership meeting in Lagos, speakers after speakers harped on retaining the presidency in the South...dignitaries....said the North would never taste power again for the next coming years...(Weekly Trust, December 17 – 23, 2005:1-5).

2007: IT'S NORTH'S TURN, SAYS GOV IGBINEDION: Governor Lucky Igbinedion of Edo state, yesterday in Abuja advised the South-South to jettison its desire for the presidency and support a Northern candidate in next year's election....(Daily Trust, June 30, 2006:1-2).

IBB: YAR'ADUA TICKET BELONGS TO THE NORTH: Former president Ibrahim Babangida said yesterday that the PDP was being dishonest when it said President Jonathan could run for election next year on his initial joint ticket with the late UmaruYar'adua....(Daily Trust, August 30, 2010:1-5).

Figure 2: Daily Trust newspaper's coverage of Muslims/Shari'a for Northern and Southern States (2004-2014)



Source: Field Work (2014)

Figure 2 above shows an analysis of how *Daily Trust* newspaper covered Muslims and issues of Shari'a during the period under study. From the above figure, the newspaper has featured one hundred and forty three (143) news items on Muslims and Shari'a issues during the period under study. Eighty seven (87) of these news items, representing 60.84%, were for the Northern states, six (6), representing 4.19%, were for the Southern states, while fifty (50), representing 34.97%, were for both the Northern and the Southern states.

The above figure revealed the interest that *Daily Trust* newspaper has on issues that concern the Muslims and Shari'a in both the North and the South. Both the two founders of the newspaper interviewed by the study and two of the columnists of the newspaper have confirmed that *Daily Trust* newspaper was founded to, among other things, give voice to Muslims and Islam not only on rotational presidency, but all other national issues.

Alhaji Ishaq Ajibola, one of the two founders of *Daily Trust* newspaper said; "there were two things that were important to us; to cover the North very well like no other newspaper; our religion was also important for us." (Interview, 2014).

Also, Malam Kabiru Yusuf said thus; "I think every news medium that is located in a certain area would have to go along with the belief and the views of its readers to some extent. So, being in the North with largely Muslim readership meant that, to some extent, we have to respond to those issues or views that our readers have and to the kind of information that they are interesting in. To that extent, I cannot say that we set up in a vacuum. We are conscious of the community where we are based. And we thought that the only way to succeed is to respond to their needs and aspirations to the best that we can." (Interview, 2014).

Again, Malam Mohammed Haruna, a *Daily Trust* newspaper columnist, said; "the way some people would think that the *Daily Trust* is Northern or Islamic paper, I don't think they should apologise for that. Because every newspaper in the world has an immediate constituency, and unless it serves that constituency well, it wouldn't survive." (Interview, 2014).

In the same vein, another columnist of the newspaper, Malam Bala Muhammad, said thus; ".....Not necessarily the North. My first agenda is Islam. I am a Muslim and I always feel that Islam is underreported and misunderstood. Part of my contribution is to see that people understand Islam more, and that it is not what people think it is, especially our compatriots in this country, the non-Muslims. So, that is my first agenda to set the record of Islam correctly, to ensure that at least I do a little bit of explaining the religion." (Interview, 2014).

Below are examples of the news items featured by *Daily Trust* newspaper on Muslims and Shari'a issues:

NATIONAL CONFAB: NSCIA DECRIES MUSLIMS MARGINALISATION: The apex umbrella organisation of Muslims in Nigeria, the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), has risen against the apparent discrimination and marginalisation of Muslims in the selection of delegates to the national conference on political reforms.....(Daily Trust, February 24, 2005:1-2).

HAJJ: MOST PILGRIMS MAY MISS 2011 ELECTIONS: Most of the 95,000 expected Nigerian pilgrims may not have the chance to participate in the 2011 elections based on the guidelines released by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).....(Daily Trust, September 10, 2010:1-3).

BARKA DA SALLA: Muslims all over Nigeria, like their counterparts in many parts of the world, are today celebrating the Eid el-Fitr to mark the end of Ramadan....(Daily Trust, September 10, 2010:30).

IZALA FACTIONS UNITE: Sheikh SaniYahayaJingir yesterday emerged as the national leader of the unified Izala movement, after days of consultations that culminated in the unification of the sect's two factions at a meeting in Kaduna....(Daily Trust, December 22, 2011:1-5).

ISLAMIC SCHOOL BOMBED IN DELTA: Six children and another person were injured on Tuesday night when assailants threw a homemade bomb in the midst of about 100 kids taking lessons at an Islamic school in Sapele, Delta State, witnesses and police said....(Daily Trust, December 29, 2011:1-5).

PUNCH AND AREGBESOLA: In November, Alhaji Abdul RaufAregbesola, the governor of Osun State, declared the 15th of November 2012, which coincided with the 1st of Muharram, a public holiday to commemorate the commencement of the Islamic Hijra New Year. By the nature of things, this declaration ought to have been supported by all those who normally clamour for a proper federation. Alas, this was not to be. Immediately after the announcement, there was what appeared like orchestrated press opposition to it; and The Punch would go to the extent of writing an editorial to castigate the governor's action....(Daily Trust, January 11, 2013:64).

Discussion of Findings

The literature reviewed by the paper have established the passion that Nigerians attach to the issue of rotational presidency. Some scholars see rotational presidency as an approach to ensure fairness and inclusiveness in the Nigerian polity, especially on who becomes the president of the country. However, other scholars like EgboSiuba (2011) view rotational presidency as oligarchic in nature, which has the ability to cause division and nepotism in Nigeria hence rotational presidency negate the basic tenets of democracy.

Media as one of the three actors that engage in dynamic interaction in political communication are involved in the debate over rotational presidency, largely in support of a given region, tribe or religion. It is on this ground that this paper established the involvement of *Daily Trust* newspaper in the debate over rotational presidency where the paper supported the position of the Northern states. By this, *Daily Trust* newspaper has given the Northern states a voice in the debate and represented the states in the information balance of the country. This has assisted the Northern states to regain power in the 2007 presidential elections.

The research also established how *Daily Trust* newspaper covered religious issues in favour of the Northern states, particularly the Muslim citizens of the states. This has assisted the clamour for the return of power to the North, which became a reality in the year 2007. For the fact that, the debate over rotational presidency sometimes takes religious colouration, the prominence given to religious issues by *Daily Trust* newspaper has added value to the stance of the North on the need for power to rotate as agreed when adopting the principle of the rotational presidency.

Conclusion

As political communication entails a dynamic interaction among three actors – media, politicians and audience/readers – therefore in a diverse state like Nigeria this interaction most often is guided by sentiments and primordial interests. This brought about the emergence of the principle of rotational presidency in Nigeria, because every part of the country wants to produce its kinsman at the president. Every part of Nigeria effectively utilise the media in order to set agenda for the rest of the country. This was why the media was used by different parts of Nigeria in order to support their position on the debate over rotational presidency. *Daily Trust* newspaper has played a significant role for the Northern states in the rotational presidency debate, particularly in this political dispensation. The coverage of the issues of rotational presidency by *Daily Trust*

newspaper is one of the factors that ensured the return of power to the North in the year 2007 after the region has voluntarily surrendered power at the centre in 1999.

The agenda setting theory has assisted the paper to establish how *Daily Trust* newspaper made the return of power to the North a national agenda through the prominent coverage of the issue in favour of the Northern states. Although rotational presidency encourages divisions in Nigeria, but at the same time rotating power between regions, tribes and even religions is capable of making Nigeria more cohesive.

The foregoing brings up the need for the media to give more emphasis on the adherence to the terms guiding the principle of the rotational presidency despite the fact that it is not recognised by the constitution of Nigeria. When the terms are bridged like in the year 2011, the media ought to be united in ensuring that the right thing is done. In essence the media should deemphasise promotion of sentiment for the unity of Nigeria.

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INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM TRAINING AND TRAINERS: AN EVALUATION OF ABUJA JOURNALISTS

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Abstract

The researchers examined training and trainers of investigative journalism among Abuja journalists. The study adopts in-depth interview design and multi stage sample (stratified and purposive sample) in selecting 21 participants. Data collected were analyzed using thematic analysis. Findings revealed among others that; FCT journalists had on the job training in investigative journalism practice. Also, the study discovered that on the job training in investigative journalism were done by ten trainers namely- African Institute for Investigative Journalism, BBC, Konrad Adeneur Foundation, World Bank Institute, MacArthur Foundation, International Institute of Journalism, American Embassy, Nigeria Union of Journalists, Premium Times and Daily Trust. And of this number Konrad Adeneur Foundation had the most frequency when it comes to on the job training for FCT journalist in investigative journalism. In view of the findings, this study recommends regularly on the job training on investigative journalism. And, likewise, stakeholders, Nigerian Union Journalists, and among unions should seek for other avenues for attracting trainers of investigative journalism.

Keywords: Investigative journalism, Training, Trainers, Journalist, Abuja

Introduction

The practice of investigative journalism has grown considerably around the globe. An appraisal of literature on the practice of investigative journalism indicates that investigative journalism has spread worldwide and even in authoritarian countries (Kaplan, 2013; Ahmad, Cheema, Waheed, Zulfiqar, Ahmad and Anjaria, 2012). After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the practice of investigative journalism considerably grew in areas other than Europe and United States (Ahmad, et al, 2012). There have never been more opportunities for regional collaborative investigative journalism explosion in data and communication technology than now (Kaplan, 2013; Donal, 2011).

On the contrary, Oso (2013) observes that the watchdog role argument has over the years been displaced of its effectiveness, as the media occasionally bark, but their ability to bite has been seriously curtailed. Corroborating, Dorril (2000), Just, Levine and Regan (2002) and Hanna (2000) argued that from the last three decades onward the practice of investigative journalism around the world is at moribund stage. The absolute number of investigative stories on local TV news stations had declined during the past five years (Aucoin, 2005). According to losing their eyes and ears around the world precisely when they needed them most. Many broadcast networks and major newspapers are losing their eyes and ears around the world precisely when they needed them most due to the closed foreign bureaus, cut in travel budgets and disbanded investigative teams (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists cited in Amanda, 2016). For example, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *Boston Globe*, *Newsday*, and the *Baltimore Sun*, have closed their remaining overseas investigative agencies. Also, CBS News used to have 24 foreign bureaus

and stringers in 44 countries, but today, there are only six bureaus around the world and none of them in Africa or Latin America (Lewis in Kaplan, 2008).

Although, despite the reported claims by pundits on the decline of investigative journalism, the creation of the Centre for Investigative Journalism at various countries of the world and its successful collaboration with a range of broadcasters and news organizations indicated otherwise (Amanda, 2013). Recalls that till 1989 only three non-profit organizations were working in the field of investigative journalism, but at the moment this has increased in recent years, with vibrant centers across the six continents of the world (Ahmad, et al, 2012; Ntibinyane, 2018; Oyedele and Lasisi, 2018)

Regardless of the aforementioned, Berglez (2013) argues that many other possibilities for enhance investigative journalism outcomes remain largely unexplored in some parts of the world. Could this be applicable to journalists in Abuja? It on this note, the study attempts to contribute to the knowledge base by exploring investigative journalism training and trainers of journalists in Abuja.

The following objectives are formulated for this study:

1. To determine the whether journalists in FCT have on the job training (i.e workshop, seminar etc) in investigative journalism
2. To find out the trainers and most regular trainer(s) of FCT journalists in investigative journalism.

Based on the problem and objectives of the study, the following questions have been designed to guide the study.

1. Do journalists in Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) have on the job training (i.e workshop, seminar etc) in investigative journalism?
2. Who are the trainers and most regular trainer(s) of Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) journalists in investigative journalism?

Reviews of Literature

Concept of Investigative Journalism

The concept of investigative journalism differs from one author to another. According to Carson (mentioned in Amanda, 2016) renowned Investigative journalism scholars-Hugh de Burgh, Tiffen and Schudson have all attempted to define investigative journalism, though their conceptualization of investigative journalism differ, but they all agreed that investigative journalism is to 'expose injury and injustice; reveal information in the public interest; and where necessary, promote legislative reform to correct a wrong legal or administrative loophole. UNESCO (2011) argues that investigative journalism involves exposing to the public matters that are concealed either deliberately by someone in a position of power or accidentally behind a chaotic mass of facts and circumstances that obscure understanding. Also, Marsh (2013) sees investigative journalism as a report that aims to clear the rights and wrongs in the society which targets are not limited and achieves its effects through publicity.

In addition, Yushau (2010) refers to investigative journalism as the mirror of the society that uses its conscience in uncovering wrongdoing that would likely remain hidden to the public. Dyikuk (2001) argues that investigative journalism is a form of journalism in which reporters deeply investigate a single topic of interest often involving crime, politics corruption and corporate wrongdoing. Therefore, investigative report is a type of journalism that is produced over time, outside day-to-

day deadline crunch, and includes diverse sources (Hansen cited in Broussard, 2014).

Investigative Journalism Training and Trainers: A review

A considerable number of mass communication awarding institutions and graduates have proliferated over time (Ayodele and Olisa, 2017; Pate, **Lai** and **Jibril**, 2017). And, yet journalists are poorly trained, because, the quality of journalism education has declining (Ayodele and Olisa, 2017; Carlsson and Poyhtari, 2017). This has promoted debates on the level of training and trainers of investigative journalism around the world. For example, the dearth of investigative journalism training has been mostly attributed to the absence of good curriculum, equipment and tutors (Olusegun, 2004). It is argued that academics do not necessarily have the know-how to teach investigative journalism as they have never practiced it themselves (Saba, 2016; Olusegun, 2004). In others studies, Agba, Abang and Ogri, (2019) detect a wide disparity between what is taught in the classroom and journalism practice which takes place in the newsroom.

Therefore, most journalism graduates have been declared of lacking the basic skills and competence to properly fit into the constantly changing needs of the media industry in the contemporary world (Agba, Abang and Ogri, 2019; Okoro, Obaya and Onyebuchi, 2013; Ojomo, 2015). In other words, there is a yawning gap between journalism educations and what is required to practice journalism elsewhere (UNESCO, 2007). Regardless of Mohammed and Ahmad (2021) position that investigative journalism is taught briefly in Nigerian universities undergraduate programmes under a subsumed course. Based on the aforementioned, these clearly show that most studies attribute the problem of training on the educational system, while some blame it on the employers.

Based on the aforementioned, investigative journalism practice had received heavy set back, this is evident in Kohut (mentioned in Kaplan, 2008) that fewer Americans support watchdog journalism compared to the mid-1980s. Those valuing the press' watchdog role decreased from 67% to 60%. On the contrary, Lars and David (in Kaplan, 2008) reported that the percentage of respondents whom approve of investigative journalism climbed to 84%, indicating that a significant majority of the public still favors a news media that reports on corruption and fraud. In many Africa countries, Ntibinyane (2018) and Oyedele and Lasisi (2018) argue that following the coming of nonprofit organizations and foreign aid investigative journalism has proliferated. Investigative journalism is now being practiced in more than 20 countries throughout the continent. We have in South Africa the *AmaBhungane Center for Investigative Journalism*, in Botswana the *Ink center for Investigative Journalism* and in Nigeria the *Premium Times Center for Investigative Journalism* (Ntibinyane, 2018). And there are other NGOs; Olawoyin (2018) observes the presence of International Center for Investigative Reporting (ICIR), Macarthur Foundation, Wole Soyinka Center, Ripple center for data and investigative journalism among others for their support in Nigeria through financial assistance, training and motivational support.

Theoretical framework

The study is anchored on Behaviorism theory. Behaviorism theory is **propounded by** John B. Watson **in 1940s**. Behaviorism theory claims that learning is endless. It also argues that learning is observable and measurable behavior, as consciousness cannot be seen, touched or exhibited in a test tube (Mangal, 2008). Behaviorists argued that most human behavior is the result of conditioning by the external environment, **Baran and Davis (2010) explain:**

Early mass communication theorists, who saw the media as providing external stimuli that triggered immediate responses, frequently used behaviorist notions. For example, these ideas could be applied to the analysis of the Nazi propaganda films. The powerful, ugly

images presented of Jews or the mentally ill were expected to trigger negative responses in their German audiences. Repeated exposure to these images would condition them to have a negative response whenever they see or think about Jews. These behaviorist notions were used by some theorists to develop what has come to be known as **magic bullet theory** (p. 81)

Although, the basic assumption of behaviorism theory is that learning only occurs after some changes in behavior due to acquisition, reinforcement and associations. In other words, behaviorism learning theory entails the change(s) in behavior that result from stimulus-response associations made by the teacher and learner (Zhou and Brown, 2017). Therefore, Behaviorism theory is a learning theory that focuses on modifying behavior (Sabo, 2020). Since, learners are blank slate that should be provided with information to be learnt (Mangal, 2008). Furthermore, according to Harold and Corcoran (2013) the key assumptions of behaviorism that support education are:

- Learning occurs where specific stimuli are introduced to the learners.
- Every behavior is learned
- The behavior is governed by the environment in which it occurs,
- Learning doesn't occur without teaching
- Learning equates to changing behavior

- Behavior is governed by what follows actions

Therefore, logic for adopting this theory is as follows: considering the fact that FCT journalists are humans, and humans are prone to behavioral changes. For instance, the assumption of the theory contends that humans are passive and blank slate, therefore, training (stimulus) must take place before learning will be attained. Like investigative journalism education, journalists would have to be trained by professionals in other to practice investigative journalism.

Methodology

This paper adopts in-depth interview method (qualitative). This is because interview elicits deeper insight at building a robust understanding of a topic in complex relationships of our social world (Wotanis, 2011; Maxwell, 2012; Patricia, 2017). The population of this study is made up of 3,050 journalists in the Federal Capital Territory- Abuja (Nigerian Union of Journalists, 2019). **The sample size for the study** was determined through saturation and sufficiency. Although, attaining saturation and sufficiency could be quite difficult for some researchers (Seidman, 2006; Baconshone, 2020). Hence, Boyd (2001) suggests that saturation can often be reached after interviewing 2 to 10 persons. But, whenever 2 to 10 persons are often too few to meet the sufficiency standard depending on the study, Luborsky and Rubinstein (mentioned in Boyd, 2001) recommended between 12 – 26 respondents in other to achieve saturation and sufficiency. Considering, Luborsky and Rubinstein's recommendation, the study interviewed 21 news editors.

These 21 interviewees were selected through mixed method sample. This method is adopted because is a kind of sample that precedes another and influences the proceeding sample using probability and non-probability sample namely; stratified and purposive sample (Louis, Lawrence, and Keith, 2018). Thus, stratified sample was used to group media houses into 3 strata namely: print media (newspaper and magazine), Electronic media (radio and television) and online media. Thereafter, the researcher selected 21 interviewees (7 for each media genre) using purposive sample. Data were collected with the aid of interview guide and presented on table and analyzed with the aid of thematic analysis using Atlas.Ti software application.

Data Analysis and Findings

Research question 1: Do journalists in Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) have on the job training (i.e workshop, seminar etc) in investigative journalism?

This research question seeks to know whether Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) have on the job training – be it workshop, seminar etc. in investigative journalism

Table 1: Response on the job training on investigative journalism

Theme	Quotation Content	Source
On the job training investigative journalism	I had chance to attend many courses organized by my employer both former and current employers organized by the Nigeria Union of Journalists among other bodies that I belong to. I have attended courses within and outside the country, on course that are related to investigative journalism.	P21
	Yes. I went to International Institute of Journalism here in Abuja and I was taught investigative journalism.	P20
	Yes. I had training on investigative journalism	P18
	Yes. I had training with African Institute for Investigative Journalism	P17
	Of course, yes, we were taught investigative journalism...The recent was three-week training in Germany DWU financed by Konrad.	P15
	Yes. I learnt investigative journalism on the job.	P14
	Yes. I have done courses on investigative journalism.	P12
	Yes. I have been exposure to like few investigative trainings organized in Nigeria.	P11
	Yes. A little bit. I had training with MacArthur foundation and some unknown organization.	P9
	Yes. I had some training. The recent one was the one day BBC training, I think last year.	P8
	Yes. I got most of it on the field. So, the lessons on the field were more practical or demonstrative.	P7
	Yes. Some training was related to work and sorry I cannot disclose them. Although some were local and other were outside the country.	P6
	Yes. I was taught during my post graduate - developmental communication and also during work.	P4
	Yes. I have done some	P3
Yes.	P2	
Oh! Yes. I have undergone a number of courses both at home and aboard on investigative journalism.	P1	
No on the job training on investigative journalism	Not at all.	P19
	Not really.	P16
	No.	P13
	No. I have not necessarily attended any. No. It is not something that I am particularly kin about.	P10

As shown in table 4.2.2.6, there are two themes- on the job training on investigative journalism' and 'No on the job training on investigative journalism'. The theme on the job training on investigative journalism had the most reoccurring theme (P21, P20, P18, P17, P15, P14, P12, P11, P9, P8, P7, P6, P4, P3, P2, and P1).

For instance, participant 1 acknowledged that, 'Oh! Yes. I have undergone a number of courses both home and aboard on investigative journalism.' In the same vein, participant 4 added that, 'Yes. I was taught during my post graduate- developmental communication and also during work.' Similarly, participant 15 said, 'Of course, yes, we were taught investigative journalism. The recent was three-week training in Germany DWU financed by Konrad.' Also, Participant 8 affirmed in an extract that 'Yes. I had some training. The recent one was one day BBC training, I think last year.' Participant 9 affirmed that 'Yes. A little bit. I had training with MacArthur foundation and some unknown organizations.' In the same mood, it was participant 12 that confirmed that 'Yes. I have done courses on investigative journalism.' And, participant 17, affirmed that 'Yes. I had training with African institute of investigative journalism.'

This result signifies that majority respondent had on the job training on investigative journalism. This result aligns with Mohammed and Ahmad (2021) study that journalists are taught investigative journalism.

Research question 2: Who are the trainers and most regular trainer(s) of Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) journalists on investigative journalism? and

This research objective seeks to find out the organizer or trainers of Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) journalists on investigative journalism and also those whom often train the journalists. Below is a present to that effect:

Table 2: Response on investigative journalism organizers/trainers

Themes	Quotation Contents	Sources
African Institute for Investigative Journalism	Yes. I had training with African Institute for Investigative Journalism	P17
BBC	I have done many trainings that were organized by world bank institute, BBC name them. The recent one was one day BBC training, i think last year.	P3 P8
Konrad Adeneur Foundation	...The recent was three -week training in Germany DWU financed by Konrad. Another by Konrad Adeneur Foundation in Kano. Most of the trainings have been long now, so I can not say exactly, b ut of course, some were privately organized by Konrad Adeneur	P15 P12 P2
World Bank Institute	...the training was organized by World Bank Institute.	P3
MacArthur Foundation	I had training with MacArthur Foundation... There is growth in journalism support from MacArthur	P9 P16
International Institute of Journalism	...International Institute of Journalism here in Abuja	P20
American Embassy	One sponsored by American embassy. I recalled that one of them was sponsored by USA government at a time.	P7 P1
Nigeria Union of Journalists	...organized by the Nigeria Union of Journalist s among other bodies	P21
Premium Times	Premium Times School for Investigative J ournalism. I have been trained twice.	P4
Daily Trust	It was organized by Daily Trust Newspaper Foundation.	P11

Table 2, presents ten themes; African Institute for Investigative Journalism, BBC, Konrad Adeneur Foundation, World Bank Institute, MacArthur Foundation, International Institute of Journalism, American Embassy, Nigeria Union of Journalists, Premium Times and Daily Trust. From these themes Konrad Adeneur Foundation had the most responses (P15, P2 and P12). According to Participant 15'...*The recent was three week training in Germany DWU financed by Konrad.*' Participant 12 confirmed that, he had training with '*Konrad Adeneur Foundation in Kano.*' And Participant 2 affirmed that '*Most of the trainings have been long now, so I cannot say exactly. But of course, some were privately organized Konrad Adeneur Foundation.*'

This therefore implies that on the job training in investigative journalism were done by ten trainers: African Institute for Investigative Journalism, BBC, Konrad Adeneur Foundation, World Bank Institute, MacArthur Foundation, International Institute of Journalism, American Embassy, Nigeria Union of Journalists, Premium Times and Daily Trust. Also, responses affirmed that Konrad Adeneur Foundation had the most frequency. The result from this study compares with Olawoyin (2018) that Konrad Adeneur Foundation, International Center for Investigative Reporting (ICIR), Macarthur Foundation, and Wole Soyinka Center for investigative journalism among others has been instrumental to the training and motivational support of investigative journalists.

Discussion

The first finding from the study indicates that majority of FCT journalists had on the job training on investigative journalism practice. This result implies that despite journalists daily experience on the field, there is still need for on the job training as argued in behaviorism theory that learners are blank slate and every behavior occurs when specific stimuli (i.e training) are introduced to the learners (Mangal, 2008). Also, this result supports other studies in investigative journalism training. For example, Saba (2016) and Mohammed and Ahmad (2021) affirmed that journalists are been trained on investigative journalism.

The second finding indicates that on the job training in investigative journalism were done by ten trainers namely- African Institute for Investigative Journalism, BBC, Konrad Adeneur Foundation, World Bank Institute, MacArthur Foundation, International Institute of Journalism, American Embassy, Nigeria Union of Journalists, Premium Times and Daily Trust. Also, responses affirmed that Konrad Adeneur Foundation had the most frequency. The result from this study buttresses one of the assumption of behaviorism theory that learning is endless (Mangal, 2008). Also, the result compares with Olawoyin (2018) that Konrad Adeneur Foundation, International Center for Investigative Reporting (ICIR), Macarthur Foundation, and Wole Soyinka Center for investigative journalism among others has been instrumental to the training and motivational support of investigative journalists. There is also evidence that nonprofit organizations and foreign aid investigative journalism such as Premium Times Investigative journalism center, Wole Soyinka Center for Investigative journalism, Ripple center for data and investigative journalism among others trains journalists (Ntibinyane, 2018).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In conclusion, the findings of the study contribute to the existing fountain of knowledge by assessing investigative journalism training and trainers of Abuja journalists. Thus, the study discovered that FCT journalists had on the job training on investigative journalism practice. Also, on the job training in investigative journalism were done by ten trainers namely- African Institute for Investigative Journalism, BBC, Konrad Adeneur Foundation, World Bank Institute, MacArthur Foundation, International Institute of Journalism, American Embassy, Nigeria Union of Journalists, Premium Times and Daily Trust. And, of this number Konrad Adeneur Foundation had the most frequency when it comes to on the job training for investigative journalism.

Based on the findings of the study, the researcher recommends the following;

- There should be regularly on the job training for FCT journalists in investigative

journalism.

- Likewise, stakeholders, Nigerian Union Journalists, and among unions should seek for other avenues of attracting trainers of investigative journalism.

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REVISITING CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND 2015 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA: ITS RELEVANCE TO 2023 GENERAL ELECTIONS?

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Abstract

The attention of the international community is on Nigeria again because it is another electioneering period (though amidst worsening personal security situations) when it is expected that the country should solidify and consolidate its nascent democracy. In view of this, the purpose of this paper is to x-ray the historic 2015 general elections which have been widely acknowledged to be arguably, the freest, fairest and most credible in Nigeria's electoral history since independence and recommend derived lessons that should be applied to the forthcoming general elections in 2023 in order to have an even better electoral success. While x-raying an array of secondary data on 2015 general elections in Nigeria, it was observed that the exceptional roles of the international civil society organisations with the collaboration of some local ones contributed very significantly to making that year's electoral process and outcomes historically successful and this, no doubt, has not been adequately covered in extant literature. The paper argues that although civil society organisations have been involved in Nigeria's elections for decades, at no time have the international csos been so deeply committed as in 2015 due mainly to some pre-election's predictions about the country's breakup.

Keywords: 2015 general elections, civil society organisations, international civil society organisations, Nigeria elections, 2023 general elections.

