

**People Democratic Party (PDP) and Internal Democracy
in Kogi State: Implication on Democracy Consolidation**

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Abstract

The study examined the consequences of poor internal democracy on People Democratic Party (PDP) in Kogi state. The study has its method rooted in the survey design using close and open ended structured questionnaire, textbooks, journals, internet materials, etc. using Multi Stage Sampling, 1919 study participants were randomly selected from the 12 local government, party leaders and these leaders comprised of 8 Local Government party chairmen and four Local Government party secretaries proportionally selected from across the 3 senatorial districts in Kogi State. Data obtained were quantitatively analyzed descriptively on percentage tables using the Statistical Package for Social Scientist (SPSS). Findings of the study show that the level of popular participation in the party was very high, while adherence to nomination process is commendable, however, serious fears were expressed regarding adherence to party policies/constitution by the party leadership. This mixed result for the internal democracy mechanisms invariably has mixed consequences on democratic consolidation, ranging from stalling or abandonment of development projects, intra-party conflicts or violence among others are inevitable outcomes. The study recommends that; there is need to strengthen the internal democratic mechanism and legal frameworks for fighting the imposition of candidate within political parties in Nigeria. As things stand now, Nigeria's political parties are still perceived as those whose destinies are in hands of the power-brokers within the parties.

Keywords: Democracy, Internal Democracy, PDP, and Consequences of Poor internal Democracy

Introduction

According to Susan Scarrow (2004) internal democracy is a very broad term describing a wide range of methods for including party members in intra-party deliberation and decision makings. It is democracy within the party and the extent to which a party subscribes to and abides by the basic and universal democratic tenets (Scarrow, 2004). On a pragmatic level, some advocates for intra-party democracy argue, that parties using internally democratic procedures are likely to select more capable and appealing leaders, to have more responsive policies, and as a result, to enjoy greater electoral success. A number of scholars converge on the premise that parties that “practice what they preach”, in the sense of using internally democratic procedures for their deliberation and decisions, strengthen democratic culture generally.

In his scholarly endeavours (Gosnell (1969) sees intra-party democracy as that which “provides necessary vertical linkages between different deliberating spheres and horizontal linkage between competing issues” (Gosnell, 1968). It is, however the creation of a permissible climate within a political party which

guarantees the participation of all party members in decision making as well as the general administration of the party. Such a climate fosters active involvement of every party member and not a few powerful rich. At this juncture, it should be added that the purpose of intra-party democracy in political parties is basically to create a level playing-field for the active participation of every member in the party affairs and to build a congestive party that is vibrant enough to win elections and as such provide a strong government committed to quality service delivery that will meet the needs and yearning of the citizens.

However, the incessant intra-party conflicts which came in varying magnitudes and intensities have become a major threat to democratic survival in Nigeria especially its fourth republic. Some of these conflicts have led to the factionalisation of some major political parties and the consequence of party members decamping to another. This negative trend in political parties has been having profound negative impact on the country's democratization process, against the background that political parties are vehicles of modern representative democracy and a strong pillar for consolidating democratic governance (Mamodu and Matudi, 2013). But, the ability of political parties to achieve this very important role is dependent on whether the relationship that exists among members is harmonious or conflict ridden owing to the fact that social groups exist by conflict and cooperation. This has been articulated in the theory of intra-group cooperation whose central thrust bothers on the fact that social groups exist through conflict and cooperation. It is important to note that as members of a group interact together, there emerge power relations in the internal dynamic of the group, which may polarize the group into two power blocs namely; the privileged and the less privileged power blocs.

These power blocs compete for the control of the decision making machinery of the group with the aim of influencing the decisions of the group to their favour. This is no doubt the situation in the People's Democratic Party (PDP) which more often than not occasions intra-party conflicts and rancor. Some of the sources of the intra-party conflict in the People's Democratic Party (PDP) according to Mamodu (2013) includes taking major decisions by few of the executive members, discrimination or favouritism in the selection of candidate, jettisoning, zoning arrangement, arrogance of party executive among other factors/problems have eaten so deep into the People Democratic Party (PDP) that the resultant situation is defection of members to other (opposition) political parties. These cases partly contributed to the defection of five sitting governors of the People's Democratic Party: Adamawa, Sokoto, Kwara, Rivers, and Kano States in 2013 to the All Progressive Congress (APC) which is the main opposition party. It is in consideration of the above identified internal wrangling within Nigeria political parties that this study was carried out to examine the consequences of poor internal democracy in the People's Democratic Party PDP in Kogi State.

