

**THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE:
A RESPONSE TO CONTEMPORARY REALITY**

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Abstract

The search for security and peace are central to both state and group formations; hence, the rise of human simple groupings which in recent times have evolved into more complex formations like the state and international organizations. The formation of the African Union to replace the defunct Organization of African Unity in the recent past is a realistic expression of this natural quest. This paper, therefore, while drawing its data from both secondary sources and a qualitative methodological analysis, sought to explain how the AU has been able to design a structure to meet its fundamental need in a continent that seems to be the most conflict-ridden and attendant developmental challenges. This paper, however, argues that whilst, there exist ample institutional design for combating security challenges on the continent, the problem of “capacity” and resolute commitment remain a critical stumbling block on the path of progress towards achieving its set goals. Finally, concludes among other things that proper assessment and reconciliation of issues of ambition be established, capacity and commitment for effective and efficient security structure and mechanism remain its cardinal priorities.

Keywords: Africa, Union, Security, Architecture, Contemporary and Reality

Introduction

The concerns for freedom, safety, defense, protection, and guardian characteristically define human, group or organizational behaviour in their relationship with other entities, partners or opponents, in the bid to maintain, advance or assert their influence or position within a given structure. These critical concerns of man or groups which tend to define their interest of defending today and securing the future in all their political, economic and socio-cultural endeavours tend to set the framework and assign meaning to all-time concern by all human persons, groups and associations for security. However, survival in terms of maintaining peace and providing security which has been prioritized among these concerns as the most basic according to the realist paradigm is fundamental to every political behaviour of nation-states in the international system, collective or otherwise. It is in the light of this reality that the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on May 26, 1963 by thirty-one (31) independent African states (Cerveck, 1977) being the immediate parent of the African Union (AU) can be explained.

The premise behind both was to address Africa's insecurity and underdevelopment, and create a more assertive and self-defining continent (Vines,) in eras most characterized by the quest for freedom from colonial bondage and Cold War politics and the threat of globalization respectively. It is therefore instructive to state, according to the World Bank (2011), that efforts to maintain collective security, as expressed and demonstrated in the OAU and AU frameworks, as well as other international arrangements since the end of the First World War, are at the heart of human history, such that as from the earliest times, there has always been this recognition that human safety or security depends on collaboration, which has been a major motivating factor for the formation of village, communities, cities, and nation-states.

It is therefore in the light of this historical reality that this paper sets out to examine the security architecture of the African Union as a continental collective framework for safety and protection of the African states and peoples from both internal and external threats. It is structured to consider such issues concerning the emergence of the AU Security Architecture with a brief historical trace of the OAU's Security Mechanism and their challenges, the structural framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), processes and procedures, achievements and challenges as well as a summary and conclusion with some policy recommendations. Meanwhile, we will first attempt the clarification of some key concepts of the paper.

Conceptional Definition

As Nachmias and Nachmias (1996:28) has explicitly posited, if concepts are to serve the functions of communication, sensitivity to and organization of experiences, generalization, and theory construction, they have to be clear, precise, and agreed upon. It is on the basis of this desire and the need for clarity, precision and agreement that this paper now seek to give concise definitions of some of the major concepts employed in the paper which include: security, architecture, pan-Africanism, and pax-Africana.

SECURITY

The concept of security had been imagined as both an objective reality deserving of adequate measurement and/or possessing normative features of some good to be aspire to (Boemcken and Schetter, n.d.). According to Baldwin (1997) security was astutely defined as "a low probability of damage to acquired values". Similarly, for Lawrence Krause and Joseph Nye (1975) it was "...the absence of acute threats to the minimal acceptable levels of the basic values that a people consider essential to its survival". However, this paper adopts a broad and deep interpretation of security encompassing a varied range of perceived threats to human kind (Hugh, 2008) with its referents objects cutting-across traditional state-military conception, pluralist multi-stage perception, and the constructivists' utilitarian dimension with their widening and deepening implications in the usage of the concept.

ARCHITECTURE

The concept of architecture has been defined as both the process and the product of planning, designing, and construction usually of building and other physical structures (Wikipedia, 2013). In the context of the security arrangement of the African Union, we simply situate the concept of architecture within the general institutional framework, processes, procedures, and culture of peace through safety, protection and measures which negates insecurity as it is specifically experienced by individuals and groups in concrete situation (Falk, 1995) on the African continent.

PAX-AFRICANA

According to Dersso (2012), the concept was offered by Ali Mazrui in his seminal work titled: *Towards a Pax Africana*, published in 1967. It simply assumes the need for Africans to assume full responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on the continent. Therefore, in the words of Moller (2009), it represents "African solutions to African problems." Put different, pax- Africana means African kind peace or solution.

PAN-AFRICANISM

Pan-Africanism is another important concept that would be used in the course of this paper which deserve some clarity, at least, a distinction from Pax-Africana. Simply put, it is a socio-political world view, physiology, and movement which seek to unify native Africans and those of African descent, at its earliest form. However, following the emergence of African states, the concept has taken a more institutional dimension as an advocacy for political and socio-economic unity among African countries.

