

THE STATE AND THE GENESIS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NORTH EASTERN NIGERIA

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Abstract

This study examines the State and the genesis of Boko Haram insurgents in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. The research uses both primary and Secondary sources of data from various stakeholders in Borno State. Data was generated through interviews and Focus Group Discussions, later they were analysed using descriptive method of analysis were simple percentage and tables were used. Structural Conflict Theory was adequately utilized to explain and trace the origin of Boko Haram ideology. The study has discovered that: State failure to effectively control its territory, deliver public goods, inherent weak political and religious institutions contributed immensely to the genesis and spread of Boko Haram insurgency in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. The study therefore recommends that good governance and effective control of political and religious institutions will go a long way in controlling religious insurgencies in the northeast in particular and Nigeria in general.

Keywords: Boko Haram, North East, Religion, Security, State, Nigeria.

Introduction

Historically, northern Nigeria is known as agrarian region where farming, cattle grazing, commercial activities and other businesses exist in the region. People live peacefully even though, there were records of some clashes and intra and inter-tribal conflicts because they are pervasive and inevitable in every human existence. Relations between herders and sedentary farming communities have been harmonious. By and large, they lived in a peaceful, symbiotic relationship: herders' cattle would fertilize the farmers' land in exchange for grazing rights as noted by international crisis group (2017).

The people of Nigeria had different cultures and are of different levels of economic development. Perhaps, that is why Chief Obafemi Awolowo said 'Nigeria is a mere geographical expression' cited in Maier's book 'This house has fallen: Nigeria in Crisis'(2002:8). The territory of Nigeria was divided into three main parts: North, East and West. In the north the main ethnic groups are Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri which are linked culturally, religiously, politically and economically. In the same North there are many other ethnic groups around Benue, Plateau, Kaduna and Niger State. These ethnic languages include: Berom, Nupe, Tiv, Jukun, Igala, Igbira, Jaba, Bajju, Kataf, Koro and many others, each of these ethnic group has never see itself the same with others.

In the West, the Yoruba language is very predominant, but other languages are spoken in the region. In the East, which was the least centralized political entity during the colonial period, the Igbos and Ijaws are the main ethnic identities in the region. Other languages like Ibibios, Tsekiri, Urhobo, Eko and many others exist there and each is an entity that seeks to be on its own. (Maier, 2002 emphasis added by the research)

Unfortunately, the various ethnic groups and political regions of Nigeria have never agreed with one another. As a result, there have been agitations and counter agitations between the central government and the regional ethnic groups. Nigeria has witnessed untold repressions, violation of law and order and various forms of Security challenges which continue to threaten the country's corporate existence. The integrity and corporate existent of Nigeria is already weakened by Nigeria's elites. This has generated suspicion, hatred and lack of mutual tolerance among the various regions that formed what is known as Nigeria. Failure of the Nigeria's political elites to ensure unity in diverse State, has turned its territorial integrity to be questioned and threatened among various ethnic groups. This has led to the emergence of a number of ethnic Militias, and insurgents (rebels) that continue to demand secession from the central government. It was on this background that (Babdmus, 2006) observed.

.....Noteworthy among these ethnic militia movements include the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), The Maitashine/KALA KALO Militia, the prominent pan Yoruba political enclave, the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), The Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), The Arewa People's Congress (APC), and JamaatuAhlisSunnah Wal Jihad popularly known as Boko Haram

(Badmus, 2006 emphasis added by the researcher)

1:2 Theoretical Framework

This study has utilized Structural theory of conflict. This theory sees structural defects externally or internally generated as the main cause of conflict. The theory has two main strands, the first is the radical structuralism propounded by Karl Marx and Engels and later popularized by V.I Lenin. The second school is the liberal structuralism developed by Ross, Scarborough and Galtung. The central argument of the radical school is that violence or conflict is a phenomenon that is built in human societies according to how they are structured and organized. The theory looks at social problems like inequality, political and social exclusion, injustice, disease and poverty as sources of conflict. The theory maintains that conflicts occur in a society because of the exploitative and unjust nature of human societies, such as the domination of one class by another (Ademola, 2006).