Literature Review

Internal Democracy Conceptualized

Internal democracy is most required in the selection of candidates for elective positions both within and outside elections as it has been observed that what normally causes factionalisation or conflicts in most political parties is the issue of selection of candidates through party primaries for elective positions in the general elections. It is imperative therefore that each political party should create a level playing-field for every party member that is interested in running for any elective office both within and outside the party. The importance of this is to keep the party united as well as throw-up credible and popular candidate that would guarantee the chances of the party in winning elections political parties that are inclusive in their decision making process enjoy active participation of their members in their affairs.

Scarrow, (2005), in Momodu, and Matudi (2013) opines that in the most inclusive parties, all party members or even all party supporters, are given the opportunity to decide on important issues such as the choice of party leader or the selection of party candidates. Due to the fact that inclusiveness is a matter of process and formal rule according to them, more inclusive parties will offer more opportunities for open deliberation prior to the decision stage Mamodu and Matudi (2013). It is in line with this that Norris (2004) submits that one of the key issues in internal democracy is parties nomination processes, in other words, who decides and how which citizens are entitled to run for parliament as a candidate of that specific party, whether such nomination processes are deemed democratic or not, depends on the degree of centralization, i.e. how much power is given to regional distinct or local bodies in the process of selection. Secondly the scale of participation in the nomination is also considered: the more people that

are involved in the selection, the more democratic the procedure is also, in his final submission, the scope of decision making. The nomination process is governed by law only in a few countries. In most legal system, parties are entitled to decide themselves on the most aspirant's regulations (Norris, 2004).

Operational functions of Political Parties

Essentially, political parties perform various functions in ensuring the growth and continuity of the democratization process. According to a research conducted by The Friedrich Ebert Foundation Centre for Governance and Development (CGD) on institutionalizing political parties in Kenya published in (2010), political parties are the vehicles of representative democracy. They play several critical roles to make representative democracy a reality. These include:

- i. Representing societal interests within the state (by participating in parliament)
- ii. Socializing political leaders on the principles of democracy and democratic participation;
- iii. Carrying out political education and communication (by providing information on which the voters may base their selection of candidates before them);
- iv. Carrying out political mobilization and encouraging the public to cast their votes in election;
- v. Recruiting political leaders;
- vi. Aggregating and articulating interests;
- vii. Promoting pluralist debates by presenting alternative policy platforms; and
- viii. Integrating the diverse groups within a country into a cohesive nation. In the same vein, the various functions of political parties are;
- ix. Aggregate and articulate needs and problems as identified by members and supporters
- x. Socialize and educate voters and citizens in the functioning of political parties and electoral system and generating general political values;
- xi. Balance opposing demands and convert them into general policies;
- xii. Activate and mobilize citizens into participating in political decisions and transforming their opinions into viable policy options;
- xiii. Channel public opinion from citizens to government and
- xiv. Recruit and train candidates for public office. (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, <http://aceproject.org>).

Furthermore, Almond (2000) argues that political parties have two major, but multifaceted, functions in any democracy. These variables according to him are anchored on input-output functional variables and the historical method that provides a perspective background for discerning party politics vis-à-vis the problems associated with political instability in the Nigerian State (Omodia, 2010). Almond's input-output functions constitute seven functional variables which could be classified thus:

- (a) Input Functions
 1. Political Socialization and Recruitment- This refers to the introduction of individual citizens into different roles in the political system, as well as selecting them for membership in the organization
 2. Interest Articulation- It refers to the process through which demands are injected into the political system
 3. Interest Aggregation- It involves the formulation of policies in which group interest are combined, accommodated and more or less committed to a particular pattern of public policy
 4. Political Communication- It is the channel through which political information is transmitted among the different group and between the governed and their rulers and vice versa.
- (b) Output Functions
 1. Rule Making- This is the process through which laws are made. In a democracy, the legislature is basically charged with this function.
 2. Rule Application - this involves the process of implementing laws and governmental policies. This function falls within the executive arms of government.
 3. Rule Adjudication- This function lies within the province of the judiciary in the sense that the laws that guide persons and institutions of the state.

Generally, political parties service as an index through which democratic governance could be compared in States, in that, the structure and operation of party politics in polities tend to serve as measuring rod for determining the fragility or otherwise of democratic systems (Omodia, 2010). These numerous

functions performed by political parties in the democratic system make them vibrant and indispensable players in the democratization process.