An Overview of African Security Crisis

In recent times, following the dawn of the 20th century, the concerns about the lasting legacies of two very devastating World Wars, colonial struggles and ideological conflicts which had characterized this period are driving force behind such efforts to establish international systems that would foster global (and regional) peace (World Bank, 2011) whether in the League of Nations' Collective Security or in the United Nations' Security Council and its peace-keeping, and in recent times, peace-making mechanisms, as well as regional and sub-regional security frameworks and systems like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in North America and Europe and other series of existing regional security structures co-existing with socio-economic structures in many areas of the globe, and Africa is no exception, especially in the wake of several security challenges which have continued to impasse developmental efforts on the continent. As Golaszinski (2004) has argued, Africa currently portrays the image of a continent riddled with territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars, violence and the collapse of governments, and ultimately states, (one could add, escalating terrorism).

The general trend of this African security challenges as demonstrated by Marshall (2005:27) clearly showed a constant increase in the magnitude of warfare in Africa during the Cold War/decolonization between 1946 and 1989, a trend which continued through the early years of 1990s such that by 1993 over forty percent of the countries were experiencing wars at the peak, until it began to reverse and navigate downward in the same year and continue today in the face of new security challenges as in terrorist activities with Islamic fundamentalism and heightened globalization as sources of new threat and motivation for concerted and collective continental effort or integration (Adejo, 2001:133).

The causes of conflict have been traced to several factors which have historical, internal, external, economic and social foundations as well as others specific to particular country situations (UN office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 2005). It was in recognition and indeed appreciation of the necessity of safeguarding themselves against such diverse-sourced threats and causes within a collective framework that the contracting states of the OAU in 1963 clearly stated in the 6th and 7th paragraphs of the Preamble of the OAU charter that "...in order to translate their determination" for understanding and cooperation "into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established" and "to safeguard and consolidate their hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their states, and to fight against neo-colonialism in the continent", such conditions must prevail (OAU, 1963).

This ultimate concern for security and peace was further expressed in Article II Section 1 Paragraph (C) where it was stated that one of the purposes of the organization would be "to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence." In order to drive this objective in the face of threats posed by the Cold War, Apartheid South Africa, and colonial interest in Portuguese and British Colonies in Southern Africa, the OAU Defence Commission was established in Article XX (3). The commission which occupied a special place within the OAU offered an interesting insight into the Organization's aspiration to create a security system in Africa with two objectives: to protect the OAU members against aggression (South Africa and Portugal being regarded as potential aggressors) and to support liberation movements engaged in armed struggles (Cervenka, 1977:38). Meanwhile, in order to manage conflictual relations among members, the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was created as one of the organs of the organization in Article VII (4) of the charter to help

pursue its principle of peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration.

The OAU based on this structure became engaged in conflict resolution in Africa almost from its inception in 1963 to 1993, but restricted its efforts to settling border disputes and adjudicating ideological differences resulting from the Cold War (Amoo, 1993, Jonah, 1994) as well as providing both material and non-material support for liberation movements in the subsisting colonial territories and struggle against Apartheid South Africa. Nevertheless, the creation of a more formidable framework by the OAU to deal with different forms and phases of conflict in the continent was initiated in 1993 when African Heads of States moved beyond Declaration and making of Resolutions or the so-called “setting of standards” (Moller, 2009:7) and took an institutional steps to upgrade its conflict prevention and management capacity through the creation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Cairo, Egypt. The purposes of the Mechanism were:

1. to articulate and prevent situation of potential conflict from developing into full-blown war;
2. to undertake peace-keeping and peace-building efforts if full-blown conflicts should arise; and
3. to carry out peace-making and peace building activities in post conflict situations (Dowell, 2005:9).

The creation of the Mechanism which had been criticized of not being of any worthy consequences (Berman and Sams, 2000:61-68, and Mwangi, 1996 cit. in Moller, 2009) was a follow up to several recommendations and proposals from the mid-1980s which were centered on the urgent need for some form of pax Africana by which Ali Mazrui (1995) meant an African peace established, enforced, and consolidated by Africans themselves in the face of debilitating security challenges in the continent. The need for a standing machinery for conflict resolution and the establishment of an OAU peacekeeping capacity were advocated by stakeholders including leaders and diplomats (Jonah:1994). The creation of African Supreme Tribunal and a Permanent OAU Security Council with specific peacekeeping, conflict resolution and perhaps peace-enforcement functions (Sesay and Fasehun, 1985, Packer and Rukare,2002) long with several other proposal including the resuscitation of the long-dormant Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration and bolstering of the sub-regional organizations to deal with severe domestic conflict (Coring and Solomon cited in Parker and Rukare, 2002) were strongly advocated.