On the other hand, the liberal theory of structuralism was on how the competing interests of groups tie conflict directly to the social, economic and political organization of a society, as well as the nature and strength of social networks within and between community groups (Ademola, 2006). The theory sees resources, overpopulation,

economic underdevelopment and demographic factors as a central cause of conflict in a society. It is a situation in which the few existing structures are tilted in favour of one group while putting the other group at a disadvantage position (Scarborough, 1998). Essentially, liberal structuralists argue that in a society where there is economic or political discrimination and lack of tolerance in plural societies are embedded in human social relationship, conflicts are bound to be higher than in societies where social relationship is established. The structural theory of conflict has been criticized for been emphatic on material interest as the central cause of conflict while neglecting other factors such as ideology, psychological, and socio-cultural (Habu, 2006)

Main arguments of Structural Theories

- Scarce resources, overpopulation, economic hardship and demographic factors are central cause of social conflicts
- Structural imbalances in a heterogeneous and multi-cultural society causes social conflicts
- Conflicts are higher in societies where there is economic, social, political and religious discrimination
- Social problems like inequality, political and social exclusion, injustice, disease and poverty are sources of conflict
- The central issue in preventing conflict occurrence in a heterogeneous society, is to set structural balance with justice, fairness and tolerance
- Good governance that will lead without economic and political discrimination can control social conflicts.

The theory is relevant to this study because it centered on the causes of social conflicts, insecurity and insurgencies. The theory is very significant on the role of the state in combatting, managing or controlling criminal acts.

1:3 Methodology

This study is purely qualitative not quantitative, the location of the study is North-East geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The zone has six States which include: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. The zone according to the 2012 National Bureau of Statistics has an estimated population of 22,327.89418,971.965.

The universe of the population of this study is the stakeholders from the age of 18 and above, irrespective of their marital status. A combination of male and female were selected to gather relevant information. A purposive sampling method and multi staged sampling methods were used to capture the targeted population as a source of information within the selected areas in Borno State. Stakeholders in this study were mainly:

- Islamic Scholars living in Maiduguri Borno State
- Traditional rulers, or Community elders
- Internally Displaced Persons whether in IDPs Camps or re-settled communities.
- Security Personnel (Military and Para-Military)

The above were identified as the main stakeholders in this study; this is because they have the knowledge and experience about the activities of Boko Haram. The various stakeholders were either interviewed or invited for focus group discussions.

Data Collection and Analysis.

This study has visited the real threatening scenes of the Boko Haram insurgency to trace its origin and dynamism. Both structured and unstructured interviews were conducted to get the opinions of various stakeholders in the activities of Boko Haram in the North-Easter region of Nigeria. Three different Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were adequately organized and implemented in Borno State in particular been the starting point of Boko Harm insurgency and the most affected State of the North-Eastern geo-political zone. In the FGD, various communities were met to sample their opinions on the evolution and dynamic of Boko Haram. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camps were visited and the victims of Boko Haram insurgency were interviewed. The stakeholders of the interview were Islamic clerics (Ulamaa), Traditional rulers, Community elders, Security agents and victims of Boko Haram insurgents.

This research uses descriptive analysis to interpret and analyse the data sourced from the field. Interview and FGD. This is anchored on simple interpretation to sum up the mass of information gathered so that appropriate meaning can be read.

The nature of Nigerian State and Nigerians

It is of course, very clear to state that Nigeria is one of the most complex States to rule in the world. To paraphrase Maier (2002) Nigerians from all walks of life are openly questioning whether their country should remain as one entity or break apart into several political units or entities. In Nigeria since 1960s there were so many attempts by many groups to either secede from the central government or to have a territory different from that of the united Nigeria. The activities of Afenifere (Yoruba OPC) of the South West, The Biafran's of Igbo ethnic group of the South East, the Maitastine Militia in the North West of 1980s, the current Boko Haram insurgents in the North East, MASSOB and MEND in the South South region of Nigeria were all as a result of State failure to provide the basic needs to its citizens including Security and social justice. The foregoing narrative is actually the nature of Nigerian State. Several uprisings and insurgencies have occurred in Nigeria since the 1960s after it gained political independence from Great Britain in 1960. Most of the insurgents had questioned the authority or the existence of the Nigerian State. They threaten the central authority of Nigeria and attack State Public Institutions like the Police, Army and other State Forces apparatus. Some of the most popular insurgent groups are the Maitatsine uprisings, Movement for the Actualization of States of Biafra (MOASSOB), Movement for the

Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND). Other notable organizations that have unleashed violent attacks against the central authority of the Nigerian State because they do not see Nigeria as a State that should have authority over its territory include the Zakzaky's Shia Organization with headquarters in Zaria; the Jamatu Ahlisunnah Liddawatu Waljihad, popularly called Boko Haram; the Bakassi Movement for Self-determination, BAMOSD; the Oduduwa People Congress (OPC); the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) etc. As such, these groups violate Nigerian's Constitution, attack public Institutions and clash with the Nigerian Armed Forces, including the Police and the Army. This research therefore, plan to trace the evolution and dynamic of Boko Haram Ideology in the North Eastern region of Nigeria.