Introduction

The attention of the international community will be on Nigeria because it is another electioneering period (Olowojolu and Ake, 2015). Thus, as the 2023 general elections in Nigeria are just around the corner it is another opportunity for the nation to solidify and consolidate its nascent democracy in other to reclaim its pride of place in the international arena. As the country gets ready for the 2023 general elections in a few months time, two of the most important things are that there be a level playing field and personal security as or more than experienced in 2015 when the most-widely acknowledged peaceful, credible, freest and fairest general elections in Nigeria's fourth republic were held which led to the historic defeat of the incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan of the Peoples Democratic Party by Muhammadu Buhari, the presidential candidate of the opposition party, the All Progressive Congress, APC. Nigeria has never had it good like this in the annals of its electoral history since independence where a sitting president (Goodluck Jonathan) was defeated by a candidate (Muhammadu Buhari) from an opposition party in a general election characterised by a no do-or-die political atmosphere. Most interesting is that the incumbent president congratulated the opposition candidate even before the conclusion of the elections on noticing that the latter was already coasting to victory as indicated by the yet to be announced final results. This was unlike the past elections especially the 2003 and 2007 which "were ranked among the most violent and least credible in the world" (Aderonmu, 2013, p.20).

Perhaps, at this juncture we may ask, what made the historic 2015 general elections possible against the 2015 pre-election odd predictions? What are the contributions of the international actors especially the civil society organisations in the 2015 general elections? Put differently, which role did the international CSOs play to the success of the 2015 general elections that needs to be emulated in 2023?

Divergent views and opinions in extant literature are awash with the historic success of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria (see Olowojolu & Ake, 2015; Itodo & Abah, 2016; Nwosumba, Abah

& Ngwube, 2016). Some opine that the historic electoral success was possible due to electoral reforms initiated and actualized by president Yar'Adua/Jonathan government earlier before the elections. To Olowojolu & Ake (2015) in their overview study of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria, the introduction of PVCs and Card Readers into the electoral process reduced electoral fraud and time wasting thereby indicating that the country can improve its electoral process through the injection of advance technology. Others like Itodo and Abah (2016) argue that the "un-reckoned" roles of those they refer to as the "peace shooters" that is the election peace committee during and after the elections contributed largely to the success of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. However, these un-reckoned roles of the peace shooters are treated as part of the study carried out by Nwosumba, Abah and Ngwube (2016).

In the work, the scholars are of the view that both local and international civil society organisations, CSOs in collaboration with INEC played significant roles through the mass media in the sensitization of rural dwellers on the need to be registered during the registration of voters exercises as well as the collective resolve of some CSOs to ensure that some politicians signed a peace accord known as Abuja Peace Accord. This, they contend, accounts for the peaceful nature of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. As presented by the trio the outcome of the elections dumbfounded many who predicted doom for the country before the elections including local and International analysts and researchers as their expectation that electoral crisis might degenerate into wide, full-scale violence and probably war turned out negative. However, in spite of all the hullabalos, the country was able to manage itself and in fact, conducted satisfactorily, one of the best ever elections in Africa.

Although the positions of the literature have indeed tried to relate the different roles of the electoral reforms of pre-2015 and civil society organisations to the successful outcome of the 2015 general elections enough contributions have not been deeply made to critically examine how the international civil society organisations significantly helped in providing a propitious electoral environment and processes that helped immensely to make the outcome of the 2015 general elections especially the presidential election historic as never before in Nigeria's electoral history. This paper is joining this debate considering that as the upcoming general elections in Nigeria are very close, elections which present another opportunity for the nation to solidify and consolidate its nascent democracy (see Vanguard, 2022) there is a need to reappraise the historic success of the 2015 general elections in order to suggest what should be emulated for another historic electoral outcome in the country in 2023 to be possible. The paper follows the trendy nature of the debate about the civil society which Kukah (1999) says has become more urgent since the seeming collapse of the democracy project midway in many African countries. Thus, for this paper to contribute in narrowing the gap identified in the literature and join the debate especially as it is tailored to the making of a successful 2023 elections in Nigeria, it specifically focuses deeply on reappraising the significant relationship between the roles of the international civil society organisations and the historic 2015 general elections in Nigeria. We will continue to talk on this 2015 general elections and the roles of international civil society organisations because the elections are historic and have remained the best in the country and so needs to be emulated in 2023. There is no doubt that Nigeria enjoyed enormous momentary goodwill from the international community as a result of the achievement (Olowojolu & Ake, 2015) and the country needs again now that its international image is gloomy.

Methodology

This study uses the historical research design known as the ex-post facto (after the facts) research design because the 2015 general elections had taken place and the data are already in existence (see Ndiyo, 2005 as cited in Sylvanus et al., 2022). Being a qualitative research, the paper adopts historical method of inquiry. Historical method is associated with Machiavelli, Vico, Montesquieu, Savigny, Maine, Seeley and Freeman and stresses the use of historical evidence for

a proper study of political phenomena (Johari, 2013). The implication is that the researcher needs historical evidence to build a relationship between distant occurrences, the present events and future predictions of what are likely to happen. The fact that this study takes root in history makes historical analytical method the chosen instrument of analysis. However, in spite of the limitations of the method, the ability of the researcher to use it effectively without any statistical interpretation is an evidence of the qualitative orientation of the paper. Data collection is done by x-raying and dissecting the array of documented information dotted in many publicly endorsed and accepted printed and electronic secondary sources like books, journals, newspapers, the internet and their like. So the combination of facts from already certified secondary data makes the paper authentic and as such, an acceptable public document. Thus, the essence of drawing echoes from documents on the past 2015 general elections is to bring back the winning strategies and means through which the electioneering processes and outcomes of that year produced a historic success which were widely adjudged arguably as the best in the country since independence, now that the 2023 general elections are around the corner. Hence, the analysis as contained in the paper is to serve the interests of electoral policy makers and the umpire, INEC, civil society groups in Nigeria, the international community at large but with particular reference to the international civil society organisations, the voters and other stakeholders.

Conceptual Analysis

Civil Society

Civil society as a concept has no straightjacket definition since it has over the years been contextually used by scholars and practitioners in different ways. In VanDyck's report for Center for Strategic and International Studies (2017) the most commonly used definition of civil society was created by CIVICUS which conceives it as the arena outside the family, the state, and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations, and institutions to advance shared interests. However, civil society organisations are critical recipes for democratic consolidation globally, especially in Africa, where liberal democratic institutions are fledgling and fragile.

In the classical era, the term civil society was used to denote a regime that was committed to secure the rule of law for the common good on behalf of people. Common good meant the provision of basic rights, public safety, education for all, and basic infrastructure like roads, electricity, pipe borne water, hospitals among others. In this perspective, civil society was viewed as a good society where democratic dividends are delivered to the populace. To Osborne (2021), civil society is exactly what could be referred to as a forum for intermediate powers, a fact corroborated by Chukwuma (2005) who defined civil society as a set of institutions, organisations and behaviour situated between the state, business world and family.

Against the foregoing, it can be said that these civil society organisations and institutions include non- governmental organisations, private voluntary organisations, people's organisations, civic organisations, community based organisations, cultural, gender, religious, and social organisations such as civic clubs and trade unions (Chukwuma, 2005; Uwan & Yearoo, 2009). In a similar vein, Ikelegbe sees civil society as the associational life of citizens characterised by common interests, civil and public purposes, and voluntary collective autonomous actions. It also stretches to include all those associations that enable citizens to participate voluntarily, freely and openly within the public realm, and operate and function independent of and outside state and corporate powers though, relating with them (Ikelegbe, 2013). Civil society acts as a buffer against the power of the central government and in that capacity encourages individuals to follow their own courses without fear of intimidation from the central government. The essence of civil society is to advance the interest of a group of people with a common socio-economic, political or cultural interest with the objective of not to capture political power or make profits but to provide and advance the course of good governance and common good of its members (Ghaus-Pasha, 2004, p.9).

Going by the conceptualisations above, civil society is therefore conceived in this paper in line with Nwosumba, Abah and Ngwube (2016) to mean the third sector, the collectivity of associational groups that are different from the state, business and family that are geared towards the promotion of group goals and objectives. Civil society provides the necessary social factors that interface between the government and the citizens especially in the promotion of good democratic governance. Their responsibilities are clearly defined and cut across social, political, economic and cultural matrix of human society.

"The debate over civil society in Africa is, some would say, relatively new. In fact, the expression itself was first used in relation to Africa only recently and was brought into prominence" by Jean-Francois Bayart (Kukah, 1999, p.37). This notwithstanding, in Nigeria, particularly since the return of civil rule in 1999 civil society organisations have played and are still playing meaningful roles in the sustenance of democracy through advocacy, civic education, social capital formation, citizen litigation, economic development, human capacity building, budget tracking, anti corruption crusade and electoral advancement among others. In spite of these roles, Nigeria has not been able to conduct a widely accepted credible, free and fair elections as the ones in 2015. Thus, the 2015 general election marked a watershed in the annals of Nigeria's electoral system as it was an election that was tension-soaked and generated staccato debates among scholars and public commentators (Nwosumba, Abah & Ngwube, 2016) but later turned out to be arguably, adjudged the most peaceful and successful in the country since independence. Thanks to the significant roles of the international civil society organisations for their uncommon commitment though with the collaboration of the local csos, to making the elections successful and historic. International civil society organisations are therefore conceptualised in this paper as part of the civil society family which is playing an intermediate roles between the state and the citizens but with across-the-national boundaries of states' scope in operation. So, unlike the local csos which are limited to operate within their national boundaries, international csos are mostly operating outside their national boundaries and so are sometimes multi-nationally oriented and based. They are usually like other csos that are not for profit.

General Elections in Nigeria

According to Flanders (1980, p. 114), the word election comes from a Latin root meaning "to choose....An election is the method of filling an office by vote, particularly by the electorate...." Election is therefore an indispensable aspect of democracy as there can be no true liberal democracy without a credible, free and fair election. Election is the periodic organised and systemic procedures and processes for selecting political representatives in a liberal democratic society. However, it can be said that election is a major standard for gauging the level of democratic consolidation in a given society. Ideally, election is a necessary recipe of democracy but in Africa, where liberal democracy is a new trend due to age-long monarchies and governance through royal blood, elections have become a major challenge to democracy (Jega, 2011). General elections in Nigeria in this sense implies elections that are nationally oriented and based. For example, the 2015 general elections in Nigeria were nationally oriented and based and so represent what this paper refers to as general elections because they were simultaneously organised at the local, states and national levels.

Although elections are expected to be free, fair and credible they "are not really free unless the people voting in them are free from fear of those in power" (Flanders, 1980, p.114). Although this fact is provable as it applies to advanced democracies, the question is whether the people voting in Nigeria's elections are free from fear of those in power. It is conceived in this paper as an indictment of Nigeria as far as general elections are concerned because no single general elections in the country has been conducted and the outcomes widely accepted by the local, national and international community as being indeed free, fair and credible before 2015. Even the 1993 general elections midwived by military president General Ibrahim Babangida

adjudged widely to be free and fair were annulled by the same president. It is against the foregoing point about voters being free from fear of those in power that the roles of the civil society organisations in nascent democracy such as Nigeria are considered imperative.

As analysed by Itodo and Abah (2016), the fear prior to the 2015 general elections about the odd predictions that the country was prone to breaking up due to election crisis was so large that the offices of the Special Adviser to the President on Inter Party Affairs and National Security Adviser together with other stakeholders like the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP and European peace building organisations converged to work out a framework to douse the tension and this culminated to the forming of the national peace committee which midwived the eventual signing of the now famous Abuja Peace Accord. The roles of the international civil society organisations in the making of the 2015 historic electoral success owing to the peace accord signed and kept speak volume (see also Nwosumba, Abah & Ngwube, 2016). In the end, the successful and peaceful outcomes of the elections indicate that when there is a level playing field for all political players and lack of fear of those in power the tendency of conducting free, fair and credible elections in any democracy and not only Nigeria is guaranteed. Assuming the electoral environment was still characterised by the hitherto, do-or-die politics prevalent in the fourth republic, there would not have been the possibility of an opposition party presidential candidate winning an incumbent president who also was the presidential candidate of the ruling party. It has never happened in Nigeria until 2015. More so, as can be argued, if the relationship between the state and civil society in Nigeria has remained largely that of extreme dependence of the latter on the former (see Kukah, 1999) as before there is no how the csos would have played their intermediate roles significantly. The jettisoning of the politics of do-or-die within the electoral period also paved the way for the csos. Considering the foregoing it, therefore, becomes a challenge for Nigeria to create a level playing field and peaceful electoral atmosphere in which all the political participants, electorates and contestants alike, shall do the business of 2023 election without the fear of those in power. This does not imply however, that the paper is saying that an opposition candidate must win as in 2015 before the 2023 elections outcomes should be widely accepted as being the most credible, peaceful and freest rather, it is saying that the most credible and accepted candidates should win if the electoral process at all stages is devoid of do-or-die politics and played on a level field.

Suffice it to say therefore that given the fact that elections are free when the people voting in them are free from fear of those in power, there is then the need that elections should be free, fair and credible everywhere including Nigeria. This will encourage political participation and reduce political apathy. Thus, considering that the possible benefits of voting (political participation) outweigh those of political apathy it is necessary that voters in Nigeria should be free from fear of those in power. [Olubusoye et al \(2020\)](#) on this note corroborate that elections offer the citizenry opportunities to exercise their basic rights as abstaining from voting amounts to dereliction of civic duty. Nigeria should to create enabling environment for an increased political participation in the country in 2023.

Theoretical Explanation

Liberal theory of civil society holds that the existence of civil society is highly imperative in a democratic society because it promotes freedom, equality, tolerance, accountability and progress. Liberalism is a negation to autocratic ideology and is sine qua non to democracy. To an extent according to Osborne (2021), civil society can be described as a liberal idea. As a political ideology, liberalism espouses citizen's freedom of association, expression, thought among others (Fadakinte, 2013). Alluding to this fact, Osborne (2021) stresses that "for much liberal democratic thought civil society is represented as a bulwark against the alternatives of occluded, wholly privatised, even atomised existence and a big state that suppresses personal freedoms by

imposing its own norms exclusively." To the liberals, civil society is crucial in any democratic nation, especially in a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria because it promotes unrestricted freedom, tolerance, and equity, freedom of expression and association which are germane for building a violent free democratic society. By providing guidelines and legal provisions for openness and freedom, citizens are better informed and empowered to participate in governance. The survival of these liberal tenets inhibits the emergence of dictators and attenuates democratic culture.

Within the above perspectives, civil society stands as an alternative way to aggregating social, political and economic forces outside the state which help to monitor, observe and gauge government policies and programmes on the citizens and to articulate the views and interests of people outside the arena of political corridor to the government. Liberalism which emerged with the fall of feudalism and communism and the triumph of capitalism is contemporarily being vanguarded by liberal institutions like the United Nations Organisations (UNO & family), International Monetary Fund, (IMF), World Bank (WB) European Union (EU) among others. These agencies believe that the existence of civil society helps to deepen democracy by promoting accountability, transparency and prudence in governance. In fact, western donor organisations like IMF and WB have made the establishment and promotion of virile civil society a prerequisite for granting aids to developing countries of Africa and Asia.

Besides, with the exercise and location of all powers and authority with state, a third party is needed to ensure that there is accountability and respect for the constitution. This ultimately helps to curtail the emergence of dictatorial or authoritarian regimes and further promotes democracy and good governance which are germane for the welfare of all the people. The roles as played by the csos in Nigeria's 2015 general elections especially in the signing and keeping to Abuja Peace Accord attests to the foregoing because by the politicians and their parties playing to agreement reached by all of them and as moderated by the civil society yielded a huge electoral success. In a nutshell, Nigeria's democracy was strengthened as it avoided an enthronement of a dictatorial or authoritarian regime when the defeated incumbent president Jonathan accepted defeat and handed over power to the opponent who won the presidential election. This is history that has not been made by the country since independence. It is within this theoretical plank that this study adopts liberal theory of civil society in the study. The reason for adopting this theory is because it will help explain the activities of civil society organisations in Nigeria's 2015 general elections which is advocated herein for emulation in 2023 when the next general elections are to be held in the country.

Roles of the International Civil Society in 2015 General Elections in Nigeria

Since the return of civil rule in Nigeria on 29th May, 1999, elections have become a recurrent political process in the country (Mercy, 2012, p.42). However, due to the high demographic spread, ignorance and incessant ethno-religious cum political innuendos, past elections have been fraught with misdemeanors and the electoral umpire seemingly incapacitated to deliver a credible election (Jega, 2011, p.8). As a result of this, civil society organisations have been horizontally and vertically integrated in the conduct of elections in Nigeria.

Generally, many civil society organisations participated in the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. It is estimated that over 3000 CSOs were directly and indirectly involved in Nigeria's fifth quadrennial elections in 2015. Although only 107 were registered by the INEC to fully observe and monitor the presidential and National Assembly elections across the 774 Local Government Areas of Nigeria (INEC 2015). Other numerous faith and community based CSOs such as community based organisations, labour groups and the media were involved in all the tripartite stages of the election process (pre, during and post election stages).

Pre-Election Stage

During the pre election stage which involved planning, re validation of voters register, registration

of prospective voters, production and distribution of Permanent Voter's cards, issuance of voter's cards and voters' education, Civil society organizations in Nigeria played significant roles in the build up to the general elections. For instance, the Centre for Democracy and Development West Africa (CDD) was involved in the sensitization of Nigeria through the Mass media, street rallies, workshops and conferences on how to conduct a credible 2015 elections in Nigeria. They closely monitored and critiqued the Independent National Electoral Commission's (INEC) strategies adopted during the nationwide voter's register validation.

Civil society organisations were highly instrumental to the success of the 2015 polls in Nigeria through their dogged commitments to voter's education and general public enlightenment on the civic responsibilities of citizens. At the end of voter registration preparatory to the 2015 elections, INEC produced a total of 68,833,476 Permanent Voters Cards (PVCs) for registered voters for the 2015 elections and beyond (INEC 2015). This new card had new features which helped to minimize electoral frauds. Patrick observes that the PVCs contained the:

Biometric details of the voter whose passport sized photograph appear in front. These cards have many components and specialized features such as base substrate, security printing, personalization, lamination and chip embedding; it is designed with an average lifespan often (10) years. With this innovation, voters could access their status in the voters' register by sending a text message "INEC, state of registration, last name, last five digits of the Voter Identification Number (i.e., on the TVC) and sending the SMS to short code 20120." This replaced the Temporary Voters Card (TVC) and automatically ceased to be operational in the 2015 general elections. The PVCs issued by INEC considerably curbed the issue of multiple registrations, cloning, and voter's card theft. In the past, politicians mobilized their thugs who are smuggled into the registration exercise to manipulate things (Patrick, 2015, p.11).

While INEC should be commended for these innovations, it is germane and imperative to equally acknowledge the unparalleled financial role of civil society organizations in making the entire registration and production of PVCs possible. Although the election was budgeted for by the Federal Government of Nigeria, different Non-Government organizations and donor agencies made enormous financial donations to INEC. In fact, INEC established a consolidated account known as Donor Basket Fund in which donor organizations made their donations into. The funds from Donor Basket Fund were used in paying ad-hoc staff of INEC and for offsetting other financial and logistical challenges (Jega, 2015).

In addition to these, many International CSOs rendered free consultancy services to INEC especially in areas of training and re-training of electoral officers and voter education to help strengthen the nation's democratic process. Some of the International CSOs that rendered these services to INEC in the build up to the 2015 elections include; Ford Foundation, Mac Arthur Foundation, OSIWA-OSJIFriedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES), International Republic Institute (IRI), International IDEA among others (INEC, 2015). In fact, INEC identified four basic areas of support to include:

Offer Technical Assistance to the Commission in diverse fields. These include providing consultants who advise the Commission on Voter Registration, Voter Education, Media Work, Transmission of Results and Election' Management generally, The Commission receives support for training. Several workshops and training are funded, including BRIDGE Training, support experience sharing between the Commission, Experts and Election Management Bodies..... The Commission also receives support, In its reviews of major electoral activities including the registration of voters and general elections (INEC, 2015).

More novel in the annals of Nigeria's electoral system was the establishment of a peace committee which later culminated to the signing of peace accord by all the political aspirants who participated in the elections. Commonly known as the Abuja Peace Accord, it was an initiative of civil society organizations particularly the Kukah Centre in partnership with the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) to create a platform upon which all the presidential candidates made pragmatic commitment to strict adherence to basic electoral guidelines. Patrick specifically observes that the Abuja Accord:

was meant to brainstorm and generate commitment from the presidential candidates for a peaceful electoral process. Those in attendance were the 14 presidential candidates (prominent were those of the APC and PDP); national leaders of the political parties; Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General; Emeka Anyaoku, former Commonwealth Secretary General. The following were articles of the pact signed;..To run issue- based campaigns at national, state, and local government levels. In this, we pledge to reframe from campaigns that will involve religious incitements, ethnic or tribal profiling both by ourselves and by all agents acting hi our names. . . To reframe from making or causing to make in our names or that of our party any public statements, pronouncements, declarations or speeches that have the capacity to incite any form of violence before, during and after the election. . . To forcefully and publicly speak out against provocative utterances and oppose all acts of electoral violence, whether perpetrated by our supporters and or opponents. . To commit ourselves and political parties to the monitoring of the adherence to this accord if necessary by a national peace committee made up of respected statesmen and women, traditional and religious leaders,..All the institutions of government including INEC and security agencies, must act and be seen to act with impartiality (Parick, 2015, p.13).

The National Peace Committee working in collaboration with Kofi Annan Centre, Centre for Strategic Conflict Management (CSCM), Catholic's Justice, Peace and Development Commission, Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE) helped in ensuring that the Presidential candidates particularly Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressive Congress (APC), and Goodluck Jonathan of the Peoples Democratic Party(PDP) kept to the terms of the peace agreements. Eminent Nigerians comprising of traditional rulers, religious leaders and retired distinguished civil servants were part of the National Peace Committee. Odey further observes that members of this committee include:

Former Head of States, General AbdusalamAbubakar. Other members included, Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, former Chief of General Staff in the General Ibrahim Babangida's Administration (Vice Chairman); John Cardinal Onayiekan, Most Rev. Dr. Matthew Hassan Kukah, Catholic Bishop of Sokoto Diocese; Alhaji Aliko Dangote; Justice Rose Ukeje (rtd); AihajiSa'adAbubakar, Sultan of Sokoto; Muhammad Musdafa, Lamido of Adarnawa; Most Rev. Nickolas Okoh, Primate, Anglican Communion; Pastor Ayo Oritsejfor, President, Christian Association of Nigeria; Dame Priscilla Kuye, former President, Nigerian Bar Association; Professor BolajiAkinyemi, former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Professor Ibrahim Gambari; Sam Pemu-Amuka, Publisher, Vanguard Newspaper; Professor Ameze Guobadia; and Professor Zainab Akali (Patrick, 2015, p.14; Ugbede, 2015, p.20).

Shortly after their inauguration, leaders of different civil society organisations in Nigeria through advocacy visited members of the National Peace Committee (NPC) to offer useful ideas on how to sustain the accord. The Media as a critical component of civil society gave utmost attention to the accord. In this perspective, different newspapers, both print and online, and television stations and radio stations dedicated special time sessions to stress the need for all the presidential candidates to honour the terms of the accord.

Election Stage

This stage was one of the most critical and tension-soaked stages in the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. This is because it is usually events at this stage that determine political victories and failures of political aspirants. Some of the critical roles that civil society organisations played on election days include; mass orientation, enlightenment and dissemination of on-the-spot reports of elections across the country (Mercy, 2012, p.48; Eric, 2015). The civil society situation room (Situation Room) was very active in this regard. The Situation Room was a coalition of about 60 Civil Society Organisations that kept vigil on all the processes leading to the elections. Led by the

Executive Director of the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC), Clement Nwankwo, the group's members monitored the electoral process, keeping Nigerians informed about developments through briefings at its situation room in Abuja. The Situation Room collaborated with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to ensure that there was smooth dissemination of electoral information between INEC and the Media, CSOs and the general public. Also the Situation Room through sheer activism and watch dog role, sought clarifications on any electoral matter that was foggy such as security, training and posting of INEC officials (Eric, 2015). Nigeria's 2015 general elections were postponed from the earlier dates of February 14 and 28 to April. The Civil Society Situation Room publicly criticized INEC, the Nigeria Police and other law enforcement agencies for failing to safeguard and consolidate Nigeria's democracy (Eric, 2015). The Situation Room shortly after the initial postponement also issued a Press Conference on February 12 in Abuja warning all those planning to disrupt the elections to desist from such act. Eric (2015, p. 35), urged major stakeholders, particularly the courts, the security agencies and religious organisations to be wary and desist from yielding themselves as tools to truncate the democratic process. Warning against any further tinkering with the election timetable it is believed that the postponement of the elections, for whatever reason, will undermine whatever modicum of legitimacy the electoral process still has and may ultimately be the trigger for massive unrest, violence and armed conflict, effectively setting the stage for civil unrest.

At the conclusion of the first round of voting on March, 28 the group after a thorough assessment of the exercise, observed some lapses, including late arrival of electoral officers to polling centres, reported cases of the malfunctioning of the card reader machines, partisan conduct by some security personnel, among others. In a statement it issued on March 29, the group stated that the failure of the card reader in some cases, which forced INEC to revert to manual accreditation, undermined the full benefit anticipated by the use of biometric technology and imposed unnecessary hardship on Nigerians. It also warned about the threat posed to the credibility of the process, where security agencies failed to prevent interference in the electoral process in some states. It urged the security agencies and officials to conduct themselves according to established standards of professional conduct, and asked INEC to correct its own deficiencies and inform the Nigerian public as to what to expect during the next round of elections.

Some international CSOS that were accredited along local ones for the elections according to INEC include but are not restricted to the following: 1) UNDP/DGD Project 2) Oxford Department Of International Development, University Of Oxford 3) Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission, Kenya 4) African Union Election Observation Mission 5) Commonwealth Observers Mission 6) Centre For Conflict Management, Kennesaw State University, Atlanta. Georgia USA 7) European Union Elections Observation Mission 8) ECOWAS Mission 9) African Students Association Of Ireland (ASAI) 10) International Republican Institute (IRI) 12) International Foundation For Electoral Systems (IFES) (Nwosumba, Abah and Ngwube 2016).

In addition, all the accredited observer groups monitored voting exercises at the polling stations and recorded the dynamics of transparency and equity in the voting process. Apart from these, they also monitored and observed the process of counting of election results at the polling stations and followed such results down to the INEC offices in various Local Government Areas where collation of Local Government Area results were coordinated and forwarded to the state headquarters. During the 2015 presidential and National Assembly elections, civil society organizations played their watchdog role by critically interfacing in all the stages of the elections. The *raison detre* for this is to deepen democratic accountability, equity, fair play and transparency in democratic process and that yielded a positive result, the type of electoral history that Nigeria was not witnessed prior to 2015 general elections.

In a similar vein, the current globalisation process played a critical role in the elections through the enhancement of means of information and communication. This can be seen in the way the civil

society organizations especially with the use of social media helped greatly to ensure transparency and credibility in the conduct of 2015 general elections in Nigeria. Through the use of social media platforms such as Facebook, Blackberry Messenger, WhatsApps, Twitter, Blog, MySpace, YouTube and Instagram, accredited election observers tracked election procedures and results. These platforms apart from being important tools for voters education, also emerged as important means of electioneering and policing of election results and new platform (Liberty, 2015). For instance, an online Newspaper, PREMIUM TIMES, through the use of the above social media platforms sent broadcast and re-broadcast messages to its subscribers. Premium Times reporters that monitored the election from different states shared live news and pictures at polling boots on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and uploaded Youtube Videos of election events.