The Nexus between Political Parties and Intra-Party Democracy in Africa

The nature of political parties in Africa and the context within which they operate imply that we will have to take into account a number of other equally important factors if we are to assess or try to improve on intra-party democracy. For instance, it is obvious that political parties in Africa, like their counterparts in established democracies have established rules and procedures in form of party constitution, manifestos and other important party documents. However, given the context within which they operate, in which informal relations and patronage networks play a very important role, those interested in understanding intra-party democracy in particular and internal dynamics of political parties in general would have to pay special attention to the informal and unwritten rules and traditions for it is these that would provide us with a fair picture. In other words, what is written may not be what is done or indeed what is important. The challenge here is that of getting to know that which is not written but yet is critical to the operations of the party. In more concrete terms, it means that one would have to become an insider of the system to have a better picture of how things work. Snapshot and/ or quantitative surveys like those done by Afro-Barometer, World Governance Assessment (WGA) or Freedom House may only succeed in linking at the formalisms, but this not enough. What we may need in this case are more social anthropological and qualitative based approaches like those employed by International IDEA (in their State of Democracy Project).

Similarly, to consider inclusiveness as a measure of participation of the rank and file in party affairs is to assume that we are able to identify those party members and their motives in the first place. In both instances, we face problems that we need to reckon with. As we have just noted, rarely would we find political parties with robust and highly institutionalized records of party members. The question then is who will address the questions related to inclusiveness

Motives of party membership may also have an impact on the extent to which a party may be seen to be inclusive or not. Where individuals view parties as just a source of personal aggrandizement as is the case in many political parties in emerging democracies, political activism dwindles with the decrease in the likelihood that that party or party leadership will be able to provide the kind of material benefits that were expected. This is why the trend in crossing of the floor, a phenomenon that has become a thorn in the flesh of Africa democracies is comparative advantage in the extent to which they can offer some 'dividends' to their members. In this regard, some party members may not actively facilitate their participation. Rather, they may have given up simply because for them, it is like the cow is no longer producing milk.

Furthermore, in some cases, lack of participation of certain groups like women in party affairs may not necessarily be an indication of an exclusive and hence internally not democratic party it may actually be a reflection of cultural issues whereby in some cultural setups, women are generally discouraged to take up prominent roles in public life. Thus, just insisting on inclusion of women in political process without paying regard to the cultural dimension may therefore result in arriving at wrong conclusions.

Challenges also arise in situations where political parties revolve around dominant personalities who are either founders or financiers or both. In this case, it may be difficult to conceive of a possibility of the followers to demand accountability of such leaders. After all, these leaders are seen as the patrons of their followers for the latter depend on the former for favours or even the actual sustenance of the party itself. In other words, such 'parties' do not have members. Rather, they have 'subjects' and it is erroneous in the first place to expect subjects to demand accountability of their 'masters'. What is at stake in this case is not just the question of intra-party democracy but the very conceptual foundations of a party itself for unless the subjects turn into members and the masters become democratically elected leaders, that which exists may not qualify to be called a political party. In other words, the nomenclature would have to change and we may not have to talk about intra-party democracy for it is like looking for international democracy in an absolute monarchy. From a practical standpoint, therefore, we would sequentially have to reform the absolute monarchy into a democracy (constitutional monarch) in the first place so that we can then assess the progress being made in the internal democratization process.

Indispensability of Internal Democracy to Political Parties

In discussion of the indispensability, otherwise relevance of internal democracy among political parties in any political system, there are two schools of thought. In his contribution, Diverger maintains that internal party democracy is very important for the functioning of the democratic system as a whole. Sartori, on the other hand stressed that logic of party competition rather than internal party democracy is the element that makes democracy functioning. In Nigeria, there seems to be total disregard for internal party democracy among the registered political parties particularly as it relates to the conduct of party primaries conducted between the 26th of November, 2010 and 15th of January 2011, where candidates were nominated to contest the April 2011 general elections on the platform of their political parties.