Religions and the Boko Haram ideology in Nigeria.

Long before the emergence of Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria openly, religious organizations and sects are not properly monitored by government agencies from local, State or Federal Level. Religious clerics feel free to create sects for monetary gains. Religion is sometimes manipulated and distorted, followers are simply deceived, dis-informed and mis-informed about the actual teachings of the religion to gather material gains. Many 'claimed clerics' lack the true knowledge of the teaching of the religions being defended by both Muslims and Christians. Even though, Islam and Christianity are totally different in their theological nature, they both call for peace, respect, tolerance, love, patient, and peaceful co-existence. In Nigeria's case the teaching of the holy Books are sometimes distorted and misinterpreted by some bad elements from both Muslims and Christians for material gain. The leadership of the two opposing religions in Nigeria (Islam and Christianity) cannot exonerate themselves from the present situation. Because whatever idea or impression is held by the followers of each religion, this depends on the kind of information passed down to them by their leaders (Omotasho, 2003 cited in Yakubu, 2018). Deliberate manipulation and misinterpretation of spiritual books by some mischief makers among religious clerics is a fundamental cause to religious violence and extremism in Northern Nigeria.

The Genesis of Jannaatu AhlisSunna Lid Daawati Wal Jihad

It is imperative in the literature to review some works regarding the evolution of Yusuffiyyah popularly known as Boko Haram that is an important variable in this study. There are many stories concerning the origin, nature, motive and ideologies of Boko Haram. Individual researchers, groups, organizations, journalists, security agencies, NGOs and INGOs have written a lot about it. Unfortunately, most of the literature on Boko Haram are either one-sided, subject. The formal and original name of what is today known as Boko Haram is 'JamaatuAhlusSunnahLiddaawatuwal Jihad' (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad). This is an organization formed by Abu Yusuf Mohammed Yusuf; who was born in 1970 in Girgir, Jakusko area of YobeState. Its other popular names are "Yusufiyyah" or "BokoHaramá" name given to them by journalist due to their claimed ideology rejecting western education. While Yusuffiyyah, an Arabic word, which literally means "Western Education is forbidden". The Organization of Muhammad Yusuf initially was formed for propagation of Islam based on Islamic culture and teachings (International Crisis Group, 2014). The Organization's teachings rejected anything secular or western, the leader of the organization advocated that western education is unlawful or forbidden'

because, according to them, it contradicts Quranic teachings. In a paper presented at (NIPSS, 2012) it is pointed that one of the principal goals of Boko Haram sect is to transform the modern western education into an Islamic form and to achieve this there is a need to create a strict Islamic State in the North that the sect believes would address the ills of society, including corruption and bad governance. Abu Qaqa, the group's best known spokesman, explained: "Our objective is to place Nigeria in a difficult position and even destabilize it and replace it with Sharia". He also said that the group's agenda is to "take Nigeria back to the pre-colonial period when the Sharia law was practiced" (cited in International Crisis Group Report, 2003). According to the report, the sect's core beliefs are strict adherence to the Quran and the Hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammed, S.A.W). Muhammad Yusuf, the leader of the movement, was a member of the Borno State Sharia Implementation Committee under Governor Mallah Kachallah (1999-2003), and was active in debates on Islamic Issues on local radio and television stations. A colleague recalled that even while on the committee, Yusuf was "against the system of government, and regularly preached against it"(International Crisis Group report, 2014).

While already popular, Yusuf rose to much greater prominence when he reportedly formed an alliance with Senator Ali Modu Sheriff (popularly known as SAS), a politician then Governor of Borno State and wealthy businessman from a prominent Maiduguri family. The connection allegedly' also generated resources for Yusuf and his followers. Sheriff and his associates on many occasions have denied any alliance with Yusuf and accused the PDP (opposition Party in the State and the ruling Party at the federal level) of creating Boko Haram. In 1999 Sheriff won the Borno North senatorial seat and helped Mala Kachalla, a far older politician, becomes governor on the ticket of the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) that controlled both Borno and Yobe State.