In spite of these concerns and recommendations expressed and which were followed by several declarations and resolutions, the performance of the OAU in guaranteeing or achieving pax-Africana at the end of an era that marked the end of the struggle against racism in Apartheid South Africa and Colonialism which had served as the only unifying factor and primary function of the Organization respectively (Packer and Rutare, 2002) was irredeemably poor in the face of mounting intra-African conflicts with its untold humanitarian and developmental consequences. It was on the basis of this that the Organization had been derogatorily labeled “toothless bull-dog” (Agubuzu, 2004). Hence, Moller (2009:6) has also argued that the record of the OAU was not much more impressive in the field of direct security related activities, as it was mainly involved in setting norms and standards which it was never effective in enforcing them. As such, the Organization was seen to have failed to respond to serious intra-African conflicts or to act as a pan-African body against foreign interventions (Cervenka, 1978) in terms of proxy wars by the super-powers in the heat of the Cold War, regardless of the professed Non-alignment doctrine.

Nevertheless, there are several reasons advanced for the failure of the OAU's conflict resolution mechanisms. Foremost among these was the Organization's undue emphasis placed and unequivocal commitment to the principles of sovereign rights of member-states, non-interference, and respect for established colonial borders and territorial integrity (Powel, 2005). By these principles therefore, the OAU was not legally or operationally equipped to intervene in either inter or intra-state conflicts in the continent, thereby branding the Organization not only as a guardian of incumbent regimes (sometimes against their own peoples), but also the implicit privileging of the existing states within their pre-determined borders made it impossible for the Organization to deal constructively with secessionist

struggles (Kamanu 1974; An-Na'im, 1988). Hence, Shaw (1998) has contended that, just as sovereignty often prevented intervention and commitment to upholding territorial integrity limits the scope of peaceful settlement options, contradictions between principles also tend to result in inaction by the Organization. In a similar way, by this critical engagement of the OAU as a state-based organization, its focus was on Hard-power security; hence, many of its declarations and decisions were thus channeled, while the soft-power security in the areas of promoting economic advancement, good governance and democracy, human rights and freedom, and indeed, general human security concerns received little or scanty attention, regardless of the formulation and signing of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (the Banjul Charter) on June 27, 1981, the 1990 Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic in Africa and Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, the Kampala Document of 1993 which parented the Nigeria-Promoted Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDC) in 2000, the 1993 Declaration Re-launching Africa's Economic and Social Development (the Cairo Agenda for Action), the Declaration on Unconstitutional Change of Government (the Algiers Declaration) of 1999, and the Lome Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to the Unconstitutional Changes of Government in July 2000, which were targeted at people-centered rather than state-based security system, but only amounted to norms and standards setting, as they were implemented with little or no success. Nevertheless, the creation of the Mechanism For Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution in 1993 as a continental integrated security framework was an attempt to provide the OAU with the capacity for conflict management and resolution, including through the interference in the internal affairs of member states, if necessary (Powel, 2009). Yet this state of inertial with regard to maintaining continental peace and security remained unchanged, as such dominant views on the sanctity of sovereignty and centrality of non-intervention pervaded the Organization.

It was in the light of this gross inefficiency on the part of the Organization to guarantee enabling peaceful and security-proven environment for socio-economic and political integration in the continent in the face of new global challenges with the end of Apartheid regime in South Africa and the Cold World in the early 1990 which set the tone for the change that began with the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) following the signing of the Abuja Treaty by thirty-four (34) African leaders on Jun 3, 1991 (Packer and Rukare, 2002), which was designed to create a framework for the development, mobilization, and utilization of African human and material resources to achieve continental self-sufficiency (Green and Seidman, cited in Packer and Rukare, 2002) culminating in the Sirte Declaration of September 9, 1999 which laid the ground-work for the establishment of the African Union (AU) which was followed by the adoption of the Constitutive Act on July 11th, 2000 in Lome, by the OAU Assembly in its 36th Ordinary Session which eventually entered into force on May 26, 2001 (Tieku, 2007) following the deposit of the last required instrument of ratification by Nigeria on April 26, 2001, and perfected in the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union at the Inaugural Session of the Assembly of the African Union on July 9, 2002, in Durban, South Africa, thereby marking the setting of a new stage for African peace and security framework.

The Emergence of the African Peace and Security Architecture

As already clearly outlined in the foregoing, the years from 1999 to 2002 saw a gradual transformation of the OAU into what is now called the African Union (AU) (Mwansali, 2003), a process which has been described to have made a significant departure from the past by establishing the right of the Union to intervene in domestic affairs of member states in the case of "war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; on the decision of two-third majority by the Assembly (Murithi, 2007; Mwanasali, 2008; William, 2007), including such "serious threat to legitimate order", which could involve military coups or other attempts at overthrowing legitimate government (Baimu and Sturman, 2003; Kwali, 2008). Similarly, this confidence was also expressed by African leaders themselves at the launching of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2004 when they emphasized that the establishment of the Council "marks an historic watershed in Africa's progress towards resolving its

conflicts and the building of durable peace and security order” (AU, 2004, cited in William, 2009). As Tiekou (2007) has strongly contended, the creation of the African Union (AU) reflects a shift in the focus of the pan-African project from the legitimization and institutionalization of statehood (and regimes) as existed in the OAU framework to that which provides framework for dealing with human security based on the three identified challenges of security threats, underdevelopment, and the impact of international political economic forces as “supposedly” advocated by Nelson Mandela and Ahmed Salim Ahmed in the early 1990s as South African and Tanzanian presidents respectively.