Other media organisations within and outside Nigeria used these platforms in the elections. Patrick observes that in order to effectively and efficiently cover the electoral process, both the print and non- print media created social media platforms. For instance, Channels TV, https://twitter.com/Channels_TV; Punch newspaper, <https://twitter.com/MobilePunch/status>; Vanguard newspaper, <https://twitter.com/vanguardngrnews>; the Federal Radio Corporation (FRCN) also launched a live lot of social media users through dedicated phone lines, BBM, Facebook, and Twitter accounts. Election observers like those with the Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC) used SMS to forward election reports. The provision of security for users makes it possible for prompt report of electoral irregularities anonymously or through pseudo-identities. This is evident when anybody with a smartphone or a digital camera could cover electoral proceedings and upload same on the internet. Nigerians and indeed the world were able to predict winners of the general elections due to social media reports (Patrick, 2015, p.14).

Thus, the success of the 2015 elections in Nigeria is also largely attributed to the gargantuan multifaceted roles that the third sector (CSO) especially the international partners played using the social media platform to educate and mobilise voters and ultimately monitor the election results from the local to the national levels, roles which helped to minimise electoral malfeasances in no small ways.

Lessons From 2015 General Elections For 2023

International civil society organisations having collaborated significantly with the local ones to achieve a first-of-its-kind electoral feat in Nigeria in 2015 where a do-or-die politics was jettisoned and a relatively more peaceful atmospheric electoral climate created be given another opportunity in 2023 for an improved strategic role. This is so because before and after the 2015 general elections no other general elections in the country since the fourth republic has been widely acknowledged to be such peaceful, free, fair, violent-free and credible. The fact that before the 2015 general elections, the electoral process in the country has been characterised by electoral fraud and violence, an anomaly which has made Nigeria to be unable to conduct an internationally recognised free, fair, peaceful and credible elections and that the international community has raised eyebrows about this especially when it comes to post-elections violence (Itodo & Onodugo, 2016) and that after that year's general elections the country recorded a historic successful outcome that both the local and international communities hailed is an evidence that something has been done differently. And this is largely attributed in this paper to the Abuja Peace Accord which the international civil society organisations played a critical role in its making and enforcement.

Evidence from authors supporting this claim can be seen for instance, in the way logistics support for the Peace Committee that spearheaded the signing of the Peace Accord "primarily came from the UNDP and a number of other international organisations including Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue...based in Geneva" (Itodo & Abah, 2016, p.37). Emeka Anyaoku, former Commonwealth General Secretary and Koffi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations who while in and out of their international offices still remain ardent advocates of

liberalism significantly impacted the roles of the international civil society organisations as their roles in the making and enforcement of the Abuja Peace Accord proved beyond doubt that they really worked for the success of the elections. For the 2023 general elections to be like the ones in 2015 or even better, Nigeria should first of all aspire to be a good international citizen. A good international citizen in this context requires as Itodo and Onodugo (2016) stressed, conducting free and fair elections that can be internationally recognised. It means therefore that for the process and outcomes of the 2023 general elections in Nigeria to be internationally recognised as being free, fair and credible it must tow the line of 2015 where a do-or-die political environment was avoided and a level playing field created for all the key political actors and their parties, a situation which in turn provided a propitious opportunity for the civil society to contribute significantly to making the elections a historic success. The Abuja Peace Accord should again be signed and enforced and the incumbent president and his party should, like other key political actors abide by the terms of the peace agreement signed. It goes to buttress the fact that if the incumbent president in 2015 did not abide by the terms of the agreement signed the process and probably, outcome of that year's elections would not have been historically successful as they turned out to be internationally recognised. It was in doing this that the roles of the civil society in the consolidation of the country's democracy in 2015 came to be highly appreciated. In conclusion, it is the opinion of this article that the civil society organisations (both international and local) should be enhanced and strengthened for more and increasing roles in the 2023 general elections especially in the areas that may attract the interests of the electorates to participate more than before in choosing the nation's next leaders. More to this, local civil society organisations should try to act above board for complimentary roles with their international counterparts considering, according to some that "the relationship between the state and civil society in Nigeria has been largely one of extreme dependence" (Kukah, 1999, p.58).

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**CAUSES, PATTERNS AND CONSEQUENCES OF STUDENTS' MISCONDUCT
IN IBRAHIM BADAMASI BABANGIDA UNIVERSITY LAPAI, NIGER STATE:
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Abstract

Deviance, as a behaviour negates social norms, it is an inevitable feature of social life. Its manifestation in various forms demonstrates its inevitability in any social interaction. Antisocial behaviour, a variant of deviance, has assumed alarming rates in Nigeria. The phenomenon is more worrisome in the institutions of higher learning. The incremental trend in antisocial behaviour among youths permeates virtually all institutions of higher learning in Nigeria. The doggedness of the syndrome has allowed its undue persistence leading to massive destruction of the moral fabric of society. In fact, the syndrome threatens to redefine the existential essence of tertiary institutions in the country, if left unchecked. Studies connect the phenomenon of antisocial behaviours to peer group influence, psychological problems, broken relationships, family backgrounds and poverty, academic frustration, pressure, search for identity, experimentation and so on. This diversity in causations proves the ubiquitous nature of the syndrome and calls for a holistic approach in tackling the problem. To achieve this, researchers must first understand the nature of the causes of antisocial behavior, its patterns and specific consequences on the individual, their group and the society at large. This informs the need for this research. The study focuses on antisocial behaviours among students of Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University (IBBU) Lapai, Niger State. The study seeks to unravel the causes, patterns and consequences of the rising antisocial behaviours on the institution and the society at large. The findings of the study shall be utilized to guide policy directions of the University towards minimizing and subsequently eradicating the menace in the University. A survey research design was adopted for the study and respondents were drawn from amongst students, parents, and staff of IBBU Lapai. Both quantitative and qualitative data analysis were conducted using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Nvivo respectively. In the quantitative analysis, descriptive statistical tools such as simple percentages, frequency distribution table and charts were used to present the data. Similarly, thematic analysis was employed to analyze the qualitative data. The results from the study helped in understanding the real causes of anti-social behaviour in the University, the trend or pattern of the antisocial behaviour, and the consequences of such antisocial behaviours on the institution and the society at large.

Keywords: Social interaction, Antisocial behavior, deviance, higher institutions of learning, youths, students

Introduction

In 2006, Nigerlites received the news of a new university, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University (IBBU) Lapai, with great joy and resounding accolades. The institution was established to bridge the human capital shortfalls in the State and grow its educational capacity. With the aim of providing an avenue for indigenes and non-indigenes of Niger State to acquire quality education, the university drafted staff and students from different parts of the globe. Training in the institution

is geared towards equipping students with adequate skills needed for the development of the State and the country at large. Unfortunately, not much has been achieved in this regard partly due to the challenge of moral decadence among the students. In recent times, syndromes of sexual exploitation, cult violence, robbery, amongst others have painted a negative image of the university in the public domain (Adebowale, 2017; Adams, 2019; Ojo, 2021). The development has brought the university under scrutiny by the State as the impact of the university in nation-building is minimally felt and its glory weathering away. have of late become breeding grounds for criminals as well as deviants. These negative indicators have lethal consequences for a young institution like IBBU. In order to adequately understand and tackle these problems, it is pertinent to appreciate the peculiarity of the context in which the antisocial behaviours manifest. This implies that a generalization of the causes and patterns may not sufficiently explain the cases in different institutions. As such, there is the need to understand the causes of students' misconduct in IBBU, its patterns and consequences in order to set a new pace towards achieving the goal of its establishment.

Problem Statement/Justification

Antisocial behavior among students particularly at Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University is on the increase (Agency Report, 2021). This has unsettled many concerned stakeholders and deserves urgent attention. With the growth and expansion of the university, cases of misconduct have become daily breakfast for the university's Students' Disciplinary Committee. Despite mounting public outcry against the insidious phenomenon, the issues of moral corruption and antisocial behaviours among students of tertiary institutions have not been accorded the required attention. Systematic and scientific analysis on the problem remains shallow with media houses being the key architects in solving the problem. More so, the diversity in the social backgrounds of students makes it difficult to rely on generalized explanation of causes of the phenomenon. This is because the social context of deviance plays a key role in its emergence and sustenance. Hence, the need to study, analyze and explain comprehensively the nature, origins, and dimensions of deviance on campuses and their implications for national development aspirations. In doing this, this research is poised towards answering the following questions: what types of deviant behaviours occur on Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University Campus? What are the causes of deviant behaviours at Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University? What are the patterns of deviant behaviours among Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University Students? What are the formal and informal strategies employed to control deviant behaviours on the campus?

Objectives of the Study

The broad aim is to have an assessment of the general level of deviance among the students of Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University. The specific objectives are to:

1. Determine the causes of student misconduct in Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University;
2. Identify the different patterns and kinds of students' misconduct at the Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University
3. Determine the effect of student misconducts at the Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University.
4. Provide appropriate policy recommendations on how to tackle the problem to appropriate authorities.

Review of Literature

Antisocial behavior is a concept variedly defined by scholars of criminology. Very often, definitions are founded to suit the context of discourse. Essentially, the bottom line of all definitions

connotes actions that harm others. Such acts may or may not violate legal codes but is considered hostile to other individuals (Ojo, 2015). Wachikwu and Ibegbunam (2012) in Ikediashi and Akande (2015) outlined these behaviours to include lying, deceit, promiscuity, thuggery, alcoholism, hostility, stealing, arson, aggression, greed, forgery, counterfeiting, and love for violence, among many others. In this study, the concept of antisocial behavior is operationalised to capture the following social vices; cultism, drug abuse, stealing and robbery, thuggery, sexual promiscuity, and alcoholism. These antisocial behaviours are referred to as students' misconducts in this study.

The Nigerian University System, like its counterparts the world over, is built on varying interests between and among students, academic and non-academic staff and business operators. These interests are sustained through the integrative functions of rules, regulations and guidelines establishing the university and its services, functions and objectives. Onyekwere, Uche, and Nwodo (2017) submit that the phenomenon of moral decadence is deeply rooted and widespread in the people and institutions of Nigeria. This assertion suggests that the moral decay observed in the tertiary institutions of learning is merely an extension of the general moral decay in the larger society. Nigerian tertiary institutions are plagued with high doses of moral decadence which spells great uncertainty for the future of the learning citadels (Ayanwale, 2020). Studies on the moral decay in the higher institutions of learning have identified illicit sexual behavior, prostitution and sexual promiscuity, drug use, environmental violence (Suraju, 2019; Nnadi, Uzoekwe, Ofojebe, & Chigbu, 2022) as common antisocial behaviours found among the students. The list is not exhaustive as there are many vices as there are institutions. In Nigerian tertiary institutions, it is not uncommon to find female students, supposed future mothers, dressed half-naked to classes and on the streets of our cities. It is common knowledge that many female students have sacrificed meaningful studies for prostitution thereby possessing certificates they can hardly defend. Deviant behaviours such as gang violence and cultism are viewed, in general, as destabilizing the smooth functioning of the university system and the society at large (Gboyega, 2005). These countless antisocial behaviours in the tertiary institutions of learning have watered down the quality of education in the institutions and have birthed high incidences of examination malpractice. Consequently, the country grapples with serial corruption, failed policies, projects, programmes, initiatives, as well as advanced fee fraud syndrome, money laundering, drug trafficking, copyright violations, counterfeit and fake drugs, failed education and healthcare, electoral fraud (Gboyega, 2005; Nnadi, Uzoekwe, Ofojebe & Chigbu, 2022). As noted in the list of vices, moral decadence has far-reaching consequences for the individual, institution, and society at large.

It is obvious that our traditional moral values are corroding rapidly and the youths are greatly disillusioned. Nnadi, Uzoekwe, Ofojebe, and Chigbu (2022) submit that the reasons for the high rate of moral decadence in Nigeria are due to poverty, parental neglect, and bad peer influence. Furthermore, Ikediashi and Akande (2015) found nature of the home environment, gender, socioeconomic status of parents, peer group influence, and residential location to be factors aiding the spread of antisocial behavior among adolescents. The foregoing submissions underscore the need for collaborative effort between the school and the home in stemming the tide of antisocial behavior in our institutions. The role of the home in character moulding can never be over emphasized. In this regard, Smah (2000) identified academics and administrators as sharing a common goal of ensuring good characters in students. Since academics and administrators consist of the more stable populations on the campus, it is reasonable that they should, (as "parents and foster parents") be adequately involved in any major steps towards the control of any form of misconduct.

The impacts of antisocial behaviour are far-reaching. Be it on the individual, the institution or the society at large. In their submission, Ikediashi and Akande (2015) report that insecurity of lives and properties, poor tourist attraction, poverty and hunger, infrastructural decay, unemployment, and low foreign investment are some of the consequences of antisocial behaviour.

On the whole, the foregoing review of literature has highlighted the state of research on the subject of this study. From the review, studies of undergraduate students are scanty. Also, the methodological approaches used were majorly quantitative in nature. Most of the literatures predate the corona era and there is the possibility of emerging forms of antisocial behaviour during the reign lockdown. This is due to the changing nature of social interaction such as emergence of virtual sessions for classes, and meetings. These issues are to be addressed in the current study in order to fill the knowledge gap.

Methodology

Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University is a government owned university, located in Niger State, North Central Nigeria. It is named after the former Nigeria Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida. The university started academic activities in the 2005/2006 academic session. The university has six faculties, Natural Sciences, Management and Social Sciences, Applied Sciences and Technology, Education & Arts, Agriculture and Languages and Communication Studies. The university also has an Institute of Maritime Studies. There is also a School of Post Graduate Studies, which offers higher degree programmes in some specialized areas tailored towards human resources development and advancement of research activities. It has a student population size of about 7,000.

The Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University has been selected purposively for study. Pattern of deviance in it is of interest because it is an emerging university and there is need to document the deviance cases to serve as reference or baseline data for future studies. Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University is one of the third-generation universities in Nigeria, established to cater for the educational needs of the State and neighbouring States. Due to the inadequacy of students' hostel accommodations this has brought the students to stay off campus bringing about the ratio of students staying off campus to be more than those living on campus.

Mixed method design would be adopted for the study. Hence, both quantitative and qualitative data would be collected. Questionnaire would be used to collect information from undergraduate students while Key Informant Interview would be conducted with staffs of the university and parents who are in position to provide valuable information in the subject of the research. The analytical technique to be used is the simple descriptive analysis. It will also involve the literal translation of all interview sessions, which will be categorized into tables put into each year, gender, level of study, and age. The recorded data will be written down and analyzed. Information will be presented in tabular and pictorial format chart. Numerical summarization (summarizing the figures) will also be employed.

Data Analysis and Presentation
Section A: Socio-demographic Information

Table 1: Sex Distribution of Respondents

Sex		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Male	41	51.25
	Female	38	47.5
Total		80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

In determining the sex distribution of the respondents, it could be seen from the table above that 51.25% of them were Male while the rest 47.5% of them were female respondents which gives a total of 79 respondents one of the respondent fail to identify his/her sex which makes it invalid for the researcher to analyze. Apparently, those involved in providing the needed data for the completion of this project were majorly male.

Table 2: Age Distribution of Respondents

Age		Frequency	Percent
Valid	18-25years	42	52.5
	26 - 33 years	28	35.0
	34 - 41years	7	8.75
	42-49 years	3	3.75
	50years above	0	0.0
Total		80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

The above table shows the age distribution of the respondents to which 52.5% were 18 –25years of age, 35.0% of them were 26 – 33years of age, 8.75% of them were 34 – 41 years of age, 3.75% of them were above 42-49years of age and no one was above 50years of age. It could be seen that majority of the respondents that determined the source of data gotten for the research work were within 18 – 25years of age.

Table 3: Marital Status Distribution of Respondents

Marital Status		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Single	45	56.25
	Married	32	40.0
	Divorced	2	2.5
	Widowed	1	1.25
Total		80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

The table above shows the marital status of the respondents, 56.25% of them were single, 40.0% of them were married, and 2.5% of them were divorced while 1.25% of them were widowed. It could be concluded therefore that majority of the respondents were single.

Table 4: Current Levels of Study of Respondents

Current level of Study		Frequency	Percent
Valid	200 level	28	35.0
	300 level	30	37.5
	400 level	22	27.5
	500 level	0	0.0
Total		100	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

From the table above, the current level of the respondent as at when the research study was included: 35.0% which were in 200level, 37.5% of them which were in 300level, 27.5% of them which in 400level while 0.0% of respondent were not in 500level at the time of the research study.

Section B: Knowledge on Patterns of Students Misconduct

Table 5: What Form of Students Misconduct have you experienced in the University?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Cultism	47	30.32
	Thuggery	29	18.70
	Sexual promiscuity	32	20.64
	Gang violence	15	9.67
	Drug abuse	20	12.90
Missing	Alcoholism	12	7.74
Total		155	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

The table above illustrates the experiences of students misconduct in the university of the respondents and most of the respondent were allowed to tick more than one answer which included: 30.32% of them confirmed that its cultism, 18.70% of the respondents said it is thuggery, 20.64% confirmed it to be sexual promiscuity, 9.67% of the respondents choose gang violence, while 12.90% said its drug abuse and 7.74% said it is alcoholism. It could be concluded therefore that majority of the respondents have their experience to be cultism.

Table 6: Which was more frequent?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Cultism	12	7.74
	Thuggery	29	18.70
	Sexual promiscuity	32	20.64
	Gang violence	15	9.67
	Drug abuse	20	12.90
	Alcoholism	47	30.32
Total		155	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

The table above illustrates how frequent this students misconduct in the university which included: 7.74% of them confirmed that its cultism, 18.70% of the respondents said it is thuggery, 20.64% confirmed it to be sexual promiscuity, 9.67% of the respondents choose gang violence, while 12.90% said its drug abuse and 30.32% said it is alcoholism. It could be concluded therefore that majority of the respondents confirmed that alcoholism is the major reason for the misconduct.

Table 7: How often have you experienced any misconduct by students of the university?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Weekly	4	5.0
	Monthly	9	11.25
	Yearly	67	83.75
	Total	80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

The table above shows how often they experienced any misconduct by students of the university which include: 5.0% said they experienced students misconduct weekly and 11.25% have experienced students misconduct monthly while 83.75% confirmed they experienced students misconduct yearly. We can therefore presume that majority of the respondents experienced students misconduct yearly.

Table 8: Which of these locations is known to record more cases of misconduct?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	The University Campus	22	27.5
	Off Campus	49	61.25
	Neighbouring Towns	5	2.25
	Neighbouring States	4	5.0
	Total	80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

The table above shows the location which is known to record more misconduct which makes the respondents answer 27.5% of the misconduct happens in the university campus, 61.25% says it happens off campus, and 2.25% says its happens in the neighbouring towns, while 5.0 says its happens in the neighbouring states. This shows that most of the misconducts happen off campus.

Table 9: Who are the major perpetrators?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Male Students	49	61.25
	Female Students	19	23.75
	Male and Female Students	12	15.0
	Total	80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

The table above illustrates the major perpetrators of the misconducts which included: 7.74% of them confirmed that its male students, 23.75% of the respondents said it is the female students, while 15.0% confirmed its both sexes which are male and female students. It is concluded therefore that majority of the misconduct were carried out by the male students.

Table 10: Students of which of these levels are mostly engaged in cases of misconduct?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	100 level	12	15.0
	200 level	48	60.0
	300 level	14	17.5
	400 level	5	6.25
	500 level	1	1.25
	Total	80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

The table above shows the Students of which of these levels are mostly engaged in cases of misconduct which included: 15.0% of respondent reveals that its 100level students, 60.0% of the respondents reveal that its 200level students, 17.5% reveals that its 300level students, and 6.25% of the respondents reveals that its 400level students, while 1.25% reveals that its 500 level students. It is concluded therefore that majority of the misconduct were carried out by the 200 level students.

Table 11: Which of this describes the perpetrator of the misconduct?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	First time offender	12	15.0
	Second time offender	49	61.25
	Repeated offender	19	23.75
Total		80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

The table above shows the which of this describes the perpetrator of the misconduct 15.0% of the respondent confirmed that its first time offender, and 61.25% of the respondents said it is the Second time offender, while 23.75% of the respondents confirmed its Repeated offender. It is concluded therefore that majority the perpetrator of the misconduct were carried out by the Second time offender.

Section C: Causes of Students Misconduct

Table 12: In your opinion, which of these is responsible for students' misconduct in the university?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Lack of home training	21	26.25
	Poor regulation in the institution	13	16.25
	Peer pressure	22	27.5
	Poverty	20	25.0
	Influence of Gender	4	5.0
Total		80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

Table 12 above which determines what is responsible for students' misconduct in the university has it that, 26.25% of the respondents admitted that it Lack of home training was based on student misconduct, 16.25% of them admitted that it was Poor regulation in the institution based, 27.5% of them admitted that it was peer pressure based, 25.0% of them admitted that it was poverty while 5.0% of them admitted that it was Influence of Gender based which is responsible for student misconduct. From the words hitherto, it could be derived that the major factor responsible for students' misconduct are peer pressure.

Section D: Effects of Students' Misconduct

Table 13: Which of these illustrates the extent or magnitude of victimization?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Loss of life	11	13.75
	Hospitalization	9	11.25
	Loss or destruction of property	12	15.0
	Theft	32	40.0
	Minor injury	16	20.0
	Total	80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

Table 13 above gives an illustration extent or magnitude of victimization and to this effect, 13.75% of the respondents answered that it enable Loss of life, 11.25% of them answered that it makes its victim Hospitalized, 15.0% of them answered that it gives room for Loss or destruction of property, 40.0% of them answered that it was for the sake of Theft and 20.0% of them answered that it was Minor injury. Concurrently, it could be illustrated that the extent or magnitude of victimization on student misconduct is admitted to theft.

Table 14: What are some of the effects on the perpetrator?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Poor learning ability	15	18.75
	Delayed graduation	13	16.25
	Withdrawal or expulsion from school	52	65.0
Total		80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

Table 14 above showcases some of the effects on the perpetrator in which 18.75 % of the respondents answered that Poor learning ability respectively, 16.25% of them answered that Delayed graduation, while 65.0% of them answered that Withdrawal or expulsion from school. Therefore, it could be concluded that the effect on the perpetrator should be Withdrawal or expulsion from school.

Table 15: What are the effects on the institution?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Bad image of the university	49	61.25
	Exit of academic and non-academic staff	2	2.5
	Poor enrolment from prospective students	7	8.75
	Poor ranking of the university	14	17.5
	Sour relationship between the town and the gown	8	10.0
Total		80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

Table 15 illustrates the effects of misconduct on the institution in which 61.25% of the respondents pointed out that its will give bad image of the university, 2.5% of them pointed out that it will make room for exit of academic and non-academic staff, 8.75% of them illustrated that Poor enrolment from prospective students and 17.5% of the respondent stated that it will give Poor ranking of the university while 10.0% of them pointed out that it will Sour relationship between the town and the gown.

Table 16: Which of these statements describe public perceptions of the university as regards students' misconduct?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	It's a university with poor handling of misconduct	32	40.0
	It's a university with zero-tolerance for misconduct	7	8.75
	It's a university with weak handling of misconducts	41	51.25
Total		80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

Table 16 illustrates the statements best describe public perceptions of the university as regards students' misconduct in which 40.0% of the respondents pointed out It's a university with poor handling of misconduct, 8.75% of them pointed out that It's a university with zero-tolerance for misconduct, while 51.25% of them pointed out that It's a university with weak handling of misconducts respectively. To this end, we infer that It's a university with weak handling of misconducts are the major statements that describe public perceptions of the university as regards students' misconduct.\

Section E: Ways of improving on social behaviour

Table 17: Do you think there are ways to improve the situation of students' misconduct?

Responses		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Yes	52	65.0
	No	28	35.0
Total		80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

Table 4.25 has it that 65.0% of the respondents agreed to the fact that there are ways to improve the situation of students' misconduct while the rest 35.0% of them disagreed to the fact. Therefore, it is factual that there are ways to improve the situation of students' misconduct.

Table 4.26: How do you think the authorities can manage cases of students' misconduct in the university?

Description		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Public enlightenment on the effects of social vices	31	38.75
	Expulsion of perpetrators	14	17.5
	Punitive measures against offenders	16	20.0
	Collaboration between the home and university administrators	19	23.75
	Total	80	100.0

Source : Field Survey, 2022.

Table 17 above show cases how the respondents think the authorities can manage cases of students' misconduct in the university in which 38.75% of the respondents answered that the Public enlightenment on the effects of social vices respectively, 17.5% of them answered that they should expulsion of perpetrators, 20.0% of them answered that punitive measures against offenders while 23.75% of them answered that there should be collaboration between the home and university administrators. Therefore, it could be concluded that there should be public enlightenment on the effects of social vices.

Charts from the Disciplinary cases in the Files of Students





Figure 1 Reports from Interview with Participants

From the interview conducted some students were of the opinion that families train their children in God fearing way but when they come to school they feel they are at liberty to do what they want. They tend to behave the way they feel like.

There was the advice to the university not to admit students that have stayed five years and above after completion of their secondary school education. This is because they are the ones that are inculcating bad ideas into the ones that are fresh graduates from secondary school. The university should admit in cognizance with the accommodation available. The issue of co-habitation; the basic thing is that hostel inadequacy has played an important role on campus marriages. "Lapai

Marriage”, students tend to live together as “husband and wife”. They live with the western life style of courtship where two young people live together to study one another.

Regarding indecent dressing, they believe the only way they can show case themselves is to look at their body to have the highest bidder. They seek the attention of men that cannot control their emotion. The university does not give the students enough academic challenges. For instance, resumption dates are exceeded by weeks which make the students feel they can dictate when to resume school.

Sanctions placed against laid down rules should be carried out effectively. the dress code system there should be strict measures to ensure that students abide to the laid down regulations. Examination malpractice comes up as a result of inadequate preparation prior to the examinations. The students do not read extensively to prepare themselves adequately examination has become not a test of knowledge it has become a do or die affair. Students now pass through knowledge without knowledge passing through them. Examination questions should be printed out on the day of the said examinations, in that way some of the cases of malpractice will be minimized.

Some students go into prostitution because they want to do it, while some do it because they do not have someone to take care of their studies. They would use what they have to get what they need. While some do it because of the way they are brought up.

Summary and conclusion

The research was able to investigate the causes of student misconduct, identify the pattern and minds of students' misconduct. Bad leadership, corruption and the mismanagement of the nation's resources have further marginalized and entrenched the masses into vicious circle of poverty and deviance. Poverty is palpable amongst students, lecturers and other lower level administrators in various places, including our universities.

Lecturers seeking to enhance their meager salary sometime engage in unwholesome practices. Likewise, the tendency of the universities to milk the students has led to greater incidences of theft, cult activities and violence.

Some photocopying enterprises indicated that some students who gave them work collected the work and pledged to pay later, but many of them defaulted on their payments. Thus, the need to meet up with the challenges of school work and general living expenses has resulted in some antisocial behaviour by students who can no longer afford to worry about the consequences of their misdemeanors.

To determine the effect of students misconducts' and provide appropriate policy recommendation on how to tackle the problem to appropriate authorities.

Findings

Based on this research, we conclude that:

The university system is going through massive social, moral, philosophical and cultural revolutions and changes.

1. Antisocial activities are on the increase, especially forgery of result and theft.
2. Sanctions of different degrees of severity have been employed but they do not seem to have yielded the results. For example, expulsions and dismissal as have not affected the ebbs and flows of campus deviance.

