Structure and Authority in the Nigerian Intergovernmental Relationships: Contextual and Theoretical Framework

Abstract

Across modern democratic societies, structures or institutions are established to perform specific functions. Even when there are different political systems among nations, the structures perform similar functions. The objective of the paper is to examine the structure and authority of the relationships between the central and the sub-national levels of government, with a view to underscore the attitudes and behavior of the actors and their compliance to the constitutional provisions. Using coordinate-authority and overlapping-authority models, the study uses desk review to collect data. Data for the study was analysed qualitatively. The paper argues that power is concentrated at the centre with the federal government having fiscal dominance over the sub-national levels. The study further reveals that the structure of Nigerian federalism and the constitutional provisions do not guarantee the autonomy of local government. The study also discovers an unhealthy rivalry among the levels of government. The paper recommends constitutional amendment to reflect Wheare’s postulation of federalism.