Internal Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: The Nigerian Example

There is no doubt the fact that the practice of democracy in Nigeria lacks essential internal democratic virtues that conform to international best practices as in the developed countries. It is characterized with kangaroo primaries organized by leaders of political parties in favour of their anointed, preferred or imposed candidates, unlawful substitution and wrongful replacement of candidates who are voted through the people's mandate, the selection of candidates for political offices by the party overloads without recourse to due process and laid down regulations in the parties' constitutions among others. According to Metuh (2010), internal democracy required two instrumental elements. The first element involves organizing free, fair and regular elections of internal positions, as well as candidates for representative bodies. The second entails equal and open participation of all members and member groups in such a way that interests are more or less equally represented. These two instruments are essential for creating an open and deliberative political party in which people can participate in elections equally but may also engage in participation or be represented in other ways. The inability of some cabals or the so-called godfathers among the Nigerian political parties to adhere to the principles of ideal democracy has resulted in the emergence of new parties, and various factions within the party, party defection among others, which have constituted a major threat to democratic consolidation. It is therefore pertinent to critically examine some challenges of internal democracy among the Nigerian political parties.

One major challenge of internal democracy among the Nigerian political parties since 1999 is the issue of party defection. The country has witnessed series of carpet crossing, with politicians jumping from one party to the other especially to the ruling party since the last decade of democratic governance. A number of reasons have been adduced to this ugly phenomenon. While some argued that over ambitious and selfish interest of Nigerian politicians were accountable for this problems, others hinged it o the lack of internal democracy among the political parties. It is essential to examine a chronicle of party defection in Nigeria since 1999. In 1999, Chief Evan Enwerem, having lost the gubernatorial primaries in the All peoples Party (APP) in Imo State, decamped and joined the People Democratic Party (PDP) on whose ticket he won a sensational seat (Odum, 2002). In Plateau State, Alhaji Alhassan Shaibu decamped from the APP and joined the PDP in 1999. Former Vice-President, Atiku Abubakar, a founding member of the PDP, defected to the Action Congress (AC) after a running battle with the former President Olusegun Obasanjo. In 2007 he contested the presidential elections on the platform of A but lost to the late President Umaru Yar'Adua. A few months later, Atiku went back to the PDP where he contested the presidential primaries in 2010. In Ondo State, there was a mass cross-carpeting of PDP members to the Labour Party (LP) after Dr. Olusegun Mimiko had been declared the winner of 2007 gubernatorial election by the court of Appeal sitting in Benin. In fact, nearly all the members of Ondo State House of Assembly including Hon. Oyebo Aladetan, Hon. Henry Akinsuroju and the incumbent speaker (Rt. Hon Samuel Adesina) who were all elected on the platform of PDP decamped to LP between 2009 and 2010.

Defection was not limited to elected party members. There were examples of state governors defecting to the ruling party, the PDP. The first was that of incumbent governor of Bauchi state, Isa Yuguda who had won the governorship election on the platform of the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) defected to the PDP with a large number of his supporters. Others include the incumbent governor of Imo State, Ikedi

Ohakim, who won the governorship election on the platform of the Peoples Progressive Alliance (PPA) but defected to the PDP, Aliyu Shinkafi of Zamfara State (ANPP) and Saminu Turaki of

Jigawa State (ANPP) all defected to PDP. Also, defection in recent times are not only peculiar to states, but also have involved senators and members of House of Representative.

Recently, six Senators elected under the platform of the ANPP, the Accord Party (AP) and the Action Congress (AC) cross-carpeted to PDP. These include Senators Salih Godwin (AC, Plateau State), Patrick Osakwe (AP, Delta State), Patricia Akawasike, (ANPP, Nasarawa State) and Sa'di Yaou (ANPP, Zamfara State). Since 2007 when the present National Assembly was inaugurated, no fewer than 13 senators and 15 members of the House of Representatives have defected to the PDP. Also, in 2011, Senator Ajayi Boroface who was elected on the platform of the LP to represent Ondo North Senatorial District has recently defected to ACN. Another candidate who was also elected on the platform of LP, a member of House of Representative, representing Akure North Federal Constituency in person of Hon. Sunday Abegunde (aka Abena) has equally decamped to the ACN.

A critical analysis of party defection discussed shows that it is in two ways. First, there is great movement of politicians from different political parties into the ruling party with little to other parties towards the time of the general elections. The idea is to participate in parties' primaries. The second movement starts after the party primaries. At this stage those who lost in the party primaries move to their former parties or to new one or even to form a new party under which they intend to contest the next elections. However, there is nothing wrong in people cross-carpeting if they do not find the programmes of their party in consonance with their ideals. Meanwhile, it becomes dubious when politicians begin to mortgage their conscience as well as seek to pursue their private and selfish interest in the name of cross carpeting. This may have stemmed from the mere fact that politicians are too desperate to hold public office as a means of accumulating wealth. In advanced democracies, cross carpeting is done on principle, rather than on selfish and personal interest. The scenario of party defection in Nigeria today is political prostitution which lacks political morality and discipline another critical challenge of internal democracy in Nigeria is how party primaries are being conducted within the Nigerian political parties. The conduct of party primaries within the Nigerian political parties have failed to apply the provisions of the party's constitutions of all party members who are eligible and want to run for office in the conduct of their party primaries. Rather than conducting appropriate primaries, what we usually witness is either kangaroo primaries or the imposition of anointed candidates on the party without election and due process.