However, the transformation of the OAU into AU is argued to be a fusion or convergence of three projects which were respectively sponsored to address African security challenges in both traditional and contemporary senses (Moller, 2009). These projects include: the first grandiose was a quest for a pan-African unity which was aimed at forming a continental state sponsored by the late Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, but only resulted in the convening of the Extraordinary Meeting of the OAU Assembly which eventually saw the launching of a more compromising agenda through the Sirte Declaration of September 9, 1999. The second of these projects was the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) sponsored by then President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo as an offspring of the so-called “Kampala Movement” (Deng and Zartman, 2002), an imitation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSSE) (Moller, 2008), formulated in the 1991. The “Kampala Document”, which amongst other aims in the changing African political and global scenes, was to modify the principle of sovereignty in favour of a shared African responsibility to protect human rights (Deng and Zartman, 2002, 2002: 117-9), but laid dormant until was resurrected by Obasanjo in 1999, and got the endorsement of the OAU in 2000 (Moller, 2009). The CSSDCA was based on the broad concept of security which includes human security, recognizing good governance as the assured means to stable peace, and advocated the designing of 'a collective continental architecture for promoting security and inter-African relations', while it recommended the signing of non-aggression pacts, a common defence policy for Africa, stand-by arrangement for peace support operations, police collaboration, the establishment of early warning mechanism as well as the strengthening of confidence-building measures, most of which were eventually confirmed at the inaugural session of the AU in July, 2002, Durban, South Africa (Moller, 2009); hence, they constitute the underlying framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The third project was 'the New African Initiative' sponsored by Thabo Mbeki, the then President of South Africa based on his vision of an African Renaissance in the new millennium, dating back to the OAU summit in 1999, at which President Mbeki and his Algerian Counterpart, Bonteflika were mandated to negotiate debt cancellation for Africa. This team was later expanded to include President Obasanjo of Nigeria in a bigger project that came to be called the Millennium Partnership for the Africa Recovery Programme (MAP) endorsed by the OAU Assembly in 2001. MAP was subsequently merged with the Omega Plan of Abdulahi Wade, the Senegalese President at the time, to form the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) which came to be described as the “holistic comprehensive integrated strategic framework” (Muhibbu-Din, 2011) which was later supplemented in July 2002 at the Durban AU summit with the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance that eventually paved way for the establishment of an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in March 2003 at Abuja, Nigeria, as a monitoring and control mechanism on their commitment to the Declaration and the NEPAD framework based on certain identifiable criteria and indicators (Wikipedia, 2013). These composites of programmes and projects were reflections of several views expressed regarding the prospects of the African continent and those of her peoples, as a response to the emerging “new world order” following the demise of the Soviet Union with the ascendance of the United States as a “supposed” unipolar hegemon, coupled with the ravaging consequences of globalization on the international economy, deepening hiatus between the developed countries in the North and the underdeveloped countries in the South, rising wave of poverty, hunger, internal political and resultant humanitarian crises, dependence and underdevelopment in the South with grave implications for global peace and harmony (Okpoh, 2005:5 – 6, OAU, 2001: Para 5 and 6, CA).

Nevertheless, all of these concerns for political, economic, and social transformation which had engaged the thoughts of scholars and policy makers in Africa in view of what prospects awaited their largely

underdeveloped countries in the New Millennium were critical defining factors in the transformation and the re-orientation of the continental integration framework based on state survival and defense in the OAU to a more human-based, people-oriented, and progressive framework in the AU. Meanwhile, the cumulative impact of these new challenges with their attendant security threats and the compelling need to defend against which if a better future must be guaranteed for the continent as “an integrated and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena” (Williams, 2011:3) in the New Millenium, a comprehensive security framework with a multidimensional mechanism was designed and built into the African Union framework, being a panacea for African emancipation from socio-political and economic quagmire as expressed in paragraph 8 of the AU preamble. It is therefore, this complex (and multidimensional) institutional security mechanism of the AU which has come to be called the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (William, 2011).

The Nature and Structure of the APSA

The recognition of the underlying fact that the development of the AU has been driven more by a political than an economic (or other) agenda (Vines, 2013 :95) is core to the understanding of its repeated emphasis on peace, security and defense of the continent and understanding of the designing, building and general operation of the APSA. The Union's more specific vision for conflict management reflects awareness that the precondition for achieving an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa is security and peace on the continent (William, 2011). This reality was effectively captured in the preamble of the Constitutive Active of the African Union (CAAU) as already alluded to above. As a statement to this therefore, the Constitutive Act which entered into force on May 26, 2001, outlined in Article 3 the conflict management objectives or vision of the Union in paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (f) to (h) to include: to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states; promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; promote peace, security and stability on the continent; promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; and promote and protect human and peoples rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments (CAAU, 2000:3), being precondition for the attainment of the critical objectives of achieving greater unity and solidarity between African Countries and the peoples and accelerating the political and socio-economic integration of the continent as well as to promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels coupled with cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples as stated in paragraphs (a), (c), (j), and (k) of Article 3 of the CAAU.