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E-GOVERNANCE AND CALL FOR ORGANIZATIONAL EFFICIENCY IN NIGER STATE

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Abstract

This paper examines the role of e-governance in achieving organizational efficiency in Niger State. The objective is to show the relevance of e-governance to the realization of organizational efficiency. The paper is anchored on technological determinism theory by Thorsten Veblen (2016) as a framework for analysis. The documentary approach is used by researchers through the use of related literatures on E-governance and organizational efficiency in order to enhance effective service delivery in public organizations. Thus, E-governance is all about ensuring transparency, accountability, minimize cost, reduce bureaucratic tendencies, and reduce corruption in a bit to establish sanity in the system of governance, however, organizational efficiency entails using little resources as an input in achieving maximum output. Hence, this study looks at E-governance and organizational efficiency through the instrumentality of ensuring transparent operational activities, accountability, effective and efficient service delivery, reduction of corruption, and deploying electronically gadget in curbing the menace of sharp practices in organization. The paper concludes and recommends the following as impetus for effective and efficient service delivery through the use of ICT, by providing adequate fund to facilitate the operation of public offices, organizing of capacity building to boost the competencies of personnel in an organization, constant enlightenment by the government on the importance of e-governance to the general public in order for citizens to key in the governance.

Key words: E-governance, organizational efficiency ICT, service delivery, transparency

Introduction

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has brought tremendous change to different aspects of human life in the 21st century (Agwu, et al 2014). Therefore, ICT has become the most strategic resource that is increasingly transforming the world economy. For instance, internet has become important in online transaction with hundreds of users engaging in online shopping and e-banking services on a daily basis. People book for flight tickets and make payment online, check the weather, engage in research and connect with the entire world on a daily basis.

The increase in globalization and information and communication technology has made government to adopt e-governance as an initiative to ensure effective and efficient service delivery, increase citizens participation in decision making process, promote democracy, ensure accountability and transparency. Government of modern day cannot achieve its goals in this present time without effective use of ICT for service delivery. There is increasing evidence through

public policy formulation and implementation that e-governance played an important role in advancing national development (United Nations e-governance Survey, 2014).

In Nigeria, the application of e-governance initiatives can be traced to the formulation of Nigeria National Policy for Information Technology in 2001 (Oni et al 2016), Abassilin Gbereubie et al (2017). This policy has cardinal objectives to, ensure that the information (IT) resource are readily available for promotion of efficient national development, empowerment of Nigeria citizens in participating in software and IT development, improve accessibility to public administration to citizens, ensuring transparency of all government process, develop IT into the mainstream of education and training, enhance national security and law enforcement, develop human capital etc.

Statement of Problem

Niger State government has made a lot of efforts in the application of ICT in most organizations to ensure efficient service delivery. Yet, the application seemed not to have yielded the desired results in terms of effective and efficient service delivery. But is still need to be done to improve e-governance development initiatives. This often has a devised effect on good administration. Nigeria as a country had suffered ICT initiatives as this, has shown in the current ranking where Nigeria is ranked 143 position in e-governance readiness at middle of e-governance survey (United Nation Government 2016), since 2001, United Nations e-government survey, Nigeria has been unable to move to the high level of e-governance development (Oloto, 2017). Nigeria as a country is faced with the challenges of achieving good governance, which has undermined sustainable development. This is shown on the increase in corruption, low accountability and transparency, low level of citizen's participation, poor service delivery etc.

Several scholars (Abasilim 2017, Ibrahim 2016; and Oni 2016) have linked the poor adoption of e-governance in Nigeria to corruption and low literacy level in public service as well as lack of commitment on the part of government and citizen resistance to changes among others. These factors have become major challenges to the application of ICT in Nigerian's public administration. Looking at above reasons and in the light of limited scope of empirical studies, the needed empirical impetus to move from traditional system of administration to modern system through use of ICT has not been extensively research on and this form the basis of this research.

Review of Literature

Concept of e-governance

Abdiullahi (2017) observes that e-governance is the used of Information Communication Technology (ICT) and it application by relevant government bodies for the provision of information and public services to the people. In simple terms e-governance is the use of technology to enhance the assess and delivery of government service.

The appropriate use of ICT to achieve the goals of the governments of nations to reformed public sector and ultimately for improved economic development is what makes up e-government. The focus of government is therefore on provision of governmental services via the use of information technology with the aim of enhancing the service level relationship, between government and various stakeholder groups, such as the citizen, businesses tourists and other governmental agencies (UN 2008). Drucker (Cited in Visser and Twinomumzi 2007) defines e-governance as the use of emerging information and communication technology to facilitate the processes of government and public administration.

UNESCO (Cited in Okwueze 2010), sees e-governance is the use of information and

communication technology by public sector with the aim of improving information and service delivery, encouraging citizen participation in decision making process and making government more accountable, transparent and effective. World Bank (2001) defines e-governance as the government owned or operated systems of information and communication technologies that transform relations with citizens, the private sectors and for other government agencies so as to promote citizens empowerment, improve service delivery, strengthen accountability, increase transparency and to improve government efficiency (Ndou 2004).

According to Silcock (2001) e-governance is the use of technology to enhance the access to and service delivery of government service to benefit citizens business partners and employees.

Therefore e-governance can be seen as the use of information, communication and technology (ICT) by government offices in service delivery to ensure.

Models of e-governance

We can refer to e-governance as the use of ICT to exercise political, economic and administrative authority towards managing the affairs of the state, which involves citizen rights and interest and participation. E-governance involves four models namely:

1. **G2C** - Government to citizens: This means offering a variety of ICT service to the citizens efficiently and effectively and to strengthen the relationship between government and citizens using technology.
- ii. **G2B** – Government to Business: This is the interaction between the government and business with the use of ICT.
- iii. **G2G** – Government to Government: This is the use of ICT in communicating and interacting with one level of government to another or government at the same level and its agencies.
- iv. **G2E** – Government to Employees: This is the interaction between government or its agencies and its employees and among employees in government with the use of ICT.

1. Effective and Efficient

E-governance as a tool for achieving organizational efficiency

To justify e-governance as an effective tool for achieving organizational efficiency, it is better to come up with the benefits of e-governance which is associated to the achievement of organizational efficiency.

(Siahaan 2016) outlines some benefits of e-governance to the achievement of organizational efficiency

1. Effective and Efficient Service delivery: Studies have shown that e-governance can promote effective and efficient service delivery (Gurung e'atal 2015; Mutgonibi, 2013 and Makene, 2009). This is because with the application of ICT, service delivery of public service will be carried out appropriately and on a quicker time with minimum use of resources.
2. Reduction of corruption: E-governance service serves as a tool for fighting corruption. E-governance can reduce corruption through accountability and transparency by reducing interactions with officials, speeding up decision and reducing human errors (Misty etal 2012).
3. Effective financial management: Effective e-governance implementation is necessary to save high amount of resources thereby, reducing waste of resources. The adoption e-

governance initiatives have saved a huge amount of money for Niger State government. For example, the introduction of single treasury account (TSA) has helped to saved billion, of naira which would have being stolen and recent cashless policy of Federal government to be embark on by public offices will reduce the corruption to certain extent (Unuba 2016).

5. Citizen participation in governance: With the implementation of e-governance, citizen participation in decision making is very easy. E-governance does not only allow citizens to access to the government, but it also encourages citizen participation in decision making (Ogeka etal 2017).
6. Promotion of National security: The fight against crimes like cybercrimes, militancy terrorism, armed robbery, cross border crime etc required adequate ICT on ground. Studies have shown that, one major problem of government in fighting, banditry, Boko and militancy is poor utilization of ICT gadget (Uwueze 2016).

Concept of Organizational Efficiency

Organizational efficiency is often equated with success and work. It can be defined as the extent to which an organization can attain its goals (Oghojafor 2012).

An organization is a complex entity with many dynamics that contribute to making it efficient and sustainable. These dynamics can run an organizational smoothly even during the challenging times of various transitions like recession and pandemics etc.

Sheffield (2012) organizational efficiency examine how the output of an organization can be achieved using specific resources, the more output delivered using those same resources, the more efficient organization is. And therefore, it is the process of using fewer resources, as well as less time and less money to achieve the same goals.

Hussy (2001) propose that efficiency of an organization is a combination of the perspective, output and input of an organization.

Kalirajan and Shand (1999) also suggest that efficiency of an organization is made up of two components; technical and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency is defined as the capacity and willingness of an economic unit to produce the maximum possible output from a given bundle of inputs and technology. While the latter concept is defined as the ability and wiliness of an economic unit to equate its specific marginal value produce with its marginal cost.

Abdullahi etal (2006) in their studies contend that efficiency refers to the comparison between the outputs and inputs used in the process of producing a product or service. The researchers further proposed that, the concept of organizational efficiency is either technical efficiency or a locative efficiency. Technical efficiency is the firm's ability to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs. While, a locative efficiency means the firm's ability to use inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices and production technology. Therefore, to this end, organizational efficiency should be seen as a process was organizations uses small resources as an input to achieve maximum output.

Indicators of organizational efficiency

(Oglojafor 2012) identified some indicators of organizational efficiency, and these are follows:

1. **Employee retention:** Retention of employees in an organization is one of the most imperative components that drive the organization towards its vision and mission (Sandhya etal 2011).

2. **Competitive Advantage:** Organizational efficiency can be majorly understood with the help of its competitive position in the market (Twin 2021). This refers to the performance in the external environment where other competitors are also operating. The competitive advantage of an organization over its competitors reflects in the profit earned the stock price of their organization, customer attractiveness and many other parameters the actual position of the organization (Abston and Stout 2006).
3. **Adaptability and Technological advancement:** one of the critical indicators of organizational efficiency is the adaptability of the organization to the dynamism in the society or environment where it is operating. In an intensely competitive market strategic management, technological advancement and change management lead to organizational success (Willburn 2018).
4. **Financial gains return on investment and turnover:** With time various parameters that are used in measuring organizational efficiency has changed and evolved but there are some core components that radically indicate the efficiency of an organization. The financial returns of an organization are very important to fulfill other parameters like employee satisfaction, customer's satisfaction, use of technology. Return on the investment done is very important for an organization to fulfill its role in the market. Turnover indicates the wellbeing and development (Sheffied 2021).
5. **Employees and Technology as instrument for longevity:** An organization can be considered as developing efficiently growing when employees act in accordance with organizational goals: When employees are satisfied, retained and associated for the long term, it provides a strong performance boost as major hurdles like absenteeism, favoritisms, groups complaints etc can be avoided.

Apart from this, technological advancement has also been considered as an important parameter for understanding organizational efficiency because the market is evolving and to cope up with the transition of external environment, technological advancement and adaptability is very important (Tahsildarim, 2015).

Empirical Review

Mistry and Jalal (2012) carried out an empirical study of the relationship between e-governance and corruption in developed and developing countries: they argued that the impact of e-governance is higher in developing countries than in developed countries and as the use of ICT increase, corruption decrease. They observed that (based on their model) that 1% increases in e-governance index may have resulted in 1.7% decrease in corruption.

Lup and Lazar (2015) studied the influence of e-governance on the level of corruption in some EU and non-EU states, and discovered that the increasing use of e-governance will reduce corruption because 1% increase in the index of e-governance can result in a decrease in corruption by 6.7% for countries entering the EU and 6.3% for non-EU members. This means that, the more a country adopts e-governance, the higher tendency of reducing corruption in the system.

Enofe etal (2015) appraised e-governance and corruption in Nigeria, they revealed that “the integrated payroll and personal information system (IPPS) has significant effect in reducing the incidence of ghost workers in the public sector and e-payment have significant effect in scaling down level of corruption practice in public sector. Moreso, the new policy on cashless transaction by public office introduced by President Muhammad Buhari will in a long run reduces the level of corruption

Theoretical Framework

This paper is anchored on technological determinism theory propounded by Mashal McLuhan. McLuhan, an American sociologist and economist argues that technology would come to take over all facets of human life, determining what is done and how it is done. Many proponents of McLuhan's proposition have explained that new technologies have already saturated how human societies behave. This theory posits that the level of technology of any society affects how the society operates. The theorist sees technological advancement as a factor that determines human activity and societal progress. Therefore, social progress is determined by level of technological innovation. He sees the media technology as a force that shapes how individuals in the society think, feel, and act and how society operates. Therefore, the level of a country's technological developments determines the level of improvement of that society or state.

According to Chandler (2014), Technological determinists interpret technology in general and communication technologies in particular as the basis of society in the past, present and in the future. Technologies such as writing or printing, television or computer changed society. New technologies, transforms society at every level, including institutions, social interaction and individual. This implies that, any institution that fails to properly adopt the current communication technologies cannot function effectively and efficiently, thus shortchange the citizens in the delivery of public good that would likely make life better for them. This means their hopes and aspirations might not be achieved in the nearest future.

Methodology

The result of this study is based upon documentary approach through secondary source of gathering data, which include review of relevant literatures such as journals, textbooks, thesis, seminar papers, published and unpublished articles relevant to the variables of the research topic.

Importance of E-governance in Niger State

Since the coming of twenty-first century, a lot of importance has been attached to the use of internet in societal practices. This recognition cuts across various spheres of societal operations including the politics and administrations dissemination of information and messages among organisations. The internet has today become the bridge of interaction between organizations and their key publics or stakeholders (Ivanov, 2012). Niger State has been involved in the use of e-payment systems in school and in all major source of revenue that accrue to the state.

Consequently, the shifts in governance landscape have been a serious theme for discussion in achieving effective administration and socio-economic advancement in societies for the past several decades. As the new landscape evolves, e-governance practice is witnessing a hasty and important revolution. The government of Niger State has been involved in the use of social meeting for meetings and announcements of government policies, projects and programmes through the ministry of information and political aids/advisers that are bestowed with the responsibilities of disseminating information to the citizens.

The advances of technology have been reasoned by those in the industry to have strengthened the core roles and functions of societal practices, but as the paradigm shift in internet communication changes from a traditional model of an authoritative, top-down, centralized, one-way communication to an interconnected, democratized, two-way symmetric discussion, some evidence suggests that leaders in Niger State are reluctant or slow to adapt their traditional methods to digital strategies.

Laughey (2009) observes that through internet, people are no longer defined by physical

boundaries or places (where we are) by networks of information and knowledge facilitated by new media technologies that have no sense of place. Internet has brought public and organizations into a shared domain where shared meaning is faster and instantaneous. This practice also prevails among political office holders and other government functionaries but not well strengthened because of lack of codified policy on this practice.

Consequently, the emergence of Web 2.0, has brought with it an overall change in the political sphere, with high hopes for democratic renewal and improvement. In the current governance ecology, researchers like Scolari (2012), have come to term with reality that the Internet has become the cornerstone of political and administrative communication strategies. As political parties increasingly adopt new communication technology, they are also gradually providing opportunities for citizen participation and engagement online. The idea of political engagement on line is personal to the owners of social media handles. However, there are groups chart boards that serve as platform for engagements. They are yet to be vibrant like the platforms in traditional media like the radio where there are programmes that monitors the government ant their policies.

Davis (2009) highlights the increase of information circulating in digital networks, resulting in organizations having to struggle to get their stakeholders' attention in an environment cluttered with messages and stimuli. This phenomenon is yet to be experienced in Niger State because of the low level of internet penetration. Majority of the citizens are in the rural areas and the level of literacy is low as such contents are not generated to the level that they could overwhelm governmental institutions providing services for them and incase of absence of living up to the expectation of citizens, the citizens would not be able to hold the government accountable as a multitude.

For the purpose of impacting on the welfare of citizens, leaders in Nigers State need to adapt technological practices and outreach strategies alongside complementary new and information and communication technologies. The shift to digital communication has changed the way that people expect to find, share, and discuss information, and has opened whole new models for engagement and participation. People now expect to be able to receive and discover up-to-date information instantly online, and expect information to be live and fresh. People also expect to be able to share, rate and discuss content, as opposed to simply consuming it. Static websites with information that rarely changes are rapidly being replaced by dynamic blogging platforms where new and interesting content is added daily, and where social sharing and commenting is integral.

Organizational efficiency through the instrumentality of ensuring transparent operational activities, accountability, effective and efficient service delivery, reduction of corruption, and deploying electronically gadget in curbing the menace of sharp practices in organization will go a long way in making life better for citizens dwelling in Niger State.

Conclusion

It is understandable that when Nigerian citizens are well equipped with knowledge and competency of ICT skills capacity, this will open window of opportunities for several activities to strive, because e- governance which is all about effective and efficient service delivery is aimed towards rapid economy growth and development. Therefore, e-governance can promote and encourage the survival and efficiency of public organization across Niger State. The review of relevant literature depicts that effective application of e-governance by public organization is a sine qua non for the actualization of public organizations efficiency.

Recommendation

For Niger state government to be one of the leading in the use of e-governance to ensure efficiency, the following measures should be taking into consideration.

Adequate finance should be provided that can be used for procurement of ICT facilities for efficient and effective operation of public sector in the state. Government officials should be given adequate training on the use of modern ICT. The government should adopt measure to protect its website from any security threat which can undermine the effective functioning of the website. The government should take adequate steps to enlighten the citizen on the need to embrace e-governance. There should be a strong policy by government to ward e-governance to enable public offices achieve efficiency and effectiveness.

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**PARTY POLITICS, ELECTORAL PROCESS AND TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY:
A COMPRATIVE STUDY OF NIGERIA AND GHANA UNDER FOURTH REPUBLIC**

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Abstract

Ghana and Nigeria are two countries in the West African sub-region that share significant historical similarities like British colonialism, nationalism, economic crisis, prolonged military rule, multi-party democracy and are in their fourth republics. With the global democratization process, Ghana and Nigeria successfully made the transition to civil rule in 1992 and 1999 respectively and are rated differently on the democratization scale. While the former is rated high, the latter is rated low in comparative ranking within the same period of democratization. This paper sets out to assess party politics and electoral processes in transitional democracies: A comparative study of Nigeria and Ghana under fourth republic. The paper adopts secondary source and adopts structural functional theory for its analysis. Also, the paper finds that in Ghana the virtue of the Electoral Commission Act of 1992, the chairman and members of the Commission are appointed by the president but are accountable to the parliament, whereas in Nigeria chief Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) chairman is also appointed by the president subject to senate approval but the ruling party and the president have great influence on the chairman as well as the conduct of the elections. The paper recommends that efforts should be made as much as practicable to make elections less hostile and crisis prone. It is absolutely necessary for the government to ensure that political leaders emerge through democratic procedures in every round of elections.

Keyword: Party Politics, Electoral Process, Transitional Democracy, Nigeria, Ghana

Introduction

Contemporary literature on emerging democracies and party politics identify the arts of elections as ultimate measures for democratic credentials in a country. If free and fair elections are held regularly within a constitutionally stipulated time frame and in particular, where regime change occurs through such elections, it is enough reasons for a country to be branded democratic. Recent studies conducted by Ghanaian and Nigerian Universities on Ghana and Nigeria elections since 1996 tend to affirm this view. In contrast, other literature argues that merely conducting free and fair elections at regular intervals does not make a country democratic state. What is important is the quality of elections held and the meaning attached to them. Couple with the fact that, the paper argues that, for a state to be democratic, there are functions of enduring electoral body and sound party politics manifested in decent political behaviour which are enshrined in the basic tenets of political party systems in any given government. The descriptive and comparative critical method of analysis is adopted for examining the dynamics of party politics and electoral processes between Ghana and Nigeria with the view to determining their transitory democratic status. Ultimately, the study attempts to show how the various conceptions of party politics and electoral processes in these countries have drawn them either nearer or further away from achieving democratization.

Electoral competition has progressively occupied a central place in the political life of almost all the countries of the West African sub-region since the beginning of what has been called the third wave of democratization at the beginning of the 1990s. The direct consequence of this, according to Kambale (2011), has been the creation of Electoral Bodies (EBs) described as independent of the executive in almost all the countries of the sub-region. Hence, electoral bodies have become a keystone of the process of democratization in the countries of West Africa. Their composition,

mandate and activities have attracted increasing public attention. The role of Independent Electoral Bodies or Electoral Commissions is crucial to the outcome of an election as these electoral bodies derive their powers and mandate from the national constitutions. This, as remarked by Mapuva (2010), include administering and implementing laws regarding the registration of voters, overseeing the actual conduct of elections, supervising the ballot and the count, promoting transparency at all levels and being accountable to the public and parliament where one exists. But most important of all, the role of an EB is to ensure that elections are conducted in conformity with the laws of the country (Mapuva, 2010).

In West Africa, overwhelming evidence points to the fact that elections conducted by independent electoral bodies are more successful, and the results respected. In countries where election results have been respected, the state has ceded greater responsibility to the electoral administration body, such as the Electoral Commission in Mali, Ghana and Senegal. In the same way, where evidence indicate the absence of administrative clarity and the political will on the part of the Electoral Commission to enforce the rules, election results are always viewed with suspicion by the populace as is the case in Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. In such an atmosphere, groups who feel swindled and abandoned by the electoral process will resort to nondemocratic forms of protests (Adu-Gyamfi, 2014).

It is against the above background that this paper became imperative and set to examine party politics and electoral processes in Nigeria and Ghana under the Fourth Republic. The choice of Nigeria and Ghana was predicated on the premises that both countries share similar historical experiences. Both countries were victims of exploitative and dehumanizing British colonialism.

Conceptualizing Transitional Democracy

Democratic Transition is a process of Democratization where a state undergoes regime change away from a particular type of authoritarianism to a more liberal and/or democratic one (Huntington, 1991). Transitional or imperfect democracy is characterized by the fragility of its institutions and the dissatisfaction of the people with the democratic procedures for the emergence of their political leaders.

Transitional Democracies are about developing states that are aspiring to become a more democratic political regime including substantive political changes moving in a democratic direction. It can equally go with the scenario where people govern themselves by regular elections through which their political leaders are periodically determined or policies governing them are chosen so as to attain maturity in democracy.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopted the structural functional theory as its theoretical base. Propounded by Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell (1966), the structural functional theory underscores the role of structures and functions in understanding party politics and electoral processes in transitory democracy and the conditions under which the structures can perform its functions effectively.

The basic assumption of the structural-functional theory is that all systems have structures, which can be identified, and those structures perform specific set of tasks if they are to remain in existence. All political systems are involved in the activities of the State, while the latter works towards the interests of the former (Johari, 2011). Consequently, the structural-functional analysis enables us to establish the relevance of the structures created by government to conduct elections and whether these structures have played any significant role in the consolidation of democracy in the countries under study: Nigeria and Ghana. The theory further helps us to understand the level of participation of the citizens in the electoral process in these countries (Johari, 2011).

In pragmatic terms, Electoral Bodies (EB) as structures are seen as a key democratic institutions with explicit functions. In most Sub-Saharan African countries, these commissions are established to oversee the conduct of public elections. To this end, the independence and credibility of the body is

fundamental to the credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process. Therefore, the conduct and fairness of the commission is important. Obviously, the conduct of the Electoral Bodies is a decisive factor in the determination of electoral outcomes, and their acceptability by the political actors. This implies that election of public officials is an important aspect of the electoral process, and for election to be free and fair, the citizens must have confident or agree with the outcome of the election. Hence, the institution that performs the conduct of election is the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in the case of Nigeria and the Electoral Commission (EC), in the case of Ghana (Aiyede, 2007).

And so, there is a set of functional requirements, and operational conditions that must be satisfied if the structures, INEC and EC are to continue to exist. Failure of these institutions to function in its primary assignment, will lead to malfunctioning of the whole system, and this will hamper democratic consolidation and consequently leads to structural decay. For example, in Nigeria, widespread electoral malpractices perpetuated by the Independent National Electoral Commission in 2007 provoked post-election violence which compelled President Yar'Adua (late) to promise in his inaugural speech to create an Electoral Reform Committee to review and overhaul the electoral process to save the system from decay (Onwudiwe, 2010).

It is within this framework that this paper assesses the party politics and electoral processes in Nigeria and Ghana under the fourth democratic republics.

Method of Data Collection

The research relies on secondary sources where books, journals, magazine and online materials are consulted.

Political Parties and Party Politics in Ghana

Dahl (1967) wrote that the “presence or absence of competing political parties can be used as a litmus paper test for...democracy in a country. No full-fledged modern democracy lacks parties that compete for votes and offices in national elections”. Unfortunately, while competitive parties are considered indispensable for democratic consolidation, the numerous military interventions in post-independence Ghana adversely affected the development of multi-party systems in the country. Indeed, by 1962, only five years after independence in 1957, Ghana was a *de facto* single-party state, which was legalized in 1964. The period 1966 - 1992 saw the rise and fall of many political parties, as Ghana entered and exited from a succession of military regimes. Needless to say that the decade-long (1982-1992) ban on political parties under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), significantly undermined the development of the party system in Ghana.

Significantly, both the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) emphasize their commitment to democratic values though with differing interpretations. In ideological terms, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which is typically regarded as a pro-market, pro-business party, professes 'Property Owning Democracy' – the right of every citizen to have the opportunity to own property (NPP Manifesto, 2004). On the other hand, the NDC, which began as a revolutionary, Populist Party professes 'social democracy' – the protection of the rights of socially disadvantaged groups within a multiparty environment. (Akinduro, 2011).

However, it is also worth emphasizing that much as the NPP and the NDC identify themselves with different ideologies, in practice, these parties are more distinguishable by ethnic affiliations than ideological orientations, with (Gyimah-Boadi and Asante 2006) rightly noting that “the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), are largely perceived as Ewe- and Ashanti/Akan-based respectively” (GH PC, 2000). This is in spite of the fact that the 1992 Constitution requires every political party in Ghana to “have a national character” by *inter alia*, ensuring that its membership is “not based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions” (Ghanaian Constitution, 2009).

Political Parties and Party Politics in Nigeria

What we have since 1999 in Nigeria as political parties include: The Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), the All Peoples' Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) have nothing in common with the political parties of the first or second or third republic. Now we have the ACN as another South Western Party that has evolved to consolidate the ethnic and tribal agenda of Yoruba politicians. Manner of origin of these political parties does not fit into what we know from literature. Their composition is fluid and unstable; they can be viewed as instrument of transition from military to civilian rule and form the future with the prospect of more parties. By 2011, the number of political parties has risen to at least 64 (Appiah, 2012). The evolution of these parties with each coming election year raises more questions than answers to the lingering problems of political behaviour and party politics in Nigeria. This probably explains why they resort to primordial sentiments attached to religion, ethnicity and regionalism. Corroborates this point when he noted that: "The PDP has never really come out with any clear cut agenda to define its vision for Nigeria" From a pan Nigerian perspective, contends that the country's politics is bereft of "concert issues, ideology, principles or a clear national vision" such that politics is a high stake contest for raw power and resources". From another perspective (Mapuva, 2010), some have argued that for the PDP, ideologies are lacking and political formations are bereft of identity- as in Nigeria's 4th Republic- we are confronted with the efflorescence of several look alike political parties differentiated only by the fatness of the purpose of their main sponsors and the unique mannerism and idiosyncrasies of their leaders.

From the comparative studies done so far in this paper, it is clear that *Party Politics* is conceived as political acts and principles directed toward the interests of one political party or its members without reference to the common good. Party politics is therefore mainly for the benefit of the party members. This is even more so where corruption and nepotism are the motivating factors for forming such political alliances and seeking elective offices. Now, after almost over fifty-three years of independence for both countries (Ghana and Nigeria), we will be making a biased judgment if we give a pass mark to both countries with regards to measuring up with the tenets of democratic standards when measured from the standard highlighted above, in the light of the nature of party politics practiced in the countries under review. While we may decide to cut the Ghanaian system and government some slacks for the efforts they have made towards entrenching an enduring institution of democracy, the same cannot be said of her counterpart Nigeria (Appiah, 2012).

Institutional Structures and Election Administration in Transitional Democracies Nigeria

In Nigeria, the primary responsibility of electoral administration rests with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The Commission consists of the chairman, who is the chief electoral commissioner, and 12 national electoral commissioners of two from each of the six geo-political zones of the country appointed by the President. The commission has offices in the 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory as well as maintains offices in all the 774 Local Government Areas. Each state office of the commission including the FCT is headed by a Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC), appointed by the President from each state of the federation, and who upon confirmation by the Senate, are deployed to the commission's offices outside their states of origin while the local government area offices are headed by Electoral Officers who are staff of the Commission, and they report to the RECs. The secretary of the commission is the head of the commission secretariat and head of administration. The Members of the commission and the RECs are appointed to serve a five-year term, which is renewable (Adu-Gyamfi, 2014).