This problem has often times led to the loss of contest to opposition party especially in the stronghold of the incumbent party. Examples of such are the governorship elections in Anambra State in 2009; and that of Ogun State in 2011 where PDP was in control. For instance, in Anambra State, Professor Chukwuma Soludo, the former Governor of CBN was imposed on the State as the PDP governorship candidate by the national executive of the party without any primary. This act was not only rejected by the State chapter, but it also triggered a spate of petition writing and prosecution which in effect brought about factions in the party and last minute cross-carpeting of some members to the other parties. This was why the then Vice-chairman of the southeast zone of the PDP said that "Internal party wrangling denied our great party the governorship seat in the February 6 governorship election tolerate such development in any of the remaining states in the southeast zone. We are going to put all the machinery in place to ensure that PDP wins the remaining states in the zone come 2011" (Metuh, 2010). The case of Ogun State in 2011 gubernatorial election was a little bit different. Two different primaries were conducted by the party (PDP) in the state to choose the gubernatorial candidates for the election. The crisis between the party leaders resulted in the emergence of two factions which held two different primaries that invariably led to the emergence of two different candidates. The candidate of one faction led by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, in person of Brigadier Adetunji Olurin (Rtd) was accepted by INEC as the candidate of the party. This development made the second faction led by the former governor of Ogun State, Otunba Gbenga Daniel to defect to PPA with Chief Gboyega Isiaka as the standard bearer of the party. The outcome of this crisis led to the loss of the state which was initially controlled by the PDP to the ACN.

The high incidence of aggrieved members seeking redress in the court of law over injustice meted on them as a result of the outcome of party primaries in the recent times is another challenge. This has to issuance of court injunctions and counter orders in attempts to stop one candidate or the other from contesting. The amendment of the Electoral Act of 2006 section 87 (7) by National Assembly which states that: “where a political party fails to comply with the provision of this Act in conduct of its primaries, its candidates for elections shall not be included in the election for the particular position in issue” later gave birth to Electoral Act of 2010 which states that: “Every political party shall not later than 60 days before the date appointed for a general election under the provisions of this Bill, submitted to the commission in the prescribed forms, the list of candidates the party proposes to sponsor at the elections, provided that the commission shall not reject or disqualify candidates for any reason whatsoever”. The use of the phrase “any reason whatsoever”, make INEC to be stripped of its ability to determine the qualification or status of any candidate submitted by a party, irrespective of any circumstances surrounding a candidate's status. With this provision, the cabals or godfathers within the party now has the power to dictate, impose, and determine how, who and why a candidate can context in an election in which they are participating, even if INEC has doubts over the candidates credibility (Mbah, 2011).

Lack of internal democracy which causes party defection has resulted in the development of divided house. A good example of this was the case of the governor of Bauchi State, Isa Yuguda who defected to PDP from ANPP but his deputy refused to follow him. Initially the legislators in the house impeached the deputy governor, but the court reinstates him due to the unlawful impeachment. The governor is a PDP member and his deputy of an ANPP member. What a divided house? I will be very difficult for both of them to work in harmony and make a sensible progress politically. The deputy governor is likely to face all sorts of intimidation and be sidelined in all areas of public service.

Indeed, it is morally wrong for an aspirant to use one political party as a platform to ascent power only to dump that arty at the least opportunity for another party. This is what is often referred to as lack of indiscipline among the Nigerian politicians. With the growing cases of defections to PDP in particular and the depleting member of the opposition, there is a mounting fear that Nigeria may gradually be moving toward a one-party state which may be inimical to the nation's nascent democracy and its consolidation.