Furthermore, this vision for a peaceful and secured Africa was reaffirmed with grave commitment in the principles of the Union as outlined in Article 4. For instance, paragraph (d) proposed the establishment of a Common Defence Policy for the African continent, which has now been translated into action in the form of the APSA; hence, the purpose of this paper. On a more specific terms, the CAAU went ahead to define the scope of its peace and security mechanisms, and the procedures for activating it as part of its underlying principles. Such that, while paragraph (e) sued for peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the Union through such appropriate means as it may be decided upon by the Assembly; paragraphs (f) and (g) prohibit the use of force or threat to use force among members states of the Union and interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another. However, paragraph (h) marked a break with the past by establishing the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. This epochal and resolute principle is flanked by such others which include: the right of members state to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security; respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rules of law and good governance; respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities; and condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes in governments as stated in paragraphs (j), (m), (o), and (p) of Article 4 of the CAAU respectively.

Regardless of these lofty objectives and declarative principles, no peace and security management mechanism was put in place as part of the organs or committees of the AU within the framework of the Constitutive Act on July 11, 2000 in Lome (Williams, 2009), as the responsibility of maintaining peace and security continued to wrest with the Executive Council under the directive of the Assembly as the latter was empowered by Article 9 (g) of the CAAU. Nevertheless, the provision for further establishment of organs by the Assembly in Article 5 (2) set a pace for the creation of a peace and security mechanism that would drive the security agenda of the Union, that is, the African Common Defence Policy designed in the APSA, and was eventually actualized in the creation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) on July 9, 2002 at Durban, South Africa following the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union by fifty-three (53) African leaders at the Inaugural Session of the AU (William, 2009).

However, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as articulated in the protocol provides a comprehensive framework for conflict prevention, management and resolution, including peacekeeping operations (Fahamu and ASSN, 2011:7). Similarly, the protocol which entered into force on December 26, 2003 embraces an expanded and comprehensive agenda for peace and security that include amongst others conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-building, the encouragement and promotion of democratic practices, and intervention, humanitarian action and disaster management (APSA Assessment Study, 2010). The APSA is meant to be the structure that provides for peace and security policy and action in Africa which incorporates several institutions including a political decision-making body (the PSC), an analysis centre (the Continental Early Warning System or EWS), a military element (the African standby Force or ASF and Military Staff Committee or MSC), an external mediation and advisory body (the Panel of the Wise or POW), and a special fund to cover costs (the African Peace Fund or APF) which are to interact closely in order to provide a comprehensive set of tools with which African actors can address the security concerns of the continent (Vines, 2013:95). However, the pillars of this APSA framework are the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (Fahamu and ASSN, 2011). The AU recognizes eight (8) of these RECs which include Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),

Inter governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as two Regional Mechanisms to coordinate the ASF which include the East African Standby Force (EASF) and the North African Regional Capability (NARC) with which it supposedly maintains an hierarchical but mutually reinforcing relationship by harmonizing and coordinating their activities in the peace and security realm through their liaison officers within the commission of the Union in Addis Ababa (AU, Algiers 2008 MoU, cited in Williams 2011:6). Therefore, the APSA simply denotes a complex set of interrelated institutions and mechanism that function at the continental, regional and national level (William, 2011) stirred by the PSC on the authority of the Assembly with the support of the Commission of the Union.

Meanwhile, a part from institutional design for peace and security management on the continent as was clearly lacking in the Constitutive Act of 2000 adopted in Lome which has now been fixed with the adoption and the enforcement of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU in 2002 and 2003 respectively, the AU has gone ahead to put in perspective and express in concrete terms its security agenda through several pacts and protocols which tend to directly address both traditional security's perspective of state protection and defence as well as such "wideners" and "deepeners" views of socio-economic or human security. Amongst these include: the 2000 Lome Declaration for an OAU/AU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government which was founded on the 1999 Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional changes of Government; the 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa; the 2004 Sirte Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy; the Abuja 2005 Non Aggression Common Defence Pact being a follow-up to the 2004 Common Defence Policy; and the 2007 Addis-Ababa's African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. It is therefore on this

back drop that this paper will now seek to take a cursory look at peace and security management in Africa, procedures and challenges.

The African Union's Peace and Security Management and Procedures

At the core of the reframing of pan-Africanism with the formation of the AU was Ali Mazrui's "Pax-Africana" concept which tend to advocate African solutions to African problems, especially and African peace (and security process) established, enforced, and consolidated by Africans themselves (Mazrui, 1995). This was also recently advocated with some degree of confidence by the then AU's commissioner of Peace and Security, Ambassador Said Djinnit (2004), when he said that, "No more, never again. African's cannot ... watch the tragedies developing in the continent and say it is the UN's responsibility or somebody else's responsibility. We have moved from the concept of non-interference to non-indifference to the tragedy of our people." (cit. in Powell, 2005:4). The Constitutive Act of the AU and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC protocol) placed renewed emphasis on building a continental security regime capable of preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts in Africa (Powell, 2005) through the establishment of an operational security structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in areas of conflict preventing, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction (PSC Protocol 2002: para 17), so as to put an-end to conflict of any kind within and among states in Africa, in order to create propitious conditions for socio-economic development and integration of the continent, as well as the fulfillment of the aspirations of (African) people (AU - Non Aggression and common Defence Pact, 2005: para.4)