However, an ANPP politician said, they fell out when Mala Kachalla backed out of an agreement to give way to Sheriff after one term. It is widely believed in the region and by many Boko Haram members (International Crisis Report, 2014) that Sheriff then cut a deal with Yusuf, whose large youth followers was a significant electoral block. Yusuf allegedly promised to help Sheriff, provided he would implement Sharia and give the sect some senior government appointments. Sheriff denies any agreement though many politicians and observers say Yusuf gave massive support to his campaign, reportedly including fiery attacks that portrayed Mala Kachalla as a bad Muslim uninterested in Sharia. Sheriff took control of the ANPP's party machinery and legislators in Borno, forcing Kachalla to run on the ticket of Actrion for Democracy, a party mostly based in South West Nigeria (Sun Newspaper, 23rd February, 2003). Sheriff has also been accused of enlisting a group, named ÉCOMOG' after the Nigeria –led West African peacekeeping force in Liberia, to intimidate and silence political opponents with impunity (Crisis Group Interview, 2014). A good example of the impunity by ÉCOMOG in Borno under sheriff was that in January 2011, Abdullahi Gwange, a staunch PDP (Peoples Democratic Party) supporter was shot dead in broad daylight by ÉCOMOG' reportedly on orders of its leader, Duhu (darkness). Alhaji Kiram, another PDP supporter hostile to Sheriff, was reportedly deliberately run over in October, 2010 by an ÉCOMOG' bus, suffering a fractured leg (Crisis Group interview, Maiduguri, July, 2013. 'Nigeria: The ÉCOMOGO factor in the North-East'(Weekly Trust, Abuja, 6

August, 2000).

The government of Borno under Sheriff allegedly provided funds to Muhammad Yusuf through Alhaji Buji Foi, known locally as a Yusuf disciple. Sheriff made Buji Foi religious affairs commissioner when he became governor. Muhammad Yusuf used the money to organize an informal micro-credit scheme that gave his disciples capital to set up businesses. They in turn gave part of their profits as alms to the group, which began amassing arms, mostly Kalashnikovs from neighboring Chad, allegedly with Baba Fugu, who is Muhammad Yusuf's father-in-law (International Crisis Group Report, 2014). Cracks appeared in the purported Yusuf-Sheriff alliance, however, after the latter became governor in 2003. According to Yusuffiyyah members, he reneged on his promise to implement Sharia fully in Borno State. Muhammad Yusuf began to direct sermons against Sheriff and his government, ultimately branding him an apo-State. Yusuf's criticism of Western education brought him into disagreement with many Islamic Scholars, including fellow Salafis; his former mentor, Sheikh Jaafar, Mahmud Adam. In his teachings on many occasions Adam dissociated himself from Muhammad Yusuf and alerted government about the movement (Sheikh Jaafar Adam's 2008 Tafseer Audios). Sheikh Auwal Adam Albany, Zaria, devoted considerable time to criticizing the group and warning the government about it.

On a number of occasions Yusuf was arrested, taken to the SSS Abuja headquarters during President Obasanjo's Administration, but he would be quickly released and returned to Maiduguri sometimes by official jets. The SSS halted the harassment when it became apparent his followers became more restive with each arrest. In December, 2008, the Borno State government charged Muhammad Yusuf with terrorism before the federal high court in Abuja. He was released on bail, allegedly following the intervention of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) members. Four Influential Nigerians, all Christians including the minister of information during Obasanjo's administration, Professor Jerry Gana, reportedly signed the bail bond. This led to speculation that Yusuf directly or indirectly had backing from northern Christian elites and there was a conspiracy theory that he was being used to undermine Islam and northern Muslim leaders (International Crisis Group Report, 2014).

Beginning of the Boko Haram attacks on government agents

Fights between Boko Haram and the Police began in July, 2009, when members of Boko Haram took arms targeting Police Headquarters, stations and officer's homes in Maiduguri and some cities in the north including Bauchi, and Potiskum. Their aim was to have total implementation of Shariah law. This was followed by a brutal, multi-day military crackdown which killed over 800 'mostly innocents' and some Boko Haram members. The group has since alleged that Sheriff ordered the killings of Muhammad Yusuf, Buji Foi and Baba Fugu to cover up his involvement with Boko Haram – a charge which Sheriff staunchly rejected. After Sheriff declared BujiFoi wanted for funding the movement, he was reportedly arrested by the military in his village farmhouse and taken to the State Police and later he was killed. Alhaji Baba Fugu, who appeared voluntarily at the police headquarters in Maiduguri, was also killed. Two days later, Muhammad Yusuf was captured by Nigerian troops, handed over to Police and shortly thereafter, he too was extra-judicially killed. Nigerians were not happy with the manner