One of the greatest challenges of lack of internal democracy among political parties is the further fragmentation of position parties from where politicians have defected. It has created chances for the emergence of new political parties that lack strength; focus on the political scene and without manifestoes or ideology. Today, there are about 62 registered political parties from three in 1999 when the fourth republic began. Lack of internal democracy leads to the creation of mushroom political parties which results in the weakness of opposition parties. This development does not augur well for the development of party politics. This development does not augur well for the development of party politics in Nigeria. In fact it promotes money politics. This does not give room for ideology-based political parties to thrive and develop are formed and joined for personal interests.

Another underlying challenge which political party defection created by lack of internal democracy is the development of dishonest traits in some politicians. Odum (2002) captures this scenario when he argues that: politicians and prostitutes are two seemingly parallel professions. While the former supposedly displaying constitutional leadership virtue in governance, the latter is revealing social vice-the fabric of a decadent society. Incidentally, one common denominator for both appears to be their loyalty, which standards on quick sand, shifting as mundane attractions glow in their adulterous eyes. The consideration, especially with the modern day politicians is where stakes may be lower and gains higher. It does not matter who is differ. So, while the prostitutes switch beds, the politicians change camp in this game of cross-carpeting. His is the internal ordering of our nascent democracy. Power is no longer a thing held in trust today. It has become a fraud which every politician is clamouring to hold (Mbah, 2011).

On the final note, the increasing cases of undemocratic practices in our polity as a result of lack of internal democracy among the Nigerian political parties and shows the problem of poor leadership among political instability. For examples, countries such as Malawi, Zambia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, have experienced a number of cases of party defection which had threatened the stability of the political system (Mbah, 2011).

Hoeane, (2008) in Abimbola and Adesote (2012) argues that in extreme cases of floor crossing, where the number of public representatives who have defected has been significantly high, such shifts of allegiance have led to the collapse of democratically elected government, such as in Lesotho in 1997. Defections of political office holders to other political party without the need to resign the first platform for coming to political position do not add value to the process of democratic consolidation in the country. At the juncture, it is important to mention that in a country drive to democratic consolidation, individual party internal mechanisms must be such that is in consonants with the ideal rules and procedures laid down in the party constitution, which is not also antithetical to the rule of law. In line with this, the IMD, (2004) submitted the following four indicators considered universally agreed upon for internal party democracy: such questions are needed to be asked in measuring a party's internal democracy as:

- i. Is the party functioning according to established rules and procedures?
- ii. Is decision making democratic and based on party statutes and current laws?
- iii. Is there meaningful decentralization of the party's economic resources?
- iv. Can the rank-and-file (the ordinary member of the party at the lowest level in the party hierarchy) exercise oversight over the party leadership? IMD, (2004).

However, if all of these are adequately present, then, the party in question is said to be internally democratic. This is not different from the path toed by Susan Scarrow in his implementing intra-party democracy. According to him, what are some of the ways of expanding inclusiveness in party procedures and what are some of the practical consideration associated with such techniques? He went further to say that it is impossible to give a complete inventory of the many ways in which parties have sought to incorporate supporters within their basic decision structures, but it is a bit easier to outline some of the primary choices that parties must take when implementing the more common forms of intra-party democracy.

Research Methodology of the Study

This study adopted survey research method and made use of primary data as the main source of data collection through the instrument of structured and unstructured questionnaire. The study randomly selects one thousand nine hundred and nineteen (1919) respondents from twelve Local Government Areas across the three senatorial districts that made up Kogi State: Kogi Central, Kogi West and Kogi East Senatorial districts. The senatorial districts have a total of 21 LGAs, comprising of 9 in Kogi East, 7 in Kogi west and 5 in Kogi Central. Proportional random sampling was used to select 50% of the Local Government Areas in each district. This is because the LGAs are of unequal size or number. Thus, 5, 4 and 3 LGAs were chosen from Kogi East, Kogi west and Kogi Central Senatorial Districts respectively, which gave a total of 12 Local Government Areas.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Table 1: socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Variables		Kogi Central		Kogi East		Kogi west		Pooled	
		Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Sex	Female	108	32.2	340	36.5	209	32.1	657	34.2
	Male	227	67.8	592	63.5	443	67.9	1262	65.8
	Total	335	100.0	932	100.0	652	100.0	1919	100.0
Age range (years)	18-25			187	20.1	8	1.2	195	10.2
	26-32	84	25.1	133	14.3	91	14.0	308	16.1
	33-39	94	28.1	211	22.6	166	25.5	471	24.5
	40-46	20	6.0	251	26.9	147	22.5	418	21.8
	47-53	13	3.9	122	13.1	113	17.3	248	12.9
	>53	124	37.0	28	3.0	127	19.5	279	14.5
	Total	335	100.0	932	100.0	652	100.0	1919	100.0
Educational qualification	Primary school			198	21.2	28	4.3	226	11.8
	Secondary education	167	49.9	363	38.9	288	44.2	818	42.6
	OND/NCE	48	14.3	184	19.7	162	24.8	394	20.5
	HND/University degree	54	16.1	142	15.2	108	16.6	304	15.8
	Post-graduate	66	19.7	45	4.8	66	10.1	177	9.2
	Total	335	100.0	932	100.0	652	100.0	1919	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2014