Thus, the emerging continental security system is predicated on the Peace And Security Council and has been expressed through it as "a decision-making organ as well as a collective security and early - warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa", supported by the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, African Standby Force, and a Special Fund (PSC Protocol, 2002: Article 2 (1) (2). The PSC was not part of the CAAU adopted in Lome in July, 2000, but could have been adequately anticipated in section (2) of Article (5) which empowered the Assembly to establish other organs for the union. However, the PSC grew out of the ad-hoc process to reform the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution which had been adopted by the OAU's Assembly of Heads of State and Government in June 1993, Cairo, Egypt as a central organ for coordinating African peace and security efforts, especially in the anticipation and prevention of conflicts (Williams, 2009, Muyanwa and Vogt, 2000), following the decision of the Assembly of the OAU at its 37th Ordinary Session July 2001, Lusaka, Zambia, to review the structures and working methods of the OAU Mechanism in the light of the establishment of the AU, which culminated in the production by the OAU Secretary General of the report titled: Background Document on the Review Structures, Procedures and Working Methods of the Central Organ (Levitt, 2003:114) which came to serve as the conceptual frame of the PSC protocol (Williams,2009) adopted on July 9,2002 at the Inaugural Summit of the AU's Assembly in Durban and came into force on December 26,2003 following the ratification by twenty-seven (27) of the fifty-three (53) member countries, yet the PSC was not lunched until May 25, 2004 (Powell, 2005). The Council however began its preliminary work on March 16, 2004, at the Ministerial level, during the 4th Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council and by March 2009, it had held over 180 meetings, issued 100 communiqués, imposed sanctions against regimes in several African states including Togo, Mauritania, Guinea and Madagascar, and had authorized peace operations in Sudan, the Comoros (three times) and Somalia, as well as being partially involved in the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) which was created in 2003 just before its effectual take-off (Williams, 2009), until the mission was integrated into the United Nations Peace-keeping Mission in June 2004 (Powell,2005).

The mandate of the council as set out in its objectives includes: promoting peace, security and stability, anticipating and preventing conflicts, promoting and implementing peace building activities, coordinating and harmonizing efforts to prevent and combat international terrorism, development of a common AU defence policy, and encouraging democratic practice, good governance and the rule of law, as well as protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms (Williams, 2011). In order to achieve

these, the Council was given eighteen (18) “powers” ranging from assisting in the provision of humanitarian assistance to military intervention as well as the mobilization of external support or partnership, as listed in Article 7 of the PSC Protocol based on certain agreed norms and rules of engagements in consonance with the AU Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which range from peaceful settlement of dispute to outright intervention of the Union in grave circumstances as provided in Article 4 of the PSC Protocol. Nevertheless, being the highest authority within the AU on peace and security-related matters (Cilliers and Sturman, 2004), the structure of the PSC is clearly inspired by the UN Security Council (the Supreme Authority of which it explicitly acknowledged), yet it has neither permanent members nor veto rights, but its fifteen (15) members are elected, ten (10) of them for a two-year term and five (5) for a three-year term based on certain conditions which include geographical representativity and rotation, payment of dues and contribution to operations and peace fund set up to fund them (Moller, 2009). Hence, Article 5 (2) of the PSC Protocol unequivocally declared that the election of the members of PSC by the Assembly of the Union shall be by “the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation” and meeting of certain criteria by each member including the capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities entailed in membership. As at 2010, thirty-five (35) states had been elected to serve on the PSC with Nigeria being the only country to have sat consistently on the Council since its inception in 2004 (Williams, 2011). By 2011, the Council had held nearly three hundred meetings with an average of five meetings every month. Meanwhile, before proceeding to look at the performance of the PSC which is the fulcrum of the AU security architecture in peace and security management, its achievement and challenges, it would suffice here to put in perspective other supporting institutes of the APSA as central actors in the AU security framework. These institutions as already been mentioned include: the Continental Early-Warning System (CEWS) as the analysis centre, African Standby Force (ASF) and Military Staff Committee (MSC) which serve as the military element on the structure, the Panel of the Wise (POW) which is the external mediation and advisory body, and the African Peace Fund (APF) and a Special Fund to cover costs.