INEC is the second-largest government agency in terms of staff strength with approximately 14,000 full time staff members across the country. The commission also appoints ad hoc staff for election duty. For the purpose of efficiency, the commission's administrative structure has been restructured several times since 1999 in line with the leadership policy at different times. At its

inception in 1999, the Commission had eight departments and three units (INEC, 1999). At some point, the leadership decided to streamline the number of departments to six departments, three directorates and three units (INEC, 2003). After the 2003 elections it was restructured to create more departments and a longer reporting chain. Following a change of leadership in 2010, the commission was reorganized and it had 16 departments and an Electoral Institute that comprised four departments. Following another restructuring in April 2013, the commission currently has 20 departments and an Electoral Institute with three departments (Jega, 2012).

Ghana

The Electoral Commission of Ghana is simply known as the Electoral Commission (EC). The Commission is composed of the seven (7) members; a Chairman who is the chief executive officer of the commission; two (2) Deputy Chairmen who are in charge of the two broad divisions of the Commission - Finance and Administration and the Operations divisions; and four other members, all appointed by the president after consulting the Council of State. The chairman and the two deputy chairmen of the commission have permanent tenure of office and enjoy the same conditions of service as Justices of the Supreme Court Functional Divisions: The Commission is organized into two (2) broad areas or functional divisions, namely; (a) Operations Division (b) Finance and Administration Division. Each functional Division is headed by a Deputy Chairman (Operations) and Deputy Chairman (Finance and Administration) led by a coordinating central director. Under the current structure, the Operations Division consists of three departments: The Elections Department, the Training Department and the Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Department. The Division of Finance and Administration is composed of the Human Resources and General Services Department, the Finance Department and the Information Technology Department (Adu-Gyamfi, 2014).

Head Office: The Commission is located at the Head Office in Accra even though by law the Commission can meet anywhere in Ghana designated by the Chairman. The Commission is required to meet at least once in every two (2) months, that is, six (6) times a year. The seven (7) members of the Commission collectively constitute the policy-making and management body of the organization and exercise general supervision over the activities of its staff. There are seven (7) departments at the Head office, namely, Elections, Finance, Information Technology, Human Resource and General Services, Research and Monitoring, Training, and Public Affairs; each of headed by a Director. The permanent staff of the Commission are made up of two coordinating directors, for each division; 17 directors (seven at head office and ten in the regions); 138 district officers; 20 senior electoral officers at head office; and about 1010 other categories distributed among the regional and district offices (Adu-Gyamfi, 2014).

Regional Offices: A director, assisted by at least one deputy regional director, heads a regional office of the Commission. Unlike the head office, a regional office and its staff are not formally organized into functional divisions and departments. A Regional Director and his staff combine both Operations and Finance and Administration functions. As a result, a Regional Director reports to the Commission through the head Office Directors, as the case may be.

District Offices: A District Electoral Officer (DEO) reports directly to the Regional Director, and heads a District Office of the Commission. Like a Regional Office, a District Office has no functional divisions or departments.

Election Officials: During elections, the commission recruits numerous temporary staff in the categories of registration/returning officers, deputy registration/returning officers and presiding officers and polling assistants. They are not formally part of the Commission, but their services are so vital to the work of the Commission that they must be regarded as an informal part of the structure of the Electoral Commission. The District Electoral Officer (DEO) recruits and works closely with these officials. In this connection, the DEO is required to:

- (a) Recruit the best person available of the job at hand
- (b) Organize and supervise their proper training.
- (c) Instill in them the correct attitude towards electoral work (impartiality, probity, accountability, etc.) and to maintain the integrity of the Commission.
- (d) Co-ordinate their activities in the spirit of team work.
- (e) Accord them the importance, respect and dignity that they deserve (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012).

Powers and Functions of Electoral Management Bodies

Nigeria

The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria and the Electoral Act (2010) mandates and confers statutory functions on INEC to:

- (a) Organize, undertake and supervise all elections to the offices of the President and Vice President, the Governor and Deputy Governor of a State and to the membership of the Senate, the House of Representatives and the House of Assembly of each State of the Federation.
- (b) Register political parties in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and an Act of the National Assembly.
- (c) Monitor the organization and operation of political parties including their finances.
- (d) Arrange for an annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of the political parties and publish a report on such examination and audit for public information.
- (e) Arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and prepare, maintain and revise the register of voters for the purpose of any election under the constitution.
- (f) Monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern the political parties.
- (g) Ensure that all electoral commissioners, Electoral and Returning Officers take and subscribe to the oath of office prescribed by law.
- (h) Delimit constituencies for representation in the National Assembly according to the number of seats provided in the constitution.
- (i) Delegate any of its powers to any Resident Electoral Commissioner.
- (j) Carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly.

In similar vein, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) empowers federating states to constitute State Independent Electoral Commissions:

To organize, undertake and supervise all elections to Local Government councils within the State.

To render such advice as it may consider necessary to the Independent National Electoral Commission on the compilation register of voters in so far as that register is applicable to local government elections in that State (Adu-Gyamfi, 2014).

Ghana

The main functions of the Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) as outlined in the 1992 Constitution, Act 451 of the Electoral Commission Act (1993), as amended by the Electoral Commission (Amendment) Act (2003) section 2 are:

- (a) To compile the register of voters and revise it at such periods as may be determined by law.

- (b) To demarcate the electoral boundaries of both national and local government elections.
- (c) To conduct and supervise all public elections and referenda.
- (d) Create new regions or merge the existing regions.
- (e) To keep proper books of accounts and the necessary records to be audited annually by the Auditor General.
- (f) To educate the people on the electoral process and its purpose.
- (g) To undertake programmes for the expansion of the registration of voters.
- (h) To perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law (Elklit, 2002).
- (a) In addition, the Commission is assigned other statutory functions of conducting and supervising elections for various bodies in the country such as: The election of five (5) members of each Regional House of Chiefs to the National House of Chiefs.
- (b) The election of the President and Vice-President of the National House of Chiefs, as well as each Regional House of Chiefs.
- (c) The election of the executive officers of the Ghana Medical and Dental Association, the Veterans Association of Ghana (VAG) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC).
- (d) The election of the Presiding Member of a District Assembly.
- (e) The Electoral Commission is often called upon to provide services, which it is not required by any law to provide. The major service in this regard is organizing, supervising or conducting elections for various organizations to select their executive officers. The Commission readily performs these services in the belief that such elections constitute a learning process for the members of the organization and that this in turn facilitates its work during general elections.
- (f) The Commission is also sometimes called upon to issue identity cards to members of an organization (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012).

ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA FROM 1999 TO 2019

Civil rule returned in Nigeria on May 29th 1999 led by a retired military man and former Head of State Olusegun Obasanjo. The elections of 1999 saw three political parties winning elections at the state and national levels, with the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) producing the President of Nigeria; so arranged to assuage the ill-feelings generated by June 12 annulment and crises (Smith, 2011). In 2003, the PDP federal government supervised one of the worst elections in the history of Nigeria in a bid to “win everywhere”. That election was massively rigged by the PDP and tended to destroy the growth and emergence of opposition parties in Nigeria's democracy. The champions of that era however, never enjoyed the four-year controversial mandate as it was a period of free for all fight in the presidency (Smith, 2011).

Nigeria was the loser 2007 elections were also massively rigged as it was dubbed “do or die” by President Olusegun Obasanjo. In a hasty bid to checkmate then Vice President Atiku Abubakar's quest to succeed his principal, President Obasanjo in 2007, the PDP and Obasanjo foisted Governor Umaru Musa Yar'Adua on the country as President. The election was so badly and violently rigged under the chairmanship of Professor Maurice Iwu's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), that the European Election Observer Mission in Nigeria reported that “Nigerian leaders had deceived their people”. This drew the anger of Obasanjo's government which asked the foreign election observers to leave Nigeria (Erdman, 2017).

The rate of election petitions and litigation that followed the 2007 elections was of monumental proportion among the three major political parties and their candidates then, both at the national and state level elections – Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP), and Action Congress (AC) with Umaru Musa-Yar'Adua, General Muhammadu Buhari and then Vice

President Atiku Abubakar respectively. President Umaru Musa-Yar'Adua in his inauguration speech, acknowledged the fraudulent nature of the election that brought him to office to the admiration of the whole world and his countrymen. He went on to set up a high-powered Electoral Reforms Committee which was chaired by Justice Mohammed Uwais. The Committee made far-reaching submissions in their report which was applauded by the nation, but which late President Yar'Adua and President Goodluck Jonathan implemented in a half-measured and perfunctory manner leaving Nigeria's electoral process still in limbo of malpractices, rigging, ballot snatching, violence, fraud and evil manipulations which still haunt us till date (Ola, 2016).

Neither President Yar'Adua nor the Nigerian people enjoyed this mandate that was fraudulently given as the President was in and out of hospital in and out of the country till his death in office leaving behind controversies and unnecessary crises that almost brought the nation to a halt. Since independence, the outcomes of fraudulent elections have always threatened national peace and security; continually questioning the existence of Nigeria and bringing its economy to its knees; creating an ugly image of Nigeria as a nation that takes one step forward, while taking several steps backwards in its march to nationhood and economic development (Erdman, 2017).

The 2011 and 2015 elections under the supervision of Professor Attahiru Jega's INEC and under the superintending influence of President Goodluck Jonathan saw to the decrease in tensions in our body polity as it relates to elections and its associated crises in Nigeria. The litigations also reduced and opposition politics improved in Nigeria, strengthening our democracy. The only ugly side of this electoral period was General Muhammadu Buhari's aspirations and utterances. He had registered a political party called Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), which statements and body language during campaigns in the northern part of Nigeria triggered electoral violence, when he lost in 2011 to President Jonathan. Several people, among who were Nigerian youths on national service lost their lives in the northern part of the country, while working as ad-hoc staff of electoral INEC (Ola, 2016).

In 2015, Goodluck Jonathan lost to General Muhammadu Buhari who had become a candidate of a new alliance called the All Progressives Congress (APC). Jonathan congratulated Buhari even before the results were fully announced. Neither Jonathan nor the PDP went to court to challenge the outcome of the elections and these had a trickle-down effect on other candidates. President Buhari's electoral history has been a chequered one that if subjected to forensic examination may turn out to be one that has claimed many innocent lives, due to the violence, it has generated. So, with General Muhammadu Buhari's victory Nigerians heaved a sigh of relief. Now that someone whose supporters are fanatical, a champion of anti-corruption and good governance and credible and transparent elections, Nigerians looked forward to a peaceful country that will be characterized by successful fight against corruption, good and transparent governance, and most importantly credible elections. These were the reasons Nigerians celebrated the victory of President Buhari and his inauguration as Nigeria's leader (Erdman, 2017).

However, four years after, most Nigerians' expectations and the promises of government have been met in half measures. The last straw in the network of failures is the inability of the Nigerian people to witness a free and fair election in the February and March 2019 elections which claimed several lives, several inconclusive and rigged elections as if we have returned to the sad years of 2003 and 2007 "do or die" era. We thank God for the peaceful way those who feel aggrieved at the elections results have gone to the Election Petitions Tribunals. At the last official count, 736 election petition cases have been filed in courts. A situation that make Professor Maurice Iwu and Professor Mahmood Yakubu, and Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Muhammadu Buhari two sides of one coin. These four men have one thing in common – supervisors of the worst elections in Nigeria's history (Erdman, 2017).

ELECTIONS IN GHANA FROM 1992 TO 2016

After more than a decade in office of the J.J Rawlings led Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) military regime, a consensus was reached to send Ghana back to a multi-party constitutional rule in 1992. According to Frempong (2017), three major steps were followed in 1992 to return Ghana to a constitutional rule; namely, The April 1992 referendum held to adopt a new constitution. It is record that, the PNDC tasked an established National Commission on Democracy (NCD) to collate public opinion across the ten regions of Ghana. These views were referred to the consultative assembly and was subsequently upheld to lift the ban on the formation of political parties and to pave way for the presidential and parliamentary elections in November and December 1992 respectively (Frempong, 2017:139-140). This led to the proliferation of some political parties like the National Democratic Congress (NDC) metamorphosed PNDC led by JJ Rawlings, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by a University professor and historian Professor Albert AduBoahen. Other contesting political parties included Peoples National Convention (PNC), National Independence Party (NIP), People's Heritage Party (PHP) and other minor parties like the EGLE and NCP which later formed a coalition with the NDC ahead of the polls (Frempong,2017).

Electoral Victories and Defeats in Ghana Since 1992 by Percentage

PARTY	YEAR	1992	1996	2000	2000	2004	2008	2008	2012	2016
NPP		30.4%	39.6%	48.2%	56.9%	52.5%	49.1%	49.8%	47.7%	53.9%
NDC		58.3%	57.4%	44.5%	43.1%	44.6%	47.9%	50.2%	50.7%	44.4%

Source:Frempong (2017) & Electoral commission of Ghana.

From table 1, the NDC led by J.J Rawlings is on record to have won the 1992 General elections with a huge percentage of (58.3%) to form government even though, there were series of agitations by the Opposition parties. The largest opposition then, New Patriotic Party accused the PNDC which later metamorphosed to NDC to have rigged the elections. Interestingly, the came out with a book “Stolen Verdict” which consisted of a compilation of alleged areas of electoral malfeasance in support of their claim and later went ahead to boycott the parliamentary elections which was held in December 1992. The NDC consolidated their victory to retain the seat of Government when the won the 1996 General elections recording (57.4%) as opposed to that of the NPP (39.6%) which was led by a new candidate John AgyekumKuffour (Ayee, 2008).

Interestingly, Ghana attained its first alternation in power in 2000 when the loosing candidate of the NPP in the 1996 election; John Agyekum Kuffour won the second round of the election with a whooping (56.9%) as opposed to (43.1%) from the incumbent NDC under the leadership of their vice president John Evans Atta Mills. The NPP also retained the seat when the incumbent president John AgyekumKuffour won the 2004 general elections. Amazingly, Ghana attained what Huntington has described as the “Two-turn-over-Test” in 2008 when there was peaceful alternation of power between the two major parties namely NDC &NPP. The NDC led by the same candidate from 2004 election won the run-off of the 2008 elections with a slim margin of (50.2%) as opposed to the incumbent's (49.8%) who were presented a new flagbearer in the person of Nana AddoDanquahAkuffoAddo who served as the Attorney General and Foreign Affairs Minister in the John Agyekum led government between (2000-2008). An incident that changed the electoral dynamics of Ghana occurred for the first time when the sitting president John Evan Atta Mills lost his life due to a short ailment in July 2012. The sitting vice president in the person of John DramaniMahama was subsequently sworn as a substantive President as the 1992 constitution of Ghana prescribes. The NDC retained John Mahama ahead of the 2012 general election to compete with an old face from the NPP Nana AkuffoAddo who was visiting “the shrine “for the second time. The NDC won the election by a slim margin of (50.7%) but decision as to who won was later tested at the Supreme Court of Ghana when the aggrieved NPP sort for justice in the famous

2012 election petition (Agomor, 2014).

The verdict of the court however affirmed the earlier declaration made by the Electoral Commission of Ghana that, Candidate John Dramani Mahama won the election. This according to some political pundits was a major step in consolidating democracy in Ghana largely because, the aggrieved party resorted to the use of the law court instead of violence. It is believed that, this major step by Nana Akufo Addo was lauded by both local and international actors and institutions as an excellent move. The NPP on this was noted to had a defeat with a taste of victory because, the turn of events at the court brought to bear some of the electoral anomalies and called for major electoral reforms the party was on the neck of the Electoral Commission in the heat up to the elections. The political capital the NPP made out of the landmark election petition case is believed to have aided the party to win the 2016 General elections. The NPP won with a whopping percentage of (53.9%). This according to some political pundit marked the biggest political defeat the NDC has ever experience with a loss margin of over 1 Million votes (Agomor, 2014).

It can be deduced from the above that the Electoral Commission of Ghana has worked very hard

Discussion of Results

Within the purview of the analysis in the paper, the following observations, which are of historical, theoretical, conceptual and above all comparative relevance became obvious;

1. In Ghana, by virtue of the Electoral Commission Act of 1992, the chairman and members of the Commission are appointed by the president but are accountable to the parliament, whereas in Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) chairman is often associated with the ruling party and the president. The constitutional provisions for the appointment of the INEC chairman and members are sometimes manipulated by the president, subject to confirmation by the Senate (according to section 153: i(f) and 154:1-3 of the 1999 Constitution) and the case of party politics both Nigeria and Ghana share intense rivalry among the political parties of People Democratic Party (PDP) and All Progressive Congress (APC) in Nigeria while in Ghana National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP).
2. Since Nigeria's returned to democracy in 1999, elections have been held under politically and logistically difficult circumstances that made them less free and fair. In Ghana however, credible elections have been conducted since the 1990s, most electoral contests in Nigeria since the return to civil rule in 1999 have been controversial and substandard as indicated by (Amuwo, 2009).
3. Apart from the twin problems of electoral manipulation and violence, there is problem with electoral legitimacy, which again is more problematic of the Nigerian system: partisan and ineffective election management while Ghana has institutionalized modest rules and regulations of election management and administration, Nigeria has been less effective in terms of the most fundamental preparations for elections.
4. In Ghana, elections are more peaceful and less bitter whereas, 2015 general in Nigeria was conducted peacefully in the history of Nigeria as a result of conceding defeat by former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan as the case of smooth transition of power from President Rawlings of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to President John Kufuor of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and then back to John Atta Mills of the NDC and again to Nana Akufo-Addo of NPP. One can argue that despite crucially similar presidential designs and almost the same military-civil rule path, prospects of sustaining democratic consolidation are brighter in Ghana because no single party dominates the system contrary to PDP ruled for sixteen years.
5. The Ghana's EC and Nigeria's INEC have done relatively well in that they have worked

with the political parties in the context of the IPAC to initiate many electoral reforms since 1996 in Ghana and 2011 in Nigeria. Electoral reforms such as the representation of the parties by agents at the polling stations, at the collation centres and at the headquarters of the Commission during compilations of election results have enhanced the transparency of the electoral process. With the introduction of the biometric verification registration machines during the 2012 and 2015 elections respectively, both Commissions detected and eliminated multiple registrations, thus enhancing the integrity of the voter's register.

6. The main problem of INEC include its usually poor preparations for the general elections, inadequate power to deal with Electoral Act offenders, failure to create a level playing field for all parties and candidates, among others. Political analysts attribute these problems to INEC's gross lack of independence, given its composition and funding by the presidency; the poor quality of its leadership and its corrupt dispositions unlike the EC in Ghana, which is subjected to the parliament and civil society organisations.

Concluding Remarks

This paper posits that party politics and electoral processes in both countries (Ghana and Nigeria) practice in accordance with the major tenet and guidelines stipulated as basic reasons and conditions for setting up political parties. Politicians and party politics are therefore enjoined to seriously consider and insist that the purpose and functions for which political parties are instituted are practiced based on the idiosyncratic characters of the leaders of each country. These very salient steps, in the opinion of this paper, will seriously aid in enshrining lasting democratic systems in both countries and Nigeria in particular. The above no doubt confirms the position of this paper that the more an Electoral Management Body is independent, the more sound and healthy party politics and democracy will be strengthened. The paper therefore, recommends that:

1. The independence and credibility of electoral management bodies in Nigeria and Ghana should be guaranteed by modifying the procedure of appointing and composing its members.
2. The Independent National Electoral Commission should be re-strategized to make for transparency in the electoral management process and to practically address obvious defects of previous elections. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission of Ghana should continue to sustain its standards of professionalism in all areas of the electoral processes to consolidate transparency and consensus all the way through the electoral process – before, during and after elections.
3. Efforts should be made as much as practicable to make elections less hostile and crisis prone. It is absolutely necessary for the government to ensure the emergence of political leaders that reflects the choice of the electorates.

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ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF N-POWER PROGRAMME ON POVERTY REDUCTION AMONG BENEFICIARIES IN GOMBE STATE, NIGERIA

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Abstract

In response to the increasing rate of poverty/unemployment in Nigeria, the Federal Government of Nigeria introduced N-Power empowerment programme aimed at lifting millions of Nigerians out of poverty. The central problem which the study addressed was assessing the extent to which the N-Power programme impacted on poverty reduction in Kaduna and kano states. The objectives of the study where to examine the extent to which N-Power funding affect youth employment and poverty reduction in Gombe State. The Meta theory of Empowerment developed by Elisheva Seedam and translated by Flanze was adopted as theoretical framework for the study. The research design adopted was mixed method design by John W. Creswell and data were generated from both primary and secondary sources, with questionnaires, interviews, and observations as the instrument for primary data generation and were analyzed using both descriptive and statistical analysis/multiple regression analysis using statistical package for Social Scientist [SPSS] for the test of hypotheses. The study found that funding of N-Power programme has a significant positive effect on youth empowerment and poverty reduction in Gombe State. Consequently, it was therefore recommended that, N-Power funding should be revisited with a view to ensuring prompt payment of monthly stipends to the beneficiaries in the study state.

Keywords: N-Power, Poverty reduction, Youth employment

Introduction

Poverty is a worldwide social problem that attracts the attention of international community, government and non-governmental agencies including African scholars, and policy makers. The concept of poverty and material deprivation is a critical one in contemporary social discussions. The poor are materially deprived, socially alienated and politically excommunicated. Thus, the poor are conceived as those individuals or households in a particular society, incapable of purchasing a specified basket of basic goods and services such as food, water, shelter, health care, access to productive resources including education,

working skills and tools, political and civil rights to participate in decisions concerning socio-economic conditions. It is generally agreed that in conceptualizing poverty, low income or low consumption is its symptom.

The level of poverty in Nigeria since the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the 80s has tremendously increased (UNDP Nigeria, 1998; FOS, 1999; World Bank,

1999). The poverty profile in Nigeria showed that the incidence of poverty increased from 28.1% in 1980 to 43.6% in 1985, but declined to 42.7% in 1992 and rose again to 65.6% in 1996 (FOS, 1999). The UNDP Human Development Indices (HDI for 2001) ranked Nigeria the 142 with HDI of 0.40 among the poorest countries in the world. The situation even grew worse 18 years later when in 2019 the HDI report ranked Nigeria 161 with HDI value of 0.539 (Human Development Report, 2020).

In recognition of the high poverty and unemployment levels in the country, the current administration established what is considered by many as an explicit social intervention policy called the National Social Investment Programmes (N-SIP) since June, 2016. The policy is meant to cushion the effect of hardship caused by the prevalent poverty in the polity. The said policy is schemed in four stand-alone programmed that are designed to provide skills, income flow, cheap capital and food security. Specifically, these programmed are: the N-Power programme, the conditional Cash Transfer Programme (CCT), the Government Enterprise and Empowerment Programme (GEE) and the Home-Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSF).

Earlier announced in 2015 and officially kick-started in December 2016, the N-Power was established as a manpower development programme to harness Nigeria's demography through appropriate skills development efforts to provide an opportunity to achieve inclusion and productivity within the country. It further seeks to achieve accelerated development through poverty reduction, socio-economic development via efficient utilization of natural resources. N-Power programme which is for young Nigerian between the age of 18-35 is an intervention programme meant to address the challenges of youth unemployment by providing structure for large scale and relevant work skills acquisition and development, while linking it core and outcomes to fixing inadequate public services, and stimulating the larger economy.

N-Power volunteer involves a massive deployment of 500,000 trained graduates who will assist in improving the inadequacies in the public services in education, health and civic education (FOS, 2018). The N-Power Programme is designed to train Nigerian youths (graduate and non-graduate) on different fields with a token fee of N30, 000.00 each for two years. The graduate's category is divided into three areas namely, N-Agro, N-Health, N-Teach and for the non-graduates' category, there is N-Build Scheme. The totality of the beneficiaries would provide teaching, instructional, and advisory solutions according to the programmer's category in which they are placed.

The N-Agro beneficiaries would work in the agricultural sector of the economy functioning as intermediaries between research and farmers. They operate as facilitators and communicators, helping farmers in their decision-making and ensuring that appropriate knowledge is implemented to obtain the best results on farms. N-Health beneficiaries are meant to serve as public health assistance teaching preventive health to community members in the primary healthcare centers especially pregnant women, children, families and individuals. For their background in health-related academic fields, they are also trained to provide basic diagnostic services (Aderonmu, 2017). Against this background, this study intends to assess the implementation of N-Power programme on poverty reduction among the beneficiaries in Gombe State. Clearly, curbing the high rate of poverty and unemployment, economic wastages such as excessive loss of output which manifested in a reduction of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and gross underutilization of human resources were among the reasons given for the establishment of N-Power programme.

The N-Power programme is set to address the challenges of youth unemployment by providing a

structure for large scale and relevant work skills acquisition and development while linking its core and outcomes to fixing inadequate public services and stimulating the larger economy (Nwoabi, 2019). According Kabeer (2018), the objectives of the programme include reducing the rate of unemployment in the country, facilitating the transfer of entrepreneurial and technical skills, boosting employability status of the beneficiaries and bringing solution to active public service and government diversification policy. In spite the commendation received from various stakeholders, the programme is bedeviled by multiple challenges notably issue of funding which this research intends to address. Funding has been cited as one of the problems bedeviling the successful operation of N-Power and other components of National Social Investment Programme (NSIP) in Nigeria. The National Director of NSIP reveals that only 15.8 percent of the 2016 and 2017 appropriation for the programme was released Wakili, 2018; Guardian 20 February, 2018). Also, only N300 billion out of the budgeted N1.5 trillion has been utilized for running the programme.

Therefore, appropriation without release and actual cash backing make effective project execution impossible. This is buttressed by the theory of public policy implementation by Meter and Horn (2002) which identified available resources as critical in policy implementation. However, this paper intends to ask that to what extent has funding of N-Power programme affect the incidence of poverty among the beneficiaries in Gombe State? And the main objective of the studies is to examine the extent to which funding of N-Power programme affects poverty reduction among beneficiaries in Gombe State. Various studies have been carried out in relation to N-Power programme and poverty reduction in Nigeria. Therefore, the study confined itself in some specific areas and ignored wider range of poverty reduction of which this study tends to fill. Thus, this research work seeks to assess the implementation of N-Power programme on poverty reduction among beneficiaries in Gombe State.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Concept of N-Power Programme

N-Power aspires to provide a platform where most Nigerians can access skills acquisition and development. At this time however, the initial modular programmed in N-Power are designed for Nigerian citizens between the ages of 18 and 35. One needs to meet the minimum requirement (if any) for the respective programme. Generally, selection is based: on one's expression of a genuine interest in whichever area you decide; passing the relevant tests; willingness to push beyond comfort zone; and ability to show a flair to develop all the skills you need to be the best you can be (Aderonmu, 2017).

While there are fixed requirements along way, we will be relying on you to take ownership of the process and take the lead in shaping your route, by making the most of the training that you will receive. For the purposes of N-Power, Graduate means any post-tertiary qualification including an Ordinary National Diploma (OND) or Nigerian Certificate in Education (NCE) or as may be specified by the programme (Oba, 2017). The N-Power Volunteer Corps is the post-tertiary engagement initiative for Nigerian between 18 and 35. It is a paid volunteering programme of 2-year duration. The graduates will undertake their primary tasks I identified public services within their proximate communities. All N-Power Volunteers are entitled to computing devices that will contain information necessary for their specific engagement, as well as information for their continuous training and development. In 2016, the Federal Government engaged 200,000 N-Power Volunteers. In 2017, the Federal Government is enlisting 300,000 more. The June 20017 Application is only open to the Graduate Category-the N-Power Volunteer Corps. N-Power

volunteers provide teaching, instructional, and advisory solutions in 4 key areas (Bennel, 2018).