Table 1 shows the personal characteristics of the respondents, namely their sex, age and educational qualifications. The pooled results revealed that 65.8% of the respondents were male while 34.2% were female. The results of the study will therefore capture the views of both genders in order to gain a better understanding of their perceptions of the issues investigated. The higher proportion of males may be because majority of the households interviewed were males. Similar trend was observed at the senatorial level, with males dominating with a percentage of 67.8%, 63.5% and 67.9% for Kogi central, Kogi east and Kogi west respectively.

The age distribution of the respondents indicates that highest modal categories were 33-39 years and 40-46 years with a percentage of 24.5% and 21.8% respectively. The average age of the respondents, at the aggregate level, was about 38 years, while for Kogi central, east and west it was 40, 39 and 40 years respectively. The finding suggests that the respondents were young and full of energy. About 10.2% of the respondents were 18-25 years, 16.1% were 26-32 years old while 12.9% were 47-53 years old while 14.5% were above 53 years old. The responses captured in this study thus reflect the different age groups, which is important in ensuring that their concerns are equally represented in a study of this nature.

In terms of educational attainment, Table 4.1 reveals secondary education to be the modal range (42.6%). About 11.8% had primary education, 15.8% had HND/university education while 9.2% had post-graduate certificate. The general results suggest that the respondents were literate. Thus, they would be able to understand political party constitutions and processes.

In political studies, it has been strongly advocated that the views or opinions of both men and women should be sought. This is pertinent since the government and international as well as local agencies have decried the tendency to relegate women to the background. This is even more so particularly in Nigeria, whose nature and character inherently debar the effective participation of women in the political process. Accordingly, Osaghae (1994) has developed the linkage between amiral politics and state pitfalls in Africa. Going the same line, Englebert (2000) and Joseph (1987) make similar analysis using tags such as neo-patrimonialism by the former and pre-patrimonialism by the former and pre-bendalism by the latter, to explicate the nature of politics. This phenomenon has its central character in what Reno (1995:1-60) sees as a situation (created by colonialism) whereby "access to state power translates into private benefit". In short, political power become secures perverted as a tool used to appropriate wealth. This is the situation that operates in Nigeria (Joseph, 1987); with the result being desperation and fierce do-or-die attitude to partisan politics perhaps, resources would result in a federation that was not viewed a high stakes zero-gum game. In any case, this character of the Nigeria state that not only concentrates so much at the federal and other governmental levels, but is also the easiest and fastest way to illegally accumulate money in the country, makes competition for its control vicious. Men, believing that women have not so much use us them for money and generally that women

are to be provided for (by men), plus being more aggressive, are more willing to slug it out and are more likely to win using all means including illegitimate and dangerous available to them, coupled with the belief that “the language of politics is masculine” (Simbine, 2006). Thus elections in Nigeria and the contest for political power is still seen as zero-sum activity. It is more apparent being understood and practiced. Thus, the fact that 35% of the views expressed in this research are from women will have addressed this concern

Table 2 Consequence of Poor Internal Democracy

Variable	Kogi Central		Kogi East		Kogi west		Total	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean*	SD
Abandonment of development efforts/project	3.73	1.20	3.98	.88	3.99	1.08	3.94	1.02
Distraction from development or governance objectives	3.87	1.05	3.89	.94	3.92	.98	3.90	.97
Members defecting to other political parties	2.98	1.18	3.69	.93	3.26	1.04	3.42	1.06
Conflicts/violence among party members	3.45	.72	3.17	1.25	3.54	.73	3.34	1.03
Engagement in anti-party activities by party members	2.34	1.03	4.16	1.06	2.39	1.11	3.24	1.40
Sabotage of development projects	2.88	1.27	2.39	1.44	3.12	1.17	2.72	1.36
Going to court to resolve party disputes	2.25	1.36	2.57	1.28	2.23	1.15	2.40	1.26

Discussion of Findings

The consequences of poor internal party democracy were examined and the results presented in Table 2. Based on the pooled values, major consequences of poor internal democracy as perceived by the respondents were abandonment of development projects in the nation or State in particular by political office holders (mean = 3.94), distraction from pursuance of development or governance objectives (mean = 3.90) and political defection (mean 3.42). Others include engagement in anti-party activities by party members (mean = 3.24) and intra-party violence or conflicts (mean = 3.34). Sabotage of development projects (mean = 2.72) and resorting to court for constant settlement of party disputes (mean = 2.40) were not agreed to as being very serious consequences.

