EFFECT OF THE EFCC'S PLEA BARGAINING IN CORRUPTION CASES UNDER PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI'S ADMINISTRATION 2015-2023

Abstract

This study examines the effectiveness of plea bargaining in corruption cases by Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) during President Muhammadu Buhari's administration (2015-2023). Using a qualitative case study design, the research analyzes selected high-profile corruption cases, court records, EFCC documents, and public discourse to evaluate the impact of plea bargaining on asset recovery and public perceptions of justice. The findings reveal that plea bargaining achieved a 78% successful asset recovery rate compared to 45% in traditional trials, with effectiveness dependent on early defendant cooperation, international collaboration, and robust asset tracing capabilities. However, the study also uncovers significant public skepticism, with 67% of public commentary expressing concerns about the fairness of plea bargaining in high-profile cases, particularly regarding perceived leniency in sentencing. While plea bargaining has enhanced the EFCC's operational efficiency and asset recovery capabilities, its implementation has created tension between expedited case resoluti onand public expectations of justice. The research concludes that successful plea bargaining requires balancing operational efficiency with public accountability and recommends establishing specialized plea bargaining units and implementing transparent communication frameworks to maintain public confidence in the justice system.