The CEWS is established by Article 12 of the PSC Protocol as an early warning and preventive institute whose essential role is to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts and consists of a central observation and monitoring centre, the Situation Room, located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the AU in Addis Ababa to collect and process data from the observation and monitoring units of the regional mechanisms that collect and process data and transmit it to the situation room (Williams, 2011), using software adopted from the European Early Warning System (Vines, 2013) in the form of a report. The reports however, identify potentially dangerous activity based on certain indicators of threats, vulnerabilities, and risks which are then passed to early warning analysts who decide on the level of gravity and potential consequences of the events identified. The information collected and analyzed through this system will be used by the chairperson of the commission to provide the Peace and Security Council with advice on appropriate responses to potentials or actual conflict (Powell, 2005) and as such help inform decisions reached by the PSC and guide the deployment of the ASF (Vines, 2013). Although, with the assistance of the UN's Situation Centre in New York and external donors, the AU's situation room can now provide continent-wide coverage of conflict dynamics on a regular basis and produces a range of reporting mechanisms including daily news summaries and more substantial updates on emerging issues, yet it faces three critical problems alongside the technical problems of the dearth of sufficient technological infrastructures and better-trained analysts (Williams, 2011). These problems include: the stability to develop proper interpretability with the REC's insufficient real-time diplomatic reporting and intelligence, and the difficulty of analyzing information and using it to influence decision making within the PSC. The PWO established by Article (11) of the PSC protocol as an advisory and external mediating body of five (5) distinguished African personalities chosen on the basis of their contributions to African peace and security, and should consult always and undertake any activity in furtherance of peace and security on the continent (PSC Protocol, 2002: Art. 11)

The other very crucial instrument in the envisaged responses to armed conflict is the African Standby Force (ASF) as well as the Military Staff Committee (MSC) to serve as an African Rapid Reaction Force capable of deployment anywhere on the continents, as provided for in Article 13 of the

PSC Protocol and was established following the adoption of the policy framework document for the Chiefs of Staff on 17-18 January, 2004 which was subsequently adopted by African Ministers of Defense on January 20, 2004, and was finally approved by the African Head of State in Addis Ababa in July 2004 (APSA Assessment, 2010). The force is based on and divided into five (5) regional brigades in the north, south, east, west, and central, and will draw on military and civilian resources from a combination of some or all of these regions. The stand by brigades are envisaged as the operational arm of the planned security architecture (Vines, 2013). The ASF functions on three interconnected levels: the continental level (the AU commissions planning element), the sub-regional levels (the five brigades) and the state level (the contributing countries (Williams, 2011). However, ASF is intended to respond to six crisis management scenarios ranging from small-scale observation to forcible military intervention with proposed full scale operationalisation by June 30, 2010), but this goal was not met (Williams, 2011). The five forces each of which was to have 6,500 military, police and civilian personnel, are intended to be flexible, mobile and capable of deployment. Nevertheless the MSC consists of senior military officers from PSC member states who advise the council on the military dimensions of its initiatives, but its lack of clearly defined working methods tends to hamper its efficiency. Similarly, the African peace fund (PF) which was to provide the necessary resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security was provided for in Article 21 of the PSC protocol.

The fund houses financial contributions from the AU's regular budget voluntary contribution for member states, other internal sources, and from external donors (Powell/2005) although, the was earlier created in the OAU in order to solve the problem of financial disincentive, despite series of initiatives, the AU has failed to secure sustainable, predictable, and flexible financial for its conflict management activities, as inadequate funding remains emblematic of member states. General unwillingness to provide the organization with sufficient financial resources (Williams, 2011)

Nevertheless, it must be observed that central to the overall setup and strategy of the AU as a continental integrating framework with strong actual and potential threats to its core aim of ordering socio-economic transformation in the continent based on the experience of its predecessor, OAU, is peace and security management. Hence, every other organs and commission, as well as institutions of the Union are strategic actors in the management of security, ranging from socio-economic threats, as represented in the Economics, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), as well as the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) with the standing mandate to advance both individual economic and social rights, and the collective human rights (Jones, 1999; Kiwanuka, 1988), to armed conflict and security issues, as best captured in the PSC Protocol. However, the AU Commission or Authority as it has been renamed (Moller, 2009) is also involved in conflict and security-related activities with the primary duty to facilitate, coordinate, and monitor the union's progress towards overarching vision of peace and security (Williams, 2011) based on its two strategic objectives of reducing conflicts and achieving security and stability as a prerequisite for development and integration (AU Commission, 2009:22). The duty it performs through a special department, the Peace and Security Directorate.

Operationalisation of the AU's Security Architecture

Since 2003, the AU has entered into its operational phase and deployed missions to Burundi (African Union Mission in Burundi or AMIB between April 2003 and December, 2004), Sudan (African Mission in Sudan or AMIS between June 2004 and December 2007), Comoros (AU military Observer Mission in the Comoros or MIOC in 2004 and Electoral Support and Security Assistance Missions, in 2006 and 2007 respectively), Somalia (AU mission in Somalia or AMISOM in 2007), and has conducted several joint or hybrid missions with the United Nations as exemplified by the UNAMID (AU-UN Hybrid operation in Darfur) in 2008 (Williams, 2011, Moller, 2009). Moreover, as the Fulcrum of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the PSC has launched several initiatives in fulfillment of its mandate by serving two interrelated political arenas: being a forum for debating how transnational and potentially globalizing norms interact with conditions in Africa, and by serving as a platform where its member states interact alongside a transnational bureaucracy (Williams, 2011). It has also, to this extent, facilitated the formulation of a Common African Defence and Security Policy