However, skills and knowledge are driving forces of economic growth and social development.

Despite the current high level of unemployment, harnessing Nigeria's young demography through appropriate skill development efforts provides an opportunity to achieve inclusion and productivity within the country-scale skill development is the main policy thrust of the N- Power Programme. N-Power is also linked to the Federal Government's policies in the economic, empowerment and social development arenas. N-Power addresses the challenge of youth unemployment by providing a structure for large scale and relevant work skills acquisition and development while linking its core and outcomes to fixing inadequate public services and stimulating the larger economy. The modular programs under N-Power will ensure that each participant will learn and practice most of what is necessary to find or create work. The N-Power Volunteer Corp involves a massive deployment of 500,000 trained graduates who will assist to improve the inadequacies in our public services inn education, health and civic education, health and

civic education. Some of these graduates will also help in actualizing Nigeria's economic and strategic aspirations of achieving food security and self-sufficiency (Federal Ministry of Youth Development, 2017).

Perhaps to further demonstrate the fact that it was aimed at addressing the challenges of empowerment, its forerunners categorized it into Graduate Teachers Corps which targeted 500,000 graduates' recruitment. N-Power knowledge is targeting 25,000 non-graduates' recruitment and N-Power Build which targets 75,000 non-graduates' recruitment. It was gathered that the 500,000 graduates under the N-Power Corps programme will get the computing devices that will contain information necessary for their specific engagement, as well as information for their continuous training and development. Participants are to provide teaching, instructional, and advisory solutions in 4 key areas namely agriculture, health, power tech and community education (Obadan, 2017).

The N-Power agro-volunteers are meant to function as intermediaries between research and farmers. They operate as facilitators and communicators, helping farmers in their decision-making and ensuring that appropriate knowledge is implemented to obtain the best result on farms. Through the N-Power Health programme, young graduates who form part of the 500,000 N-Power Corps members are trained to work as public health assistants. They teach preventive health to community members including pregnant women, children, families and individuals. They are also trained to provide basic diagnostic services (Aderonmu, 2017).

The N-Power teach programme engages qualified graduates for the benefit of basic education delivery in Nigeria. They are not to deployed as teaching assistants in primary and secondary schools across Nigeria. They are not to replace the current teachers, but are to work as support teachers, assisting with teaching, school management and other functions within the schools. They assist in taking basic education to children in marginalized communities (Aderonmu, 2017). Indeed, the programme is carefully designed in such a manner that if well implemented, can help in further addressing the challenges of empowerment and subsequently, reduce poverty among the youths. But then of course, there appears to be some confusion of some sort in the way and manner, the programme is being handled. The programme could not kick off in most states as scheduled. Some of the controversies included the fact that the names released so far are reportedly fraught with 'ghost names' (Bethel, 2017).

Funding of N-Power Programme

N-Power and other social investments programmed developed under the watch of President Buhari are intervention programmed aimed to lift millions of Nigerians out of poverty and create a platform for employability among the teaming youths. The programme is fully funded by the Federal Government of Nigeria as disclosed by the President that “National Social Investment Programmes are funded with billions of naira from its inception to-date as a government mechanism to help provide necessary buffers and shield to millions of Nigerians who are exposed to the widespread economic vulnerabilities”. He further stressed that “In furtherance of our inclusiveness agenda, the sum of N420 billion has been provided to sustain the social investment programmed, while 20 billion has also been set aside for the family homes and our Social Housing Programmes”. Under the N-Power programme, the first batch of 200,000 participants are to be paid N30,000 a month and deployed by the respective state governments and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) to their different places of assignment, including classrooms as teachers (Federal Ministry of Youth Development, 2009). But some months into the programme, it has started facing different challenges with about 13,000 participants alleging that they have not been paid their monthly stipend (Aderonmu, 2017).

The Nigerian Interbank System (NIBSS), which provides the technical support for the programme has identified sundry challenges, including failure on the part of the beneficiaries to input correct Bank Verification Numbers (BVN) and other details to match the information initially provided for processing. Funmi Olowosolu, a participant who was posted to LGEA primary school, Lokoguma, Kogi state, where she teaches, is yet to receive her monthly stipend of N30,000 three months after enrolling in the programme, because of inconsistency in her personal details, as well as her Bank Verification Number (BVN) (Bethel, 2017). This clearly indicated that, Federal Government is the sole financier of N-Power programme.

Concept of Poverty

Poverty is interpreted broadly as lacking the basic means to live in dignity: A multidimensional understanding of poverty helps us define poverty as a human condition characterized by sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security, and power necessary for enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002). Poverty as a subject attracts several definitions from the different scholars. For the purpose of this study, we shall adopt some definitions with inherent universal attributes, which address poverty issues in relation to the subject of discourse. The World Bank (2017) defines poverty as per capita income of less than 2.150 calories per day. This should however be accepted conditionally, considering that the value of one dollar varies from region to region. Suffice to say that one dollar may provide minimal food requirements in a country with abundant sources of food, while it may not in another region, which relies on imports for her food supply.

Umar (2012) sees poverty as debilitating that its eradication becomes extremely difficult if not impossible. Thus, both individuals and societies would like to avoid it like a plague. This is probably why since the nineteenth century, policy makers and academicians in the developed world have persistently concerned themselves with how to eliminate or at least reduce poverty, though so far with no success. This must have connection with the poor implementation of policies and programmed designed to tackle poverty issues across the globe.

Poverty as Subsistence

It concerned with the minimum of provision needed to maintain health and working capacity. The

subsistence definition described poverty objectively as lack of income needed to acquire the minimum necessity of life. Those who lack the necessities to sustain life are described as poor. However, there are difficulties in determining what constitutes 'minimum' which should be the dividing line separating the poor from the rich (Odomosu, 1999).

Poverty as Social Inequality

Inequality in this case is concerned with the relative position of income group to each other. Poverty cannot be understood in isolating the poor and treating them as a group. Society is seen as a series of stratified income layers and poverty is concerned with how the bottom layers fare in relation to the society as a whole. Inequality is determined by standing the living standard of the rich in relation to the poor. The unfairness and injustice of unequal distribution of resources has led to countless attempts to explain this phenomenon. Social inequality affects career development of individuals, and the effect of social institutions such as family, home, and occupational structure must be taken into account but a way of explaining this factor gives way to viewing it from sociological perspectives (Odomosu, 1999).

Challenges of N-Power Programme on Poverty Reduction in Nigeria

Challenges of N-Power programme in ensuring youth employment vis-à-vis poverty reduction in Nigeria have been identified by few studies. A study conducted by Abin (2018) revealed that some of the problems faced by the programme included unpaid and late payment of stipend to volunteers. Other challenge noted was the over centralization of the programme. This has the tendency to effect interaction between beneficiaries and authorities who control the programme and limit possibility of improving the scheme through understanding plights of beneficiaries. A study by Okoro and Bassey (2018) noted that the programme did not provide teacher education to volunteers before deployment in the N-Teach strand. This implies that such volunteers were not empowered to take up the teaching profession by the programme before deploying them.

Generally, empowerment has assumed wide application most recently, even though it is not a new wind, having arisen in the mid – 17th century with legalistic meaning “to invest with authority, “authorize”. It infers that individuals in society could be to attain higher and better living standards, while the development of the community made up of empowered individual could also be enhanced.

Theoretical Framework

Meta theory of empowerment developed by Elisheva Seedam translated by Flanze (1997) was used and adopted as a theoretical framework for this study. The theory of empowerment therefore sufficiently explains this study centered on the Assessment of the implementation of N-Power programme on poverty reduction among the beneficiaries in Gombe State.

Critique of Meta Theory of Empowerment

Meta Theory of Empowerment like many of the theories is Eurocentric and un-African in content and context which used and applied in the western world of which their norms, tradition and values vary with the Africans. Though, the central theme of the theory centered on how individual or community could be empowered to be self-reliance. So even with the above stated reasons, the theory suit and fitted this research work.

Research Methodology

This research adopts mixed method design by John W. Cresswell as the work used both quantitative and qualitative data in its analysis. The design gives direction to the study and for this

reason, it is most appropriate in making generalization. Hence vital views of the respondents on N-Power poverty reduction program was captured using mixed method. 350 was the sample size using Morgan table from the total number of the beneficiaries of 2,814 (NBS, 2020). Data was collected through qualitative and quantitative sources such as; publications, gazette, internet, questionnaires and interviews respectively. Therefore, 350 respondents formed the sample size which diversified interms sex, age, educational status etc. SPSS was employed to run the analysis Regression.

Hypothesis

H₀ Funding of N-Power programme has no significant effect on poverty reduction among the beneficiaries in Gombe State.

Model Analysis for Hypothesis One

Variable Coefficient

R 0.699

R-square 0.488

p-value 0.000

F stat 324.664

Df 341

Sum of squares

Regression 97.333

Residual 101.930

Source: SPSS output (Researcher's Survey, 2021)

From, the value of R = 0.699 shows that there is a strong (69.9%) relationship between funding of N-Power programme and poverty reduction. Also, R square = 0.488 indicates that 48.8% variability in poverty reduction is due to funding of N-Power programme in Gombe State. The low value of regression standard error (0.134) indicates the data for regression analysis are normal and balanced which validated the use of regression analysis. The p-value which is 0.000 (i.e., p < 0.05) indicates that the regression is significant, that there is useful linear model between the variables considered. This means the regression analysis is significant as shown in the above Coefficients of the Hypothesis.

Model Unstandardized

Coefficients

Standardized

Coefficients t Sig.

B Std. Error Beta

1 (Constant) 1.512 0.134 11.322 0.000

Funding of N-Power 0.613 0.034 0.699 18.018 0.000

a. Dependent Variable: poverty reduction

Source: SPSS output (Researcher's Survey, 2021)

Based on the p-value (i.e., p = 0.000) and standard coefficient value (0.613) respectively

indicates that the null hypothesis which states that “Funding of N-Power programme has no significant effect on poverty reduction among the beneficiaries in Gombe State” is rejected and there is a positive relationship (11.322) between funding of N-Power programme on poverty reduction among the beneficiaries in Gombe State.

Summary of Major Findings

In the course of this study which seeks to assess the implementation of N-Power Programme on poverty reduction among beneficiaries in Gombe State, the summary of the findings as delineated in this data analysis chapter is presented as below:

i. This study reveals that funding of N-Power programme has significant positive on poverty reduction among the beneficiaries in Gombe State.

Recommendations

N-Power funding pattern should be re-visited with a view to ensuring prompt payment of stipends to the beneficiaries to serve as a drastic effort to reduce poverty in the study state. It should be revisited by reassessing the current payment method in such a way that the payment should be made promptly. The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs needs to uplift the treatment standard of N-Power beneficiaries in terms of payment as they do to their staff by making their stipend disbursement on a monthly static date so as to ensure the true attainment of poverty reduction via the programme.

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SCHOOL FEEDING PROGRAMME AND ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOL PUPILS IN MUNYA LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NIGER STATE, NIGERIA: AN EVALUATION

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Abstract

The study assessed the School Feeding Programme among public primary school pupils in Munya Local Government Area in Niger State, Nigeria. The main objective of the study is to determine the effect of the programme on school enrolment, academic performance and the challenges faced in the course of implementing the programme. Abraham Maslow's Theory of needs was adopted. The study adopted the survey research design and obtained its data from primary source using structured questionnaire administered on one hundred (100) respondents in 10 randomly selected public primary schools in Munya Local Government Area in Niger State. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics. It was also discovered that the school feeding programme in Niger State has resulted in an increase in pupils' enrolment 75(75%), encouragement of punctuality 87 (87%), as well as increase in academic performance 75(75%) activities. The study also discovered that the implementation of the programme is bedeviled by challenges such as insufficient fund 65(65%), overcrowded classrooms 65(65%) and small quantity of food served 66(66%). The study concluded that the state government should double its efforts to address the problems identified by the study in the programme implementation, this will sustain pupils' enrolment and increase academic performance thereby leading to nation-building. This can be done through sustainable funding to be solicited from all stakeholders, corporate bodies and multi-national companies. The study further suggests that proper monitoring groups should be set up in each ward so as to supervise the Vendors in the course of preparing and administration of the school feeding meals.

Keywords: Feeding, Primary, Programme, Public, School.

Introduction

About Sixty Million children go to school hungry daily in developing countries of the world. A child who moves to school hungry cannot learn and the health condition of such a child will be problematic (Nesser, 2012). According to UNESCO (2011) about 66 million school children are under-nourished and an additional 67 million children are out of school. Norris (2021) asserted that different countries introduced 'Food for Education' in form of 'School Feeding Programme' and 'Food for schooling Programme' to achieve quality education and to redistribute food to poor families. While both programmes might have advantages, this essay argues that a 'School Feeding Programme', that practises 'On site Feeding' can achieve Sustainable Development Goal, i.e. quality equitable life-long learning for all learners. Conversely, a 'Food for School Programme' can increase enrolment of both boys and girls, however, school feeding programmes constitute critical interventions that have been introduced in many developed and third world

countries to address the issue of poverty, increase school enrolment and enhance pupils' performance. In developing countries, almost 60 million children go to school hungry every day and about 40 percent of them are from Africa. Providing school meals is therefore vital in nourishing children. Parents are motivated to send their children to school instead of keeping them at home to work or care for siblings (Akanbi, 2013). The introduction of the school feeding is traced to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) initiative and several conferences held thereafter by African leaders which aimed to tackle issues, such as peace, security, good economic, political and corporate governance and to make the continent an attractive destination for foreign investment. Some of these developments include the 'New Partnership for African Development' which according to the blueprint is a pledge by African leaders, based on common vision and a firm and shared conviction, to eradicate poverty and to place their countries on the path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and politics. Also, the 'Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme' and the 'Millennium Hunger Task Force' amongst others were initiatives which were designed to link school feeding to agricultural development through purchase and use of locally produced food (Bundy et al cited in Taylor & Ogbogui, 2016). To ensure that Nigerian children have sound health and quality education through overcoming the problems of hunger, the Federal government of Nigeria in 2016 launched the national home grown school feeding policy in public primary schools in Nigeria. Since the country happened to be one of twelve (12) pilot countries invited to implement the programme. So far, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya and Mali commenced the implementation of the school feeding programme. As a result, the Federal Government of Nigeria came up with the Universal Basic Education Act in 2004, which provided the enabling legislative backing for the execution of the Home Grown School Feeding and Health Programme. Towards the realization of the objectives of the Universal Basic Education programme and the central role of nutrition, the Federal Ministry of Education launched the Home Grown School Feeding and Health Programme in 2005. The overall goal of the School Feeding Programme in Nigeria is to reduce hunger and malnutrition among school children and enhance the achievement of Universal Basic Education. To the extent that poor health and nutrition among children has a negative impact on their education, programs or policies that increase children's health status will also improve their education outcomes. Given the importance of education for economic development (World Bank, 2001), this link could be a key mechanism to improve the quality of life for people in less developed countries such as Kenya (Orodho, 2014).

2. Literature Review

The national objectives of the home school feeding programme which will serve as the benchmark for this study are that home school grown feed were established in Nigeria to: To increase school enrolment, retention, completion and reduce dropout rate in primary school. The programme was designed to help improve the enrolment of primary school pupils, ensure retention, reduce dropout rate and ensure total completion in the school. Others which may not be considered now are: Improve nutrition and health of primary school children. The idea was to provide one meal per day to all primary school pupils with the classes of 1-3 in Nigeria with the objectives of improving their health status.

To stimulate local agricultural production and boost income for the local farmers through using food that is locally grown by small holder farmers.

To create jobs for community members and increase their finance by improving access to school feeding market and community benefit from new catering, processing and food handling jobs of food to children through schools.

According to Neeser (2012), 60 million children go to school hungry every day in developing countries; children that don't eat don't learn. Tomlinson (2007) add that health and education are the two cornerstones of human capital and form the basis of an individual's economic productivity. Both are valuable instruments in ensuring a healthy economy and creating a literate society. Burbano and Galliano, (2009) opined that school feeding, in its variant forms, is a well-recognized programme that alleviates hunger while supporting education, health and community development. Neeser, (2012) says healthy children learn better. School health and nutrition (SHN) interventions have been shown to improve not only children's health and nutrition, but also their

learning potential and life choices both in the short-and long-term. The school feeding programme in Brazil, according to Otsuki and Arce (2007), is part of the framework of food security policy and aims to reduce the number of malnourished children and the need to provide healthy, good quality food for children as a means to improve the population's eating habits—nearly 40percent of the population is overweight and 5 percent is obese. Tomlinson (2007) in his study of the feeding programmes in Malawi and Zambia says that there is an association between low-achieving children and less regular breakfast meals. Deficiencies in micronutrient have been associated with poor performance on various achievement tests. School feeding is positively correlated with infant mortality rates -a one percent decrease in infant mortality levels for every extra year of schooling for a mother –to -be. School feeding, according to Espejo, et al (2009) has been an effective safety net that can prevent those affected by economic shocks (increased food prices or during protracted crises) from adopting negative coping strategies.

School feeding is currently being used in this way in many countries, including Haiti, Liberia, Pakistan and Senegal. In many low-income countries, school feeding programmes have also been a critical part of the response to the global economic crisis, (Neeser, 2012). The objectives of school feeding vary depending on the context. General objectives are to: meet the immediate food needs of children; alleviate short-term hunger and improve learning capacity; increase access to education (i.e. enrolment, attendance, retention and completion); reduce gender and social inequalities; improve health and nutrition status; increase development opportunities, (Espejo, et al, 2009). However, citing The World Bank, Tomlinson (2007) argues that there is little evidence that school feeding programmes have a positive impact on nutrition neither for participating children nor on the root causes of malnutrition and hunger. Kiamba (2013) comments that in 2003, NEPAD, in collaboration with WFP and the Millennium Hunger Task Force launched the Home Grown School Feeding and Health Programme initiative. The concept is based on harnessing structured demand from school food provision (a win-win for farmers and school children).

Tomlinson (2007) advocates for the use of SFP not for educational benefits per se but as developmental tool saying it would focus on improving the livelihoods of particular groups that are vulnerable to food insecurity, and not simply (for example) improving school enrolment. The author goes on to argument that, if increased enrolment is the aim, then using government funds to reduce or waive school fees would be a more cost-effective way of ensuring this than an SFP. In a study conducted by Bosah, Ifeoma& Patience (2017) which dealt on the impact of HGSFP on the academic performance of pupils' shows those teachers and head teachers accepted that HGSFP impacted pupils' academic performance. The meal shared daily in the school makes the children to come to school every day thereby partaking in the teaching and learning. Children that come to school regularly definitely perform better than truant children Such children take part fully in the teaching and learning and no doubt perform better in the tests, assessments, home works, and more especially participate in the class discussions well. In order to improve the nutritional status of school children, the Federal Government of Nigeria launched the Home-Grown School Feeding and Health Programme in September, 2005 under the coordination of the Federal Ministry of Education. The programme aimed to provide pupils with adequate meal during the school day (FME,2007). The scheme, officially known as Home Grown School Feeding Programme insisted on buying the foodstuffs from the local farmers. It therefore reduced the rate of malnutrition while it also provided the local farmers the opportunity to sell their produce to participating schools.

The Administration of the School Feeding Programme in Niger State, Nigeria

The menu for the school feeding programme is based on national guidelines but adjusted to accommodate local peculiarities. The school meal served is assorted and nutritious and the programme is coordinated by a chief executive officer in a secretariat in the Niger State deputy governor's office as well as the commissioner for education. For the effective and efficient programme implementation, food vendors were appointed, trained and equipped with uniforms and working materials. In addition, a monitoring and evaluation committee was constituted and headed by the director of the inspectorate services in the ministry of education. Also, the local inspectors of education and zonal inspectors of education are members of the steering committees

who supervise the programme. The state Ministry of Education, the State Universal Basic Education Board and Ministry of Health collect data on general child health. The Local Government Education Authorities which are field offices of the State Universal Basic Education Board, Head teachers, Teachers, Teachers' Associations, are also involved in the administration of the programme. The programme is linked to agriculture with the aim of boosting food production and sales as well as providing employment for the people in the neighborhood of local areas that form catchment areas for the Elementary Schools. The community food vendors are fully integrated into the well-structured supply chain through which local farmers provide them with the necessary food materials required for the meals. This does not only ensure cost-effectiveness, but ensures that the money expended sinks back into the State's economy and generates maximum multiplier effects on the people (Yunusa et al, 2012).

The school feeding programme secretariat ensures that the food vendors are paid fortnightly in advance directly into their accounts as well as monthly transport subsidy. The vendors do not cook in schools however a nutritious and balanced diet is given to pupils. The strategic and technical partners for the programme include the Partnership for Child Development, based in Imperial College, United Kingdom and the Sahara Group / Food Basket Foundation International. The School feeding programme relies on continuous support and goodwill of these stakeholders. Innovative ways of funding, such as communities, philanthropists and non-governmental organizations fill up the funding gaps (Oyeniran, 2014). Neef (2020), claims that to alleviate short-term hunger, the School Feeding programme firstly requires children to be physically present at school in order to be fed and secondly the provided food is intended for only that (short) duration when the child needs to concentrate in learning. On the other hand, the 'Food for Schooling Programme' acts as an incentive to poor families to send their children to school regularly where, to be eligible for monthly food rations, children have to attend a certain number of classes.

Oyefade (2014), observed several factors with significant impact on many dimensions of poverty on school attendance and education quality, particularly early childhood malnutrition, deprivation based on gender and income inequality tend to be responsible. In many countries, such as Brazil, Philippines, Cambodia, Mali, El Salvador, Indonesia, Ghana, Bangladesh, Ecuador etc. where school feeding programmes are implemented, data reveals that the programme has increased enrolment and attendance rates over the years (Akanbi 2013). In Bangladesh, the research carried out by The International Food Policy Research Institute on the effects of school feeding programme found that the programme raised school enrolment rates by 14.2%, reduced the probability of dropping out of school by 7.5% and increased school attendance by 1.3 days a month. Similarly, in Pakistan a programme provides an income in the form of one or two tins of oil to families whose girls attend school for twenty days per month. In its pilot phase, the oil incentive programme demonstrated that it could make a significant contribution to full attendance. In participating schools, enrolment improved overall while attendance increased from 73% to 95% among participants. The programme also claims to put additional food in the hands of mothers to serve as a contact between mothers and teachers on distribution days. In another study in Bangladesh, a programme of school-based food distribution increased enrolment by 20% and a 2% decline in non-participating schools (Ahmed, 2004).

Still on the issue of SFP and enrolment, Oyeniran (2014) observed that schooling and institutions regulating access to enrolment in developing countries, to some extent, contribute to the class and social divide in urban areas. Equally, educational opportunity is driven by unequal and asymmetric political decision-making structures whereby people from poorer backgrounds tend to bear the brunt of national and local policies. He contended that availability of schools does not automatically result in higher enrolment numbers and submitted that some families cannot send their children to school because the combined cost of fees, textbooks and uniforms is prohibitive. Poor education environment can contribute to drop out rate, while quality education increases enrolment which can lead to classroom overcrowding.

Psacharopoulos (1998) indicated that the quantified benefits of investing in education are highest at primary levels. This view provides a strong case for expanding investment in primary rather

than higher levels of education. Public interest in School Feeding Programmes have stemmed from the endorsement of the view that education is essential in the promotion of the quality of human life for economic and social development. Education has for many years served as a vehicle for empowering and transforming people for better societies and the world as a whole. In the last few years, SFPs have enjoyed massive support and attention from international organizations and many development partners, this can be attributed to the multi-faceted role of this social intervention (education, health, agriculture) in achieving development objectives in many countries and a 'perceived' demand for the programme. In its multi-faceted role, SFPs can be linked to several of the MDGs namely; eradication of extreme poverty, hunger, achieving universal basic education, promoting gender equality and women empowerment, developing a global partnership for development, hence, the use of SFPs in the developing countries is a significant intervention to be considered (Birdsall et al, 2005)

2.4 The Effects of School Feeding Programme on Pupils Academic Performance

Many studies on nutrition have shown that under nutrition in children stunts their growth and mental development, hence, the relationship between nutrition and academic performance (Alabi, 2003). Although, food has classically been perceived as a means of providing energy and building materials to the body, research over the years has provided exciting evidence for the influence of dietary factors on mental function. Not only are children motivated to get into school but also there is a significant impact on their nutritional status and development, cognitive capabilities and academic performance.

Literature has shown that the development and learning potential of the beneficiaries depend on the quality and nutrient components of food (Jukes et al, 2008). Nutritional and health status are powerful influences on a child's learning and how a child performs in school. Children who lack certain nutrients in their diet do not have the same potential for learning as healthy and well-nourished children. Children with cognitive and sensory impairments naturally perform less and are more likely to repeat grades. The irregular school attendance of malnourished and unhealthy children is one of the key factors for poor performance (Uduku, 2011). Yunusa (2012) stated that students in School Feeding Programmes have the potential for improving their performance because it enabled them attend school regularly and studied more effectively. He found that in a study carried out in Jamaica, children in Grade 2 scored higher in Arithmetic when they started being fed at school. However, the impact of School Feeding Programme on the academic performance of pupils has been embraced with mixed feelings. It was observed that although SFPs motivate parents to enroll their children in school, its impact on academic performance is mixed and depends on various factors within the context in which the programme is set. Drawing from this, Uduku (2011) opined that SFPs would best improve the performance of pupils when coupled with adequate learning materials, physical facilities and teacher motivation.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopted Abraham Maslow's theory of needs, according to Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs theory, food is considered a basic physiological need and higher-ordered needs can only be achieved if the basic needs are met. In the education context, for learners to concentrate on learning and for educational institutions to achieve high-quality learning, learners' physiological needs i.e. food and water must be met before delivering teaching and learning activities. According to Norris (2021) countries introduced 'Food for Education' in a form of 'School Feeding Programme' and 'Food for schooling Programme' to achieve quality education and to redistribute food to poor families. While both programmes might have advantages, this essay argues that a 'School Feeding Programme', that practises 'Onsite Feeding' can achieve Sustainable Development Goal, i.e. quality equitable life-long learning for all learners. Conversely, a 'Food for School Programme' can increase enrolment of both boys and girls, however, it might fail to achieve quality learning and, furthermore, can develop a dependency mentality.

Methodology

The study adopted the survey research design and obtained its data from primary source. The primary data were obtained through structured questionnaires administered on 100 respondents in 10 public primary schools in Munya using the random sampling technique. The retrieved data were analysed using simple descriptive statistics in form of simple percentages.

Results and Discussion

Results generated from the questionnaires are presented in the tables below:

Table 1: There is an increase in school enrolment due to the provision of meals

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agreed	75	75
Agreed	8	8
Undecided	2	2
Disagreed	10	10
Strongly Disagreed	5	5
Total	100	100

Source: Researcher’s survey 2022.

The above table is whether there is an increase in school enrolment as a result of school feeding, 75(75%) of the respondent strongly agreed, 8(8%) agree 2(2) undecided, 10(10) disagree 5(5) strongly disagree, the results clearly indicated that there is increase enrolment as a result of the school feeding programme, this is in line with a study conducted by Oyefade (2014) in many countries such as Brazil, Mali, Cambodia etc. where school feeding programmes are implemented. data revealed that the programme have increased enrolment and attendance rate. This is also in agreement with the response of the school feeding programme Desk officer in Munya local government in an interview who categorically stated that the program has really increased the enrolment of pupils in all the targeted schools in Munya local government area.

Table 2. School feeding encourages punctuality.

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agreed	87	87
Agreed	10	10
Undecided	0	0
Disagreed	2	2
Strongly Disagreed	1	1
Total	100	100

Source: Researcher’s survey 2022.