the Police extra-judicially killed Muhammad Yusuf. Pressures were mounted on the government to investigate the matter and to bring the perpetrators to law. Seven Policemen were identified, based on video evidence, as taking part in Muhammad Yusuf's arrest and killing: Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) JB Abang, ACP Akeera, Chief Superintendent (CSP) Mohammed Ahmad, ACP Mada Buba, Sergeant Adamu Gado, and Constables Anthony Samuel and Linus Luka. Five (Abang, Akeera, Mada Buba, Mohammed Ahmadu and Adamu Gado) were arraigned in July, 2011. Later, Nigerians read in daily papers: "Trial of Suspected Killers of Sect Leader Stalled" (This Day, 14 July, 2011). The PUNCH later reported: "Judge may stop trial of alleged Boko Haram founder's killers" (The Punch, 5th March, 2014).

After the clashes of July, 2009, and the extra-judicial executions of Boko Haram members including Muhammad Yusuf, the movement attacked the police, their stations and military barracks to avenge the killings of Mohammed Yusuf and other comrades. The group also carried out jailbreaks to free members and demanded prosecution of Yusuf's killers, release of detained colleagues, restoration of its destroyed Mosques and compensation for members killed by Nigerian troops. Subsequently, the members expanded to include attacks on Christians, critical Muslim Scholars, traditional leaders, suspected collaborators, UN agencies, bars and schools (Daily Trust, 3rd March, 2014). Thereafter, it turns to committing acts of terrorism, including against students at State (secular) schools and health workers involved in polio vaccination campaigns (The Independent, 8th July, 2013; The Guardian, 8th February, 2013).

Boko Haram members expanded their attacks by assassinating neighbourhood chiefs who they believed were helping troops to identify them, and they assassinated Muslim Scholars who opposed their ideology. They killed Borno State ANPP Politicians, who they claimed reneged on promises. Victims included Madu Fannami Gubio, a gubernatorial candidate, and Modu Sheriff's cousin. Both were shot with five others outside his family house in Maiduguri on 28 January, 2011 and Awana Ngala. ANPP's national Vice-Chairman was also shot in his home with a friend on 27th March, 2011 (these happened just a month before the 2011 general elections). This made the ANPP to accuse the rival PDP of orchestrating the killings. The "ECOMOG" thugs also became targets; most were forced underground, while others fled Maiduguri (International Crisis Group Report, 2014).

The group (Yusufiyyah/Boko Haram) expanded its attacks beyond the core areas of Borno and Yobe States. High-notable attacks include the drive-by shooting of a retired deputy Inspector-general of Police in Kano, the murders of a former head of the Nigerian Immigration Service and his two bodyguards in Azare, Bauchi, and the killing of a Borno State Controller of Prisons in his home in Potiskum, Yobe. Attack and counter attack tactics became more sophisticated. The first attacks in 2010 were predominantly shootings. But Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) had begun to be used in December, especially in the run-up to the 2011 elections. After those elections, the movement turned to vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), cars typically packed with several propane cylinders or explosives-filled drums. In August 2011, it attacked the UN headquarters in Abuja with a suicide VBIED (International Crisis Group, 2014).

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In early 2013, the group captured most parts of Northern Borno. On 2nd December, 2013 around 200 insurgents dressed in military uniform and armed with rocket launchers, explosives and assault rifles infiltrated Maiduguri and conducted coordinated attacks on the air force base and a military barracks. Most of the buildings were reportedly destroyed, as well as five aircrafts. On 20th December, 2013, several hundred fighters stormed military barracks outside Bama, close to the Cameroon border, in a predawn raid, torching the compound and killing many soldiers, their wives and children. The group attacked some military barracks in the North (Agence France-Press, 20 December, 2013; Daily Trust, 21st December, 2013). The movement also resorted to kidnapping, allegedly for ransom payments, including in neighbouring Cameroon.

1:8 Data Presentation and Analysis

Below are the tabular presentations of the data and the questions asked during data collection. Informants were asked during the interview concerning their perception on the meaning of Boko Haram insurgents. Below is the summary of their responses.