Major consequences of poor internal democracy as perceived by the respondents were abandonment of development projects in the nation or State in particular by political office holders, distraction from pursuance of development or governance objectives and political defection. Others include engagement in anti-party activities by party members and intra-party violence or conflicts.

Party defection was identified by the respondents as a serious consequence of weak internal democracy. According to Abimbola (2012), a major challenge of internal democracy among the Nigerian political parties since 1999 is the issue of party defection. The country has witnessed series of carpet crossing, with politicians jumping from one party to the other especially to the ruling party since the last decade of democratic governance. A number of reasons have been adduced to this ugly phenomenon. While some argued that over ambitious and selfish interest of Nigerian politicians were accountable for this problem, others hinged it on the lack of internal democracy among the political parties. In extreme cases, party

defection can lead to collapse of government in power as noted by Hoeane, (2008) in Abimbola and Adesote (2012) who argues that in extreme cases of floor crossing, where the number of public representatives who have defected has been significantly high, such shifts of allegiance have led to the collapse of democratically elected government, such as in Lesotho in 1997.

Although going to court was not considered serious outcome of a poor internal democratic framework in this study, the high incidence of aggrieved members of a political party seeking redress in the court of law over injustice meted on them as a result of the outcome of party primaries in the recent times has been identified as a major issue associated with a party internal democratic system. According to Mbah (2011), this has led to issuance of court injunctions and counter orders in attempts to stop one candidate or the other from contesting.

Abandonment of development efforts/project or distraction from pursuance of development objectives: Lack of internal democracy which causes party defection has resulted in the development of divided house. A good example of this was the case of the governor of Bauchi State, Isa Yuguda who defected to PDP from ANPP but his deputy refused to follow him. Initially the legislators in the house impeached the deputy governor, but the court reinstated him due to the unlawful impeachment. The governor is a PDP member and his deputy of an ANPP member. What a divided house? It will be very difficult for both of them to work in harmony and make a sensible progress politically. The deputy governor is likely to face all sorts of intimidation and be sidelined in all areas of public service. This situation will seriously impede any development efforts in the state or local government as affected members or office holders are busy trying to 'save' their 'job' Mbah, (2011).

Conclusion

The present democratic regime in the country and in the State in particular has its root in the 1999 democratic elections that witnessed the transition from a military rule to a democratic regime. The period since 1999 has witnessed the birth, demise and merger of political parties but a major player in the political landscape of the nation is the People Democratic Party (PDP). This party has been at the reins of government at the national level as well as in Kogi state since 1999.

An examination of the internal democratic mechanisms of the party in Kogi State reveals that the level of popular participation in the party was very high while adherence to nomination process is commendable. However, serious fears were expressed regarding adherence to party policies/constitution by the party leadership. This mixed result for the internal democracy mechanisms invariably has mixed consequences on democratic consolidation. But if they are not some negative outcomes such as stalling or abandonment of development projects, intra-party conflicts or violence among others are inevitable outcomes.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are suggested:

1. There is need to strengthen the internal democratic mechanism and legal frameworks for fighting the imposition of candidate within political parties in Nigeria. As things stand now, Nigeria's political parties are still perceived as those whose destinies are in hands of the power-brokers within the parties.
2. There is need to enhance the nomination process, party leaders should be discouraged from imposing candidates on party members.
3. Also, party rules should be strictly adhered to in the nomination process. Any ambiguous or obsolete aspect of the rule should be democratically addressed in order to minimize or eliminate conflicts
4. Party delegates should be encouraged to vote their conscience when casting their ballot. This work has in its own way contributed to the existing body of knowledge going by the recommendation it has suggested, and it also serve as a recipe for further studies on the area of democracy and consolidation of same. If these recommendations are imbibed, it will foster democratic consolidation, with overall impact on national development

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