Table 2 shows the result on how school feeding encourages punctuality. It shows that 87(87%) of the respondents strongly agree 10(10%) agree 0(0%) undecided 2 (2%) disagree and 1 (1%) strongly disagree, this reveals that the school feeding programme encourages punctuality this is in agreement with a study conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute on the effect of school attendance, the result revealed that attendance increased by 1.3 days in a month, the result also revealed with the response of the headmistress of UBE Primary School FukanKadara who stated that the programme has increased punctuality and pupils retention in school.

Table 3. There's increase in Pupils' academic Performance as a result of School Feeding.

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agreed	75	75
Agreed	15	15
Undecided	2	2
Disagreed	6	6
Strongly Disagreed	2	2
Total	100	100

Source: Researcher’s survey 2022.

The above table reveals the responses on pupils' academic performance 75 (75%) strongly agreed that there's increase, 15 (15%) agreed, 2 (2%) undecided, 6 (6%) disagreed and 2 (2%)

strongly disagreed this is also in agreement with the responses of most of the Head Teachers interviewed who stated that they have achieved some level of improvement in the students' tests and examinations since the introduction of the programme. This is in-line with an observation by Uduku(2011) who stated that irregular school attendance of malnourished and unhealthy children is one of the key factors for poor performance.

Table 4. Insufficient funding is a challenge affecting the implementation of the school feeding programme.

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agreed	65	65
Agreed	15	15
Undecided	10	10
Disagreed	8	8
Strongly Disagreed	2	2
Total	100	100

Source: Researcher's survey 2022.

On the issue of insufficient fund as a challenge effecting the implementation of the school feeding programme 65(65%) strongly agreed, 15 (15%) agreed, 10 (10%) undecided, 8 (8%) disagreed 2 (2%) strongly disagreed. This is in line with the response of the Desk Officer who stated that the major problem they have been encountering is the problem of funding. This is also in agreement with a study by Uduku (2011) who opined that the School Feeding Programme would best improve the performance of pupils when coupled with adequate funding, learning materials, physical facilities and teacher motivation.

Table 5. Overcrowded Classrooms is a challenge affecting the implementation of the school feeding programme.

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agreed	65	65
Agreed	15	15
Undecided	10	10
Disagreed	8	8
Strongly Disagreed	2	2
Total	100	100

Source: Researcher's survey 2022.

The above table is on overcrowded classrooms as a challenge affecting the implementation of the school feeding programme. The data revealed that 65 (65%) strongly agreed, 15 (15%) agreed, 10 (10%) undecided, 8 (8%) disagreed 2 (2%) strongly disagreed. This is in line with the response of the Desk Officer who stated that overcrowded classrooms is a major challenge facing the implementation of the programme as a result of increase in pupils' enrolment.

Table 6. Small Quantity of food is a challenge affecting the implementation of the school feeding programme.

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agreed	66	66
Agreed	14	14
Undecided	5	5
Disagreed	13	13
Strongly Disagreed	2	2
Total	100	100

Source: Researcher's survey 2022.

The above table presents the result of the quantity of food served 65 (65%) strongly agreed

that is small, 15 (15%) agreed, 13 (13%), undecided 4 (4%) disagreed 1 (1%) and 2 (2%) strongly disagreed, this is in agreement with the responses of some of the head teachers who lamented that the quantity of food served is so small and lack of potable drinking water for the pupils to take after meals, it is in line with a study by Adekunle, and Christiana, (2016) in a study in Osun state which revealed that the quantity of food served is so small.

5. Conclusion

This study has revealed that School Feeding Programme is an intervention which has immense benefits in the educational development of public primary school pupils. It has improved the enrolment of pupils in public primary schools in Munya local government area of Niger State Nigeria. This study also discovered that School Feeding Programme encourages punctuality and pupils' academic performance. The study further revealed that the programme is affected by problems which include: insufficient funding, overcrowded classes as a result of increase enrolment, small quantity of food served amongst others.

School Feeding was not a novel idea in Nigeria. This is because The Basic Education Commission (UBE) Act of 2004 made provision for at least, a meal for pupils every school day, but there has not been demonstrable political will by successive administration in the country to actualize this.

Over the years, World Food Programme has shown keen interest in School Feeding Programmes across countries of the world and suggested standards to guide the design and implementation of sustainable school meals programme. These include: a strategy of sustainability, a national legislation/ policy framework, stable funding and budgeting, an institutional arrangement for implementation, monitoring and accountability etc. Unfortunately, this study found that the implementation of the School Feeding Programme falls short of some of the standards stipulated by the World Food Programme due to various challenges. The study concluded that the state government should double its efforts to address the problems identified by the study in the programme implementation, this will sustain pupils' enrolment and increase academic performance thereby leading to nation-building. This can be done through sustainable funding to be solicited from all stakeholders, corporate bodies and multi-national companies. The study further suggests that proper monitoring groups should be set up in each ward so as to supervise the vendors in the course of preparing and administration of the school feeding meals.

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NIGERIA-ECOWAS COMMON IMMIGRATION POLICY FROM 2007-2019: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

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Abstract

Human migration encompasses permanent or temporary relocation of persons from their places of initial abode to another place, in search of means of livelihood, family reunion, or other things that serve as motivation for the movement. **Specifically, the study aims at** investigating the economic opportunities of skills, transfer through citizens' migration from one African country to another and discussing the potentials in having flexible intra-continental migration laws and to identify the measures put in place for smooth and effective implementation of the economic integration agenda of the ECOWAS Common Immigration Policy in Nigeria from **2007 to 2019**. This study is anchored on functionalist social theory of migration. Migration is perceived as a positive phenomenon that contributes to prosperity productivity, and greater fairness in origin and destination societies through dual direction of flows of incomes that include funds, goods and knowledge. Herbert Spencer and Robert Merton are proponents of this theory. The study sourced for secondary data. The data was analysed in themes. The study concludes that while migration could be perceived as a negative phenomenon on nations, productive advantages too abound in developing countries. The mobility of human capital would help pave way for exchange of ideas and skills which could lead to a robust socio-economic development in the West Africa sub-region. The study recommends that ECOWAS countries need to put in place effective mechanisms that would checkmate crimes associated with migration as a way of checking the perceived negative effect of migration.

Key words: Immigration policy, regional integration, common market, regional development
Human capital development

Introduction

Migration is an essential aspect of human existence. It is usually motivated by several reasons including poverty, unemployment, hunger, conflicts, natural disasters among others (ECOWAS, 2008). Principally, human migration entails temporary or permanent relocation of people from their places of primary residence to another place, either in search of improved livelihood, family reunion, or for other reasons (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2015). The essence of forming Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a fifteen-member regional organization of West African countries in May 28, 1975 was to promote economic integration among member countries. The history of ECOWAS was traced to the military era of General Yakubu Gowon as the Head of State in Nigeria in April 1972 and his counterpart in Togo, General Gnassingbe Eyadema. The plan was launched to bring in new members between July and August 1973.

The ECOWAS as a sub-regional organization embraces a common market of over a 100 million people. The membership spans fifteen countries of different population and landmass. Consequently, prior to the Treaty of Lagos in May 28, 1975, the West African countries were unable to institute successful long term commercial dealings among themselves. The subregion was characterised by a fast-growing population and steadily increasing urbanisation. These factors greatly affected migration patterns in the region and required collective responses by West African countries (Fayomi and Adeola, 2015).

In recent years, countries in West Africa indicated interest and readiness to tackle challenges related to migration and take advantage of the inherent development potential of migration. Key ECOWAS strategic documents acknowledge the potential of free movement and migration, and, if adequately managed, would pave way for development and regional integration (Adaawen, 2017).

Also, the poor socio-economic conditions and high rate of poverty in the late sixties and early seventies were responsible for rising cases of migration. Macro-economic adjustment measures and a huge increase in the number of entrants into the labour market fueled a job crisis, creating a sustained pressure for emigration. A significant amount of brain circulation takes place among Ghana, Gambia and Nigeria; Togo and Cote d'Ivoire; Burkina Faso and Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire, countries with shared colonial legacy. Since 70s, highly skilled migrants, including doctors, paramedical personnel, nurses, teachers, lecturers, engineers, scientists and technologists moved from Ghana to Nigeria and other African countries. Europe and North America also offer attracted opportunities including relatively higher salaries and better prospects for livelihood. And because of improved living conditions, many students remained behind at the end of their training as political, economic and social conditions at home deteriorated (Ademola, 2015).

Statement of the Problem

The advantages that come with human migration have been under utilized especially in Africa. Human migration is always seen as a challenge while numerous opportunities that come with it are often neglected due to lack of adequate discourse on the what African countries stand to achieve when citizens of other countries move to their countries for greener pasture.

Several studies have been undertaken over the years have not explored the numerous benefits of citizens' migration from one African country to another. This study, therefore, explores and discusses the importance of having friendly migration laws and policies that could easily be implemented by all African countries to allow human movement from one African country to another for the sake of economic integration and development.

However, the Common Immigration Policy as designed by ECOWAS did not take into cognizance the peculiarity of economies of member nations hence its varied impacts. Most West African countries are very small, not only in population, but also in terms of economic output. Only three countries (Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire) have populations over 10 million; the others have national products equal to that of small cities or medium-sized towns in industrial countries. Nigeria stands out among the rest, with a population of over 200 millions, but low-income levels make even Nigeria a fairly small country in economic terms. Therefore, this gives room for variable inclusion gap.

Objectives of the Study

1. To examine the economic opportunities skills, transfer through citizens' migration from one African country to Nigeria.
2. To discuss the potentials in having flexible intra-continental migration laws among African countries.
3. Identify the measures put in place for smooth and effective implementation of the economic integration agenda of the ECOWAS Common Immigration Policy in Nigeria between 2007 and 2019.

Research Questions

1. What are the economic opportunities in skills' transfer through citizens' migration from one African country to Nigeria?
2. What are the potentials in having flexible intra-continental migration laws among African countries?
3. What are the measures put in place for smooth and effective implementation of the economic integration agenda of the ECOWAS Common Immigration Policy in Nigeria between 2007 and 2019?

Review of Literature

Immigration refers to the movement of people from one country to another for various reasons including search of good jobs, safety and protection. Immigration is a worldwide phenomenon. Its history has been traced to between 17th and 19th centuries when millions of Europeans migrated North and South America, Eastern and Southern Africa, Australia, and Asia. Many of these immigrants resettled in colonies established by their home countries. Most modern immigrants like the colonist of the past, are motivated to relocate to other countries to search for improved economic condition. This category of people is known as economic immigrants; they resettle in other countries in search of jobs, farmland, or business opportunities. Nowadays, economic migrations bring people from less developed, poorer countries to (relatively) more developed and more prosperous countries (Reimers and Dinnerstein, 2009).

However, in the late eighties, traditional labour importing, richer countries in the sub-region (Côte d'Ivoire) and hitherto attractive destinations for migrants (Nigeria) experienced political and economic crises, which also spur out-migration of their nationals. Until the early 80s, few Nigerian professionals emigrated because domestic working conditions were attractive and internationally competitive. The collapse of oil price, a sharp decline in oil revenue, rapid deterioration in living and working conditions, wage free, devalued national currency, declining real incomes, authoritarian military rule and the vacillating economic situation fueled large-scale emigration of skilled and unskilled workers abroad. Post-apartheid South Africa also attracted highly skilled professionals from Nigeria and Ghana to staff the universities and other sectors and tradesmen from Senegal and Mali including street vendors and small traders from Sierra Leone (Adaawen, 2017).

Migration has become a common practice in the world mainly caused by the growing and intensive economic, political and socio-cultural interdependence among countries. It is estimated that three percent of the world's population is migrants (United Nations, 2006). The West African sub-region is no exception to this growing phenomenon. Of the 191 million migrants scattered across the globe, nearly 7 million people hail from the West Africa sub-region (Adepoju, 2005).

Why Economic Integration is key to Africa's Development

Business Dictionary (2017) defines economic Integration as an agreement among countries in a geographic region to reduce and remove tariff and non-tariff barriers to the free flow of goods or services and factors of production among each other. Economic integration allows improvement of welfare of the people and boost the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the member states. However, Balassa (1961) points out that economic integration could be seen as a process and state of affairs. As a process, it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination among economic units belonging to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies.

Balassa (1961) also posits that economic integration can take several forms with varying degrees of opportunities including free-trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union and complete economic integration. In a free-trade area, tariffs (and quantitative restrictions) between the participating countries are abolished while each country retains its own tariffs against non-members. Establishing a customs union involves, beside the suppression of discrimination in the field of commodity movements within the union, the equalisation tariffs in trade with non-member countries. A higher form of economic integration is attained in a common market, where not only trade restrictions but also restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An economic union, as distinct from a common market, combines the suppression of restrictions on commodity and factor policies, in order to remove discrimination that was due to disparities in these policies. Finally, total economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal,

social and counter cyclical policies and requires the setting-up of a supra-national authority whose decision are binding on the member states.

Migration and Regional Integration

According to Ogbeidi (2004), the eventual merger of separate institutions and communities within a specific geographical region is salient as a characteristic of integration. Integration, therefore, is to be seen as an attainment within the region of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to ensure a long-time change among its population. Integration implies a higher degree of lock-in and loss of sovereignty, and also tends to apply to a broader scope, although it could as well be limited to a specific market. It also implies more united markets for goods (FTA and custom unions), factors (common markets), and also a common currency such as in the European Union. A deepest form is a federated union such as the United-States, which includes political as well as economic integration, including in infrastructure-related services (telecom, air-transport).

Typically, high degree of economic interactions – trade and investment among others. could make integration more cost effective as opposed to simple harmonisation/coordination, as the opportunity cost of exit rises. Also, the scope of integration and the concomitant complexity call for countries to relinquish sovereignty to a supra-national agency, the purest form being a federal government (Lolette-Kritsinger-van Niekerk, 2005). Citing the view of the European Union, LoletteKritsinger-van Niekerk, (2005) further defined regional integration as the process of overcoming, by common accord, political, physical, economic and social barriers that divide countries from their neighbours, and of collaborating in the management of shared resources and common national goals.

Regional integration can also be conceptualised to mean that, since it is recognised that international problems cannot be solved adequately in isolation or self-autarchic systems, it can thus be ameliorated or can be solved alternatively by collectivisation of common problems, that is to say that, economic liberalism should thrive over economic nationalism, and on this basis, problems that are peculiar to geographic regional blocs should be dealt with by pooling energies, economically, socio-culturally and even politically. The tenets of liberalism (like, free trade, liberalisation of trade) comes to fore which dismantles the barriers to cooperation erected by statist policies in protectionism.

Hence, the conscious knowledge of these problems spurs the states to the pooling of energies to tackle these problems by participating concertedly, though gradually, through functional institutions and processes. Obstacles to cooperation are overcome, problems are communalised, solved and rewards are shared. Regional economic integration would mean, the liberalisation of trade within participating states in a regional bloc, reaping the benefits of trade, by “trade creation” and “trade diversion”. However, there are variations in the concept of regional economic integration. According to Sagir (2010) “there is a “disproportionate” concentration of economic flows or the coordination of foreign economic policies among a group of countries in close geographical proximity to one another.” Disproportionate, implies that the level of intra bloc economic activity exceeds what would be “natural” in an ideal world of free global trade (Starr et al., 2006).

Regional integration is therefore an inward cooperation among integrating states, and the discrimination of states that are not within the integration bloc. It is worthy to observe that term economic integration is implied. It doesn't necessarily have to be engendered by regionalism. Hence, it may involve participating countries from other regions. As such, the EU-ACP cooperation is a typical economic integration scheme.

Immigration Policy and Economic Integration from Global Perspective

International migration has grown in recent time. According to United Nations (2017), the number of international migrants was 258 million in 2017, an increase of 85 million representing 49 per

cent, compared to 2000. UN attributed the cause to economic and social factors such as political instability and social conflict. Many countries, especially those in Europe have had labour migration in recent time, supporting the growth of their businesses and industries though the present immigration has changed from labour migration to refugee and family migration due to increased social and political unrest across the globe as well as unemployment, poverty and economic hardship.

Globalisation also contribute to the rising rate of migration. Perterson Institute for International Economic (n. d) defines *globalization* as “the growing interdependence of the world's economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade in goods and services, technology, and flows of investment, people, and information.” With globalization, countries have built economic partnerships to facilitate the movements across borders. Consequently, this development has led to the rising cases of cross-border migration in developing countries. It is estimated that 158 million people are legal international migrants (United Nations, 2002), while 15 to 30 million of them are undocumented; with nearly 40 per cent living in developing countries (World Commission, 2004). These figures highlight the growing complexity of migration patterns as well as the deepening disparities within the developing world itself. It is believed that people move to developing countries because the movement of capital, goods and skilled professionals has become an integral part of present-day open economies, including the middle and low-income ones.

With globalisation, cities that are or intend to join financial and technological forces rely on international migrants and their contribution to urban productivity. Migrants are believed to have become important actors in maintaining or creating economic dynamism of cities; they help in filling gaps in labour requirement. Moreover, the presence of transnational migrants also makes cities cosmopolitan, hence more attractive to the forces of globalisation (Duany, 2002). Cross-border movements of people are occurring and growing despite a widespread strengthening of control measures, in contrast with the worldwide liberalization of the movement of goods, services and capital. Notwithstanding the introduction of restrictive admission policies in nearly all countries (World Commission, 2004), international migration is a self-sustaining process destined to grow in the future, unless major changes in the distribution of wealth between rich and poor countries are implemented (so far a highly unlikely perspective). Thus, the question is no longer whether international migration should exist, but rather how to manage it effectively to enhance its positive effects and reduce the negative ones. Based on a comparative analysis of case studies.

Consequently, the international community has for a long time recognized the significance of interdependence between international migration and development. It is against this backdrop that the migrants and migration have been integrated into the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which is an important step forward. In specific, 10.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals calls on countries to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well- managed migration policies. Other migration-related targets in the 2030 Agenda, according to United Nations (2008) include retaining health workers in developing countries; providing scholarships for study abroad; ending human trafficking; respecting the labour rights of migrant workers; reducing the costs of transferring remittances and providing legal identity for all.

The available evidence suggests that the overall economic impact of migration is positive for both countries of origin and countries of destination. This shows the significant role of migrants in economic growth and development especially the filling of labour market shortages and provision of jobs and sources of revenue for individual migrants and their families. At the global level, about 61 percent of countries migration policies to maintain current levels of immigration. Globally, about 68 per cent of countries identify meeting labour market demands as the underlying reason for their current immigration policy. The ILO (2015) estimates that migrant

workers make up nearly three quarters of all international migrants of working age (15 years or over) worldwide. Some countries also see immigration policy as a tool to safeguard employment opportunities for their nationals. This rationale informed about 46 per cent of countries' immigration policies globally.

Nearly all Governments have adopted specific policy measures to address the issue of irregular immigration. Globally, 99 per cent of countries employ fines, detention or deportation of migrants in an irregular situation, while 77 per cent use penalties for employers of migrants in an irregular situation. One third of all countries (34 per cent) have taken measures to regularize their legal status through defined schemes or conditions. Migrants in irregular situation are particularly vulnerable to discrimination, exploitation and abuse and are in danger of being exploited by crime organizations involved in human trafficking and migrant smuggling (United Nations, 2008).

Immigration Policy and Economic Integration in Africa

Prominent among the events at the regional African level are the African Union's Strategic Framework for a Policy on Migration (2004) and the AU Common Position on Migration and Development (2006). The African Union's Strategic Framework on Migration and Development and the African Union Common Position on Migration and Development, 2006, cover a number of areas, including human resources, irregular migration, brain drain, remittances, trade, migration and peace, security and stability, migration and human rights, gender, regional initiatives and access to social services.

However, the challenges that emanated for the nature of African politics, geography, and the uneven distribution of benefits of regional economic integration trumped the traditional efficiency gains across Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The small, sparsely populated, fragmented, and often isolated economies across Africa make a compelling case for these economies to integrate regionally to reap efficiency gains, exploit economies of scale, and reduce the thickness of borders.

However, lack of support from partners and diminishing returns to the exploitation of resources has reduced supply response to market-integration oriented regional policies. Additionally, a very uneven distribution of resources has sharpened the trade-off between the benefits of common policies needed to tackle cross-border externalities and their costs, which are heightened by the sharp differences in policy preferences across members. African RECs have pursued the 'linear model' of integration with a stepwise integration of goods, labour, and capital markets, as well as eventual monetary and fiscal integration. With the exception of the francophone zone, the RECs have not yet completed goods markets integration; the lack of adjustment funds to address the uneven distribution of benefits across partners contributing to the delay.

Additional research evidences reveal that the regional integration in Africa has its roots in the political forces determined by the colonial legacy that resulted in a configuration of geographically artificial states where arbitrary borders coupled with great ethno-linguistic diversity contributed to the continent's high number of conflicts and to its high trade and communication costs (Alesina et. al. 2003; Alesina et al. 2011; and Portugal-Perez & Wilson, 2009). In Africa as a whole, but in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in particular, the RECs were to be the 'building blocs' of the hope for African union in the immediate postcolonial era. Now, they are central for implementing the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). In short, the RECs were and continue to be the glue that will cement African unity. An early phase of integration started during the first decades of independence, and was enshrined in the Lagos Plan of Action, an initiative of the Organisation for African Unity, adopted by the heads of states in 1980.

The proposed framework was for African integration into Pan-African unity and continental

industrialisation by the division of the continent into RECs that would constitute a united economy, the African Economic Community. Three regional integration arrangements were supported by the Economic Commission for Africa: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS), and later, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). This first phase corresponded to the heyday of central planning when faster industrialization would take place if carried out at the regional level under free trade among members with high tariff barriers applied to non-members, and during which an inward-looking integration also reflected a desire to develop independently from the former colonial masters. Economic unification would be the solution to Africa's development dilemma and, for many, to work it would require a political union. However, the leaders of these young post-independence African states were reluctant to encourage the erosion of national sovereignty and the emergence of a supra-national authority, which would have been necessary to co-ordinate and manage the affairs of the hoped-for African union.

The great diversity across Africa (resource-rich and resource-poor, coastal and landlocked, artificial borders, many ethnic groups and languages) translated into different interests that strengthened countries' insistence on the 'respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and the inalienable right to independent existence' as written in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) charter of 1963. Commitment to Pan-Africanism was weakened, leading to a vagueness and multitude of objectives, which helped states gloss over the issues that divided them. The outcomes of the first phase of African PTAs were insightfully reviewed by Foroutan (1992). After observing that the Gross National Product (GNP) of SSA was about the same as Belgium's, she noted that it would be hard to imagine Belgium divided into 'forty-something independent countries, each with its own isolated goods and factor markets'. She also pointed out that the skewed distribution of benefits resulting from the great disparity among members required large compensation from the gainers to the losers, large partly because regional trade was mostly inter rather than intra-industry: Absent central funding raised by less distortionary means, funds were either obtained by distortionary taxes negating any efficiency gains from eliminating protection among partners, or trade barriers were not removed. So, with the exception of integration of the franc zone in Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (EMCCAS) and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), implementation never reached the Free Trade Area (FTA) status, let alone deeper integration.

Theoretical Underpinning

This discourse is anchored on functionalist social theory of migration. The theory generally sees migration as a positive phenomenon that contributes to productivity, prosperity and greater fairness in origin and destination societies through bi-directional flows of incomes including money, goods and knowledge. Two theorists, Herbert Spencer and Robert Merton, contributed to the perspective of functional theory. Proponents of functionalism sees society as a complex system whose parts must work together to promote solidarity and stability. The theory mainly focuses on social structure, social functions, manifest functions, and latent functions as well as the consequences of breakdown of social values and structures.

Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) point out that functionalist social theory believes in society as a system, a collection of interdependent parts; individuals and actors who support one another for growth and development. Functionalist migration theories, therefore, see migration as a positive phenomenon that contribute to productivity, prosperity and theory interpret migration as optimisation strategy, in which individuals use migration to access higher and more-secure sources of income and other livelihood opportunities.

The macro level of a functionalist perspective, individual optimisation decisions are expected to contribute to a more optimal allocation of factors of production – primarily through the transfer of

labour from poor to rich areas and countries and concomitant reverse flows of capital from rich to poor areas – which is expected to decrease economic gaps between origin and destination areas (De Haas, 2010). Scholars have argued that even though such accounts have ignored how poverty, inequality, immigration restrictions, government repression and violence can prevent people from migrating, cause their forced displacement or compel migrants into exploitative work conditions, the social and economic benefits of migration would better-off migrants and their place of abode.

Thematic Analysis of Data

The Benefits of ECOWAS Common Immigration Policy to Nigeria

Nigeria is the mainstay of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Over 50% of the ECOWAS population live in Nigeria. Nigeria's GDP is larger than that of all the other ECOWAS states put together. Nigeria accounts for the lion share of the annual ECOWAS budget (31%), as well as of the ECOWAS Fund (32%) (Aribisala, 2013).

The pre-eminence of the Nigerian economy vis-à-vis the other ECOWAS states, and its correspondingly large financial responsibilities (among others), inevitably raises the question of the value of ECOWAS for Nigeria. Many regional integration schemes have been established in Africa in the bid to attain a market no more than half the size of Nigeria. Moreover, Nigeria's domestic industrial production is still insufficient to accommodate the vast demands of its internal market, how much more to provide for significant exports to neighbouring ECOWAS states.

This has led to the conclusion in some quarters that Nigeria does not need ECOWAS, at least in the short-term. The feeling is prevalent that what Nigeria basically derives from ECOWAS are the headaches of massive illegal alien immigration, rampant smuggling and large financial obligations, especially for peace-keeping. However, in spite of such "inconveniences," there is no doubt that it is in Nigeria's enlightened self-interest to be fully supportive of the ECOWAS venture. Sooner, rather than later, Nigeria will need a regional framework and market for its burgeoning economy. Therefore, it is only prudent to lay the foundation for that projected enhanced economic interaction now, whatever its immediate costs.

Nigeria has benefited from ECOWAS Common Immigration Policy to Nigeria in Relation to the Economic Integration Agenda in the following areas:

Constraints to Effective Implementation of ECOWAS Policy

While the ratification of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons is certainly a vital first step in facilitating intra-regional mobility, a number of gaps, obstacles and challenges at both the intra-regional and national levels have militated against the effective implementation of the Free Movement and subsequent protocols. In this section, we identify and discuss these gaps based on primary data and the desk study, with specific reference to Nigeria.

While the ratification of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons is certainly a vital first step in facilitating intra-regional mobility, a number of gaps, obstacles and challenges at both the intra-regional and national levels have militated against the effective implementation of the Free Movement and subsequent protocols. In this section, we identify and discuss these gaps based on primary data and the desk study, with specific reference to Nigeria.

The Right of Establishment as enshrined in the 1990 Supplementary Protocol on the implementation of the Third Phase of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services, entitles nationals of member states to settle or establish in ECOWAS states and carry out business activities under the same conditions that apply to nationals of the host state. The purpose of this is to achieve the overall goal of the ECOWAS Treaty, which is to generate robust economic activities in the region in pursuit of regional prosperity. This would require the creation of a conducive climate for professionals and other business men, including corporate bodies, to

harness the economic resources of the region and create a huge regional market. Unfortunately, the reality is far from satisfactory. The member states have in place, discriminatory legislation and regulations that make it well-nigh impossible for nationals of other member states to settle and establish business in the host state. For example, in 2010, discriminatory and virtually punitive levies were imposed on foreign companies in Ghana. Globacom, a Nigerian company even threatened to pull out. In Nigeria, there are rules and regulations that impose stringent conditions for foreign companies who want to establish businesses. The inevitable conclusion from the foregoing is that, the right of establishment as envisaged by the Treaty/Protocols is yet to be fully enjoyed by community citizens and corporate bodies. In fact, they are still being treated as foreigners, which negates the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

Some of the highlighted challenges and constraints in the effective implementation of the economic integration agenda of the ECOWAS Common Immigration Policy in Nigeria between 2007 and 2019 are: lack of travel documents and residence/ work permits, challenges in harmonising immigration procedures and documents, resource constraints and border management challenges, security and health concerns and economic challenges and political instability.