Table 1.1 Frequency Distribution of the responses

Perception	Frequency	Percentage
Terrorist Group	9	36
Irreligious organization	8	32
Insurgents Groups	6	24
Others	1	4
No Response	1	4
Total	25	100

Source Field Survey, 2021

The first question raised in the table 1.1 above, was on the meaning of Boko Haram insurgents. The opinions of the various respondents interviewed varied as could be seen from the table above. Fundamentally, 9 out of 25 which is 36% of the responses indicated that Boko Haram are terrorist, senseless and heartless organization, some 8 out of the 25 interviewed see them as irreligious groups that are merciless. Six (6) of the respondents see them as insurgents that aimed at toppling the legitimate government and want to have a territory of their own. While others described them as neither Muslims nor Christians but hiding under Islamic religion to achieve their political aim, a good example on this is the opinion of R008 who said they are 'barbaric, murderers disguising under the name of Islam whose ideology and modus operandi have nothing linkable to Islam. Some respondents like R002 opined that they are not Muslims they are terrorist or insurgents backed by foreign hands. In a similar interpretation, when we interviewed one of the traditional rulers, he observed that:

... ..*Some pretending under religious crises may be from maitatsine, Kalakato and all these. Boko Haram (BH) just came all of a sudden from nowhere. But Boko Haram seems to be non-indigene of Borno who came to Borno*

to learn, without knowing actually what they were preaching but before one could realize they have polluted the minds of many people...

Responses on the evolution and spread of Boko Haram ideology

Data generated concerning this question indicate that, poor proper monitoring of the activities of religious sects by the government officials is responsible for Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast. The table below is the summary of the responses.

Table 1.2 Frequency Distribution of the responses

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Poor monitoring of religious sects by the government is responsible for Boko Haram ideology	10	40
Poor knowledge of the teachings of the religion gave birth to Boko Haram insurgency.	7	28
Poverty and State failure to properly discharge its responsibilities	5	20
Illiteracy and others	3	12
Total	25	100

Source Field Survey, 2021

The second question in the table 1.2 above was on the evolution and spread of Boko Haram ideology. Most of the respondents 10 out of the 25 interviewed which is 40% opined that poor monitoring of religious sects by the government is responsible for Boko Haram ideology that, Seven (7) respondents which is 28% of the people interviewed reported that poor knowledge of the teachings of the religion gave birth to Boko Haram insurgency. Five (5) out of the 25 respondents indicated that poverty and State failure to properly discharge its responsibilities is responsible for Boko Haram insurgency.

Frequency distribution of the Informants' opinion on factors responsible to the escalation of Boko Haram ideology

Factor	Frequency	Percentage
Cultural deficiency has led to the escalation of Boko Haram ideology	6	24
Poverty and illiteracy	6	24
Poor Border patrol	7	28
Failure of the Govt in providing basic social needs	3	12
Politics	3	12
Total	25	100

Source Field Survey, 2021

Respondents were interviewed on the factors that led to the escalation of Boko Haram ideology. As indicated in the table above 6 out of the 25 respondents interviewed reported Cultural deficiency has led to the escalation of Boko Haram ideology. Muhammad Yusuf the founder and his close associate Imam Shekau been

capable of speaking Kanuri Language found it very easy to mobilize many adherents to the ideology of Boko Haram. Six (6) of the respondents pointed at poverty and illiteracy been responsible to the escalation of Boko Haram. A very significant number of the respondents, numbering 7 out of the 25 interviewed opined that poor border control was responsible for the failure of the government effort in tackling Boko Haram. Similarly, three (3) respondents indicated that the whole issue surrounding Boko Haram insurgency was the failure of the government to provide basic needs to its people which has affected its citizens negatively and make it easy for insurgents to mobilize massive followers. Three (3) respondents argued that negative politics is responsible for the escalation of Boko Haram. This argument was supported by the literature of (Ahmad et al, 2010) and (Ajayi, 2012)

Conclusions

This study has discovered that the activities of insurgents group known as Boko Haram in the northeast was as result of failure of the Nigerian States to understand the essence of State itself. The ruling elites have failed to control their territories. Their territorial borders are loose and porous, State failure to accomplish its roles of controlling the territory and the population. Poor knowledge of Islamic religion by some clerics and lack of proper monitoring of religious activities by government officials led to the formation of Boko Haram Ideology. This submission has corroborated the works of (Adele, 2013) and (Danjibo et al, 2010).

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