(CADSP) as expressed in Article (4) (d) of the Constituting Act and Article (3) (e) of PSC Protocol following the adoption of the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security on February 28, 2004 by the Assembly of the Union, in Sirte, Libya. The CADSP, which is largely premised on the concept of human security (Golaszinski, 2004), gave a comprehensive definition of security to encompass both the traditional, state-centric notion of the survival of the state and its protection by military means from external aggression, as well as non-military notion which is informed by the new international environment with the increasing concern for Human Security, and the high incidence of intra-state conflict (Solemn Declaration, 2004). The Declaration which outlined and defined several principles, rules, values, procedures, and mechanisms, provided a framework for a regular review and close monitoring of the implementation of all instruments relevant to Africa's efforts to promote peace and security as was outlined in the "Building Blocks" for the Declaration which clearly listed out relevant and exiting international accords with relevance to the peoples and nation-states of Africa, ranging from the general CAAU, and Protocols and Pacts which included Resolutions and Declaration of the AU/OAU on social and political issues like combating HIV/AIDS and Malaria, women right, unconstitutional changes in government terrorism, e.t.c., to such peculiar regional instruments and mechanisms (Solemn Declaration, 2004, Golaszinski, 2004).

Furthermore, the AU has been able to bring its influence to bear, though in a more reactionary, rather than preventing way in combating the problem of unconstitutional changes in government which until recently used to be the prevailing norm in Africa in the wake of the adoption and enforcement of the 1999 Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes in Government, the 2000 Lome Declaration for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, and the 2007 Addis Ababa Charter on Democracy. The AU in the bid to demonstrate this resolve has thus, suspended and lifted suspension from nine (9) of its member including: Central African Republic (2003), Togo (2005), the Comoros (2007), Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2009), Guinea (2008), Mali (2012), and Guinea-Bissau (2012). It has also imposed additional sanctions on six (6) members among the ones listed above and has issued strong condemnation to sixteen (16) countries with regards to their internal conducts (Vines, 2012) including Egypt in 2013. Notwithstanding, the above, the successes recorded from these initiatives are still very weak and remote from expectations, as the AU security procedures continues to experience several challenges or setbacks, some of which are already hinted in the forgone discussion in the paper.

Challenges to the Efficiency of the AU Security Architecture

The discourse of the challenges to the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) from observer's point of view continually revolves around the issue of lack of capacity (Vorrath, 2012) by the Union either in terms of technical skills, resources or institutional design. According to the 2010 assessment study titled: *Moving Africa Forward: African Peace Security Architecture*. Some of the challenges identified in the report included: lack of coordination among the various components of the security frameworks, dysfunctional relationships among operators of the system, and poor definition of duties or responsibilities, that is, ill-defined goals, in the administration, co-existing with lack of highly skilled technical man-power and chronic under-funding which has culminated in an over dependence on external donors like the European Union and United Nations, such that between 2008 and 2011, African states only provided two (2) percent of the AU's peace fund to cover peace and security efforts (Vorrath, 2012), thereby rendering doubtful the conception of Pax-Africana which was conceived to represent a socio-political disposition of mobilizing and framing African solutions for African problems without external influence. Other challenges to the African security framework are its dependence on regional economics communities and mechanisms in conflicts prevention and resolution considering their varied degree of integration and political framework for effective peace endeavors. For instance, Western and Southern Africa have relative stronger regional integration than the North and the East.

Conclusion

The transition from the OAU to the AU ushered in far-reaching changes to the pan-African peace and security agenda, particularly with respect to the parameters of sovereignty to intervention in

grave circumstances or what has been simply rendered as a shift from “non-interference to non-indifferent” (Djinnit, 2004) however, whilst the Union has performed admirably through its Peace and Security Council in mobilizing international and continental supports in response against unconstitutional changes in government and coup d'etats through implementing sanctions (Williams, 2009) and launching successfully though with varied degree of success peace missions in member states facing security challenges, the overall objectives especially on the issue of engendering human security, the non-military aspect of the continental security framework has remained very remote from realization. It therefore seems that the Union has not yet come to terms with the fact that the effective compatibilities to manage armed conflict (and other non-material conflict) require more than just the technical assets associated with peace-keeping. Operations and sanctions against regimes must involve important political, bureaucratic and infrastructure dimensions (Williams, 2011).

Recommendations

Based on the above challenges, the researcher hereby makes the following recommendations as a way forward in advancing the African Union Peace and security Architecture.

1. The Union must strive to close the wide gap between the ambition to create a more united socio-economic and political continent, its plans to achieve this, its organizational setup, and its capacity through a sincere and realistic engagement by its members.
2. It must also strive to close both institutional and operational gaps existing in its current structure by ensuring proper coordination and collaboration.
3. It must as a matter of principle and practice take full ownership of the African peace and security system in the spirit of Pax-Africana by breaking the continuous reliance on the European and other non-African international institutions for funding and technical support through effective mobilization of its member states.
4. The Union must try to strengthen its central operational system rather than relying solely on the effectiveness and cooperation of the sub-regional groupings in achieving its mandate.

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