Lack of Travel Documents and Residence/ Work Permits

It has been argued that the challenge to the implementation of the free movement Protocol has been the difficulty of establishing the nationalities of travellers because they do not carry national ID Cards nor passports. Border management officials described this situation in the following statements: "The free movement protocol enjoins us to admit people into our territory but we also have to establish their nationalities and be sure they are ECOWAS citizens. However, most of the immigrants we have seen at the border do not think they need passports. They come in their numbers and just say they are ECOWAS citizens so they must be allowed to pass. When you tell them they need passports to be allowed to pass, they get angry.... They don't understand the Free Movement thing very well because some say 'why do I need a passport when I am ECOWAS citizen and need to travel anywhere freely'.... And when we tell them what they need they think we just want to make life difficult". "People have always blamed immigration officers for harassment of travelers at the borders but the reality is that some of the travelers also get there without any travel document. You ask them to give you their passports for inspection and they tell you stories. Some will say they have now applied for one. Some will also say they didn't know they need a passport to travel. In such situations, they are asked to wait.... Sometimes our men may also take that opportunity to take money from those without documents".

Challenges in Harmonising Immigration Procedures and Documents

While most ECOWAS member states can be commended for the significant progress made in the area of harmonisation of travel documents, especially with regards to adoption and use of the ECOWAS passport as well as the harmonised "Immigration and Emigration Form of ECOWAS Member States", there are still gaps in the area of harmonisation of procedures of admission and travel documents. One area of concern has to do with what constitute travel documents. Whilst the ECOWAS protocol provides for the use of other travel documents such as travel certificates, some of the border management officials in some countries, including Ghana, tend to emphasize the use of only passports. An official in Ghana made reference to the challenges of harmonisation in the following sentence "You see the harmonisation of policies is one of the biggest issues that must be addressed". The Francophones have what we call the "carte d'identité" which they use to travel among themselves but which the Anglophone countries don't recognise as a travel document. So the ECOWAS Common Approach aims at harmonising policies but we still have problems with implementation because of lack of political will. So the political heads should be committed to whatever protocols they have signed".

Resource Constraints and Border Management Challenges

Given the importance of resource availability for effective policy implementation, public officials were asked about adequacy of resources for implementing ECOWAS protocol. The data collected also shows that most countries who are members of ECOWAS do not have sufficient technical and human resources for the effective control and management of their porous borders. Consequently, many irregular migrants are able to enter these countries through the porous borders. Another dimension of the problem is that many migrants leave their home countries without proper travel documents and enter host countries irregularly. To address these challenges, they have established Border Patrol Units within their Immigration Services to police their borders.

However, policing of borders is very difficult as there are several hundreds of unapproved border crossing points and which have security implications. Indeed, the immigration officials interviewed reported that as a result of resource constraints, they do not have equipment to patrol the unapproved borders.

Security and Health Concerns

The data also indicates that increasing securitisation of migration and migrants, especially in the wake of what is perceived as growing threats of terrorism, is also a challenge to the implementation of the ECOWAS protocol on Free Movement. The influx of migrants has also been blamed for rising criminal activities such as kidnapping and armed robberies, money laundering and flow of fake goods. In the area of health concerns, pandemic, epidemic and other diseases outbreak have been perceived to raise more threat due to free movement protocol.

Economic Challenges and Political Instability

The poor economic situation in most ECOWAS member states and pressure from indigenes of these countries also frustrates the migration process by making the benefits for most low-skilled jobs not worth the efforts of migrants. Economic challenges facing citizens create anti-migrant sentiments that render States reluctant to implement the ECOWAS free movement Protocols (Konan and Kouakou, 2012). The blame for economic problems is usually put on immigrants rather than the root causes of corruption and mismanagement (Yaro, 2008). Officials in both ECOWAS member states noted that poor people are likely to blame immigrants for their troubles. In the past, this has contributed to mass expulsion of ECOWAS citizens from some countries. For instance, Ghana expelled Nigerians in 1969. In early 1979, Ghana again expelled Togolese farmers. Nigeria also expelled undocumented aliens in 1983 and 1985 (Adepoju 2005).

These mass expulsions of ECOWAS migrant workers undermine the broader regional aims and principles set out in the ECOWAS Treaty on Free Movement (Adepoju et al., 2007). In both countries studied, economic challenges continue to create anti-migrant sentiments. These sentiments are more pervasive in Ghana's informal trading sector where Ghanaian traders are attributing low sales to the presence of Nigerian traders. As noted already, there has been series of demonstrations in Ghana against Nigerians and Chinese in the trading sector (Adjavon, 2013). Additionally, political instability also poses a serious challenge to using intraregional mobility to promote development. Teye et al (2015), noted that since the early 1990s, West Africa has experienced a number of intra-State conflicts. Interviewees noted that as a result of the belief that terrorism and banditry are exacerbated by mercenaries from other countries, border officials are concerned about the security implications of the inflows of migrants. According to Yaro (2008), a major challenge to ECOWAS is establishing an emergency response system capable of handling emergency migrants in an integrative manner rather than the current refugee camp system which tends to breed all sorts of social vices rather than promoting development. Even though the aim of the free movement protocol is to enhance economic activities, criminals have availed themselves of this initiative to perpetrate their nefarious activities. These have a lot of implication for the security of the sub-region. There is no security of lives and properties, weapons are readily available as a

result of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Refugees generate a different set of problems for their host country. In fact, the expected future conflict in the sub-region is conflict over amenities and resources between refugees and host communities (Olonisakin, 2008).

The challenges of the Protocol have not helped the security landscape of the sub-region. Even though ECOWAS prides itself as the first region in Africa with the free movement initiative, the Protocol is poorly implemented constituting more security concern than boosting regional trade and economic development. The security forces have rather turned the job to their own business, encouraging the crossing of smugglers of all sorts of commodities from one country to another with just a tip of tokens. There is high number of roadblocks, illegal barriers and the problem of insecurity on the roads. In 2005, about 44 Ghanaians were killed in The Gambia while trying to exercise their rights to freedom of movement within the sub-region (Ghanaian Times, 2008).

Also, because ECOWAS does not have adequate instituted mechanism for checking the entry of illegal immigrants, people who carry out nefarious activities have exploited the opportunity to their advantage laundering money, trafficking in human, drugs, illegal arms etc. Thus, the privileges of the protocol have been abused. The Protocol rather than serve the purpose of integration is rather contributing to the insecurity prevalent in the sub-region.

Unrestricted free movement of people in the sub-region can easily bring about a situation of tension among citizens of the receiving country and migrants especially in places where migrants dominate trade and labour. This will lead to resentments towards migrants which can degenerate to 'populist political sentiments'. Regimes that are rather weak can become destabilised under such tensions.

Conflicts now originate from within a state and gradually spread outside into the neighboring countries in its spill-over effects. This is the experience in West African sub-region today as in other parts of the continent. The ECOWAS protocol on free movement because of the lack of instituted mechanism for proper monitoring of cross border movements is rather positively contributing to the spill-over effects of conflicts in the sub-region. The free movement protocol cannot be said to be solely responsible for the ease of passage of militants and their weapons but the subversion of security agents have also contributed to the insecurity of the sub-region.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This discourse juxtaposed the general belief in migration. While the phenomenon was believed to have negative consequences on nations, it comes with a lot of productive advantages to nations especially developing countries. It allows mobility of human capital that will pave way for exchange of ideas and skills that would lead to greater socio-economic development.

What African countries need to do is put in place effective mechanisms that would checkmate crimes associated with migration. This can be achieved, first through proper documentation of migrants on arrival to other countries. Migrants should be properly engaged in areas of their specialization for productivity and development.

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**STATE CONTROL OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NIGERIA:
AN ASSESSMENT OF MUHAMMADU BUHARI ADMINISTRATION**

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Abstract

Globally, local government is considered as a structure of government capable of aggregating and attending to peoples' needs timely and efficiently. In Nigeria, it is part of the tripod federalism; federal, state and local government. However, the performance of this important structure compared to her constitutional duties are not impressive. Thus, the study an assessment of state control of local government in Nigeria, using Muhammadu Buhari administration as case study became imperative. It adopted desk research method through the use of secondary data and vertical and horizontal decentralisation model to analyse the ideal state-local government relations. The study found out that despite many efforts of Buhari's administration to ensure autonomy of local government from the grip of state governors, the problem persist due to constitutional ambiguity on the role of local government, anti- democratic credentials and idiosyncrasy of state governors, lack fiscal autonomy and among others. The study recommends constitutional amendment and abolition of State –Local Government Joint Account, prosecution of state governors found guilty in the interference on local government allocation among other measures.

Keywords: Administration, autonomy, federalism, local government, state control

Introduction

The key roles of local government as a veritable tool of engendering development and smooth running of governance at the local level has received scholarly attention throughout the world. In Nigeria, issues surrounding local government efficiency and autonomy from other levels of government have enjoyed unending conversation and rhetoric in the Nigeria's fashion of federalism. In social discourse and community interaction, the simplest understanding of the word local government typifies governance at the local level. Attention to these local settlers is not only informed by their vulnerability to diseases, depression and hunger, they also constitute significant population power in political calculations. Umehali (2000) reiterates this when he declared that almost 70% of Nigeria population lives in shanties and other rural area. Thus, the rural people, who supposedly exist within the confines of local government, do not enjoy the presence of governance as they so deserve. According to Okemeri (2020) the low level of performance of local government in Nigeria is a product of the overwhelming control of its affairs by the state government. Although, conversely from what Okemeri has stated, Nigeria comprises of federating units under a tripartite structure of government such as federal, state and local government, with each having its spheres of responsibilities and limitations under exclusive, concurrent and residual arrangements as provided by the 1999 Constitution (Adedire, 2019).

Armed with the philosophy and fundamental objectives of providing grassroots governance,

political awareness, civic orientation and bringing good governance nearer to the people at the local level, the 1976 Local Government reform had previously granted autonomous recognition to local government as a third tier level of government, assigned with specific responsibilities, primary of which is the need to affect the lives of the locals positively. Despite decades of many reforms on the autonomy and constitutional amendments on the status and roles of local government in Nigeria, it has failed to live up to expectations in Nigeria. State government have remained desperate in their overzealous control of local government finance, election of their chairmen and usurpation of their constitutionally assigned roles. This disturbing reality was captured by Ayodeji (2008) who opined that wide disconnection between the people and governments' programmes grow unabated, responsive leadership and fiscal accountability have been greatly eroded, while people at the local level appeared to have been left without government impacts. The tragic fate of local government has not changed in Nigeria even during the Buhari's administration, owing to the overbearing influence of state governors who have tied the operations of local governments to their apron strings through habitual ways of imposing loyal party men as council chairmen, caretaker committees and community leaders to garner unhindered control of public patrimony as against the choices of party supporters and the electorate. These among others have led to infrastructural decay, weakness of democratic institution and geometric poverty, thus making nonsense of the principle of federalism that strives to enhance the ability of the component units to develop at their own pace. It then becomes important to assess the state control of local governments under President Muhammadu Buhari administration in Nigeria.

Conceptual and Theoretical Issues

There are two perception to local government or governance at the local level; normative and institutional perceptions. The normative aspect deals with various definitions of local government. While the institutional aspect sees local governance as a form of decentralisation, arising from the sub-division of a state. The normative perception of local government deals with the legion of definitions that mainly see local government as series of political responsibility from the lowest structural levels of government. Normative definitions of local government do not give priority to the structural workings of the concept. While the institutional definition of local government takes a holistic review of the operating political system or government structure that makes such third tier inevitable, the institutional definition hovers around some fundamental variables, such as autonomy, legitimacy and electoral fairness.

Adebajo and Oyeekanmi (2020) described local government as a bottom-up approach to governance through a coordinated constitutional roles among federal, state and local government. This definition is emanate from institutional perception of local government as government and rules at the lowest strata of federal structure. Ebuku (1992) also emphasized that local government is a political authority set up by a nation or state as a subordinate authority for the purpose of dispersing or decentralising political power. In the submission, Wraith (1972, p.12) posited local government to be the act of decentralising political power. Emezi (2006) on the other hand sees local government as a system of administration under local communities, organised to maintain law and order, provide some limited range of social facilities, to ensuring that people and the needs of the rural dwellers are captured by the political decisions from the other levels of government. The local communities are encouraged to submit themselves to mutually organised authority as precursor to enjoying good governance and priorities for local needs. Emeze's definition panders to the historical foundation of local government system in Nigeria, as it is traceable to the tact of British colonial master through the introduction of indirect rule system. Local

government generally acts within the powers as derived from the constitution where distinctions between local government and states are also spelt out. In [federal-states](#), local government is referred to the third tier of government, while under a [unitary states](#) arrangement local government is placed at the second layer of administrative structure (Oniyegun, 2009).

Framework of Analysis

The study adopted the vertical and horizontal decentralisation model for effective local governance as articulated by Kauyza (2003) as its framework of analysis. According to Kauyza (2003) leveraging on the views of Rondinelli (1981) and others, understanding the effectiveness of decentralisation should be approached from two positions, the vertical and horizontal. The vertical decentralisation as espoused by Kauyza (2003) represents the relocation of political power and authority from the central government to government at the sub-national level. As for the horizontal decentralisation, attention should be focused on evolving mechanisms allowing other actors in local governance such as community-based organisations, civil society organisation and the private sector to be involved in the governance process (Kauyza, 2003). The model maintains that reform of the existing laws and the formation of a new political structure within the context of vertical decentralisation must be undertaken in the interest of good governance. Horizontal decentralisation leverages on the empowerment of grassroots communities so as to put them in a vantage position to determine, plan, administer and execute their socio-political and economic development. It does not essentially call for the re-evaluation or promulgation of new laws. Instead, it requires determined mobilisation and organisation of local communities to participate fully in the planning and implementation of socio-economic activities that are aimed at strengthening their capacities to determine and enjoy their socio-economic livelihood (Kauyza, 2003, p.4).

However, the theory is too prescriptive and legalistic in its analysis of the role of local government as a veritable structure of good governance without giving attention to other intervening factors such as leadership qualities of local government henchmen and the political will of other levels of government to allow proper decentralisation and autonomy of power for local government. This theoretical model is apt in giving an insight into how the challenges of local government can be overcome in Nigeria. It does not only suggest the proper transfer of political power and authority from the Federal government to government local governments, it also pontificates on creating strategies which pave ways for the involvement of other actors in local governance ranging from such community-based entities to civil society organisations including the private sector in the governance process.

State Control of Local Government in Buhari's Administration and Development

Against the principle of federalism on the need for coordinated responsibility among the three tiers and cooperative relationship, the ensuing relationship between state and local government is best described as servitude. This is a great danger to Nigeria's development trajectory if not redressed (Oyekanmi, 2016). In Nigeria, local government is commissioned to perform essential services such as provision of maternity centres, drainages, construction of street roads and other important needs of the local people. These services when provided have the possibility of enriching the financial capacity of the local people and convenience. However, many of the areas of revenue generating responsibilities of local government have been usurped by state government and their monthly allocation are being embezzled in the same manner. A cursory look at government at local level show debris from dirty environment capable of causing environmental hazards and pollution that can lead to other communicable diseases. Unfortunately, the local

government are cash strapped from attending to these responsibility.

The excessive control of local government by state governors through their unilateral decision of handpicking local individuals, forcing them on the party as candidate and subsequently manipulating their election into councils via State Independent Electoral Commission will continue to deny people at the local level of the service of competent, empathetic and development-oriented council chairmen. This in turn will lead to governance deficit in the needed welfare, social service and sense of inclusiveness of the people in local affairs. It should also be reiterated that whatever gains and giant development strides credited to President Muhammadu Buhari's administration on economy, infrastructural generation and agricultural revival, such development will not be felt by the people at the third spectrum of governmental structure and thus, the challenges of Nigeria's development will be a continuum.

Challenges of state control over Local Government in Buhari's Administration

The underlying *raison d'être* of local government as a tier of government either in a mayoral, prefectorial or conciliar model is to link development from the table of policy makers to the local people. The expectations of the people in villages or rural areas from all structure of political authority are good governance, sense of devotion and accountability. With this in mind, the concept of local government is meaningless if devoid of autonomy from state government in such a way that the people express confidence and honest legitimacy to the closer constituted authority around which are the local government chairmen. This underscores the place of local government as a veritable tool of getting things done through proper mobilisation of men and resources for general accomplishments (Gurlick & Urwick, 1987).

The reality of the challenges confronting local government in Nigeria is as revealed by *This Day* (2015, p.1) when it fumed that:

In Nigeria, local government today is plagued by series of reinforcing ailments, ranging from lack of capacity through low viability, elite capture, limited legitimacy, and mind-boggling corruption to low level accountability. Among others, Local government are run as private fiefdoms of governors who in most instances appoint their loyalist as sole administrators, glaringly manipulate elections to favour their supporters and arbitrarily determine the tenure of elected local officials.

From the foregoing and based on the submission of various local government scholars such as Ola (2014), Gboyega (1987), Bello-Imam (1992), among others, various problems of local government remain unresolved in Nigeria. However, for purpose of this study the major ones are identified. These range from constitutional ambiguity, poor leadership, personal idiosyncrasies of leaders of the other levels of government, overbearing primordial interest to lack of fiscal autonomy and responsibility.

Constitutional Ambiguity

Imuetinyan (2012) posited that the first clear recognition of the third tier status of local government in Nigeria was offered by the Local Government Reform of the 1979 which inadvertently reels out clear duties and responsibilities, as well as its place in the federating units. This was followed with the proper gazette of issues of local government concerns as expressed in the 1976 reforms into the 1979 Federal Constitution. With the foregoing, Section 7 (1) of the 1999 Constitution has it that "the government of every state shall ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils. This was also captured by Iyoha (2001) that local authorities are creatures of the state

governments and their relevance, strength and degree of autonomy were subject to the state governments. This power as vested in the hands of many overbearing state governor over local authorities have been abused and deployed to weaken elected and participatory governance and development at the grassroots.

The operation of local government councils under the 1999 Constitution is also very ambiguous, confusing and generating many imploding crises. In a different way, while the 1999 Constitution guarantees the operation of a democratically elected local government system, many state governors had at one time or the other abandoned the need to conduct elections into various local governments in defiance of the mandates of the Constitution. The local council men operate in accordance with the wishes of the governors (Awotokun, 2016). In Nigeria, very significantly in the South-West, appointments of Caretaker Council Members have become perverting political norms, an abuse of power and mockery of democratic creeds. These governors hide behind the constitutional misrepresentation of section 7 (1) which stated that the government of every state shall ensure the existence of local government under the law; whereas the law provides for a democratically elected council. A second major problem is the failure to provide expressly for the state government, the power to create new local government councils. In the 1999 Constitution, local government is to be created by states subject to the approval of the National Assembly for its operation); this clause has been described by (Okafor, 2021) as double standard. The situation had once created tension between federal and state governments. For example, is the face-off between the Lagos state government under Bola Ahmed Tinubu administration and federal government of Nigeria under Olusegun Obasanjo administration in 2004 over the creation of new local government area, the latter ordered the stoppage of statutory allocation to Lagos state.

Poor Leadership

The Nigerian state is in short supply of leaders with democratic credentials while few that profess democratic ideas are practically dominated by autocratic personality, a wrong democratic anathema, daily affecting good governance at the local level. The existence of local government as the third tier of government has suffered serious threat of extinction because of its non-performance occasioned by the leadership of other levels of government from federal to state government. A good number of the state governors in Nigeria are not democratic enough to allow the institution of local government flourish for the good of the rural dwellers, while it also remains a verifiable fact that their campaign rhetoric is laced promises without action (Awotokun, 2016; Chuka, 2015). Anwuka and Chuka (2015) posit that performing local government chairmen are considered politically dangerous by their state governors as it portends tortuous succession battle. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the local government is the most vilified of the three tiers of government in Nigeria. It has come under very serious obloquy for adducible reasons vis-à-vis not meeting up with its responsibilities as enshrined in the Fourth Schedule of the 1999 Constitution. Admittedly, majority of the local government councils have not also given Nigerians the cause to appreciate its nearness to the people and to bridge the gap between the governed and other tiers of government.

Overbearing Primordial Interest

The recruitment process at local level has been identified as a serious challenge of the government at grassroots. The recruitment has been popularly seen as basically on primordial interest. The spill over of which has crept into the operation and performances of Local Government as it relates to the welfare of the urban dwellers. As espoused by Oyekanmi (2016), 60 percent of local government projects in Nigeria are not approved based on the needs of the areas or wards they

are sited, but rather influenced by particularised contacts and primordial interest. Even the choice of candidates for the local government election is characterised by rotational arrangement, appeasement of high ranking politicians. This among other contentious pluralist nature of Nigeria federalism is seriously manifesting as a cog in the wheel of local government performance.

Personal Idiosyncrasies of Leaders of the other Levels of Government

Majority of the state governors, in collusion with the Houses of Assembly, have remained unswerving in the pursuit of a surreptitious agenda to continually armpit the local government as a pun on their chess boards. The governors are in the habit of misused the noticeable blank gap in the 1999 Constitution. They have consciously and covertly converted local government councils to one of their parastatals departments or agencies because of the lacuna created in sections 7 and 162 of the 1999 Constitution. The council's umbilical cord has been tied to the state governments who confer a nomenclature of an appendage or field office on them and leave the councils at the beggarly existence of the state. The captivity of the local government councils by the state government is a cankerworm that has undermined the functionality of the councils. In similar vein, Ojo (2018) stated that many governors complain of maltreatment by the federal might, whereas their dealings with the local government show clearly their poor understanding on how a federation should operate. There is no doubt that many of them need education on what federalism is all about. This situation has in great measure impoverished in all ramifications the operations and successes of local government councils under President Muhammadu Buhari administration.

Lack of Fiscal Autonomy and Responsibility

The hijack of local government resources by state government and corruption at local level is another serious area which has undermined governance at the local level. According to Ayodeji (2008), it has been an unaccountable galore in local government councils under the current democratic dispensation by state governors and chairmen. Thus, usually, Joint Account Committee (JAC) has been identified as instrument of controlling, usurping, embezzling and eroding the autonomy of local government by the state governments (Awotokun, 2016). This was evident in T. Oladunjoye's petition to Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) that Otunba Gbenga Daniel, the former governor of Ogun state mismanaged and misappropriated local government fund via JAC (*Punch*, 2015). Also, the arrested and prosecution of the former governor of Enugu state, Chimaroke Nnamani by the EFCC over the allegation of diversion of local governments funds is evident (Nnamani & Anikwe, 2013). It was on this note that Mallam El-Rufai abolished JAC in Kaduna State on assumption of office as Governor in 2015, with promise to always remit all dues belonging to Councils (Odunsi, 2015). The decision has been widely applauded by stakeholders especially the Association of Local Government of Nigeria (ALGON) who are usually mainly affected by the menace. ALGON stated that to guarantee speedy development at the grassroots, the abolition of JAC was necessary to ensure a healthy local government (Koni, 2016).

Effort and Measure to ensure Local Government Autonomy from State Government

Successive state government in Nigeria have been treating local government with disdain and as appendage structure in Nigeria's federalism. State control on local government make them a drain pipes to local government monthly allocations. Many of the state governors who clamoured for restructuring and true fiscal federalism have turned deaf ears to the agitation for financial autonomy in local government. As part of the efforts to address the excessive control of state on local government, President Muhammadu Buhari in 2021 warned the local government chairmen of the danger in allowing the state governors a sharing spree of the local government allocation.

He noted that the responsibility would be on them to account for every kobo allocated to their councils (*The Guardian, 2021*)

In May 2020, President Muhammadu Buhari also signed Executive Order to grant financial autonomy judiciary, legislature and most importantly, local government in Nigeria. This effort is commendable for mandating the Accountant General of the federation to deduct from money from source from any state government that refused to grant such financial autonomy to local government. Agbedo (2020) had noted that President Muhammadu Buhari had issued similar directive in 2019 in a bid to navigate the pathways for local government financial autonomy. The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) was mandated to stop state governors from interfering with statutory allocation accruing to local councils from the Federation Account. This was vehemently opposed by the state governors through the Nigeria Governors Forum. Thus, it has been an unending wait for local government financial autonomy as state governors have circumvented the NFIU's directive. In spite of this, the situation can be remedied through clear legislation for local government autonomy, financial independence and other strong fiscal measure to put off other levels of government from exploiting the third tier (Lamidi & Fagbohun, 2013). Another noteworthy effort was the move to address the anomaly of state governments manipulating the council electoral system through their appointed SIECs. The House of Representatives previously made efforts to transfer the conduct of council polls to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). This was contained in a bill sponsored by Musa Bagos (PDP, Plateau) which moved to amend Section 7 of the 1999 Constitution. The proposed amendment provides broad functions of the local government and empowers INEC to conduct the elections of local government. Mr Bagos' alteration seeks to delete the entire Section Seven in the Constitution and provide a new section of functions of the council, election, process of removal of the council and other sundry matters relating to the local government system. The proposed Section 7(1) e by Bago reads: "An election to the office of the chairman shall be held on a date to be appointed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)." By implication, the proposed Section 7(1) e, if passed, will delete the State Independent Electoral Commissions, as the commissions will no longer have any role, since the only responsibility they have is conducting elections into the local governments.

In the 8th Assembly (2015-2019), the Senate passed an alteration that sought to achieve this same purpose. Then, the Ike Ekweremadu-led Constitutional amendment committee had made 32 recommendations. Dino Melaye, who represented Kogi West in the Assembly, moved an amendment that SIEC should be abrogated. According to Mr Melaye, local government autonomy will mean little if SIEC continues to conduct elections. That amendment was passed by the upper chamber. But it was not concurred by the House, hence it died in the course of that alteration. However, these efforts have remained futile as most of the bills could not get 2/3 majority support of members of national assembly and the required supports from 24 houses of assembly throughout the federation before the president can append his assent.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Local government is constitutionally designated as the third tier of government for good governance at the local level for the betterment of the people at the grassroots. However, under the present Buhari administration like other successive government, local government has been unjustifiably subsumed under other levels of government, especially the state governments, in ways that have limited its capacity to achieve its mandate. The study concluded that inherent complexities arising from the operations of local government in Nigeria have adversely affected

it and have put expected governance at the local level in abeyance.

In line with the prescriptions of the vertical and horizontal decentralisation model which serves as the framework of this study, there should be relocation of political power and authority from the state government to local government and genuinely amend the 1999 Constitution with an unadulterated intent and purpose to erase contradiction and clauses that inhibit the existence and operations of the local government autonomously from state government.

Secondly, it also essential that other actors such civil society groups, human rights groups, the Nigeria Union of Local Government Employees (NULGE) and all other major stakeholders should be allowed to be involved in the local governance process so as to determine, plan, manage and implement their socio-politico and economic development at the grassroots. It also recommends that local government elections should also be taken over by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) with the involvement of all stakeholders at the local level. The INEC should be empowered to see into the tenure of elected officials and conduct elections as prescribed by law. This study believes that the taking over of elections at grassroots by INEC and the serious involvement of civil society organisations and other critical stakeholders will ensure periodic elections as against the appointment of caretaker or sole administrators, promote grassroots democracy and reduce the level of imposition by state governors of local council candidates.

Lastly, there is a need for continuous orientation and education of political actors and operators of Nigeria's federal system. The orientation must emphasise that no superior government exists in a federation, as such relations should be complimentary. In some federal settings, president is not superior to the governors neither is governor superior to a local government chairman. Hence, operators of local government system should be educated on their status as heads of a government who enjoy same degree of autonomy like other tiers of government in a federation that recognises local government as a third tier government. Thus, there is an urgent need for the political class to depoliticise their actions in office and operate more as statesmen rather than self-serving politicians.

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